October 25, 1937

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND THE WAR OF
  RESISTANCE

James Bertram: What specific pronouncements has the Chinese Communist
Party made before and since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war?

Mao Tse-tung: Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party
warned the whole nation time and again that war with Japan was inevitable,
and that all the Japanese imperialists' talk of a "peaceful settlement" and
all the fine phrases of the Japanese diplomats were only so much camouflage
to screen their preparations for war. We repeatedly stressed that a victorious
war of national liberation cannot be waged unless the united front is
strengthened and a revolutionary policy is adopted. The most important point
in this revolutionary policy is that the Chinese government must institute
democratic reforms in order to mobilize all the people to join the anti-Japanese
front. We repeatedly pointed out the error of those who believed in Japan's
"peace pledge" and thought that war might be avoided, or of those who believed
in the possibility of resisting the Japanese aggressors without mobilizing
the masses. Both the outbreak of the war and its course have proved our views
to be correct. The day after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Communist Party
issued a manifesto to the whole country, calling upon all political parties
and groups and all social strata to make common cause in resisting Japanese
aggression and strengthening the national united front. Soon afterwards we
announced the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation,
in which we set out the policies that the Chinese government ought to adopt
in the War of Resistance. With the institution of Kuomintang-Communist
co-operation we issued another important declaration. All this testifies
to our firm adherence to the principle of waging the War of Resistance by
strengthening the united front and putting a revolutionary policy into effect.
In the present period our basic slogan is "Total resistance by the whole
nation".
THE WAR SITUATION AND ITS LESSONS


Question: As you see it, what are the results of the war up to the
present?

Answer: There are two main aspects. On the one hand, by capturing
our cities, seizing our territory, raping, plundering, burning and massacring,
the Japanese imperialists have irrevocably brought the Chinese people face
to face with the danger of national subjugation. On the other hand, the majority
of the Chinese people have consequently become very much aware that the crisis
cannot be overcome without greater unity and without resistance by the whole
nation. At the same time, the peace-loving countries of the world are being
awakened to the necessity of resisting the Japanese menace. These are the
results produced by the war so far.

Question: What do you think are Japan's objectives, and how far
have they been achieved?

Answer: Japan's plan is to occupy northern China and Shanghai as
the first step and then to occupy other regions of China. As to how far the
Japanese aggressors have realized their plan, they seized the three provinces
of Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan within a short space of time, and now they are
threatening Shansi; the reason is that China's War of Resistance has hitherto
been confined to resistance by the government and the army alone. This crisis
can be overcome only if resistance is carried out jointly by the people and
the government.

Question: In your opinion, has China scored any achievements in
the War of Resistance? If there are any lessons to be drawn, what are they?

Answer: I would like to discuss this question with you in some detail.
First of all, there have been achievements, and great achievements too. They
are to be seen in the following: (1) Never since imperialist aggression
began against China has there been any thing comparable to the present War
of Resistance Against Japan. Geographically, it is truly a war involving
the whole country. This war is revolutionary in character. (2) The war has
changed a disunited country into a relatively united one. The basis of this
unity is Kuomintang-communist co-operation. (3) The war has the sympathy
of world public opinion. Those who once despised China for her nonresistance
now respect her for her resistance. (4) The war has inflicted heavy losses
on the Japanese aggressors. The daily drain on their resources is reported
to be twenty million yen and their casualties are also undoubtedly very heavy,
though figures are not yet available. While the Japanese aggressors took
the four northeastern provinces with ease and with hardly any exertion, now
they cannot occupy Chinese territory without fighting bloody battles. The
aggressors expected to be able to gorge themselves in China, but China's
protracted resistance will bring about the collapse of Japanese imperialism.
Thus China is fighting not only to save herself but also to discharge her
great duty in the world anti-fascist front. Here also the revolutionary character
of the War of Resistance is manifest. (5) We have learned some lessons from
the war. They have been paid for in territory and blood.

