In the Critical Situation in North China,
We Must Persevere in the Guerrilla War Policy

(September 29, 1937)

Zhou, Zhu, Peng, Ren[1]:

A. The overall situation in North China is extremely perilous. The enemy has already broken through the middle between the Beiping–Hankou and Tianjin–Pukou railways. Baoding has fallen, and the enemy is now outflanking Shijiazhuang from the flank. The situation in Hebei is already finished. The three armies of Wei Lihuang, Zeng Wanzhong, and Sun Lianzhong[2] have withdrawn to the line of Fuping–Huolu and are deploying flank positions, relying on the Taihang Mountains. After the fall of Hebei, the enemy will land at Haizhou and advance to occupy Xuzhou, and Shandong will then be lost without a fight. Before long, China’s positions will be reduced to holding the two lines of the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. This situation will affect the Shanghai front and bring about certain changes. Nanjing will be heavily bombed, and if the Kuomintang does not compromise, it will certainly move the capital. It is estimated that China’s political situation will undergo changes within a few months. We should strive by that time to achieve the transformation of the government, the transformation of the army, the implementation of the Three Principles of the People and the Ten-Point Program[3], and the continued support of the national

war for the purpose of the national war. Only at that time can a truly people’s national war be realized. It is judged that at that time the Soviet Union will provide China with substantive assistance.

B. Shanxi will become a special situation in North China. This is fundamentally because of the presence of the Red Army, and secondly because Yan Xishan[1] has joined forces with us. The combination of these two forces will create a guerrilla war involving millions of people. We should persevere in this policy, organize guerrilla warfare throughout the province, and firmly uphold the fundamental policies of abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing rent and interest, ensuring the people’s participation in government, and reforming the Jin Army.

C. At present, the resistance along the Great Wall is only temporary, and an extremely brief temporary measure at that. Yan will certainly demand that our army coordinate with him to fight one or two battles. In order to exert a better influence on the Jin Army, if conditions are truly favorable, participation is of course permissible, but careful calculation must be made. This is only a temporary situation at the campaign level. The fundamental policy is to win over the masses and organize guerrilla units of the masses. Under this general policy, carry out conditional concentrated operations. You should demand that Yan Xishan provide ten thousand rifles to arm the people. You should establish a cadre school at the front with five hundred to one thousand students, jointly run by the Red Army and the local Party, to train guerrilla war cadres. After six months, a large portion of the first-term students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University can be deployed in Shanxi.

D. Regarding the plan to use the 115th Division in coordination with two or three Kuomintang divisions, after the enemy has penetrated fairly deep, to launch a surprise attack on Lingqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling, Yuxian[2] and areas to their north, striking at their undefended rear, please study this carefully. If this move is carried out, it may be possible to open up a new situation for a period of time. Although it cannot fundamentally sabotage the enemy’s strategic plan, temporary and partial disruption is possible. This would greatly benefit the establishment of our base areas throughout Shanxi.

Mao Zedong

10:00, September 29

--- Notes

[1] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Zhu refers to Zhu De. Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then Deputy Commander of the Eighth Route Army. Ren refers to Ren Bishi, then Director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army.


[1] Yan Xishan, then Commander of the Second War Zone of the Kuomintang.


[2] Wei Lihuang, then Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Group Army of the Kuomintang forces. Zeng Wanzhong (1896–?), a native of Daguan, Yunnan, then Commander of the 3rd Army of the Kuomintang forces. Sun Lianzhong (1893–1990), a native of Xiongxian, Hebei, then Commander of the 1st Army Corps of the Kuomintang forces.


[2] Refers to Lingqiu and Guangling in Shanxi, and Laiyuan and Yuxian in Hebei.

[3] The Ten-Point Program refers to the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation adopted at the Luochuan Conference of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in August 1937, namely: 1. Overthrow Japanese imperialism; 2. General mobilization of the nation’s military forces; 3. General mobilization of the entire nation; 4. Reform the political structure; 5. Adopt an anti-Japanese foreign policy; 6. Adopt wartime financial and economic policies; 7. Improve the people’s livelihood; 8. Adopt an anti-Japanese education policy; 9. Eliminate traitors, collaborators, and pro-Japanese elements, and consolidate the rear; 10. Achieve anti-Japanese national unity.