Extracts from Ai Siqi's
Philosophy and Life
Relativism and Absolutism
Mao
(a 1)
All the terms (or
concepts, categories) we use,
like ”absolute” or ”relative”
etc., are all the reflection of
real things. The term horse
exists only because there are
real horses in the world. The
two terms relative and
absolute are also not divorced
from actual things.
(a 2)
In everyday life
absolutism often causes
trouble.
(SEPTEMBER
1937)
Ai Siqi
(b 1)
All the terms (or
concepts, categories) that we
use are the reflections of real
things. The term horse exists
only because there are real
horses in the world, the term
capitalism exists only because
there is a capitalist system.
The two terms relative and
absolute are also not divorced
from actual things ....
(b2)
In our lives we are
often haunted and plagued by
absolutism.
Source: Ai Siqi, Zhexue yu shenghuo (Yunan People's
Hanafin.
Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a3) Like believing in fate
and holding that things cannot
change. Also, like considering that the circumstances of
life of a certain place do not
suit one, demanding a move,
and thinking that circumstances cannot change. Also,
like considering the people
around one are not aware; not
knowing that people are also
able to change.
Ai Siqi
(b3) Today we can still come
across a great many other
people who still believe in the
will of God, and consider that
everything in the world has
been arranged by a Supreme
Director; that it is impossible
ever to alter it;
and that
suffering in life also can only
be blamed on fate ....
Even though aware youth
are progressive, we often see
this kind of shortcoming:
they
often write letters
saying: "My circumstances
are odious and I cannot
tolerate them, I must get away
from them and go and live in a
better place; perhaps you can
recommend me to someone in
the
Save
the
Nation
Organization so I can enter it
and work happily". This kind
of view is unintentionally
governed
by
absolutist
thinking.
Although
the
originators of this sort of
view are progressive youths
who embrace new thinking
and understand that the world
changes, who understand that
the duty of a Chinese at the
present stage is national
salvation and resistance,
nevertheless, they have not
taken their own progressive
thinking, and without regret,

-
Mao
(a 4)
Darkness is not
absolute, neither is brightness
absolute.
Ai Siqi
applied it to the approach
towards their own life. In
looking at their own life they
use a fixed, unchanging, and
absolute viewpoint: their
circumstances are really
gloomy, yet they for get that
gloom also can be smashed;
and that the effort of
progressive youth can make
circumstances change. The
people around them are not
aware; yet they forget people
who are not aware, under
certain conditions, will one
day walk the path of
awareness. They take gloom
and the state of not being
aware and render them
absolute, holding that these
are completely without the
potential for change for the
better.
Consequently, they
despairingly cry, ”There's no
way, the circumstances of my
life already can't accommodate me, let me go to another
more promising field of
activity! "
(b4) When we receive this
kind of youth's letter, we can
only reply: "Your ideas are
wrong: you think your circumstances are bad and you
want to flee this gloomy
captivity;
this is
wrong.
Mao
AI SIQJ'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Ai Siqi
Escape is not an appropriate
means in life, because in
current society
there
is
basically not one place that is
completely bright; you flee
from your own circumstances, yet you will walk into
a new gloomy captivity;
escape is of no avail. But
there is no need for you to be
pessimistic, because brightness strikes out from within
darkness; if darkness is not
smashed then there can be no
brightness;
therefore you
should remain in your own
surroundings and to the best
of your ability carry out your
daily duty as a progressive -
smash darkness. You do not
want to regard darkness as too
absolute!”
From this example we
know that absolutism needs to
be opposed;
it makes us
unwilling to proceed from the
reality facing us, to work, and
to struggle; we only dream of
another promising place, or
think of escaping from reality.
Absolutism does not accord
with the true condition of
things, because all things are
able to change; dark society
can also develop into bright
society; it is not an absolute
darkness. Bright things are

Mao
(aS) Exceeding reality and
seeking to realize the ideal,
and avoiding reality, are both
conceptualist (guannianlun).
The
majority
of conceptualisms subscribe to
absolutism.
Ai Siqi
also hatched from darkness; it
is not an absolute brightness
that has fallen from heaven.
(bS) One needs to grasp the
significance of the new
philosophy and new social
science; one also needs to
oppose this absolutism,
otherwise, although this new
philosophy is discussed in
words, in reality one turns
into a conceptualist.
The
emergence of this philosophy
and social science requires
that in actual dark society we
use a variety of methods to
promote the realization of the
future society and goals.
There are a few people who
misunderstand this science;
they regard the future society
as an ideal; very impatiently
they think of starting to
establish it in the world
immediately; but they do not
know it is promoted from
within
actual
society.
Although their imagined ideal
appears identical with the new
philosophy and new science,
in fact, they set too much
store on ideals and for get
reality; therefore this is still a
conceptualism (the majority of
conceptualisms subscribe to
absolutism).
AI SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a6) Infantile Leftism is a
kind of absolutism because it
renders ideals absolute; it is
unaware that ideals can only
be realized in accordance with
prevailing conditions.
(a 7)
The changing of
darkness and the obtaining of
brightness is in proportion to
one's efforts; strive and it is
so, do not strive and it is not
so;
the relativity of these
things is in terms of whether
one strives or not; it is in
terms of the duration of time.
Ai Siqi
(b6)
The term ”Infantile
Leftism” that we often hear
can be blamed on this
absolutism because it regards
the ideals of the new social
science in too absolute a
fashion (i.e., forgets it is
hatched from within the old
society).
(b7) First, we need to say:
we must acknowledge that all
things are relative because all
things are changing. Since
we acknowledge that finally
one day the circumstances of
our gloomy life will change
for the better, we must also, at
the same time, acknowledge
that gloom only exists today;
as long as we clearly see the
path of the development of
society, and in accordance
with
this path go on
struggling, then, tomorrow or
the day after tomorrow, there
will always come a time when
brightness will be discovered.
This is to say that gloom is
relative; it is relative to the
duration of today's
time;
or it is relative to our making
an effort; if we do not strive
for one day the influence of
gloom will be prolonged
for one day. At the same time
brightness is also relative;

