On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing
July 1937

[There used to be a number of comrades in our Party who were dogmatists and
who for a long period rejected the experience of the Chinese revolution,
denying the truth that "Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action" and
overawing people with words and phrases from Marxist works, torn out of context.
There were also a number of comrades who were empiricists and who for a long
period restricted themselves to their own fragmentary experience and did
not understand the importance of theory for revolutionary practice or see
the revolution as a whole, but worked blindly though industriously. The erroneous
ideas of these two types of comrades, and particularly of the dogmatists,
caused enormous losses to the Chinese revolution during 1931-34, and yet
the dogmatists cloaking themselves as Marxists, confused a great many comrades.
"On Practice" was written in order to expose the subjectivist errors of dogmatism
and empiricism in the Party, and especially the error of dogmatism, from
the standpoint of the Marxist theory of knowledge. It was entitled "On Practice"
because its stress was on exposing the dogmatist kind of subjectivism, which
belittles practice. The ideas contained in this essay were presented by Comrade
Mao Tse-tung in a lecture at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College
in Yenan.]


Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the
social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and was therefore
incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice,
that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and the class struggle.

Above all, Marxists regard man's activity in production as the most fundamental
practical activity, the determinant of all his other activities. Man's knowledge
depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes
gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the laws of nature,
and the relations between himself and nature; and through his activity in
production he also gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain
relations that exist between man and man. None of this knowledge can be acquired
apart from activity in production. In a classless society every person, as
a member of society, joins in common effort with the other members, enters
into definite relations of production with them and engages in production
to meet man's material needs. In all class societies, the members of the
different social classes also enter, in different ways, into definite relations
of production and engage in production to meet their material needs. This
is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.

Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes
many other forms--class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic
pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all spheres of
the practical life of society. Thus man, in varying degrees, comes to know
the different relations between man and man, not only through his material
life but also through his political and cultural life (both of which are
intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice,
class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound
influence on the development of man's knowledge. In class society everyone
lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without
exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.

Marxists hold that in human society activity in production develops step
by step from a lower to a higher level and that consequently man's knowledge,
whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step from a lower
to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided
to the many-sided. For a very long period in history, men were necessarily
confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of society because,
for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted history
and, for another, the small scale of production limited man's outlook. It
was not until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense forces of
production (large-scale industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive,
historical understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge
into a science, the science of Marxism.

Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth
of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man's
knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated results in the
process of social practice (material production, class struggle or scientific
experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the
anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the
laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will
fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his
ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can
thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by "failure is the
mother of success" and "a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit". The
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary
position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice
and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice
or separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, "Practice is higher
than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of
universality, but also of immediate actuality." [1] The
Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding
characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that dialectical
materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality:
it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, emphasizes that theory
is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge
or theory is determined not by subjective feelings, but by objective results
in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth. The
standpoint of practice is the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical
materialist theory of knowledge. [2]

But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice?
This will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.

In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side,
the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance,
some people from outside come to Yenan on a tour of observation. In the first
day or two, they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet many people,
attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear talk of various
kinds and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the separate
aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual
stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions.
That is, these particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the
members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions and give rise in
their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external
relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition.
At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw
logical conclusions.

As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions
and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then
a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition,
and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate
aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the
totality and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense
perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference.
Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw
logical conclusions. The expression in San Kuo Yen Yi,
[3] "knit the brows and a stratagem comes to
mind", or in everyday language, "let me think it over", refers to man's use
of concepts in the brain to form judgements and inferences. This is the second
stage of cognition. When the members of the observation group have collected
various data and, what is more, have "thought them over", they are able to
arrive at the judgement that "the Communist Party's policy of the National
United Front Against Japan is thorough, sincere and genuine". Having made
this judgement, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the
nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusion, "The National
United Front Against Japan can succeed." This stage of conception, judgement
and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing
a thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge. The real task of knowing
is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the
comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their
laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, that
is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs
from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate
aspects, the phenomena and the external relations of things, whereas logical
knowledge takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence and
the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in
the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping
the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal
relations of all its aspects.

