To Zhu De and Ren Bishi[1]

(September 16, 1937)

The Japanese bandits are advancing in two routes to attack Guangling and Lingqiu. The Jin Army has already abandoned Datong, and the entire territory of Suiyuan has in effect been lost. The Japanese bandits will use heavy forces to advance and occupy northeastern Shanxi, centered on Wutai, and will then continue their offensive to capture Taiyuan. Under these circumstances, it is no longer possible for our three divisions to concentrate in one area in northeastern Shanxi, nor is there any such necessity.

It is proposed that the 115th Division be positioned in northeastern Shanxi, with Wutai as the center of its activities, temporarily staying in Lingqiu and Laiyuan, and when conditions become unfavorable, gradually shifting southward to adopt the Taihang Mountains as its area of operations; the 120th Division be positioned in northwestern Shanxi, with the Guancen Mountains and the northern section of the Lüliang Mountains as its area of operations; and the 129th Division be positioned in southern Shanxi, with the Taiyue Mountains as its area of operations.

[1] Just as the Eighth Route Army was advancing day and night toward the Hengshan Mountains region, the Japanese forces invading westward along the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway broke through the defensive lines of the Kuomintang troops, occupied Datong on September 13, and then advanced southward along the Datong–Puzhou Railway to attack Yanmen Pass and Ruyue Pass. Simultaneously, the Japanese forces invading northeastern Shanxi from the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway advanced toward Pingxing Pass, attempting to execute a right-flank encirclement and threaten the flank and rear of the main forces of the Kuomintang’s First War Zone along the Peiping–Hankou Railway. The Japanese forces invading southward along the Peiping–Hankou Railway and its two flanks also advanced southward along the Fuyang River in mid-September, outflanking the flank and rear of the Kuomintang troops along the Peiping–Hankou Railway, in an attempt to annihilate the main forces of the Kuomintang’s First War Zone in the central region of Hebei Province. Under these circumstances, on September 16, Mao Zedong, in a reply telegram to Zhu De and Ren Bishi, issued certain directives regarding military dispositions. This is the main content of that reply telegram.