Mao
(a8)
Relativism considers
that there is no definite truth;
one person one truth;
ten
people ten truths; ”isn't that
all the same!” This is scepticism; doubt everything; nothing can be grasped.
Ai Siqi
although the prospects for the
development of society are
bright, this cannot by itself
suddenly come about;
it
needs us to promote it; it
cannot be established by us in
an easy way out of a void; it
requires that we struggle and
strive for it in actual society;
its emergence and our efforts
are relative.
(b8) To speak thus, in no
way means we need to
subscribe to relativism. The
relativity of things must be
acknowledged because things
are continuously changing;
they do not have an absolute,
permanent existence.
But
acknowledging the relativity
of things in no way means
one needs to subscribe to
relativism. Why can one not
believe in relativism? Because
it overstates the relativity of
things. It makes us think as
follows: ”Everything is the
same whether it be gloom or
brightness; all is relative; all
lacks a defining criterion; in
the world there is no such
thing as truth, because all
truth is relative; I say it is true
and another person may think
it is false. Life is the same;
why strive and struggle?
Perhaps the promise of the
Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE 237
Mao
(a9)
Doubting is correct;
doubting everything is not.
(alO) Old people tend more
to relativism; young people
tend more to absolutism.
Ai Siqi
future is only my idle dream;
why suffer hardship for no
purpose?
Drift aimlessly
through life; this is the way to
pass one's days”.
(b9) Relativism overstates
relativity. Its overstatement
makes us unable to believe in
anything, making us doubt
everything; relativism is a
scepticism. Doubt is necessary in observing things;
doubting everything, not
being able to grasp the least
thing in life and thought, only
intending to muddle through
life at the present, this is a
mess.
(blO) This relativism and
scepticism are noxious, but
those amongst the youth who
accept this poison are
comparatively few; because
the enthusiasm of youth is
very great it is easy for
absolutism to exercise a bad
influence on them, but very
few are affected by the poison
of relativism. This poison
mostly affects old people,
although lethargic youth can
also
suffer
from
this
tendency. Generally speaking, they are attacked and
cannot withstand the attacker;
they lack the courage to
struggle forward;
it is easy

Mao
(all) Relativism overstates
the relativity of things. The
relative and absolute nature of
change in things should be
acknowledged;
overstating
that nothing can be grasped
becomes relativism.
When acknowledging
the nature of change in, and
relativity of, things, at the
same time also acknowledge
fixed things amidst change
and relativity, and the definite
laws of the development of
things; acknowledge absolute
things amidst relativity. The
absolute is embodied in the
relative. Relativism does not
acknowledge this regularity.
Ai Siqi
for them to come to terms
with the adverse influences
immediately confronting
them. Therefore a part of the
shortcomings of Right deviationism comes from relativism.
If one says absolutism is a
defect of the youth, then,
relativism is a defect of the old
or adult.
(bll)
Relativism unduly
overstates relativity and this
becomes
an
abnormal,
distorted thinking;
this is
what we need to oppose, and
this
has
already
been
explained above. But we do
not need to completely oppose
the relativity of things. Since
we acknowledge the changeability of things, we must
acknowledge their relativity.
But this relativity and the
relativity
that
doubts
everything are not the same;
this relativity only indicates
change in things, it does not
deny that in this change there
are fixed, regular patterns and
laws, as well as definite
origins and prospects; therefore, although we have not
regarded present things as
absolutely permanent, we also
have not denied order and
melody in the development of
the world. This is to say that
i
I
' '
'
Al SIQJ'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a 12)
Relative things
embody definite absolute
things; absolute things are
manifested in each necessary
stage in relative things; this is
the relation between the two.
Ai Siqi
it is not that relativity that
doubts everything and does
not believe in any regular
patterns. Although it acknowledges relativity and changeability, at the same time it has
not forgotten that in change
there are fixed things, things
with regular patterns. This is
also to say that in relativity it
still sees absolute things.
Absolute things are embodied
in the relative;
relativism
cannot see this point;
this
then is the difference between
it and relativism.
(bl2) For example, at the
present moment the Chinese
people are demanding that the
nation rise together in
resistance against the enemy,
and this, obviously, is
relative, because it is only in
recent years that this has been
felt as a pressing need. Seven
or eight years ago, we
naturally wanted to oppose
imperialist invaders, but at
that time
we did not
concentrate the fury of the
nation
on
an
Asian
imperialism. What about the
future? One day this kind of
thing may be no more,
because the demand for
national liberation stems from

Mao
Ai Siqi
the intensifying oppression of
the invader, and is relative to
this oppression. If, one day
the imperialist enemy are
defeated, or because of ~
change in their own country,
they cease their assault on us,
we will not be able without
any reason to again kindle the
flames of resistance against
them. The demands of resisting the enemy and national
salvation can change; therefore, it is also relative.
But if we overstate this
relativity and say: good, this
kind of demand is only a
transient thing, perhaps
tomorrow it will not be the
same, and the day after
tomorrow it will again
change. We do not even have
to strive for this kind of
demand. It does not matter
because how will the affairs
of today turn out tomorrow;
we are completely ignorant of
this; why waste our energy?-
this, then becomes scepticism.
This kind of overstatement, obviously, is incorrect. Although we acknowledge that the unanimous
national resistance against the
enemy is only the present
stage of the movement for
national liberation, and that
Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
Ai Siqi
its relativity is in respect to the
”present stage”, at the same
time, we must also say that at
the present stage, making use
of unanimous
national
resistance against the enemy
to carry out national liberation
is an absolutely necessary
thing; at the present stage,
besides this path there is
absolutely no second path that
can be taken. In short, with
regards to the viewpoint of
development each thing is
relative, but at each stage of
development there must be a
fixed regular pattern and the
emergence of a definite thing;
this is absolute.
Relative
things always embody definite
absolute things;
absolute
things are manifested as each
necessary stage in relative
things. This is the relation
between the two.
Dialectical and Formal Logic
(a13) Sublation is: on the
one hand, the rejection and
negation of the negative
element, and, on the other
hand, the subjection of the
positive element to criticism
and transformation, as well
as its preservation; but, it is
not simple rejection. Ye Qing
(b13) First, Ye Qing says
again and again that he
himself has not put formal
logic and dialectical logic on
an equal footing.
He
acknowledges
that,
"the
latter assimilates the former,
replaces the forrner". He
also says the latter sublates the
I
I,
”

