(August 5, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

Your telegram sent between 3:00 and 5:00 on August 4 has been received. Our
reply is as follows:
1. The question of taking responsibility for operations on one front. The Red
Army is responsible for the task of suppressing the majority of the enemy forces
and eliminating part of them by engaging in mobile guerrilla warfare independently and with the initiative in its own hands. Concretely, the demand is that it
assist the operations of friendly forces by harassing, suppressing, and attacking
the flank of the enemy advancing westward along the Ping-Sui railroad and advancing southward along the Ping-Han railway line in the designated region bordering on the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan (a quadrangular
area, not a triangular area). It is also appropriate to send some units to as far away
as Rehe. This does not mean "being independently responsible for one front" but
entails assisting in the operations of regular friendly forces which are at the front
in a given locality. Such a formulation is freer, livelier, and more effective. In other
words, it is appropriate for us to engage in combat only from the flanks and not
from the front. Hence, it is inappropriate to use language implying that we are
dealing independently with one front.
2. The question of the use of troops. We have put forth the principle of using
troops in accordance with the circumstances. Under this principle, we agree that
our main force will be dispatched (in terms of numbers, the main force may consist of half or two-thirds of the troops). We shall not tell Chiang Kaishek the precise fraction. In fact, we need to fully take into account the long-drawn-out and
cruel nature of this war and Chiang's intention to set up a warlord stronghold
(Chiang demands that the entire Red Army be dispatched). We should also take
note of the fact that Shaanxi and Gansu constitute our most reliable rear (Chiang
still has ten divisions here, and once all of us are gone, he will safely occupy this
rear) and of other problems.

3. The question of supplies and logistics from the rear. Apart from the fact that
the issue of Shaanxi and Gansu should not be raised, we may demand Baotou and
Ningxia, but we must put the emphasis on seeking western Shanxi, Ningxia,
Suiyuan, and [the three xian of] Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu. In reality we fear that
it will be difficult to cooperate with Ma Hongkui,¹ and that this will be possible
only after the establishment of the Sino-Soviet military alliance.

Luo [Fu]
Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 25-27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1. Regarding General Ma Hongkui, see the numerous references in Volume V, and in
particular the biographical note on p. 62 of that volume.