On the Party’s Line: Is the Party’s line correct? I believe we must acknowledge the following points: Over the past fifteen years, the Party has heroically and resolutely led the Chinese revolution, achieving tremendous successes.
This is the first point.
Going forward, the Party will continue—and indeed can continue—to uphold and develop this same spirit of heroic resolve, leading the Chinese revolution to ultimate victory. We have every confidence in this.
This is the second point.
The Party has indeed committed errors on both the right and the “left” in its overall strategic line, resulting in losses for the revolution. This is an undeniable fact, one that should not be denied.
That is one aspect.
However, there is another aspect: it would be incorrect to say that everything was wrong. The rank-and-file members and the broad ranks of cadres never fell into fundamental errors of principle; this is precisely what prevented the Party from sustaining a fatal blow and enabled it to rectify those errors swiftly.
The major deviations in the Party’s overall line occurred only within the highest leadership bodies and were then imposed outward. A small fraction of cadres and members genuinely endorsed them, while the vast majority were compelled to follow under disciplinary pressure.
Even among the top leadership, only those who held dominant positions bear primary responsibility; others either acted under duress (bearing partial responsibility) or were entirely coerced (bearing no responsibility).
Moreover, such fundamental errors persisted only during a few very brief periods. Historically, they appeared in just two phases—the late Great Revolution and the Li Lisan period—[2] meaning that we were able to correct these mistakes relatively quickly.
This is the third point.
The reasons for the Party’s great achievements in leading the revolution are twofold. First, the Party’s leadership organs, along with the majority of its cadres and members, embraced Marxism-Leninism, adopting a political line grounded in these principles and implementing it courageously and resolutely under international guidance. Without this foundation, success would have been impossible.
Second, the leading cadres and most party members also mastered the tactics necessary to carry out this mission—namely, how to lead the masses in combat against the enemy. These included strategies for struggle, methods of propaganda and education, and guidelines for intra-party relations. Without this practical expertise, no meaningful results could have been achieved.
This is the fourth point.
Beyond occasional deviations to the “left” or right” in its overall strategic line, the Party has consistently made principled errors on specific issues throughout nearly all periods of its history. Such lapses have manifested in questions of tactical strategy, propaganda and education, and internal party relations, some of which persist to this day and are unlikely to be entirely eradicated in the future. These errors have arisen repeatedly and have likewise been overcome time and again; yet certain ones remain unresolved even now.
It is precisely through the ongoing struggle to confront and rectify these various “left” and “right” deviations that the Party has been tempered and grown stronger, ultimately yielding revolutionary gains. Were it devoid of—or experienced far fewer—such large and small principled errors, our achievements would undoubtedly be far greater than they are today. This serves as a cautionary lesson for the future.
All of these errors contravene the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. To correct them, or to prevent their recurrence, we must rely on a truly profound understanding of Marxism-Leninism as a revolutionary science.
This is the fifth point.
In summary, the Party has heroically and resolutely led the Chinese revolution, achieving remarkable successes, and will continue to guide it toward complete victory. This outcome stems directly from the Party’s adoption of a Marxist political line and corresponding methods of struggle.
Over the past fifteen years, the Party has committed numerous significant and minor errors—ranging from “left” to “right”—that ran counter to Marxist principles. Yet it has emerged strengthened through its struggles against these very mistakes, and it is precisely this process of overcoming them that has yielded our revolutionary accomplishments.
The errors that still exist today and those that will inevitably arise in the future must be addressed and prevented in accordance with Marxist principles.
Such, then, is our Party’s theoretical and practical understanding of its development.
As for the Party’s internal traditions: Does a flawed tradition exist within the Party? There are two possible answers. (A) No—what appears to be one is merely superficial. (B) Yes—though Comrades Shaoqi, Kaifeng, Ruomai, and Boqu [4] offer slightly different accounts, they all concur that such a tradition does indeed exist.
I align myself with the latter view, for the following reasons: Over the past fifteen years, the Party has forged and continues to forge a revolutionary, Bolshevik tradition—the very essence of our Party—that encompasses all that is good in terms of politics, organization, and work style. This tradition is beyond question.
Without it, we could not explain why the Party has been able to sustain itself, maintain unity, consolidate its ranks, overcome internal factionalism, engage in resolute combat against the enemy, and achieve revolutionary victories, thereby establishing itself as a major political force trusted by the working class and the people at large.