Mao
says: ”In the past fo1111al logic
governed all spheres of
research, at present, however,
it is limited to states of relative
rest". This way, our negation
of formal logic can only be of
its scope of application and
not its character. If this is not
simple preservation - what is
it? If this is not the essential
acknowledgement that fo1mal
logic and dialectics are of
equal significance - what is it?
(Zhang Youren)
Ai Siqi
forrner, negates it. However,
what is his understanding of
sublation and negation? He
says sublation is not simple
rejection and that negation is
not simple negation. It would
seem this point is correct
because sublation, on the one
hand, rejects the negative
element and negates it, on the
other hand, it must subject the
positive element to criticism
and transformation and
preserves it. This obviously
is not simple rejection.
However, what we should
take note of is that Ye Qing, in
speaking this sentence does
not indicate he has this proper
understanding. He wants to
lead us to the other extreme.
He regards preservation in
sublation as simple and
uncritical preservation. He
considers that the dialectical
sublation of formal logic is
merely the preservation of
forrnal logic within narrowly
drawn limits and not the
critical assimilation of
dialectics into its content. He
says, "In the past fo11nal logic
governed all spheres of
research, at present, however,
it is confined to states of
relative rest”. This way, our
negation of fo11nal logic can
I
I
AI SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a14) At any point in space,
things in motion, at the same
time, are at rest and not at
rest.
This is the unity of
contradiction. Ye Qing says:
”Motion is the accumulation
of rest, rest is the cessation of
motion, they engender each
other and are mutually
supportive as well as mutually
determining”. Rest is only a
specific fo1111 of motion; it is
certainly not the cessation of
motion, and motion is
certainly not the accumulation
of rest;
if it is only the
accumulation of rest it would
mean that motion is eliminated
in rest. (Zhang Y ouren)
Ai Siqi
only be the negation of its
scope of application and not
the negation of its character.
If this is not simple preservation - what is it? Is not
this the essential acknowledgement that for111al logic
and dialectics are of equal
significance?
(b14) Secondly, although Ye
Qing acknowledges in words
that motion is absolute and
that rest is relative, and it
seems he has not so far put
motion and rest on an equal
footing, nevertheless, these
are only words, in reality he
has already put these two on
an equal footing. He says,
”Motion is the accumulation
of rest, rest is the cessation of
motion; they engender each
other and are mutually
supportive as well as mutually
dete1mining”. This, then, is
Ye Qin g's understanding of
the relation between motion
and rest. Motion is merely the
accumulation of rest! Motion
in the world is able to cease.
The
two
are
mutually
deterrnining ! According to
what I know, rest is only a
specific fo1m of motion. It is
certainly not the cessation of
motion;
and motion is
certainly not the accumulation

-
Mao
(a15) Fo11nal and dialectical
logic are most fundamental
questions.
Ai Siqi
of rest. If it is simply a case
of the accumulation of rest
then it is basically ”not able to
become motion”, and it
basically eliminates motion in
rest.
He says, ”In its
progress through time, motion
must come to rest in space”.
This makes it clear that he
does not basically know how
to
use
dialectics
to
comprehend motion. At any
point in space, things in
motion, at the same time, are
at rest and not at rest. This is
the unity of contradiction of
motion. If there is not this
unity of contradiction and
there is simply only rest, no
matter how it accumulates it
cannot become motion. Here,
Ye Qing clearly forgets to use
the law of the unity of
contradiction to understand
motion. Here, can one make
out what his true colours are?
(bl5) A great many readers
have sent in letters asking
about the criticism of Zhexue
jianghua (Talks on philosophy). This criticism came
from various quarters and
there were sundry opinions.
Some were sympathetic and
some were not; some were
well-meaning and some were
Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a16) Dialectical logic: A is
A and at the same time it is not
A; a thing is at the same time
identical and not identical with
itself. Fo1mal logic only sees
the aspect of identity.
Dialectics, however, not only
sees this aspect, it also sees
the
other
aspect
(not
identical), therefore, it is able
to embody, assimilate, and
sublate formal logic. What
formal logic cannot see,
dialectics can see, what fo11nal
Ai Siqi
malicious. I thought that in
addition I would write an
article giving a general reply
and at the same time take the
opportunity to make a selfcriticism, and regard this as
the pref ace of the fourth
edition of this book. Here, I
only want to discuss Mr
Zhang's and Mr Qu's request
to explain the question of
fo1111al and dialectical logic.
This, on the one hand, is
because, just like Mr Zhang
says, this question is a most
fundamental one, on the other
hand, it is because Ye Qing
has used a special essay to
dispute with me. Therefore, I
am also using a special essay
to reply to him.
(bl6) According to Ye Qing
the dialectical formula is
"besides A is A, at the same
time it maintains A is not A”.
We may make a simple point,
and that is: A is A, and at the
same time it is not A. This is
contrary to the law of identity
of fo11nal logic. Its meaning
is: ”a thing is at the same time
identical and not identical with
itself'.
In these two fo1mulae we
can already see the relation

