Comrade Dehuai [1]: Yan Xishan [2] is now caught in a contradiction: he cannot answer the people of Shanxi without fighting a battle, yet he has no confidence whatsoever that he can win one. This contradiction of his is insoluble.


Your assessment that his resolve to abandon Pingxingguan and seek a decisive battle at Shahe is wavering is entirely correct.


His subordinates are completely lacking in resolve, and his army has lost all fighting capacity. It may be forced into a major engagement around Yanmenguan Pass, Pingxingguan Pass, and the Shahe River area; however, given the overall strategic situation, such a battle could hardly be sustained. Regardless of whether it ends in victory or defeat, Taiyuan and the entire North China region will remain in extremis, balanced on the brink of collapse.


Some comrades, however, do not yet seem to have a deep understanding of this objective and inevitable trend, being misled by temporary circumstances.


If this viewpoint remains unchanged, the Red Army too will inevitably find itself in a position similar to Yan Xishan’s—passive, reactive, constantly on the defensive, and liable to be defeated piecemeal by the enemy.


At present, the Red Army plays no decisive role in a general engagement; rather, it possesses a distinct strength of its own, in which it can indeed exert decisive influence: namely, truly independent and autonomous mountain guerrilla warfare (not mobile warfare).


To implement such a strategy, we must maintain powerful forces in the enemy’s flanks at the strategic level; our primary focus should be on establishing base areas and mobilizing the masses; and we must disperse our forces instead of concentrating them for large-scale battles.


Concentration for combat precludes mass work, while mass work precludes concentration for combat; the two cannot be pursued simultaneously.


Nevertheless, only by dispersing to carry out mass work can we decisively defeat the enemy and assist friendly units. Concentrating for battle at this stage would yield absolutely no results.


The current situation differs fundamentally from that of the previous domestic war. We must not dwell on past experiences or attempt to replicate them under present conditions.


I am in full agreement with the view expressed in your telegram of the 18th—that “even if the enemy penetrates deep into Shanxi, it will still be encircled on all sides by our guerrilla operations.”


I urge you to adhere steadfastly to this perspective, to think broadly and from a distance, and to provide thorough explanations to those comrades whose views are inappropriate, so as to achieve unity in our strategic policy.


Comrade Lin Biao [3] has sent a telegram fully endorsing my judgment and deployment of the 17th. He proposes temporarily concentrating only the Chen Brigade [4] to strike the enemy when opportunity arises, without immediate dispersal.


Such a temporary concentration of a single brigade is certainly permissible; however, if no favorable opportunity presents itself after a prolonged period, it would still be advisable to shift our main emphasis back to mass work at the appropriate time.


It is also acceptable for Wang Zhen [5], leading a regiment, to move temporarily to Wutai Mountain; but please note that, once the opportune moment arrives, he should promptly redeploy to northwestern Shanxi.


Judging from the situation, even if Lin, commanding the Chen Brigade, manages to score one or two victories, he will soon need to turn back toward Wutai.


Please consider these matters carefully and act accordingly.


Printed on the 21st by Mao Zedong, based on a copy preserved in the Central Archives.


Notes: [1] Dehuai refers to Peng Dehuai, who at the time served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army. [2] Yan Xishan was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Second War Zone. [3] Lin Biao was at the time Commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. [4] The “Chen Brigade” refers to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division, commanded by Chen Guang. [5] Wang Zhen (1908–1993), a native of Liuyang, Hunan Province, was then Deputy Commander of the 359th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army’s 120th Division.