Outline for a Report on the Current Situation in
the War of Resistance and the Party's Tasks
(October 1937)

Part I. The Current Situation in the War of Resistance

A. The Sino-Japanese War: Current State and Assessments

1. The latest developments in the war in North China and the Yangzi River area
following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
2. The Japanese bandits have achieved temporary, partial victory in this war of
aggression. This is because: (a) Japan is an imperialist country with powerful armed
forces; (b) it is a close neighbor of China; (c) it was a planned, prepared invasion.
3. But this time it is different from "September 18." Japan has paid an extremely high price for every inch of territory it has occupied and has met with
forceful resistance.
4. China has carried out a resolute, brave war of national self-defense against
Japan, and, though it has suffered temporary, partial defeats, this war of national
self-defense: (a) brought out the great and resolute brave spirit of the Chinese
nation in an unprecedented way, eliminated the "fear of Japan disease" of the past,
and dealt a considerable blow to the Japanese invaders; (b) consolidated China's
internal solidarity and unity in an unprecedented way, of China, signaling a new
atmosphere in the Republic of China; (c) caused the Nationalist and Communist
Parties, which had been opponents for the past ten years, to resume cooperation,
and brought about a decisive transformation in the Guomindang.
5. These temporary and partial defeats are also due to the fact that China is a
country of semicolonial and semifeudal relations, and so: (a) Its military technology is backward; (b) the government and the military are old and corrupt, with
many morbid states and weaknesses; (c) the military command is thoroughly backward; (d) the government is afraid to allow an open people's movement.

6. Such defeats are usually difficult to avoid at the beginning of a war between
a semicolonial country and an imperialist country.

B. The Crisis and the Difficulties of the Current Situation

1. It is precisely these temporary and partial defeats that have caused the many
current military, political, fiscal, and economic difficulties.
2. These difficulties are being used by the national defeatists, Chinese traitors,
and pro-Japanese factions to prove the inability of China to resist Japan and to
support their own capitulation and compromise. We should never underestimate
the overt emergence of their activities, their dangerous nature, or their strength.
Their weakness is that they do not have the support of the military and the people.
3. These difficulties have caused wavering and disappointment among some
people within the anti-Japanese faction. They feel that the War of Resistance is
hopeless, and they are cowed by the yammering of the pro-Japanese elements that
"if we are not subjugated by Japan, then we will be subjugated by the Communists." This is the biggest danger at the moment. Still, the "decisive force" within
the resistance faction, Chiang Kaishek, has so far continued to advocate a resolute
War of Resistance.
4. The current moment is crucial for turning the crisis around.

C. Our Standpoint

1. We firmly believe that the defeats at this point have been temporary and
partial, and are not a final and complete defeat. The war that will determine victory or defeat is still ahead of us, and the ultimate victory or defeat will be decided
in a protracted war.
2. We believe, nonetheless, that we are now at a critical moment in the crisis.
Our urgent task at the moment is to unite those within the resist-Japan faction,
which means first and foremost further cooperation between the Nationalist and
Communist Parties, in order to use all of our force to shatter the conspiracy of the
pro-Japanese faction, overcome all the current difficulties, and continue the War
of Resistance.
3. We must use the most concrete facts to prove before the people of the whole
country that China's War of Resistance can be won and propose specific methods
to solve the current difficulties.

Part II. Can China's War of Resistance Be Victorious?