Mao
logic has seen, dialectics not
only sees but transfo11ns and
deepens.
(a17) One cannot say: "on
the one hand, acknowledge A
is A, and, on the other hand,
acknowledge A is not A" and
then consider this to be
dialectics.
The relation
between
these
two
propositions is not a case of
on the one hand and on the
other hand; but is one where
at the same time they permeate
each other and are bound
together. They are a unified
whole
and
are
not
mechanically combined;
neither
can
they
be
mechanically broken up. If
they are broken up
and
understood in this way, then
the result is eclecticism. The
Ai Siqi
between for111al logic and
dialectics. That is, at any one
time, dialectics needs to see
the identity and non-identity
within a thing itself. Fo11nal
logic, however, only sees the
aspect
of
”identity".
Dialectics does not just see
this aspect, and consequently
can embody, assimilate, and
sublate for1nal logic. What
formal logic cannot see,
dialectics can see.
What
formal logic has seen,
dialectics can not only see, but
transforrns and deepens.
(b 17) All that has been said
above is apparently not any
different to Ye Qing. It seems
to be what he has said. But,
let us look into this in a more
concrete fashion and then we
may find out how much, in
fact, Ye Qing, who proclaims
that other people ”basically do
not understand dialectics”,
himself understands?
First, we need to pay
attention to how dialectics
"assimilates” formal logic.
Dialectics, in order to
assimilate fo11nal logic needs
to digest, transform, and
dissolve it so it becomes its
own flesh and blood. It does
not simply invite it to enter its
AI SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
dialectics of Ye Qing, then, is
this eclectic distortion.
Ai Siqi
house and assign to it its own
domain, then think that in
doing this it has elevated it.
People who distort dialectics
mechanically break up ”A is
A, at the same time A is not
A” into two propositions of
fo11nal logic. They hold that
as long as, on the one hand,
one acknowledges A is A,
and, on the other hand,
acknowledges A is not A,
then it is considered dialectics.
They do not know that the
relation between these two
propositions is not ”on the
one hand” and "on the other
hand" but ”at the same time”;
it is their mutual pe1n1eation.
The two propositions are a
unified whole and not a
mechanical combination.
Therefore, one cannot mechanically break these up in this
way.
Thus, when they do
break them up in this way the
result
is
an
eclectic
understanding of dialectics.
Superficially,
they
can
confuse what is said of
dialectics. They acknowledge
that one needs to "take
dialectics as a guide in order
to engage in theoretical
thinking, but, in reality, their
dialectics is only the eclectic
combination of several

Mao
(al8) Ye Qing admits that
the inductive and deductive
methods are founded on formal logic, and need to be
sublated
by
dialectics.
However, he also says: ”In
their application we can treat
Ai Siqi
propositions of fo11nal logic.
Superficially, it seems as
though they are
using
dialectics to sublate fo1111al
logic, yet, in fact, they are
eliminating dialectics in for1nal
logic.
Dialectics' sublation of
formal logic, obviously, is not
only rejection, for at the same
time it assimilates the positive
elements of formal logic.
But, this assimilation is just
like Mr Zhang says: it is not
only preservation.
Yet
eclecticism draws us entirely
to this extreme. It says fo11nal
logic still has a domain within
dialectics; its scope is merely
reduced somewhat. Looking
at this as a whole, formal
logic
is
still led and
”controlled" by dialectics, but
looking at it from a partial
perspective, eclecticism still
governs formal logic. The
dialectics of Ye Qing, then, is
an example of this eclectic
distortion.
(bl8)
For example, the
inductive and deductive
methods.
Ye Qing admits
thatthese two methods are
founded on fo11nal logic and
need to be sublated by
dialectics. He says, ”dialectAl SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
the inductive method and
the
deductive
method
categorically, using them at
the appropriate occasion in the
dialectical
process
of
research”. In this way it is
acknowledged
that
the
complete process of research
is dialectical, but in this
process there are times when
one needs to use the inductive
method and the deductive
method. The combination of
these methods, then, becomes
the complete dialectical
process of research.
(al9) The inductive method
seeks out
from
amongst
a
great
many
complex,
particular things their general,
pure common points;
the
method it adopts is analysis.
The deductive method uses
general principles to explain
particular things; the method
it adopts is synthesis. The
former proceeds from the
particular to the general and
from the concrete to the absAi Siqi
ics controls the inductive and
deductive
methods".
However, how does this so called control do
this
controlling? ”In their application we can treat the
inductive method and the
deductive methods categorically, at the appropriate
occasion in the dialectical
process of research”.
The
meaning of this is that
although the complete process
of research is dialectical, at
various occasions in this
process, there are times when
one needs to use the inductive
method, and there are times
when one needs to use the
deductive method. The combination of these methods
becomes the complete dialectical process of research.
(bl9)
We know that the
inductive method needs to
seek out from amongst a great
many complex, individual
things, their general, pure
common points; the method it
adopts is analysis. The deductive method uses general
principles to explain particular
things; its method, contrary
to the inductive method, is
synthesis. The inductive method proceeds from the partic-

