(September 17, 1937)
To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]; Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen]; He
[Long] and Xiao [Ke]; and Liu [Bocheng] and Xu [Xiangqian]:
Concerning the assessment of the situation and strategic dispositions:
1. We conclude that, broadly speaking, the enemy is attacking North China by
four routes, with a force totaling between 150,000 and 200,000 men. One route is
via Shandong, where there is no action for the moment. Another is along the Tianjin-
Pukou line, with one and a half divisions, whose offensive edge has reached
Machang. Still another is along the Beiping-Hankou line, with one division, which
is now stationed north of Zhuozhou¹ without taking any action. The fourth route,
operating along the Beiping-Suiyuan line and the Datong-Puzhou line, with about
three divisions, is his main force. It is moving in an outflanking pattern with the
intention of capturing Taiyuan, threatening the Central Army along the Beiping-
Hankou line, and then defeating it so as to seize the area north of the Yellow River.
This disposition, menacing the rear of Henan and Shandong, is advantageous for
the final capture of Shandong, thus fulfilling the enemy's intention of seizing the
five provinces of North China. His main strategic orientation is outflanking on the
right. As for his advance toward Shanghai, apart from destroying the lifeline of
China's economy, [the enemy] aims to pin down the main force of the Central
Army and expedite his seizure of North China. The above is a general assessment
of Japan's operational plan for the first phase.
2. The right wing of the Japanese bandits' main force is once again divided
among three routes, all advancing in a posture of pursuit and attack. One route,
estimated at approximately one division, is moving toward Yanmenguan² along
the eastern portion of the Beiping-Suiyuan line and the northern portion of the

Datong-Puzhou line; it has not been active since capturing Datong. Another, having started from Tianzhen and seized Guangling, is now moving up to attack Lingqiu
and Pingxingguan, and to outflank the armies of Shanxi and Suiyuan on the right.
The third, having started from Zhangjiakou and seized Wei xian, is likely to attack
Laiyuan; it is outflanking Wei Lihuang's army and the troops at the Zijing Pass on
the left. The last two are estimated to have formed a joint army corps, made up of
at least two divisions, which intended a central breakthrough as the first step and
then with that impetus to achieve its second-stage purpose, namely, a flanking
movement on both sides.
3. Chiang [Kaishek], seeing Wei Lihuang's army surrounded by the enemy,
has ordered its retreat. Yan [Xishan], regarding Lingqiu as the lifeline of Shanxi,
plans to concentrate fourteen regiments for a decisive battle north of Pingxingguan.
We estimate that if the decisive battle is victorious, the southward advance of the
enemy will be somewhat delayed, but this will require sending in more troops and
fighting fiercely. If the decisive battle is lost, the enemy will necessarily attack
Pingxingguan and Yanmenguan without delay; when the reserve corps from the
rear arrives, the enemy's main force will move and take Taiyuan directly. Consequently, the Shanxi and Suiyuan armies stationed to the west of Suiyuan, the armies
in the south of the Heng mountain range, in places like Wutai, and along the northern portion of the Beiping-Hankou line, will have to retreat on their own initiative,
so the enemy can take over these areas without firing a single shot, with Niangziguan
unable to play its role as a natural barrier.
4. Laiyuan and Lingqiu are the two spots that the enemy will necessarily fight
for. If there is no north-south highway, Fuping, Wutai, and Yuxian may not be occupied by the enemy for the time being; if there is such a highway, it is possible that
the enemy will send troops southward to cut the Zhengding-Taiyuan line. No matter what, the Heng mountains remain the strategic center if the enemy is to seize the
provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Shanxi. That he will send his main force to this
center has been borne out by the occupation of Hunyuan, Weixian, and Guangling.
5. The armies of Fu [Zuoyi], Yang [Aiyuan], Liu [Mao'en], and Tang [Enbo],
all under Yan's command in Shanxi, have lost their morale, so we cannot conclude
whether these armies are able to frustrate the enemy operation plan in their respective battlefronts.
6. The Red Army at present has the nature of a detachment, playing no decisive
role in decisive battles. If deployed properly, however, it can play a decisive role
in sustaining the guerrilla warfare in North China (mainly in Shanxi).
7. Our previous plan that all of the Red Army should stay in the Heng mountains to build base areas for guerrilla warfare is altogether outdated in the present
situation as described above. Should we carry out our original plan, our entire
army will be trapped in the enemy's outflanking strategy; even if we retreat to the
Taihang mountains as our second step, we will still find ourselves within its outflanking (assuming that it has occupied Taiyuan) and completely fallen into a passive position.