This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge,
basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper,
was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist materialism
solved this problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both
materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition,
the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual knowledge
to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production
and class struggle. Lenin said, "The abstraction of matter, of a
law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all
scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature
more deeply, truly and completely." [4]
Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of
cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself
as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that
both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and
the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each
other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that
what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is
comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem
of phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving
of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice.
Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into
contact with it, that is, by living (practicing) in its environment. In feudal
society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance
because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant practice was lacking.
Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. Marx, in the era
of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know certain laws peculiar
to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism, the last stage
of capitalism, had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking;
only Lenin and Stalin could undertake this task. Leaving aside their genius,
the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin could work out their theories
was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle
and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition,
no genius could have succeeded. The saying, "without stepping outside his
gate the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs", was mere empty
talk in past times when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying
can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the people with
real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the wide world over.
And it is only when these people have come to "know" through their practice
and when their knowledge has reached him through writing and technical media
that the "scholar" can indirectly "know all the wide world's affairs". If
you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you
must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality,
to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into
contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the
practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that
thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge
which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting
matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is
the "know all" who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and proclaims
himself "the world's Number One authority"; this merely shows that he has
not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science,
and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required
is definitely the reverse--honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you
must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the
taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want
to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical
and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to
know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution.
All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have
direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge
comes from indirect experience, for example, all knowledge from past times
and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was--or
is--a matter of direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if in the
course of their direct experience the requirement of "scientific abstraction",
spoken of by Lenin, was--or is--fulfilled and objective reality scientifically
reflected, otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man's knowledge consists
only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which
comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for
me is direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole,
knowledge of any kind is inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge
originates in perception of the objective external world through man's physical
sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience,
or denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality, is
not a materialist. That is why the "know-all" is ridiculous. There is an
old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's
lair?" This saying holds true for man's practice and it also holds true for
the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.

To make clear the dialectical-materialist movement of cognition arising on
the basis of the practice which changes reality--to make clear the gradually
deepening movement of cognition--a few additional concrete examples are given
below.

In its knowledge of capitalist society, the proletariat was only in the
perceptual stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the period
of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle; it knew only some of the aspects
and the external relations of the phenomena of capitalism. The proletariat
was then still a "class-in-itself". But when it reached the second period
of its practice, the period of conscious and organized economic and political
struggles, the proletariat was able to comprehend the essence of capitalist
society, the relations of exploitation between social classes and its own
historical task; and it was able to do so because of its own practice and
because of its experience of prolonged struggle, which Marx and Engels
scientifically summed up in all its variety to create the theory of Marxism
for the education of the proletariat. It was then that the proletariat became
a "class-for-itself".

Similarly with the Chinese people's knowledge of imperialism. The first stage
was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate
anti-foreign struggles of the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the
Yi Ho Tuan Movement, and so on. It was only in the second stage that the
Chinese people reached the stage of rational knowledge, saw the internal
and external contradictions of imperialism and saw the essential truth that
imperialism had allied itself with China's comprador and feudal classes to
oppress and exploit the great masses of the Chinese people. This knowledge
began about the time of the May 4th Movement of 1919.

Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of war,
then at the initial stage they will not understand the profound laws pertaining
to the directing of a specific war (such as our Agrarian Revolutionary War
of the past decade). At the initial stage they will merely experience a good
deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many defeats. But this experience
(the experience of battles won and especially of battles lost) enables them
to comprehend the inner thread of the whole war, namely, the laws of that
specific war, to understand its strategy and tactics, and consequently to
direct the war with confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned
over to an inexperienced person, then he too will have to suffer a number
of defeats (gain experience) before he can comprehend the true laws of the
war.

"I am not sure I can handle it." We often hear this remark when a comrade
hesitates to accept an assignment. Why is he unsure of himself? Because he
has no systematic understanding of the content and circumstances of the
assignment, or because he has had little or no contact with such work, and
so the laws governing it are beyond him. After a detailed analysis of the
nature and circumstances of the assignment, he will feel more sure of himself
and do it willingly. If he spends some time at the job and gains experience
and if he is a person who is willing to look into matters with an open mind
and not one who approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially,
then he can draw conclusions for himself as to how to go about the job and
do it with much more courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided and
superficial in their approach to problems will smugly issue orders or directives
the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the circumstances,
without viewing things in their totality (their history and their present
state as a whole) and without getting to the essence of things (their nature
and the internal relations between one thing and another). Such people are
bound to trip and fall.

Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact
with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception.
The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and
reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgement and
inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich (not fragmentary)
and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can be the basis for
forming correct concepts and theories.

Here two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been stated
before but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational knowledge
upon perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need
not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist. In the history of
philosophy there is the "rationalist" school that admits the reality only
of reason and not of experience, believing that reason alone is reliable
while perceptual experience is not; this school errs by turning things upside
down. The rational is reliable precisely because it has its source in sense
perceptions, otherwise it would be like water without a source, a tree without
roots, subjective, self-engendered and unreliable. As to the sequence in
the process of cognition, perceptual experience comes first; we stress the
significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because
social practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start
man on the acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective world.
For a person who shuts his eyes, stops his ears and totally cuts himself
off from the objective world there can be no such thing as knowledge. Knowledge
begins with experience--this is the materialism of the theory of knowledge.

The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the perceptual
stage of knowledge needs to be developed to the rational stage--this is the
dialectics of the theory of knowledge. [5] To think that
knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that perceptual knowledge
alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not, would be to repeat the
historical error of "empiricism". This theory errs in failing to understand
that, although the data of perception reflect certain realities in the objective
world (I am not speaking here of idealist empiricism which confines experience
to so-called introspection), they are merely one-sided and superficial,
reflecting things incompletely and not reflecting their essence. Fully to
reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent
laws, it is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the
rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential,
eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to
the other and from the outside to the inside, in order to form a system of
concepts and theories--it is necessary to make a leap from perceptual to
rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is not more empty or more
unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been scientifically reconstructed
in the process of cognition, on the basis of practice, reflects objective
reality, as Lenin said, more deeply, more truly, more fully. As against this,
vulgar "practical men" respect experience but despise theory, and therefore
cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear
direction and long-range perspective, and are complacent over occasional
successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution,
they will lead it up a blind alley.

Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge
remains to be developed into rational knowledge-- this is the
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither "rationalism"
nor "empiricism" understands the historical or the dialectical nature of
knowledge, and although each of these schools contains one aspect of the
truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to idealist, rationalism and
empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a whole. The
dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the
rational holds true for a minor process of cognition (for instance, knowing
a single thing or task) as well as for a major process of cognition (for
instance, knowing a whole society or a revolution).

But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the dialectical-materialist
movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem
would be dealt with. And as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only
the less important half at that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important
problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and
thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws
actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important,
and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement, "Without
revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."
[6] But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely
and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely
prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that
theory, however good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice,
and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return
to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in
the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but--and this is more
important--it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to
revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world,
must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied
anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class
struggle and revolutionary national struggle and in the practice of scientific
experiment. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the
continuation of the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory
corresponds to objective reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved
in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned
above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational
knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice and see whether it
can achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science
are held to be true not only because they were so considered when natural
scientists originated them, but because they have been verified in subsequent
scientific practice. Similarly, Marxism-Leninism is held to be true not only
because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated by Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin but because it has been verified in the subsequent
practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle.
Dialectical materialism is universally true because it is impossible for
anyone to escape from its domain in his practice. The history of human knowledge
tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this
incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are
erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected.
That is why practice is the criterion of truth and why "the standpoint of
life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge".
[7] Stalin has well said, "Theory becomes purposeless
if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes
in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory."
[8]

When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our answer
is: it is and yet it is not. When men in society throw themselves into the
practice of changing a certain objective process (whether natural or social)
at a certain stage of its development, they can, as a result of the reflection
of the objective process in their brains and the exercise of their subjective
activity, advance their knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, and
create ideas, theories, plans or programmes which correspond in general to
the laws of that objective process. They then apply these ideas, theories,
plans or programmes in practice in the same objective process. And
if they can realize the aims they have in mind, that is, if in that same
process of practice they can translate, or on the whole translate, those
previously formulated ideas, theories, plans or programmes into fact, then
the movement of knowledge may be considered completed with regard to this
particular process. In the process of changing nature, take for example the
fulfilment of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis,
the manufacture of an implement or the reaping of a crop; or in the process
of changing society, take for example the victory of a strike, victory in
a war or the fulfilment of an educational plan. All these may be considered
the realization of aims one has in mind. But generally speaking, whether
in the practice of changing nature or of changing society, men's original
ideas, theories, plans or programmes are seldom realized without any alteration.