Mao
tract; the latter proceeds from
the general to the particular
and from the abstract to the
concrete. According to Ye
Qing's method, the whole of
dialectics is merely the
mechanical and eclectic
combining of the inductive
and deductive methods.
(a20) Ye Qing's formulation
appears to be dialectical
research, and proceeds from
the particular to the general
and from the general to the
particular; it is the inductive
and deductive method;
in
fact, this is wrong.
Ai Siqi
ular to the general and from
the concrete to the abstract;
the deductive method, on the
contrary, proceeds from the
general to the particular and
from the abstract to the
concrete. According to Ye
Qing: our ”use of dialectics in
research then includes the
inductive and deductive
methods" and, in the complete
dialectical process of research
the inductive and deductive
methods
each
has
its
appropriate place;
in that
case, the whole of dialectics is
merely a question of here the
inductive method, there the
deductive method -
this
mechanical, eclectic combination.
(b20) Perhaps Ye Qing may
say he is using dialectics in
studying things and that he
proceeds from a great many
concrete, individual things to
the discovery of general laws,
and that he again applies these
general laws to individual
concrete things. The fotmer
stage of the process being the
appropriate place for induction
and the latter stage of the
process belonging to the
deductive method. In fact,
this is wrong.
AI SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a 2 1)
Although,
in
dialectics, at the stage of from
the particular to the general,
ordinary inductive methods
such
as
observation,
comparison, and analysis are
used, they are only used as
key elements. Because the
inductive method only uses
the method of analysis here, it
only grasps determinations
that are simple and one-sided.
Dialectics is not like this, not
only is it analysis, at the same
time it is synthesis. It not
only grasps determinations
that are simple and one-sided,
but it needs to seek out
detenninations that are allsided
and
unities
of
contradiction.
In the process of the
general to the particular, will it
do to only use the deductive
method, adopt the method of
synthesis, apply general laws
to, and synthesize, individual
things? No! If dialectics is to
be implemented, then, one
does not only use laws and
adopt synthesis, but in doing
this, one still needs to analyze
the concrete conditions of
these individual things and
discover the tendencies of
new particular contradictions.
Ai Siqi
( b 2 1)
Although,
in
dialectics, at the stage of the
process from the individual to
the general are used ordinary
inductive methods such as
observation, comparison, and
analysis, they are only used as
key elements. Not only must
dialectics be employed at this
stage of the ascent of the
particular to the general, the
dialectical method must be
implemented and not here
replaced with a totally
unchanged inductive method.
Here, the inductive method
only uses the method of
analysis.
From complex,
diverse things it only grasps
dete1·1ninations that are simple
and one-sided.
Here,
however, dialectics not only
analyzes, but at the same time,
it uses synthesis. It not only
grasps deter1ninations that are
simple and one-sided, but it
seeks out dete11ninations that
are all-sided and unities of
contradiction. According to
Ye Qing, the research process
of the general to the particular
should be characterized as the
appropriate place for the
deductive method; if it only
uses the method of synthesis,
only applies general laws to
individual
things
and

Mao
(a22) No matter whether it is
from the general to the
particular or from
the
particular to the general, our
methods are both basically
dialectical. The inductive and
deductive methods have only
an application as respective
elements of the process of
research.
They cannot be
separated from each other
and stand alone. They are
not
simply
rejected,
nor
are they simply preserved, but
are assimilated, digested, and
transfor1ned. Dialectics is the
whole of dialectics and is not
the piecing together of the
inductive and deductive
methods.
(a23) The quality of things
does not change in the process
of quantitative change; at this
Ai Siqi
synthesizes individual things,
then this will do. In fact, one
must implement dialectics
here; dialectics not only uses
laws here, and not only needs
to synthesize, but at the same
time, it still needs to analyze
the specific conditions of
these individual things and
discover the tendencies of
new particular contradictions.
(b22) In this way, no matter
whether it is from the
particular to the general or
from the general to the
particular, our methods are
both
basically dialectical.
The inductive and deductive
methods have only
an
application as respective
elements of the process of
research. They cannot be
separated
from each other
and stand alone. Although
they are not simply rejected,
neither are
they
simply
preserved.
They are assimilated, digested, and transf 01 rned. Because dialectics is
itself the whole of dialectics, it
is not the piecing together of
the inductive and deductive
methods.
(b23)
This distortion of
dialectics by Ye Qing can
also be seen in his interpretat-
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Mao
time, in te1ms of quality, it is
at relative rest, however, in
terms of quantity, it is in
motion throughout. Because
relative rest is still a particular
fo11n of absolute motion one
still needs to use dialectics in
studying relative rest; only
then will one be able to see
things in a profound way.
Fo11nal logic can only see the
aspect of rest, moreover, it
can overstate this aspect and
forget basic states of motion.
Since dialectics can grasp the
all-sidedness of things, and
even the aspect off 011nal logic
is contained in it, why does
one still want to use formal
logic in studying relative rest?
Ai Siqi
ion of the relation between
states of motion and states
of rest. Although, verbally,
he acknowledges the absolute
nature of motion and the
relative nature of rest, in
reality, he has already put
motion and rest on an equal
footing: "they engender each
other and are mutually
supportive as well as mutually
dete11nining”. He completely
misunderstands what the
significance of absolute as
well as relative is. As Mr
Zhang says, rest is only a
particular form of motion;
things at rest are essentially
still
in
motion.
For
example, the quality of things
does not change in the process
of quantitative change. At this
time we can say, with regard
to the aspect of quality, that it
is at relative rest. However,
with
regard to the aspect
of quantity, it is in motion
throughout. On the surface, a
stone does not move or
change; internally, however,
it continuously undergoes a
process of quantitative change
(although, this is very slow).
The change of feudal society
is often very sluggish, but
you cannot say it has not