A. The Three Factors That Will Determine Victory or Defeat in the
Sino-Japanese War

1. China's strength.
2. Japan's strength.

3. The international strength.
But the decisive factor is China's own strength.

B. China's Strength Is Becoming Greater as the
War of Resistance Proceeds

1. The War of Resistance has expanded and strengthened the Anti-Japanese
National United Front and China's domestic unity and firmness (the cooperation
between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, between the government and the
people, between the localities and the center).
2. The War of Resistance made the government begin to become a government
of national defense. It has laid down the beginnings of a foundation for a unified
government of national defense: a national defense policy of resolute resistance
war, the determination to convene a national defense conference the release of
political prisoners eliminating the emergency criminal procedure law legalizing, to a certain degree, the National Salvation movement struggle against corruption struggle against Chinese traitors.
3. The National Revolutionary Army has begun to become a unified army of
national defense, and it has laid down the beginnings of a foundation on which to
build a unified national defense army: the establishment of a unified supreme commanding headquarters the differentiation of individual war zones the moving
to the front lines of each provincial army the reorganization of the Red Army
into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army beginning to set up a new
army beginning to establish political work in the more progressive of the armies.
4. The broad masses have been mobilized to participate in the War of Resistance, creating a high tide in the national War of Resistance.
5. The longer the War of Resistance persists, the more internally united China
will be, the more powerful it will become, the more it will be able to become a
democratic republic and defeat the Japanese invaders.

C. The Weaknesses and Difficulties of the Japanese Invaders

1. Fiscal and economic difficulties, particularly the failure to develop military
industry.
2. The intensification of domestic contradictions (between the government and
the people, and within the military and the bourgeoisie themselves).
3. The large territory and rich resources of China mean that the Japanese troops
are inadequately distributed and cannot consolidate the occupied regions.
4. Japan's rear area is not consolidated (Korea, Taiwan, the Four Eastern Provinces, and so on).
5. The longer the War of Resistance persists, the more Japan's weaknesses will
increase, and the more advantages we will have for achieving victory in the War of
Resistance.

D. The International Situation

1. China's War of Resistance has aroused the sympathy and assistance of the
proletariat and the people of the entire world the attitude of the social democratic parties the attitude of England's Labor Party and labor unions the sympathy of France's labor unions and Social Democratic Party the most reactionary
union federation in America advocates opposing Japan and a boycott of Japanese
goods the admission of the Soviet labor union into the International Federation
of Labor Unions in Amsterdam. The Soviet Union.
2. The attitude of all the countries of the world France Great Britain
America the inconsistencies in their internal attitudes. Germany, Italy.
3. Generally speaking, the international situation favors China, and Japan is
relatively isolated.

E. Conclusion

1. China has the strength to defeat Japan. Both the domestic and the international situations are advantageous to China.
2. The central thing today is to persevere in the War of Resistance and to wage
a protracted war.

Part III. How to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance

A. Expand and Strengthen the Anti-Japanese National
United Front, Which Is Founded on Cooperation
Between the Nationalist and
Communist Parties

1. First, it must be explained to people both within and outside the Party that the
basic precondition for this united front is resistance to Japan. "Resisting Japan
above all else." Democracy and People's Livelihood are both secondary to this.
2. The content of the united front is: (a) cooperation among all parties and
factions resisting Japan; (b) a unified government of national defense; (c) a unified army of national defense; (d) unified associations of the popular masses. This
does not mean a government, an army, or associations of the popular masses monopolized by one party or faction.
3. The objective of cooperation between all parties and factions within the united
front is "mutual help, mutual development"; it is not a matter of who should lead
whom. For instance, our attitude toward the Guomindang and all the Guomindang's
different factions is to assist in their development, consolidation, and unification;
it is not to weaken and splinter them (the question of dealing with the different

factions of the Guomindang such as the CC Clique,¹ the Huangpu Clique,² the
Revival Society, and the fascists).
4. Our methods in working with our allies: (a) practical, tangible assistance,
often taking the form of suggestions; (b) making appropriate requests and slogans
based on the degree of their consciousness and the urgency of their needs; these
should not be too demanding or too leftist; (c) well-meaning criticism, and we
should also praise their merits; (d) make use of the motive force of the masses, that
is, motivate forces from the bottom up, but do not engage in confrontation.
5. Make clear to the Guomindang that the Communist Party will cooperate with
the Guomindang not only in the War of Resistance against Japan but also in realizing the Three People's Principles and in founding a new China. Therefore, this is
a long-term cooperation to last for several decades, not short-term cooperation or
merely subterfuge. We must struggle to the end for the united front.
6. Contradictions and friction within the united front are inevitable; they cannot be eliminated and can only be diminished. We should resolve and alleviate
internal contradiction and friction under the principles of developing the resist-
Japan movement and putting resistance to Japan above all else.
7. The struggle between the two lines within the united front; oppose
capitulationism and closed-doorism. What is "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative"?
8. How to expand the united front: (a) the united front of every party and faction; (b) all mass organizations joining the united front; (c) organizing the unorganized to join the united front; (d) splitting the pro-Japanese faction and striving to
win over those elements who are under the influence of the pro-Japanese faction.

