Zhou, Zhu, Peng,[1] and inform Lin, Nie:[2] Supplementary opinions on operational issues:

A. Cheng Qian’s[3] decision to abandon Shijiazhuang and concentrate forces to defend the Taihang Mountains is correct. However, after the enemy occupies Shijiazhuang, they will advance westward. Therefore, heavy troops must be concentrated at Longquan Pass and Niangzi Pass to hold them firmly, enabling the main force to achieve victory north of Taiyuan. On the right flank, besides Zhu Huaibing,[4] what other forces are available, and can they fulfill the task of holding firm?

B. The total number of enemy troops entering Shanxi is estimated to be no more than two and a half divisions. To secure the dozens of counties already occupied in northern Shanxi, at least one division will be dispersed. Thus, the force attacking Taiyuan is likely no more than one and a half divisions at most. South of Yanmen Pass, troops must also be dispersed along the route for garrison duties. Consequently, the force engaged in combat around Xinkou will probably be no more than one division, already surrounded by us on three sides. If Longquan Pass and Niangzi Pass can hold for one month, and if our deployment is appropriate, considering the quantity and quality of our forces, it is possible to temporarily disrupt the enemy’s offensive plan. Our forces number over 150,000, and the Red Army and Wei Lihuang’s[5] troops, in terms of quality, can serve as the leaders of the northern Shanxi campaign. The Shanxi army, now at a critical juncture, will be compelled to fight.

C. The key to this campaign lies in the following three points:
(1) The firm defense of Niangzi Pass and Longquan Pass.
(2) The defense and offensive operations in the frontal Xinkou area (offensive operations are primary).
(3) The disruption of the enemy’s rear.

D. To achieve the above objectives:
(1) Request Nanjing to promptly dispatch an additional three to four divisions of fresh troops to Niangzi Pass.
(2) Request Wei’s four divisions to serve as the main force of the frontal offensive corps, with two divisions of the Shanxi army assisting in the offensive and the remainder handling garrison duties.
(3) The main forces of the Red Army’s Lin and He divisions[6] shall undertake operations to disrupt the enemy’s flanks and rear-depth areas from both the east and west. Additionally, request Nanjing to dispatch two divisions of fresh troops to operate from Laiyuan and Yu County.

E. To this end, the main force of our 115th Division should not only refrain from moving into Hebei but also should not be positioned at Longquan Pass. It seems advisable to first shift to the Doucun-Taihuai line, so as to timely strike the Daying-Shahe-Fanshi line and prepare, when possible and necessary, to cross the Great Wall northward to Hunyuan and Ying County. Using this as a center, divide into several detachments, conduct night operations, and raid the Yanmen-Datong railway line and the Datong-Zhangjiakou railway line, as well as the Zhangjiakou-Guangling and Guangling-Daixian motor roads. This action by the 115th Division (even better if supplemented by two Nanjing divisions), combined with the operations of the main force of He’s division in Zuoyun, Youyu, Pinglu, and Shuo County, will cause a halt in the enemy’s frontal offensive in Shanxi, possibly even a temporary partial retreat. It will also compel the enemy on the Ping-Han line to cease advancing deep south of Shijiazhuang, instead adopting a posture of using part of their forces to garrison the Beiping-Shijiazhuang line while diverting another part to deal with our forces in the Lingqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling, and Yu County area.[7] For the 115th Division itself, due to frequent transfers and combat, it must be prepared to pay a considerable price, namely, a reduction of 2,000 to 2,500 personnel, and as a result of this reduction, a small portion of rifles will have to be handed over to local civilians to arm them. However, this holds great significance for supporting the operations in Shanxi, which in turn supports the longer-term strategic goal of sustaining operations in North China.

F. Therefore, after your detailed consideration, if you fundamentally agree with this policy, please execute the following steps:
(1) Request Cheng and Yan[8] to confirm which units and commanders will reinforce the garrison at Longquan Pass and Niangzi Pass, and when they will arrive, to ensure the security of the eastern flank.
(2) Request Cheng and Yan to dispatch two divisions to the northern section of Mount Heng.
(3) Request Cheng and Yan to supply our army with 3,000 to 3,500 rifles, 30 to 35 machine guns, and permit the supplementation of 5,000 to 7,000 new recruits.
(4) The 115th Division’s training battalion should be deployed to the area centered on Taiyuan to carry out Red expansion, and should not be sent to Hebei, as expansion there is unreliable. The cavalry battalion should move with the main force. The headquarters and He’s division should also send personnel to the Taiyuan area for Red expansion.
(5) The main force or the entirety of Liu’s division[9] should be deployed on the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway, mobilizing the masses and coordinating with the defending forces at Niangzi Pass to secure the rear lines.

G. Please consider the above opinions in detail and reply by telegram.
After finishing this telegram, I received Zhu and Peng’s telegram of 6:00 today. Our opinions are fundamentally aligned, but I wonder if Lin and Nie still have any differing views? Also, advise Yan and Cheng to pay close attention to secrecy; it is best if their deployments are not transmitted by radio, as that would be extremely dangerous.

Mao Zedong
1:00 a.m., the 6th

Published based on a manuscript copy preserved in the Central Archives.

**Notes**
[1] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Zhu refers to Zhu De. Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then Deputy Commander of the Eighth Route Army.
[2] Lin and Nie refer to Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, then respectively Commander and Deputy Commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.
[3] Cheng Qian (1882–1968), a native of Liling, Hunan. At the time, he served as Chief of Staff of the Military Affairs Commission of the Nationalist Government and Acting Commander of the First War Zone.
[4] Zhu Huaibing (1892–1968), a native of Huanggang (now Huangzhou), Hubei. At the time, he served as Commander of the 94th Division of the Nationalist Army.
[5] Wei Lihuang, then Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Group Army of the Nationalist Army.
[6] Refers to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao, and the 120th Division, commanded by He Long.
[7] Refers to Lingqiu and Guangling in Shanxi, and Laiyuan and Yu County in Hebei.
[8] Yan refers to Yan Xishan, then Commander of the Second War Zone of the Nationalist Army.
[9] Refers to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.