Mao
(a24) Ye
Qing
says:
"Understanding the basic
character of the Chinese
economy is obviously a study
of a state of rest and
consequently is a question
undoubtedly established on
the basis of for1nal logic".
Ai Siqi
changed.
Because relative
rest is basically a manifestation of the state of
motion, we still need to use
dialectics in our study of
relative rest. Only then will
one be able to see things in a
very profound way. We are
not saying that research using
formal logic is completely
without merit, but that fo11nal
logic can only see the aspect
of rest, moreover, it can
overstate this aspect and
forget basic states of motion.
Since, for us, dialectics can
grasp the all-sided (the fo1111al
logic aspect is embodied in
this) we do not still need to
use fo11nal logic to grasp it.
Is not the way of Ye Qing,
which considers that by
relying only on fo1·1nal logic
relative rest can be completely
grasped and which considers
that tl1e domain of formal
logic will be permanently
preserved, an extremely
vulgar distortion?
(b24) When he discusses the
study of the economic
character of China this eclectic
distortion is even more
evident.
He considers that
understanding the basic
character of the Chinese
economy is obviously a study
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Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
This is wrong; this is
eclecticism. According to his
opinion, it is only the study of
the development of China's
society that is the study of a
state of motion and a
dialectical question. Form,
quality, and relation, etc., are
only the study of states of rest
and ought to belong to fotmal
logic.
Is not this obvious
eclecticism?
Quality and relation
and such questions are the
starting point of development;
although it cannot be regarded
as development itself, if we
are faithful to dialectics, we
should at least see in them
the
motive
force
of
development, see in them
specific contradictions; can
fo11nal logic do this? Fo1mal
logic only sees one side; it
can only become formalism.
For example, feudal society
needs a capitalist revolution;
this is a formula.
Because
China's economy is feudal it
is then said that China needs a
capitalist revolution and the
establishment of capitalist
society. In f or111al logic, this
kind of deduction is very
coherent, and we can only say
this, but China's specific
conditions are denied.
The
Ai Siqi
of a state of rest, and
consequently is a question
undoubtedly raised on the
basis of fo1mal logic. In Ye
Qing's opinion it is only the
study of the development of
China's society that is the
study of a state of motion and
a dialectical question. The
study of ”form, quality, and
relation, etc.", however, are
studies of states of rest. This
is such obvious eclecticism!
In fact, quality and relation are
the
starting
point
of
development. Without this
starting point there is no
development.
Ye Qing
himself says, ”Economics
needs to be understood before
it is known at what stage of
evolution Chinese society is,
and what revolution is
needed". As to this starting
point: although we cannot
regard it as development
itself, if we are faithful to
dialectics, we at least need
to see within it the original
motive force of development,
as well as a variety of specific
contradictions. This, then, is
not something formal logic
can grasp. Naturally, if you
definitely base yourself on
fo1·1nal logic and advance this
question, of course, that suits

Mao
specific conditions of China
do not pe11nit that it will be
restricted historically to a
capitalist revolution, nor do
they per·mit the establishment
of ca pi tali st society.
All
questions like this are
questions that formal logic
cannot solve, only dialectics
can. The formalism of Plekhanov to Ye Qing cannot
solve any question.
Ai Siqi
you, but this way you only
see one side or it becomes
f orrnalism. This is to say:
you want to use the deductive
method, so first you adopt a
general formula, then, you
look to see what the nature of
the Chinese economy is, then,
relying on this forrnula, you
determine China's needs. For
example, feudal society needs
a capitalist revolution, this is a
general forrnula. The answer
to your research tells you that
China's economy is a feudal
one, thereupon, you say
China needs a capitalist
revolution
and
the
establishment of a capitalist
society. In fo1n1al logic this,
naturally, is very coherent.
But, do the specific conditions
of Chinese society comply
with this formula?
Your
deduction cannot manage this.
However, Chinese society
cannot comply with your
deductive forrnula. Although
Chinese society is feudal, its
special conditions do not
per1nit that it will undergo a
Western European style
capitalist revolution, nor do
they pern1it the establishment
of capitalist society. This can
only
be
done
through
dialectical study, for none of
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Al SIQJ'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
(a25) Two thousand years
ago Greek sophists regarded
motion as innumerable points
of rest in space, and therefore
concluded that there are only
innumerable points of rest and
no motion. Ye Qing says rest
is the cessation of motion and
motion is the accumulation of
rest; this is the return to life
of sophism.
Ai Siqi
this can be seen by the
deductive method of formal
logic. In understanding Chinese economics, people who
are faithful to dialectics must
implement it. They cannot
assign a domain to it here,
thus giving empty for·111alism
room to establish itself.
(Plekhanov, esteemed by Ye
Qing, made the mistake of
forrnalism precisely because
of this kind of thing.)
(b25) First, he says motion
is the accumulation of rest,
and rest is the cessation of
motion. This is just like Mr
Zhang says, not only does it
eclectically combine rest and
motion, but it does it to the
extent that as a result it
eliminates motion in rest.
Two thousand years ago
Greek sophists had already
developed this theory. They
regarded motion as the sum
total of innumerable points of
rest in space and consequently
concluded that there are only
innumerable points of rest and
no motion. Who would have
thought that sophism would
return to life in the mouth of
”twentieth century" Ye Qing.
This truly makes people want
to "acclaim it as the height of
perfection".

Mao
(a26) Lenin says, "a simple
judgement is also a unity of
contradiction. For instance,
the proposition 'Ivan is a
man' has the meaning of 'the
particular is equal to the
general'". Fo11nal logic often
makes
this
kind
of
proposition, ”a youth is a
shop-assistant", but not, "a
youth is a youth”, and this is
because formal logic itself
cannot strictly abide by the
law of identity without
making itself untenable.
When fo11nal logic uses this
kind of proposition it naturally
has not considered that it
contains a contradiction, and
therefore it cannot be said that
this is an application of the
law of the unity of contradiction. However, we cannot deny that this kind of
proposition in essence contains a unity of contradictions.
(a27) Ai Siqi says: ”Things
that are different are not conAi Siqi
(b26) Secondly, in fo1mal
logic the proposition ”the
youth is a shop-assistant” is
common, and this must be so
for formal logic becomes
untenable if strictly according
to the law of identity one is
only able to say ”the youth is
a youth”. When we say ”the
youth is a youth" contains a
contradiction, it is to indicate
that fo1n1al logic itself cannot
strictly abide by the law of
identity.
When formal
logicians use this proposition
they naturally have not
thought that it contains a
contradiction, and therefore
this proposition is certainly
not an application of the law
of the unity of contradiction.
But we still cannot deny that
this kind of proposition in
essence contains a unity of
contradictions.
Ilyich, in his
Philosophical Notebooks,
says, ”a simple judgement is
also a unity of contradiction.
For instance, the proposition
'Ivan is a man' has the
meaning of 'the particular is
equal to the general”'. It is
not known whether Ye Qing
understands this point or not.
(b27) Thirdly, things that
are different are certainly not
I
I
Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
tradictions, for instance, a
pen, ink, and chair are not
contradictions.
But if the
principles of development and
change are understood then it
is known, that under certain
conditions, things that are
different are able to transforrn
themselves into contradictions. If at the same time
and place two definite things
begin to act on each other in a
mutually exclusive fashion,
then they become contradictions.
For instance, a
shop-assistant and a writer are
basically without contradiction, but if a certain shopassistant has an interest in
writing
and
thinks
of
becoming a writer, the two
then
become
mutually
exclusive within an entity and
f orrn a contradiction. If it is
thought
only such things
as good and bad, male and
female are
contradictions
and other things cannot
transforrn
themselves into
contradictions, then, it is a
for 111alistic differentiation. Is
this distinguishable from
Zhang Dongsun's fo1·111alistic
division of "contrary, contradiction, and opposition"? The
basic principle is correct but
Ai Siqi
contradictions, and so such
things as a pen, ink, and a
chair are not contradictions.
However, if dialectics is truly
"understood”
and
the
principles of development and
change are understood, then it
must be known that under
certain conditions things that
are
different can
also
transforrn themselves into
contradictions if at the same
time and place these two
different things begin to act on
each other in a mutually
exclusive fashion.
For
example, a shop assistant and
writer are two different,
totally unrelated things.
However, if someone who is
a shop-assistant is very
interested in writing as well as
dissatisfied with his or her
existing state of affairs and
thinks hard about becoming
a writer, at that time two
different things - a shopassistant and writer, within
an entity, become mutually
exclusive. Can you say this is
not a contradiction? Can you
say this shop-assistant has not
experienced a contradiction in
his or her life? If you insist
that only good and bad, male
and female, etc. can be con-