B. Establish a Unified Government of National Defense on the Basis
of the National Government

1. Instead of establishing another government, we want to establish a unified
government of national defense on the basis of this anti-Japanese National Government. Push the current government forward.

2. We call upon those members of all parties and factions, including the Communist Party, who have prestige to join this government, consolidate the center,
and persist in the policy of the overall policy of the War of Resistance.
3. Gradually weed out the pro-Japanese elements and the corrupt and degenerate elements from the government.
4. Help the central government to improve the local governments, oppose the
situation of feudal separatist rule, help the local governments make progress in
becoming organic components of the central government. Eliminate the antithesis
between the central government and the localities.
5. Solve the problem of special districts. The principles for solving the problem
of special-district governments are: (a) maintain the leadership of the Party; (b)
make the special districts into local governments that are part of the Republic of
China; (c) maintain the special districts as progressive regions in the War of Resistance against Japan, as the locomotives of nationwide democratization, and as
embryonic models for the new China.
6. We should strictly differentiate the special districts from the united front
areas (for example, regions in which the Eighth Route Army is stationed).
7. Communist Party members in governments of all levels should become models
of resolve and bravery, endurance and diligence, public-spiritedness, politeness,
and honor, and should be subject to strict supervision by the Party at the central
and local levels.
8. Our objective is to establish a democratic republic with a parliamentary structure; both the domestic and the international situations demand this. (The example
of Spain)

C. Expand and Establish a Unified Army of National Defense on the
Basis of the Current Military Forces

1. Expand and establish it on the basis of what exists, rather than discarding the
existing military forces.
2. We cannot say that the existing forces fighting the War of Resistance are still
warlord forces or that those who lead the troops are warlords. Warlords can become national heroes and good military men.
3. How should we assist in expanding and building a unified army of national
defense? (a) set up a political work system: (i) to strengthen the fighting capacity
of the military forces, (ii) to improve military-civilian relations, (iii) to improve
officer-soldier relations; (b) unify command, discipline, armaments, supply, battle
plans, and so on; (c) oppose the warlordist practice of commanding one's own
army for self-defense only, but also oppose discrimination against the localities by
the central government; (d) help the government carry out the military conscription system; (e) train talented military and political staff in large numbers, improve, and expand military and political schools; (f) improve our military skills
and military command.

4. Expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, strengthen the Party's leadership, strengthen political work, and improve its technical equipment, to make it
a part of the national army and act as a model within it.
5. The Communist Party members should go to the army, go to the schools for
military officers, go to the guard teams, the recruit teams, the volunteer forces, and
the guerrilla units, to become models of political consciousness, resolve and bravery, endurance and diligence, and disciplinary obedience. They should also use
their position to influence other officers and soldiers, and improve the quality of
the army.
6. Coordinate the guerrilla warfare with the regular warfare. Relying on guerrilla war alone, it will be impossible to defeat the Japanese bandits.

