(1) The Lugou Bridge Incident and the occupation of Beiping and Tianjin were merely the beginning of the Japanese aggressors’ full-scale invasion of mainland China. Japan has already initiated a nation-wide wartime mobilization. All their so-called propaganda claiming they seek no further expansion is nothing more than a smokescreen to cover their offensive.

(2) Under the pressure of the Japanese aggression and mounting public indignation, the Nanjing government has now resolved to wage a war of resistance. Comprehensive national defense preparations and actual combat operations in various regions have also begun; a full-scale Sino-Japanese war is inevitable. The resistance at Lugou Bridge on July 7 has become the starting point of China’s nationwide war of resistance.

(3) China’s political situation has thus entered a new phase—the phase of waging the war of resistance. The preparatory stage for the war has passed. The central task of this new phase is to mobilize all forces in order to secure victory in the war. During the previous stage, owing to the Kuomintang’s reluctance and insufficient mass mobilization, the goal of achieving democracy was not attained. This must now be accomplished in the course of striving for victory in the war.

(4) In this new phase, our differences and debates with the Kuomintang and other anti-Japanese factions no longer concern whether or not to resist; rather, they center on how to achieve victory in the war.

(5) The key to securing victory in the current war lies in transforming the already-launched resistance into a comprehensive, nation-wide struggle. Only such a total, all-people’s war can lead to final victory. The Ten Major Policies for National Salvation Against Japan, put forward by our Party today, constitute the concrete path toward that ultimate triumph.

(6) The war currently underway carries great risks. Primarily, this stems from the Kuomintang’s unwillingness to involve the entire population in the resistance. Instead, they regard the war as solely the government’s responsibility, constantly fearing and restricting popular participation, obstructing the integration of government troops with the people, denying the masses democratic rights in the cause of national salvation, and failing to thoroughly reform the political system so as to make the government a national defense government representing all sectors of the nation. Under such conditions, limited successes may be achieved, but final victory remains unattainable. On the contrary, there is a serious possibility of complete failure.

(7) Given the grave weaknesses still present in the current war effort, numerous setbacks, retreats, internal divisions and defections, as well as temporary and localized compromises, may occur in the course of the struggle ahead. The loss of Beiping and Tianjin serves as the most sobering lesson since the fall of the Northeast provinces. We must therefore recognize that this will be a protracted and arduous war. Nevertheless, we are confident that, through the concerted efforts of our Party and the Chinese people, this war will surmount all obstacles and continue to advance and develop. We should overcome every difficulty and resolutely strive to implement the Ten Major Policies for Securing Victory in the War of Resistance proposed by our Party. We must firmly oppose any erroneous policies that contradict these policies, as well as the defeatist, pessimistic attitude of national surrender.

(8) Communist Party members, together with the masses and armed forces under their leadership, should take the most active stand at the forefront of the struggle, becoming the core of the national resistance. They should devote tremendous energy to developing the mass anti-Japanese movement, seizing every opportunity without delay to propagate ideas among the people and arm them. As long as we can truly organize millions upon millions of people into the Anti-Japanese National United Front, victory in the Anti-Japanese War will be assured.

(Originally published in “Historical Reference Materials of the Communist Party of China,” Vol. IV, compiled by the Central Party School of the CPC, p. 415)