As for the lessons, they are likewise great ones. Several months of fighting
have disclosed many of China's weaknesses. They are manifest above all in
the political sphere. Although geographically the war involves the whole
country, it is not being waged by the whole nation. As in the past, the broad
masses are restrained by the government from taking part, and so the war
is not yet of a mass character. Unless it has a mass character, the war against
Japanese imperialist aggression cannot possibly succeed. Some say, "The war
is already an all-embracing war." But this is true only in the sense that
vast parts of the country are involved. As regards participation, it is still
a partial war because it is being waged only by the government and the army,
and not by the people. It is precisely here that the chief reason for the
great loss of territory and for the many military setbacks during the last
few months is to be found. Therefore, although the present armed resistance
is a revolutionary one, its revolutionary character is incomplete because
it is not yet a mass war. Here, too, the problem of unity is involved. Although
the political parties and groups are relatively united as compared with the
past, unity still falls far short of what is needed. Most of the political
prisoners have not yet been released, and the ban on political parties has
not been completely lifted. Relations are still very bad between the government
and the people, between the army and the people, and between officers and
men, and here one observes estrangement instead of unity. This is a fundamental
problem. Unless it is solved, victory is out of the question. In addition,
military blunders are another major reason for our losses in men and territory.
The battles fought have been mostly passive, or to put it in military terms,
have been battles of "pure defence". We can never win by fighting this way.
For the attainment of victory, policies radically different from the present
ones are necessary in both the political and the military fields. These are
the lessons we have learned.

Question: What, then, are the political and military prerequisites?

Answer: On the political side, first, the present government must
be transformed into a united front government in which the representatives
of the people play their part. This government must be at once democratic
and centralized. It should carry out the necessary revolutionary policies.
Secondly, the people must be granted freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
and freedom of assembly and association and the right to take up arms against
the enemy, so that the war will acquire a mass character. Thirdly, the people's
livelihood must be improved through such measures as the abolition of exorbitant
taxes and miscellaneous levies, the reduction of rent and interest, better
conditions for workers, junior officers and soldiers, preferential treatment
for the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese, and relief for victims
of natural calamities and war refugees. Government finance should be based
on the principle of equitable distribution of the economic burden, which
means that those who have money should contribute money. Fourthly, there
should be a positive foreign policy. Fifthly, cultural and educational policy
should be changed. Sixthly, traitors must be sternly suppressed. The problem
has become extremely serious. The traitors are running wild. At the front
they are helping the enemy; in the rear they are creating disturbances, and
some of them even put on an anti-Japanese pose and denounce patriotic people
as traitors and have them arrested. Effective suppression of the traitors
will be possible only when the people are free to co-operate with the government.
On the military side, comprehensive reforms are required, the most important
of these being to change from pure defence in strategy and tactics to the
principle of active attack; to change the armies of the old type into armies
of a new type; to change the method of forcible recruitment into one of arousing
the people to go to the front; to change the divided command into a unified
command, to change the indiscipline which alienates the army from the people
into conscious discipline which forbids the slightest violation of the people's
interests; to change the present situation in which the regular army is fighting
alone into one in which extensive guerrilla warfare by the people is developed
in co-ordination with regular army operations; and so on and so forth. All
these political and military prerequisites are listed in our published Ten-Point
Programme. They all conform to the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's
Principles, his Three Great Policies and his Testament. The war can be won
only when they are carried into effect.

Question: What is the Communist Party doing to carry out this programme?

