(September 25, 1937)
Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

I have new views regarding strategy. A long telegram will be sent out immediately.¹ For the moment, I want to ask you to keep all Red Army units in northeastern Shanxi temporarily stationary, conceal the target, and do not alert the enemy.
In this way, when the main forces of the enemy penetrate as far as the vicinity of
Daizhou and Baoding, we will strike suddenly northward, to retake the Heng mountain range. The Red Army will play a strategic role in the decisive battle at Baoding
and in northern Shanxi.

Mao Zedong

My Views Regarding Strategy in the
Operations in North China

(September 25, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], and also to Zhou [Enlai], and to be
communicated to Lin Biao:

My strategic views:
1. Based on the present situation, in which the enemy is attacking Baoding and
Daizhou, and is advancing toward Shijiazhuang and Taiyuan, but does not appear
to have many troops defending the four xian of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and in
the light of the talk between Chiang [Kaishek] and Yan [Xishan] in which they
decided to adopt the policy of fighting a decisive campaign in Baoding, but resorting to a tenacious defense in northern Shanxi, in order to prevent the enemy from
occupying Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang to the south, and to support the protracted
war in North China, I propose to ask Chiang and Yan to send He Zhuguo's¹ entire
cavalry army, as well 15,000 to 20,000 strong infantry troops from the Guangxi
faction or the Central Army, to cooperate with the whole of Lin's division of our
armies,² [the joint forces] to be commanded by Zhu and Peng. When the enemy
from Wei and Lai is marching toward Baoding, and the enemy from Ling and
Guang is marching toward Daizhou, and when they have indeed gone deeply into
these regions, you should launch a sudden attack northward from between Ling
and Lai (a counteroffensive breakthrough in the center), regain the four xian of
Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and then launch a large-scale surprise attack from the
rear flank along the Datong-Zhangjiakou-Beiping line, the Datong-Taiyuan line,
and the Beiping-Shijiazhuang line, and set up fortified mass base areas in Ling,
Lai, Guang, and Wei. If this succeeds, we may use a fairly large unit to go in and
out of Rehe, thus perhaps creating a new prospect in the war in North China, and
sustaining this protracted war for quite a long period of time. Please think about
this and then make suggestions to Chiang and Yan.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 60-62, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp.
25-27.
2. Whether or not Chiang and Yan help, at the moment it is not appropriate for
the Red Army to be exposed too early, and it is particularly inappropriate to send
out tactical detachments. You should wait until the enemy in Wei and Lai has left
Wei and Lai and gone to the vicinity of Mancheng, wait until the enemy in Ling
and Guang has left Ling and Guang and gone to the vicinity of Fanzhi, and the
number of enemy troops in these four xian has become extremely small (at this
moment the enemy in Zuozhou should be attacking in the vicinity of Xushui, and
the enemy in Datong should be attacking in the vicinity of Yanmenguan). Then
you can use our entire Lin division to launch an attack northward. On the basis of
the specific situation, it may be subdivided into numerous small detachments or
two to three corps, and carry out an extensive surprise attack on the enemy's empty
rear flank in the extended region to the east, west, and north of the Heng mountains. If the main forces of the enemy have not been concentrated at its major point
of attack, and the enemy's rear is not yet entirely empty, it will be disadvantageous
to expose the target of the Red Army and attract the enemy's attention. It is no use
at all if you send only tactical detachments.

3. If you agree with the above ideas, please conceal all our military forces for
the time being, conserve strength and store up energy, and wait to carry out our
plan until the necessary conditions are ready. At that time, Wang Zhen's forces³
should be put in a place where they will be able to assist the front as well as to
maintain the rear. The same principle applies to the use of He's division⁴ in northwest Shanxi.

4. If you have reached the enemy's rear, you should adopt the policy of confiscating the property of the big landlords and mobilize the masses extensively. Thus,
the Red Army will not be isolated.

5. Chiang and Yan's policy of fighting a decisive battle in Baoding and mounting a firm defense in northern Shanxi (see Chiang's telegram of the 19th regarding
deployment) is absolutely a passive posture inviting defeat. Without the surprise
attack in the enemy's rear by an army suddenly appearing from nowhere mentioned above, they will not be able to hold out for long. Only by carrying out the
aforementioned plan can we turn a passive situation into an active one. Now that
this is the only move left, you should try your best to persuade Chiang and Yan
(for the moment, do not tell them that the Red Army is operating independently;
only ask them to send some troops to assist you).

6. If the above plan can be carried out, even if Baoding and Daizhou fall, it will
not be something to fear. Without paying the price of the fall of certain places, we
will not be able to obtain the advantage of operating in the enemy's rear.

7. The above plan should be carried out under the conditions that the enemy
troops in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei are extremely few, and that there is the kind of
topography in which the enemy troops in the rear find it very difficult to operate
while our infantry forces find it very easy to move around.

8. The above is a suggestion. Please think it over and reply by telegram.

Mao Zedong

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 59, where it is reproduced
from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. See the text immediately following.


1. He Zhuguo was at this time commander of the Second Cavalry Army of the Guomindang
Army.

2. I.e., the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

3. Wang Zhen was at this time deputy commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th
Division of the Eighth Route Army.

4. The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He
Long.