Mao
the fo11nulation ”difference is
not contradiction" is not. One
should
say
that, under
certain conditions, all things
that
are
different
are
contradictions. A person sits
at a chair, dips a pen into ink
to write an essay. Because a
person and writing, these two
definite conditions, temporarily unites the things that
are in contradiction, one cannot say these differences are
not contradictions. When a
cook prepares food, he takes
firewood, rice, oil, salt,
sauce, vinegar, and vegetables
and, under certain conditions, unites them. Under
certain conditions, a shopassistant and a writer are also
able to unite. Part work-part
study
can
unite
work
and study. Difference is each
and every thing, all being
under certain conditions, contradictions; therefore, difference itself is contradiction;
this is what
is
called a
concrete
contradiction. Ai's
fo11nulation is unsatisfactory
(Mao Zedong's opinion).
(a28) The forrnula "A is B
or not B" of the law of the
excluded middle, in fact, conAi Siqi
sidered contradictions and
other things cannot transf orrn
themselves into contradictions, then what is the
difference between this
formalistic method of differentiation
and
Zhang
Dongsun's
division
of
"contrary, contradiction, and
opposition", etc. Can this be
the thinking of a person who
"understands" dialectics?
(b28)
Fourthly, in formal
logic, "a youth is a shop
assistant" suits only the fo1111Al SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
tains a contradiction: that is,
"A is not A but is B", or ”B
can be B or not B"; Hegel has
already criticised this.
(a29)
Although external
cause may not be overlooked,
it cannot deterrnine necessity
in things. What determines
necessity is internal change.
Ye Qing says, "one must
acknowledge the interaction of
internal and external cause".
This is mechanical interaction
where the two sides are withAi Siqi
ula A is A of the law of the
excluded middle; everybody
understands this.
But the
focus of our attention is to
indicate: can a proposition of
formal logic fundamentally
find a role in dialectics and be
"under the jurisdiction of
moving logic"? We do not
want to classify the law of the
excluded middle with the law
of the unity of contradiction.
The formula "A is B or not
B", in fact, already contains a
contradiction: that is, "A is
not A but is B" or "B can be B
or not B "; Hegel has already
criticised this. But, perhaps
for Ye Qing it is not easy to
understand because from start
to finish he only knows how
to use a for1nal mind to carry
out rigid classification, and he
is unaware of development
and change.
(b29)
Although external
cause may not be overlooked,
it cannot dete1mine necessity
in things. What dete1 rnines
necessity in things is internal
cause. At this point the two
must be distinguished in te11ns
of superiority and inferiority.
Ye Qing
says dialectics
must acknowledge interaction.

Mao
out a relative superiority or
inferiority. This, then, forrns
Ye
Qing's
eclectism.
Dialectical interaction is not
like this. In it, the two sides
are distinguished by a primary
and secondary significance.
Ye Qing's question is
admitted, ”Mechanics need an
external motive force: water
encounters external heat and
vaporizes; the evolution of
organisms is due to the
environment; are these not
facts?" This is not a question
of simple denial. However, at
the same time the activity of
the thing itself in [this process
of]
change
must
be
acknowledged;
this is the
determining factor in [the
process of] change in things.
Mechanics has movability;
water has the property of
vaporization; it is the nature
of organisms to evolve.
Because of this, external
causes such as motive force,
heat, and the environment
have a function.
Internal
cause determines the necessity
of change in things, not
external cause.
Ai Siqi
Therefore, there must be an
interaction between internal
and external cause. However,
one
knows
that
when
speaking of interaction there is
the
difference
between
mechanical and dialectical
interaction.
Mechanical
interaction is reciprocal. The
two sides are without a
relative superiority and
inferiority.
This kind of
interaction can only forrn Ye
Qing's eclecticism.
In
dialectical
interaction,
however, the two sides are
distinguished by a primary
and secondary significance.
In the interaction between
internal and external cause
dialectics stresses the primary
determining function of
internal cause. This is what
is meant by saying ”what
is called the occurrence of
internal action, then, is
considered to be the reason
for necessity in things". Ye
Qing has put several questions
to me, "Mechanics needs an
external motive force, is this
not a fact; water encounters
external heat and vaporizes, is
this not a fact; the evolution
of organisms is due to the environment, is this not a fact?"
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Mao
Internal and External Cause
(a30) General things will
always manifest themselves
through particular forms. No
Ai Siqi
I naturally reply ”yes".
I
cannot simply deny it.
However, acknow !edging
these facts is not the same as
acknowledging that external
cause determines necessity. If
you ask, "Motive force causes
mechanical movement, is this
necessity? Heat causes water
to vaporize, is this necessity?"
I naturally will answer in the
affirrnative. However, if you
again ask, "Well then, is not
the determination of this
'necessity' precisely motive
force, heat, etc.?” To this I
will reply in one word "no".
Why is the answer ”no”?
Because Ye Qing himself
must acknowledge that,
"External cause must depend
on internal cause to become
external cause. If mechanics
lacks dynamism, motive force
cannot become the motive
force of mechanics. If water
lacks
the
property
of
vaporization,
heat
then
becomes the heat of water and
•
•
t'
1t cannot vaponze .
(b30) This is to say general
things
often
will
be
manifested through particular

