... Today the Red Army plays no decisive role in the matter of decisive engagements, but it has its own special forte, and in this special forte it can certainly play a decisive role. This is genuine, independent guerrilla warfare in the mountains (not mobile warfare). To implement such a policy, it is necessary to have powerful forces strategically positioned on the enemy’s flanks, to focus on creating base areas and mobilizing the masses, and to disperse our forces rather than concentrating them for battle. If we concentrate for battle, we cannot do mass work; if we do mass work, we cannot fight. The two cannot be carried out simultaneously. Yet only by dispersing to do mass work can we find the one and only way to decisively defeat the enemy and assist our friendly forces. Concentrating for battle at present can yield no results whatsoever. The current situation is fundamentally different from that of the past civil war; we cannot hark back to the flavor of the past and try to replicate it now. I fully agree with the view expressed in your telegram of the 18th: “Even if the enemy penetrates deep into Shanxi, he will still find himself surrounded on all sides by our guerrilla warfare.” Please uphold this view. Taking the long and broad perspective, provide profound explanations to individual comrades who hold inappropriate views, so that the strategic policy may be unified. Comrade Lin Biao has telegraphed his full agreement with my assessment and dispositions of the 17th. He only wishes to temporarily concentrate the Chen brigade to strike the enemy when an opportunity arises, without dispersing for now. Such temporary concentration of a single brigade is, of course, permissible, but if no opportunity presents itself for a long time, it would still be advisable to shift the focus to mass work at the appropriate moment. It is also acceptable for Wang Zhen to lead a regiment temporarily to Wutai Mountain, but please note that at the proper time it would still be advisable to transfer it to northwestern Shanxi. Judging by the circumstances, even if Lin leads the Chen brigade and manages to win one or two victories, he will soon have to turn toward Wutai. I request you to consider and handle all this as you see fit.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 52, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.