Adopt a Modest Attitude While Consulting with
People from All Sides
(August 10, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Xuefeng:1

I have taken note of all your telegrams, and I am greatly reassured.
1. While consulting with people of all circles, under the overall orientation of
actively promoting the War of Resistance, we must have a modest attitude. We
must not boast of the merits of the Red Army ourselves or say that the Red Army
is sure to win the War of Resistance against Japan; on the contrary, we must ask
them for advice on all sorts of things, such as the fighting capacity of the Japanese
army, campaigns in the mountains and on the plain, and other circumstances of
which the Red Army generally has no experience, so that the Red Army will have
some basis and will gradually overcome the difficulties. We must not conceal certain shortcomings of the Red Army that should not be concealed, such as that it
can only wage guerrilla war and not positional war, mountain warfare and not
warfare in the plains, or that it is suited only to fighting independently and self-reliantly under overall strategic command, and not to circumstances in which it is
bound by a centralized command in campaigns and tactics, in which it will lose all
its strengths. Because of [this suitability for] mountainous terrain and guerrilla
warfare, the Red Army should be positioned in the four-cornered area bordering
on the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan and should launch a
flank attack against the enemy troops that are marching westward along the Ping-
Sui railway line and those marching southward along the Ping-Han railway line in
cooperation with the strategic operation of the friendly forces in the front. We
must also let them know that the technology and equipment of the Red Army are
rather primitive and ask them to supply us with the five categories and nineteen
kinds of commodities listed in yesterday's telegram, for otherwise it will be very
hard to be successful in fighting a strong enemy.

2. Since the current situation is very critical, the Red Army is planning to set
out before reorganization, and the reorganization can be carried out after arriving
at Datong. Zhu [De] and Zhou [Enlai] flew to Nanjing on the 9th.2 The Red Army
will set out as soon as we receive their telegram. If they ask why the Red Army is
still not reorganized, you may say that it is because of the delay by Nanjing. (The
declaration was not published, no decision was made regarding political principles,
and there was no announcement regarding headquarters or designation; the designation [as the Eighth Route Army] was only issued a few days ago, but the headquarters has not yet been appointed.)
3. As regards the itinerary, because there is no grain along the distance of over
a thousand li from Luochuan to Fugu, and no grain for sale in the area 800 li to the
north and south of Yan'an (the grain the institutions consume was bought from
western Shanxi and Xi'an), we must absolutely not take the way of northern
Shaanxi. Instead, the only way is to cross the river at Hancheng, by way of Puxian,
Xiaoyi, and Fenyang, and concentrate at Datong. This must be achieved while
negotiating with Yan [Xishan].3
4. The office in Taiyuan should be set up immediately, and you are appointed
its director.

Mao Zedong

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 28-29, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1. For a biography of Peng Xuefeng (1905-1944), alternate name Peng Yufeng, see
Volume V, p. 559, note 1. In late 1936 Peng had been sent to Shanxi to engage in united front
work, and in particular to persuade Yan Xishan cooperate with the Communist forces.

2. As indicated in the telegram of August 4, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai had gone to Nanjing
at the invitation of Chiang Kaishek to participate in the meeting of the National Military
Council.

3. Regarding Yan Xishan (1883-1960), the unchallenged ruler of his native province of
Shanxi, see the brief note in Volume V, p. 61.