8. Basing ourselves on the above-described situation and assessment, for the
purpose of maneuvering in a strategically flexible position, that is, maneuvering
on the enemy's flanks, so as to hold up the enemy from attacking Taiyuan and
going farther south, and to assist the armies of Shanxi and Suiyuan and help them
to avoid overly heavy losses; for the purpose of actually carrying on the independent guerrilla warfare in hilly areas; for the purpose of mobilizing the masses
extensively, organizing the volunteers, and opening up guerrilla base areas in support of the guerrilla warfare in North China; and for the purpose of expanding the
Red Army itself, it is proposed to alter our original plan and adopt the following
strategic deployment: (1) Our Second Front Army is to assemble in Yi xian, north
of Taiyuan, pending orders, and be ready to move, once Yan's approval has been
obtained, to areas like the Guancen mountains in northwestern Shanxi and carry
out operations there; (2) Our Fourth Front Army is to enter the Luliang mountain
range at the appropriate time and start operations there; (3) Our First Front Army,
deliberately assuming a passive manner, will now enter the southern part of the
Heng mountain range and, if the enemy moves southward and our allied armies
fail to defeat it, get ready to go gradually south and operate between the Taihang
and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeastern Shanxi; (4) The headquarters will
move to the neighborhood of Taiyuan and then choose the proper location in accordance with the actual circumstances.
9. What do you think? Please consider and reply by telegraph.

The Question of the Strategic Zones of the
Eighth Route Army

(September 19, 1937, noon)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have taken note of your telegram dated the 18th. Have you received my
long telegram on strategy dated the 17th?¹
2. The enemy is resolved to take Taiyuan. At present we should look one step
ahead when making deployments.
3. Wutai, Dinxiang, and Meng xian are rather narrow. After the enemy enters
Taiyuan, he will be encircled. The present deployment of Lin Biao and Yang
Aiyuan's units in these areas is temporary in nature. There is no possibility of their
staying there for long. It is estimated that that area can only support a guerrilla war
fought by a few thousand people.
4. He Long's unit should be stationed in northwestern Shanxi, located on the
outer flank of Datong and Taiyuan, and engage in guerrilla warfare in the direction
of Datong and Suiyuan. Only in this way will they be able to play quite an effective role in containing the enemy, which is advancing southward toward Taiyuan.
There are the two units of Lin and Yang in the Wutai area. This is quite sufficient.
If He's division goes there, too, it will lose its strategic significance.
5. Therefore, He's division should advance to the northwest of Shanxi and hasten to be the first to occupy that region.
6. In the future, Liu [Bocheng]'s division may move nearer to Lin [Biao]'s
division and be stationed in the Taiyue mountain range and the Luliang mountain
range (between Jixian and the Fenhe River) in the south of Shanxi. It is all right to
transfer some units from northern Shaanxi to support them.

Mao Zedong

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 46-49, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp.
15-18.

1. This city, located a short distance southwest of Beiping, was called Zhuo xian in 1937,
but had been Zhuozhou until 1913 and has now taken that name again.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 50-51, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the preceding telegram.


2. Yanmenguan, located in the northern part of Dai xian in Shanxi, is one of the important strategic passes of the Great Wall.