(1) The entire work in North China should take guerrilla warfare as its sole direction. All other tasks—such as mass mobilization and the united front—must be subordinated to and revolve around guerrilla warfare. If the regular warfare in North China fails, we shall not be held responsible; however, if guerrilla warfare fails, we will bear grave responsibility.

(2) Apart from the arrangements already made in Shanxi, the Party in Hebei should devote all its strength to guerrilla warfare. Leveraging the Red Army’s prestige in the War of Resistance, we should mobilize the entire Party throughout North China (including Shandong), rouse the masses, collect scattered soldiers and firearms, and systematically yet broadly organize guerrilla units. To this end, might Comrade Zhou consider holding another round of talks with Ma Zhian, Huang Shaoxiong, and others? Please make your own judgment.

(3) To achieve this goal, priority should be given to assigning senior cadres and establishing independent collective organs of the Party, government, and military capable of exercising leadership. We must envision a scenario in which, even after the enemy has completely occupied North China, we can sustain extensive and effective guerrilla warfare. It is imperative to make clear to the entire Party that henceforth there is no other task save guerrilla warfare. To this end, the Red Army should provide every possible form of assistance.

(September 25, 1937)

Guerrilla Warfare Should Be the Only
Orientation of All the Work in North China

To Zhou Enlai; to be relayed to Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], [Yang] Shangkun, and Zhu
Rui, and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi].

1. All our work in North China should be oriented solely toward guerrilla warfare. All work, such as the soldiers' movement, the united front, and so on, should
center on guerrilla warfare. If the regular warfare in North China ends in defeat,
we shall not be held responsible; but if guerrilla warfare fails, we must assume a
heavy responsibility.

2. Apart from the dispositions in Shanxi, about which you have already been
notified, the Party organizations in Hebei should be ordered to devote every effort
to guerrilla warfare. Making use of the prestige of the Red Army in fighting Japan,
the Party organizations in all of North China (including Shandong) should be encouraged to mobilize the masses, incorporate stragglers and their rifles into our
forces, and organize guerrilla units in an extensive but planned way. Should Zhou
have another talk with Feng Zhi'an and Huang Shaohong about this matter?

3. To achieve this purpose, special attention should be paid to the allocation of
our high-ranking cadres, and to the establishment of Party, government, and army
organs under their independent leadership. We must envisage how we can persist
in extensive and forceful guerrilla warfare in the event of the occupation of the
whole of North China by the enemy. We must make plain to the whole Party that,
from now on, mobilizing the people both inside and outside the Party, we have no
other task than guerrilla warfare. To this end, the Red Army should render all
possible assistance.

4. Please let me know regarding the deployments in the whole of North China.¹

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, pp. 57-58, where it is reproduced from
a copy in the Central Archives.
¹ A version of this document published in Renmin ribao for July 7, 1981, includes two more
paragraphs, dealing with obtaining arms from Yan Xishan, running cadre schools at the front,
and a possible coordinated attack by the 115th Division and two or three Guomindang divisions. (For a translation of this text, see Saich, Rise to Power, p. 794.) The more authoritative
version of these military orders, which appears in Junshi wenji, reveals that these two paragraphs belong in fact to Mao's telegram to Zhou Enlai of September 29, 1937, translated below.