Answer: We take it as our task tirelessly to explain the situation
and to unite with the Kuomintang and all other patriotic parties and groups
in the effort to expand and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United
Front, mobilize all forces and achieve victory in the War of Resistance.
The Anti-Japanese National United Front is still very limited in scope and
it is necessary to broaden it, that is, to "arouse the masses of the people",
as called for in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament, by mobilizing the people at
the grass roots to join the united front. Consolidation of the united front
means carrying out a common programme which will be binding on all political
parties and groups in their actions. We agree to accept Dr. Sun's revolutionary
Three People's Principles, Three Great Policies and Testament as the common
programme of the united front of all political parties and all social classes.
But so far this programme has not been accepted by all the parties, and above
all the Kuomintang has not agreed to the proclamation of such an over-all
programme. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principle of Nationalism has been partially
put into practice by the Kuomintang, as shown in its resistance to Japan.
But neither his Principle of Democracy nor his Principle of People's Livelihood
has been applied, and the present serious crisis in the War of Resistance
is the result. The war situation having become so critical, it is high time
that the Kuomintang applied the Three People's Principles in full, or otherwise
it will be too late to repent. It is the duty of the Communist Party to raise
its voice and tirelessly and persuasively explain all this to the Kuomintang
and the whole nation so that the genuinely revolutionary Three People's
Principles, the Three Great Policies and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament are
fully and thoroughly applied throughout the country, and the Anti-Japanese
National United Front is broadened and consolidated.
THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Question: Please tell me about the Eighth Route Army in which so
many people are interested--for instance, about its strategy and tactics,
its political work, and so on.

Answer: Indeed a large number of people have become interested in
its activities since the Red Army was redesignated as the Eighth Route Army
and went to the front. I shall now give you a general account.

First about its field operations. Strategically, the Eighth Route Army is
centring them on Shansi. As you know, it has won many victories. Examples
are the battle of Pinghsingkuan, the recapture of Chingping, Pinglu and Ningwu,
the recovery of Laiyuan and Kuangling, the capture of Tzechingkuan, the cutting
of the three main supply routes of the Japanese troops (between Tatung and
Yenmenkuan, between Weihsien and Pinghsingkuan, and between Shuohsien and
Ningwu), the assault on the rear of the Japanese forces south of Yenmenkuan,
the recapture twice over of Pinghsingkuan and Yenmenkuan, and the recent
recovery of Chuyang and Tanghsien. The Japanese troops in Shansi are being
strategically encircled by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese troops.
We may say with certainty that the Japanese troops will meet with the most
stubborn resistance in northern China. If they try to ride roughshod over
Shansi, they will certainly encounter greater difficulties than ever.

Next about strategy and tactics. We are doing what the other Chinese troops
have not done, i.e., operating chiefly on the enemy's flanks and
rear. This way of fighting is vastly different from purely frontal defence.
We are not against employing part of the forces in frontal operations, for
that is necessary. But the main forces must be used against the enemy's flanks
and it is essential to adopt encircling and outflanking tactics in order
to attack the enemy independently and with the initiative in our hands, for
that is the only way to destroy his forces and preserve our own. Furthermore,
the use of some of our armed forces against the enemy's rear is particularly
effective, because they can disrupt his supply lines and bases. Even the
frontal forces should rely mainly on "counter assault" and not on purely
defensive tactics. One important reason for the military setbacks in the
last few months has been the use of unsuitable methods of fighting. The methods
of fighting employed by the Eighth Route Army are what we call guerrilla
and mobile warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands.
In principle these methods are basically the same as those we used during
the civil war, but there are certain differences. For example, at the present
stage, in order to facilitate our surprise attacks on the enemy's flanks
and rear over an extensive area, we divide our forces more often than we
concentrate them. Since the armed forces of the country as a whole are
numerically strong, some of them should be used for frontal defence and some
dispersed to carry on guerrilla operations, but the main forces should always
be concentrated against the enemy's flanks. The first essential in war is
to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy, and for this purpose it is
necessary to wage guerrilla and mobile warfare independently and with the
initiative in our hands and to avoid all passive and inflexible tactics.
If a vast number of troops wage mobile warfare with the Eighth Route Army
assisting them by guerrilla warfare, our victory will be certain.