This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually subject to
numerous limitations; they are limited not only by existing scientific and
technological conditions but also by the development of the objective process
itself and the degree to which this process has become manifest (the aspects
and the essence of the objective process have not yet been fully revealed).
In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans or programmes are usually altered
partially and sometimes even wholly, because of the discovery of unforeseen
circumstances in the course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that
the original ideas, theories, plans or programmes fail to correspond with
reality either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect.
In many instances, failures have to be repeated many times before errors
in knowledge can be corrected and correspondence with the laws of the objective
process achieved, and consequently before the subjective can be transformed
into the objective, or in other words, before the anticipated results can
be achieved in practice. But when that point is reached, no matter how, the
movement of human knowledge regarding a certain objective process at a certain
stage of its development may be considered completed.

However, so far as the progression of the process is concerned, the movement
of human knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in the realm
of nature or of society, progresses and develops by reason of its internal
contradiction and struggle, and the movement of human knowledge should also
progress and develop along with it. As far as social movements are concerned,
true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas,
theories, plans or programmes when errors are discovered, as has been indicated
above; but when a certain objective process has already progressed and changed
from one stage of development to another, they must also be good at making
themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their
subjective knowledge along with it, that is to say, they must ensure that
the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programmes correspond
to the new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period the situation
changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change
rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to
lead the revolution to victory.

It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is because
man's cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. We are opposed
to die-hards in the revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to advance with
changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself historically as
Right opportunism. These people fail to see that the struggle of opposites
has already pushed the objective process forward while their knowledge has
stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of the thinking of all
die-hards. Their thinking is divorced from social practice, and they cannot
march ahead to guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling
that it goes too fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite
direction.

We are also opposed to "Left" phrase-mongering. The thinking of "Leftists"
outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some regard
their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an
ideal which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves
from the current practice of the majority of the people and from the realities
of the day, and show themselves adventurist in their actions.

Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all
characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by
the separation of knowledge from practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of
knowledge, characterized as it is by scientific social practice, cannot but
resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies. Marxists recognize that in the
absolute and general process of development of the universe, the development
of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow
of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage
of development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative
truths constitutes absolute truth. [9] The development
of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is
the development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge.
In social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing
and passing away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective
reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances
further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes
deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality
is never-ending and so is man's cognition of truth through practice.
Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads
to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice. Our conclusion is the
concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory
and practice, of knowing and doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous
ideologies, whether "Left" or Right, which depart from concrete history.

In the present epoch of the development of society, the responsibility of
correctly knowing and changing the world has been placed by history upon
the shoulders of the proletariat and its party. This process, the practice
of changing the world, which is determined in accordance with scientific
knowledge, has already reached a historic moment in the world and in China,
a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is, the moment for completely
banishing darkness from the world and from China and for changing the world
into a world of light such as never previously existed. The struggle of the
proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the
fulfilment of the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at
the same time, their own subjective world--to change their cognitive ability
and change the relations between the subjective and the objective world.
Such a change has already come about in one part of the globe, in the Soviet
Union. There the people are pushing forward this process of change. The people
of China and the rest of the world either are going through, or will go through,
such a process. And the objective world which is to be changed also includes
all the opponents of change, who, in order to be changed, must go through
a stage of compulsion before they can enter the stage of voluntary, conscious
change. The epoch of world communism will be reached when all mankind voluntarily
and consciously changes itself and the world.

Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and
develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it
into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively
guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective
world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form
repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice
and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the
dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.

## Notes

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of
Logic". Collected Works, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII,
p. 205.

[2] See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach". Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, Selected Works, in two volumes, Eng. ed., FLPH,
Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 403, and V. I. Lenin, Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1952, pp. 136-4.

[3] San Kuo Yen Yi (Tales of the Three Kingdoms)
is a famous Chinese historical novel by Lo Kuan-chung (late 14th and early
15th century).

[4] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of
Logic", Collected Works, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 161.

[5] "In order to understand, it is necessary empirically
to begin understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal."
(Ibid., p. 197.)

[6] V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", Collected
Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.

[7] V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,
Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, p. 141.

[8] J. V. Stalin, "The
Foundations of Leninism", Problems of Leninism, Eng. ed., FLPH,
Moscow, 1954, p. 31.

[9] See V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,
Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, pp. 129-36.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.