Opinions on Conducting Guerrilla Warfare in Shanxi

(September 23, 1937)

Comrade Xuefeng,[1] and to inform Zhou, Zhu, Peng, Ren, Lin, Nie, He, Xiao, Liu, Xu, Zhang[2]:

Your telegram of the 18th[3] has been received. Regarding the proposal put forward by Mr. Yan that, should unfavorable circumstances arise, the two armies unite as one and resolutely resist the Japanese aggressors’ offensive by means of guerrilla warfare, I am in complete agreement. However, I have the following opinions:

A. Guerrilla warfare should primarily be conducted on the enemy’s flanks and in his rear. In Shanxi, it should be divided into four zones: northwestern Shanxi, northeastern Shanxi, southeastern Shanxi, and southwestern Shanxi, assuming a posture of surrounding and attacking from all sides the enemy advancing into the central cities and key communication lines. It would be inadvisable to concentrate forces in the single area of the Wutai Mountain range; concentrating in one area
would make it difficult to gain a firm foothold.

B. The Wutai Mountain range should be made one of the important guerrilla zones, and preparations should be intensified immediately. Both sides may send personnel to reconnoiter and plan everything without delay.

C. At the same time, full attention should be paid to the Guancen Mountain range area in northwestern Shanxi, as well as its deployment and preparation, because the enemy will certainly occupy the Shenchi and Ningwu areas there first, coordinating with the action of occupying the Hengshan Mountain range to the east, to gain the advantage of commanding heights, and then launch an attack on Taiyuan.

D. Although southeastern Shanxi in the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges and southwestern Shanxi in the Lüliang Mountain range are still relatively far from the enemy at present, it is nonetheless necessary to make appropriate deployments there at this time, such as the preparation and relocation of certain essential materials. Concentrating materials solely at Wutai is inappropriate.

E. In guerrilla warfare, apart from military deployment, the most crucial aspect is to rely closely on the broad masses of the rural population. Only in this way can final victory be achieved.

F. The aforementioned deployments and plans do not hinder the current plan of striving to conduct a favorable decisive battle with the main forces in the area along the Great Wall.

G. Regarding Mr. Yan’s sincere cooperation and the matter of consulting on command, we are greatly impressed and grateful.

H. It is hoped that the above opinions on guerrilla warfare will be promptly presented to Mr. Yan for his consideration. Should they be adopted, it would be a great fortune for the War of Resistance.

Mao Zedong
Noon, 23rd

--- Notes

[1] Xuefeng, namely Peng Xuefeng, then serving as Director of the Operations Department of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and concurrently Director of the Eighth Route Army Office in Shanxi.

[2] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Zhu refers to Zhu De. Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then serving as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army. Ren refers to Ren Bishi, then serving as Director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army. Lin and Nie refer to Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, then serving respectively as Commander and Political Commissar of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. He and Xiao refer to He Long and Xiao Ke, then serving respectively as Commander and Deputy Commander of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Liu, Xu, and Zhang refer to Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, and Zhang Hao (Lin Yuying), then serving respectively as Commander, Deputy Commander, and Political Commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[3] Refers to Peng Xuefeng’s telegram of September 18, 1937, to Mao Zedong. The telegram reported on his secret meeting on the 16th with Yan Xishan, Commander-in-Chief of the Second War Zone of the Nationalist Army, in which Yan Xishan suggested: should the unfavorable situation arise where the Jinpu and Pinghan railways are lost and the Jin Army is forced to retreat, the Eighth Route Army should join forces with a group army of the Jin-Sui Army to establish a base area in the Wutai Mountain range and engage the Japanese forces in protracted operations.