Mao
thing in the world exists in a
purely general sense. What is
called "the particular is
contained in the general"
indicates a general thing
manifesting itself in a
particular forrn. It does not
say that there is some
particular thing independent of
the general (like Ye Qing
saying the theory of internal
causes is a general principle,
yet China's development does
not conforrn to a law). The
general and particular are a
unity of contradictions; there
is no purely general and there
is no purely particular
independent of the general.
(a31)
The distinguishing
feature
of
dialectical
materialism consists in its
grasp of the kernel of facts,
the essence of facts,
and
the
regularity
of
the
internal
development
of
facts. It does not consist in
esteeming the appearance of
facts. Mechanical materialists,
empiricists, and pragmatists
also respect facts, but they
only respect superficial facts.
Respecting superficial facts is
the preliminary stage of
knowledge and the preliminary stage of science.
Seventeenth and eighteenth
Ai Siqi
forrns. Absolutely no thing in
the world exists in a purely
general sense.
Therefore,
what is called ”the particular is
contained in the general”
indicates a general thing
manifesting itself in a
particular for·rn. It does not
indicate
the
particular
independent of the general.
The general and particular are
also a dialectical unity. There
is no purely general, at the
same time, there is no purely
particular thing apart from the
general.
(b31)
The distinguishing
feature
of
dialectical
materialism does not consist
of its respect for facts, but
in its ability to grasp the
kernel of
facts
and its
ability to grasp the internal
regularities of development.
What dialectics needs to
respect is
the essence of
facts and not their appearance.
Esteeming superficial facts
is the preliminary stage of
knowledge and the preliminary stage of science.
Seventeenth and eighteenth
century mechanical materialism and the science of mechAl SIQI'S PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Mao
century materialism and the
theory of the science of
mechanics are like this. It is
not denied that superficial
facts -€an also give people
some knowledge.
Seventeenth and eighteenth century
mechanics
has
already
furnished a great many truths.
Pragmatism, compared to the
empty talkers who present a
false picture of peace and
prosperity, is able to see more
of a few things. To a great
extent, it was able to expose
the crimes of the enemy
invasion and the mistake of
absolute
non-resistance.
However, this esteem of
immediate facts, that only see
the invasion of the enemy and
not the nature of the invasion,
that only see the mistake of
non-resistance and not the
prospect of the resistance of
the masses, is completely
different to materialist dialectics. It is only a superficial
fact that mechanical motion is
due to external force;
the
essence of fact is that
mechanics itself has the
potential for movement. The
science of the age of the
outlook of mechanics only
paid attention to the study of
external force. This was beAi Siqi
anics is like this. We do not
deny
that
esteeming
superficial facts can give us
some knowledge.
Seventeenth and eighteenth century
mechanics
has
already
furnished a great many truths.
The pragmatism of Hu Shi
(provided he is able to put into
practice
his
doctrine)
compared to empty talkers
who always present a picture
of peace and prosperity, is
more capable of seeing more
of a few things. Also, it was
still able, to a great extent, to
expose the invasion of the
enemy and the mistake of
absolute
non-resistance.
However, this alone is not
enough.
This crawling
esteem for only seeing
immediate facts that simply
see the invasion of the enemy
and not the nature of the
invasion, that simply see the
mistake of non-resistance and
not the prospects of the
resistance of the people, is
completely different
to
materialist dialectics.
Yes,
mechanical motion is due only
to external force, this is a fact;
however, this is only a
superficial fact; essentially,
the capacity of external force
to cause this mechanical mov-
:
'
,
'
' ” '

Mao
cause science at that time was
still at a preliminary stage; it
was not able to penetrate
through to the essence of
movement. Arriving at the
high level stage of the theory
of relativity made people
aware of the use of internal
cause
in
explaining
mechanical movement.
In
Newton's time they only
knew how to use gravitation
(external force) to explain the
movement of heavenly bodies;
the theory of relativity,
however, uses the property of
movement itself to explain
this.
Ai Siqi
ement is due to the potential of
mechanics
itself
for
movement. The reason one's
hand pushes a small stone is
because the small stone can
move. If one pushes a wall it
will not work. This is what
our paper has said several
times, so much so that even
Ye Qing himself cannot deny
it.
Ye Qing's so-called
science of the age of the
outlook of mechanics only
concentrated on the study of
external force.
This was
because science at that time
was still at a preliminary
stage. It was not a time when
it was able to penetrate
through to the essence of
things. The arrival of science
at a higher stage, like the
present emergence of the
theory of relativity, makes us
insist on the use of internal
cause to explain mechanical
movement. For example, in
Newton's time the movement
of
heavenly
bodies
was
explained by external force
(gravitation), but the theory of
relativity uses the property of
movement itself to explain
this.
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Publishing House, 1980). See also Zhongguo zhexue (Chinese
Philosophy) Vol. 1 (April 1979), pp. 5-30. T,anslated by John