(September 29, 1937, 10:00 A.M.)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. The overall situation in North China is extremely dangerous. The enemy has
already broken through between the Beiping-Hankou line and the Tianjin-Pukou
line. Baoding is lost. The enemy is just now carrying out a flanking operation on
the side of Shijiazhuang. Hebei is finished. The three armies of Wei Lihuang, Zen
Wanzhong, and Sun Lianzhong have retreated to the Fuping-Huolu line. They are
digging in on the side taking advantage of the Taihang mountain range. After the
loss of Hebei, the enemy will land at Haizhou and advance to take Xuzhou. Then
Shandong will be lost without a battle. Very soon, the Chinese positions will be to
defend the lines along the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. Such a situation will
cause some changes at the Shanghai front. Nanjing will be subject to major bombardments. If the Guomindang does not compromise, it will have to change its
capital. It is estimated that the political situation in China will undergo changes in
the next few months. During this time, we should strive to achieve the goals of
reforming the government, reforming the military, putting into practice the Three
People's Principles and the Ten Major Points of the political program, and continuing to support the national war. And only at that time will it be possible to
realize a true national people's war. It is estimated that at that time the Soviet
Union will render China truly powerful assistance.

2. Shanxi will become a special case in North China. This is basically because
of the existence of the Red Army, and secondarily because of the collaboration
between Yan Xishan and us. The union of these two forces will result in a guerrilla
war participated in by several millions of people. We should uphold this policy
and make arrangements for waging guerrilla war in the whole province. We should
uphold the fundamental orientation of abolishing the system of exorbitant taxes
and levies, reducing rent and interest, letting people participate in government,
and reforming the Shanxi forces.

3. At present, the situation of fighting the Resistance War along the Great Wall
is only a temporary phenomenon, and a very temporary phenomenon at that. Yan
[Xishan] will definitely request that our forces play a supportive role in fighting a
battle or two in concert with his forces. In order to exert more effective influence
on the Shanxi forces, if the conditions are truly advantageous, we may, of course,
participate in such actions. We must, however, take into account the fact that this is
only a temporary situation in the combat. The fundamental policy lies in winning
over the masses, and organizing guerrilla contingents with participation by the
masses. Guided by such a general policy, we shall concentrate and fight battles
only when conditions are right. You should request that Yan provide ten thousand
rifles to arm the people. You should set up a cadres' school at the front for from
five hundred to one thousand people, to be run jointly by the Red Army and the
local Party organization so as to supply cadres for the guerrilla war. In six months'
time, a substantial part of the first class of Kangda¹ can be used in Shanxi.

4. As regards the plan to have the 115th Division collaborate with two or three
Guomindang divisions to make a sudden thrust toward Lingqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling,
and Weixian and north of these xian to disrupt the empty rear of the enemy after
he has penetrated very deeply, I ask you to make a serious study of this. If such a
plan is carried out, we may be able to open up a new situation within a certain
period. Although we will not be able to disrupt fundamentally the strategic plans
of the enemy, it is possible to disrupt his plans temporarily and partially. This will
be extremely helpful in creating our base areas in the whole of Shanxi Province.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 65-67, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp.
28-30.

¹ 1. The Resist Japan University set up at about this time.