Next about political work. Another highly significant and distinctive feature
of the Eighth Route Army is its political work, which is guided by three
basic principles. First, the principle of unity between officers and men,
which means eradicating feudal practices in the army, prohibiting beating
and abuse, building up a conscious discipline, and sharing weal and woe--as
a result of which the entire army is closely united. Second, the principle
of unity between the army and the people, which means maintaining a discipline
that forbids the slightest violation of the people's interests, conducting
propaganda among the masses, organizing and arming them, lightening their
financial burdens and suppressing the traitors and collaborators who do harm
to the army and the people--as a result of which the army is closely united
with the people and welcomed everywhere. Third, the principle of disintegrating
the enemy troops and giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. Our victory
depends not only upon our military operations but also upon the disintegration
of the enemy troops. Although our measures for disintegrating the enemy troops
and for treating prisoners of war leniently have not yielded conspicuous
results as yet, they will certainly do so in the future. Moreover, in line
with the second of the three principles, the Eighth Route Army replenishes
its forces not by coercion but by the much more effective method of arousing
the people to volunteer for the front.

Although Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan and part of Shansi have been lost, we
are not at all discouraged but are resolutely calling upon the entire army
to co-ordinate with the friendly armies and fight with grim determination
to defend Shansi and recover the lost territories. The Eighth Route Army
will co-ordinate its actions with those of other Chinese troops in order
to maintain the resistance in Shansi; this will be very important for the
war as a whole, and especially for the war in northern China.

Question: In your opinion, can these good points of the Eighth Route
Army also be acquired by the other Chinese armies?

Answer: Certainly they can. In 1924-27 the spirit of the Kuomintang
troops was broadly similar to that of the Eighth Route Army today. The Communist
Party and the Kuomintang were then co-operating in organizing armed forces
of a new type which, beginning with only two regiments, rallied round themselves
many other troops and won their first victory when they defeated Chen
Chiung-ming. These forces later grew into an army corps and still more troops
came under its influence; only then did the Northern Expedition take place.
A fresh spirit prevailed among these forces; on the whole there was unity
between officers and men and between the army and the people, and the army
was filled with a revolutionary militancy. The system of Party representatives
and of political departments, adopted for the first time in China, entirely
changed the complexion of these armed forces. The Red Army, which was founded
in 1927, and the Eighth Route Army of today have inherited this system and
developed it. In the revolutionary period of 1924-27, the armed forces which
were imbued with this new spirit naturally employed methods of fighting
consistent with their political outlook, operating not in a passive and
inflexible way but with initiative and with an eagerness to take the offensive,
and consequently they were victorious in the Northern Expedition. It is troops
of this kind we need on the battlefields today. We do not necessarily need
them in millions; with a nucleus of a few hundred thousand such men, we can
defeat Japanese imperialism. We deeply esteem the armies throughout the country
for their heroic sacrifices since the War of Resistance began, but there
are lessons to be learned from the bloody battles that have been fought.

Question: Japanese army discipline being what it is, will not your
policy of giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war prove ineffective?
For instance, the Japanese command may kill the prisoners when you release
them and the Japanese army as a whole will not understand the meaning of
your policy.

Answer: That is impossible. The more they kill, the more sympathy
will be aroused for the Chinese forces among the Japanese soldiers. Such
facts cannot be concealed from the rank and file. We will persevere in this
policy of ours. For instance, we shall not change it even if the Japanese
army carries out its declared intention of using poison-gas against the Eighth
Route Army. We shall go on giving lenient treatment to captured Japanese
soldiers and to those captured junior officers who have fought us under coercion;
we shall not insult or abuse them, but shall set them free after explaining
to them the identity of the interests of the people of the two countries.
Those who do not want to go back may serve in the Eighth Route Army. If an
international brigade appears on the anti-Japanese battle front, they may
join it and take up arms against Japanese imperialism.
CAPITULATIONISM IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE


Question: I understand that while carrying on the war, Japan is
spreading peace rumours in Shanghai. What are her real objectives?