D. Mobilize and Arm the People to Help the Government and the
Military to Fight the War of Resistance and to Organize a
Consolidated Rear Area

1. The Guomindang's contradiction regarding the mass movement: on the one
hand, it "wants" it, but, on the other hand, it "fears" it. Because it "wants" it, it
cannot avoid giving it a certain legitimacy; because it "fears" it, it cannot refrain
from dominating it.
2. Our contradiction: we want to mobilize the masses, but our allies are afraid
of mobilizing the masses and want to dominate them. It is about the difference
between a "one-sided War of Resistance" and a "Total War of Resistance."
3. The mass movement can, however, still be mobilized in such a situation. The
problem is through what kind of methods, what kind of paths.
4. The fundamental principles for the mass movement should be "legality" and
"unity." Use all kinds of legal forms, even old forms. Everything should be done
for the purpose of unification and against splits. Even the movements started and
organized by the Communist Party are also subject to these two general principles.
5. About launching the struggle between the two fronts within the Save-the-
Nation-from-Extinction movement, go deep into the midst of the masses.
6. As regards the relationships between the government, the military, and the
popular masses (for instance, concerning friction over the issues of democracy
and People's Livelihood), the Party should play the role of bridge and mediator.
The government and the army should make some concessions, but the people should
also support the government in resisting Japan. It is a mistake to provoke sharp
conflicts.
7. How to arm the popular masses? (a) Mainly by seizing the enemy's weapons; (b) asking the government to provide some; (c) coming up with ways to buy
some; (d) gathering together miscellaneous guns and such to organize armed selfdefense forces, picket teams, and traitor-elimination teams.
8. Struggle against Chinese traitors, enemy spies, and Trotskyite bandits, particularly the latter, to consolidate the rear area. (a) the role of the Trotskyite ban-

dits; (b) the danger of the Trotskyite bandits; (c) resolutely wipe out the Trotskyite
bandits.

E. Carry on the War of Resistance and Guerrilla Warfare in
North China

1. Because of our Party's increasing strength in North China, we are shouldering important responsibilities in North China, particularly in developing guerrilla
warfare. We must set a good example there to influence the whole country.
2. We should stick to the overall policy of the national united front. Rather than
seeking to swallow them up, we should cooperate with all the anti-Japanese parties and factions, and help them organize in order to develop their strength.
3. In places where the old régimes still exist, we should use them and work
through the old régimes to achieve our goal of carrying on the War of Resistance;
in places where there are no old régimes, we should set up united front governments of all parties and factions, preserve the old forms, and ask the higher-level
governments for direction, appointments, and assistance. When the old systems of
command still exist, we should continue to use them and work through them to
achieve our goal of carrying on the War of Resistance; when there are no such old
systems of command, we should set up unified command headquarters and ask
higher-level organs for direction, appointments, and assistance.
4. Help the Guomindang to set up party headquarters in the two provinces of
Hebei and Chahar, and put them in touch with the Guomindang Central [Executive] Committee.
5. Regarding the organizations of Chinese traitors in the occupied regions, such
as the Peace Preservation Society, we should splinter them and try to put them to
our use.
6. We should arm the people on a large scale, expand the anti-Japanese army
and the Eighth Route Army, and organize self-defense armies, volunteer armies,
guerrilla forces, and such, of all kinds and under various names.
7. Use all the old and legal forms to organize the masses to cooperate and unite
with one another; all struggles should have resistance against Japan as their primary purpose.
8. Set up Communist Party organizations everywhere, and pay attention to the
connection between open work and secret work. There should be secret Party organizations everywhere.

F. Expand and Build Up the Defense Industry

1. The national government has thus far not paid attention to the importance of
the defense industry in a protracted war.
2. The central government should set up a ministry of national defense industry
to unify planning and direction.

