(August 4, 1937)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Ye [Jianying], and also for the information of Bo
[Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Liu [Bocheng], Zhang [Hao],² He
[Long], Guan [Xiangying], Chen [Guang], Nie [Rongzhen], Xu [Haidong], Cheng
[Zihua], Chen [Zaidao], Wang [Hongkun], Xiao [Ke], and Guo [Shushen]:

Regarding the question of national defense, our opinions are as follows:
1. The first defensive front should run through places such as Zhangjiakou,
Zuozhou, Jinghai, and Qingdao. The emphasis should be on Zhangjiakou, and we
should concentrate enough military forces for the first decisive campaign.
2. The second defensive front should run through places such as Datong,
Baoding, Machang, and Weixian. We should concentrate an advantageous number of troops, to reinforce the first defensive front at the appropriate time while at
the same time preparing for the decisive campaign along the second front.
3. As far as Taiyuan, Shijiazhuang, Cangzhou, and other places are concerned,
they can only be used as the third defensive front. We must absolutely not pay
attention only to this front and not concentrate our forces on the first and second
fronts.
4. The key at present is the first front.
5. For the time being, the general strategic orientation should be offensive defense. We must launch a destructive counteroffensive against the advancing enemy and must absolutely not conduct a pure defense. In the future we should
prepare to switch to the strategic offensive and to recover lost territory.
6. In combining regular warfare with guerrilla warfare, the Red Army and the
other appropriate armed forces and people's armed forces may participate in guerrilla warfare. Under the general strategic dispositions, they should be allowed to
exercise the power of command independently and with the initiative in their own
hands.
7. Those units which are responsible for guerrilla warfare should use their troops
properly in accordance with the topography and the situation on the battlefield. In
accordance with the nature of guerrilla warfare, the troops should in principle be
used separately instead of collectively.
8. According to the present situation, the Red Army should contribute one-third
of its forces, use the area where the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and
Suiyuan come together as the center, aim at the enemy troops which are moving
westward along the Ping-Sui railway line and southward along the Ping-Han railway line, and carry on guerrilla warfare from the flanks. Apart from that, send
another unit to be active in the Rehe-Hebei-Chahar Border Region and threaten
the enemy's rear (this force should not exceed one regiment). The Red Army should
provide it with the necessary reinforcements.
9. The mobilization of a people's campaign of armed self-defense is a central
link in guaranteeing the victory of the army. Vacillation regarding this orientation
will lead to certain defeat.
10. You may come up with other ideas as opportunity offers, but not too many,
and firmly grasp the essentials.

Luo [Fu]
Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 22-24, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1. In late July 1937, Chiang Kaishek convened a meeting of the National Military Council and invited the Chinese Communist Party to send representatives to participate. At the
beginning of August, the Communist Party Central Committee decided to send Zhou Enlai,
Zhu De, and Ye Jianying to Nanjing for this purpose. This telegram was addressed to them
by Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) and Mao Zedong.

2. Zhang Hao was an alternate name for Lin Yuying (1897-1942), a delegate to the
Communist International who played an important role in communications between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party in 1935-1937. See Volume V, p. lii and note 62, and
numerous other references to him in that volume.