Answer: After succeeding in certain of their plans, the Japanese
imperialists will once again put up a smokescreen of peace in order to attain
three objectives. They are: (1) to consolidate the positions already captured
for use as a strategic springboard for further offensives; (2) to split China's
anti-Japanese front; and (3) to break up the international front of support
for China. The present peace rumours are simply the first smoke-bomb. The
danger is that there are certain vacillating elements in China who are ready
to succumb to the enemy's wiles and that the traitors and collaborators are
manoeuvering among them and spreading all kinds of rumours in their efforts
to make China capitulate to the Japanese aggressors.

Question: As you see it, what could this danger lead to?

Answer: There can be only two courses of development: either the
Chinese people will overcome capitulationism, or capitulationism will prevail,
with the result that the anti-Japanese front will be split and China will
be plunged into disorder.

Question: Which of the two is the more likely?

Answer: The whole Chinese people demand that the war be fought to
a finish. If a section of the ruling group takes the road of capitulation,
the rest who remain firm will certainly oppose it and carry on resistance
together with the people. Of course it would be a misfortune for China's
anti-Japanese front. But I am sure that the capitulationists cannot win mass
support and that the masses will overcome capitulationism, persevere in the
war and achieve victory.

Question: May I ask how capitulationism can be overcome?

Answer: Both by words, that is, by exposing the danger of
capitulationism, and by deeds, that is, by organizing the masses to stop
the capitulationist activities. Capitulationism has its roots in national
defeatism or national pessimism, that is, in the idea that having lost some
battles, China has no strength left to fight Japan. These pessimists do not
realize that failure is the mother of success, that the lessons learned from
failures are the basis for future triumphs. They see the defeats but not
the successes in the War of Resistance, and in particular they fail to see
that our defeats contain the elements of victory, while the enemy's victories
contain the elements of defeat. We must show the masses of the people the
victorious prospects of the war and help them to understand that our defeats
and difficulties are temporary and that, as long as we keep on fighting in
spite of all setbacks, the final victory will be ours. Deprived of a mass
base, the capitulationists will have no chance to play their tricks, and
the anti-Japanese front will be consolidated.
DEMOCRACY AND THE WAR OF RESISTANCE


Question: What is the meaning of "democracy" as put forward by the
Communist Party in its programme? Does it not conflict with a "wartime
government"?

Answer: Not at all. The Communist Party put forward the slogan of
a "democratic republic" as early as August 1936. Politically and organizationally
this slogan signifies: (1) The state and government must not belong to a
single class but must be based on the alliance of all the anti-Japanese classes
to the exclusion of traitors and collaborators, and must include the workers,
the peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. (2) The organizational
form of such a government will be democratic centralism, which is at once
democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and
centralization united in a definite form. (3) This government will grant
the people all the necessary political freedoms, especially the freedom to
organize and train and arm themselves for self-defence. In these three respects,
it can be seen that a democratic republic in no way conflicts with a wartime
government, but is precisely the form of state and government advantageous
to the War of Resistance.

Question: Is not "democratic centralism" a self -contradictory term?

Answer: We must look not only at the term but at the reality. There
is no impassable gulf between democracy and centralism, both of which are
essential for China. On the one hand, the government we want must be truly
representative of the popular will; it must have the support of the broad
masses throughout the country and the people must be free to support it and
have every opportunity of influencing its policies. This is the meaning of
democracy. On the other hand, the centralization of administrative power
is also necessary, and once the policy measures demanded by the people are
transmitted to their own elected government through their representative
body, the government will carry them out and will certainly be able to do
so smoothly, so long as it does not go against the policy adopted in accordance
with the people's will. This is the meaning of centralism. Only by adopting
democratic centralism can a government be really strong, and this system
must be adopted by China's government of national defence in the anti-Japanese
war.

Question: This does not correspond to a war cabinet, does it?

Answer: It does not correspond to some of the war cabinets of the
past.

Question: Have there ever been any war cabinets of this kind?