3. Issue defense bonds to develop defense industries.
4. Defense industries should be built in safe areas.
5. It is also necessary for every province to set up small-scale defense industries.
6. The special zones should also apply themselves to this matter.
G. Seek International Assistance to Strengthen the
Forces of Resistance
1. Strengthen international propaganda (films, picture books, newspapers, joint
declarations, delegations, and so on) to win the sympathy and assistance of all
countries and their boycott of Japanese goods, and to persuade them not to sell
their munitions to Japan, but to sell them to us instead.
2. Go a step further in drawing closer to England, the United States, France,
and all other countries in the peace front; make use of contradictions in the international domain.
3. On relations with the Soviet Union.
4. The connection between domestic policy and foreign policy.
H. Conclusion
[The completion of] these tasks is a necessary precondition for achieving victory in
the War of Resistance. They are not the tasks of the Communist Party alone; they
are the tasks of the whole nation. We are willing to struggle hard, together with the
government authorities, every party, every faction, every sector of society, and every military force in order to bring about the accomplishment of these tasks.
Part IV. Set Up a Strong Communist Party Across All of China
A. What Has the Chinese Communist Party Done in the
Resistance War?
1. Our achievements: (a) the cooperation between the Nationalist Party and the
Communist Party opened up prospects for a War of Resistance; (b) we laid out a
specific program for achieving victory in the War of Resistance, carried out extensive propaganda, and have, moreover, carried out some parts of the program in
some regions; (c) the participation of the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance and its effectiveness; (d) the War of Resistance and guerrilla war in North
China; (e) the mobilization of Party members nationwide to participate in the war;
(f) the obtaining of semi-open and open status for organizations of the Communist Party-these achievements have greatly increased the Party's influence and
prestige.
2. Our weak points: (a) the united front is inadequate, and Party members do
not have a deep understanding of the united front policy; (b) our capacity to mobilize the masses is still weak, and Party members are unable to go deep among the
masses; (c) our organizational strength is weak; it has fallen behind our political
influence; (d) We are short on cadres with the ability to work independently. These
weaknesses have made us unable to develop our work still further.
3. Relying on the position we have already achieved, we should correct our
weaknesses and develop our work, so that our Party can play a decisive role in the
War of Resistance.
B. Going from a Party of the Soviet Regions and the Red Army to
Building a Party Across All of China
1. Strive to win open status for the Party on a nationwide basis, take advantage
of every possible activity to "come down from the mountains."
2. Develop and strengthen the Party; set up leadership bodies in every locality.
3. Heighten alertness within the Party to prevent traitors, enemy agents, opportunists, and capitulationists from worming their way into the Party.
4. Set up an open, nationwide Party newspaper and circulation network.
5. Prepare to convene the Seventh Party Congress.
C. Cadre Policy
1. The present panic of the cadres. Reinforce the education, training, and promotion of the cadres. "Cadres decide everything."
2. Investigating the cadres, and testing the cadres' political aspect and work
abilities.
3. Make our cadres capable not only of managing the Party but also of managing the country. They must understand how to speak to the people of all China and
the people of the entire world and work on their behalf. They must have broad, far-reaching political vision and the demeanor of statesmen.
D. Struggle for Solidarity and Unanimity Within the Party
1. Solidarity and unanimity within the Party is a precondition for defeating the
Japanese bandits.
2. The interests of the Party are above all else. Everything for the Party. Sabotage of the Party is the sabotage of the revolution.
3. Strengthen Marxist-Leninist education within the Party, and the unity of theory
and practice.
4. Correctly develop ideological struggle and self-criticism.
5. Strictly enforce the Party's discipline; resolutely observe the organizational
principle of democratic centralism.
6. Struggle on behalf of the Bolshevik line of the International and the Chinese
Communist Party.

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 48-61, where it is reproduced from
a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The conservative faction known as the CC Clique, or the Organization Clique, was led
by the two brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu.

2. The Huangpu Clique was made up of those who had studied or served as instructors at
the Whampoa Military Academy when Chiang Kaishek was its commandant in the 1920s.

3. The Revival Society (Fuxingshe), also known as the "Revive China Society," was the
front organization for the shadowy body commonly referred to as the Blue Shirt Society,
founded by Chiang Kaishek in 1932, of which the actual title was the Lixingshe (Society for
the Forceful Application [of the Three People's Principles]). On this last point, see the article by Xu Youwei and Philip Billingsley, "Behind the Scenes of the Xi'an Incident: The
Case of the Lixingshe," China Quarterly, no. 154 (June 1998), pp. 283-307. On the "Blue
Shirts" and other related bodies in general, see Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 31-79, and Hung-mao Tien, Government
and Politics in Kuomintang China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 54-65.