Answer: Yes. Systems of government in wartime may generally be divided
into two kinds, as determined by the nature of the war--one kind is democratic
centralism and the other absolute centralism. All wars in history may be
divided into two kinds according to their nature: just wars and unjust wars.
For instance, the Great War in Europe some twenty years ago was an unjust,
imperialist war. The governments of the imperialist countries forced the
people to fight for the interests of imperialism and thus went against the
people's interests, these circumstances necessitating a type of government
such as the Lloyd George government in Britain. Lloyd George repressed the
British people, forbidding them to speak against the imperialist war and
banning organizations or assemblies that expressed popular opinion against
the war; even though Parliament remained, it was merely the organ of a group
of imperialists, a parliament which rubber-stamped the war budget. The absence
of unity between the government and the people in a war gives rise to a
government of absolute centralism with all centralism and no democracy. But
historically there have also been revolutionary wars, e.g., in France,
Russia, and present-day Spain. In such wars the government does not fear
popular disapproval, because the people are most willing to wage this kind
of war; far from fearing the people, it endeavours to arouse them and encourages
them to express their views so that they will actively participate in the
war, because the government rests upon the people's voluntary support. China's
war of national liberation has the full approval of the people and cannot
be won without their participation; therefore democratic centralism becomes
a necessity. In the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, too, the victories were
achieved through democratic centralism. Thus it can be seen that when the
aims of a war directly reflect the interests of the people, the more democratic
the government, the more effectively can the war be prosecuted. Such a government
need have no fear that the people will oppose the war; rather it should be
worried lest the people remain inactive or indifferent to the war. The nature
of a war determines the relationship between the government and the people--this
is a law of history.

Question: Then what steps are you prepared to take for this system
of government to be instituted?

Answer: The key question is co-operation between the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party.

Question: Why?

Answer: For the last fifteen years, the relationship between the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party has been the decisive political factor
in China. The co-operation of the two parties in 1924-27 resulted in the
victories of the first revolution. The split between the two parties in 1927
resulted in the unfortunate situation of the last decade. However, the
responsibility for the split was not ours; we were compelled to resist the
Kuomintang's oppression, and we persisted in holding high the glorious banner
of China's liberation. Now the third stage has come, and the two parties
must co-operate fully on a definite programme in order to resist Japan and
save the nation. Through our ceaseless efforts, the establishment of co-operation
has at last been announced, but the point is that both sides must accept
a common programme and act upon it. An essential part of such a programme
is the setting up of a new system of government.

Question: How can the new system be set up through the cooperation
of the two parties?

Answer: We are proposing a reconstruction of the government apparatus
and the army system. We propose that a provisional national assembly be convened
to meet the present emergency. Delegates to this assembly should be chosen
in due proportion from the various anti-Japanese political parties, anti-Japanese
armies and anti-Japanese popular and business organizations, as Dr. Sun Yat-sen
suggested in 1924. This assembly should function as the supreme organ of
state authority to decide on the policies for saving the nation, adopt a
constitutional programme and elect the government. We hold that the War of
Resistance has reached a critical turning point and that only the immediate
convening of such a national assembly vested with authority and representative
of the popular will can regenerate China's political life and overcome the
present crisis. We are exchanging views with the Kuomintang about this proposal
and hope to obtain its agreement.

Question: Has not the National Government announced that the national
assembly has been called off?

Answer: It was right to call it off. What has been called off is
the national assembly which the Kuomintang was preparing to convene; according
to the Kuomintang's stipulations it would not have had the slightest power,
and the procedure for its election was entirely in conflict with the popular
will. Together with the people of all sections of society, we disapproved
of that kind of national assembly. The provisional national assembly we are
proposing is radically different from the one that has been called off. The
convening of this provisional national assembly will undoubtedly impart a
new spirit to the whole country and provide the essential prerequisite for
reconstructing the government apparatus and the army and for mobilizing the
entire people. On this hinges the favourable turn in the War of Resistance.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.