However, alongside these positive elements, certain undesirable habits have also taken root. They manifest themselves in the “leftist” tendencies of isolationism and adventurism within mass-struggle tactics, as well as in arrogant sectarianism. Similarly, they appear in an overbearing attitude toward propaganda and education, a failure to deeply and broadly connect theory with practice, and the ossified bureaucratic style known as “party gonggu.” In the realm of intra-party relations, too, we find traces of arrogance, cronyism, opportunism, factionalism, commandism, and punitive measures.
It is an indisputable fact that many such unhealthy practices do indeed prevail within our Party. To deny this would be inappropriate; to claim that our Party is entirely free of such habits would be both unwarranted and impossible. The reality remains unchanged.
This is what we refer to as a “flawed tradition.”
On this matter, my views largely coincide with those of Comrades Shaoqi, Kaifeng, Ruomai, and Boqu [4].
Why, then, is it predominantly a “leftist” tradition? Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. First, the dual oppression faced by our nation and society has created extreme hardships in the lives of the masses and in the Party’s operating environment. These difficulties have fostered a mindset whereby “going ‘left’ is preferable to going ‘right.’” Second, the Party’s composition still includes a substantial proportion of petty-bourgeois and young proletarian elements. Third, the Party is only fifteen years old, and its tradition of applying Marxist theory and practice remains relatively shallow. As a result, we have not yet been able to approach every issue with a fully Marxist perspective, nor has everyone had sufficient opportunity to thoroughly master dialectical materialism. Fourth, when addressing previous erroneous lines—for example, the Li Lisan line—certain shortcomings in tactical strategy, propaganda and education, and intra-party relations were never fully corrected. Some improvements proved temporary, only to reemerge later. For a prolonged period, these three areas remained inadequately examined and resolved.
Due to these four factors, certain “leftist” habits or traditions have persisted within our Party. By contrast, “rightist” tendencies have found little foothold here, partly because the circumstances did not favor them and partly because they were more thoroughly purged. Thus, they have not coalesced into a persistent flawed tradition or set of unhealthy practices.
But even with a sound tradition in place, might there still be room for flawed habits in certain areas? The answer is yes. Within what is fundamentally correct, elements of error may nonetheless be present—varying only in degree—simply because society, and often the Party itself, harbors its darker side.
Will this situation endure indefinitely? It need not. As conditions and tasks evolve, and as our understanding of dialectical materialism deepens, these lingering shadows will gradually be dispelled, effectively eradicating the “leftist” tradition in these three domains. New errors may continue to emerge, but they need not become entrenched.
Does this tradition apply equally to all leadership organs and to every cadre and member? No. Generally speaking, it is confined to certain leadership bodies—primarily those at the central level—as well as to select cadres and members.
Why, then, are certain unhealthy habits so widespread? Because a segment of the membership insists upon perpetuating them—often constituting a majority within the highest echelons—while others are either compelled or semi-compelled to follow suit. Some individuals recognize the problem and express dissatisfaction, yet lack adequate grounds to voice their concerns or are outright forbidden from doing so, leaving them silent.
This reflects the actual situation. Even among those who share these tendencies, patterns of behavior can shift: one may refrain from such practices during a particular phase, such as the Great Revolution, only to revert to them later, for instance during the reactionary period under the Kuomintang. At times, one may chafe at the arrogance of others, while at other moments one adopts a similarly overbearing stance. Following setbacks, a tendency toward caution may emerge; after successes, pride and complacency may take hold. Such fluctuations are commonplace.
It is perfectly conceivable for a correct line to coexist with isolated errors, as evidenced by the Zunyi Conference. Likewise, a virtuous person may simultaneously harbor ailments—conditions like scabies or a common cold serve as examples. Comrade Luofu’s analysis [5] further substantiates the existence of this “leftist” tradition across three key areas.
Luofu pointed out that, following the Fourth Plenary Session, the Party committed six specific errors of principle: (1) an underestimation of the evolving role of certain sections of the bourgeoisie; (2) an insufficient appreciation of the revolution’s protracted nature, complexity, and uneven development; (3) both “leftist” and “rightist” missteps in wartime strategy; (4) errors of isolationism and sectarianism in mass struggles, coupled with inadequate efforts to address them; (5) a failure to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy’s vulnerabilities; and (6) serious shortcomings in ideological struggle and cadre policy. These errors persisted throughout the Party, and even today, they have yet to be fully eradicated. Moreover, they were not confined to the central leadership alone; many local organizations and countless cadres and members were also implicated. Notably, certain errors—such as a failure to fully grasp the distinctive characteristics of the Chinese revolution—had already surfaced prior to the Fourth Plenary Session.
The underlying cause lies in the limited dissemination and depth of dialectical-materialist thinking within the Party.
Given the persistence of these errors, how could such “leftist” habits fail to take root? And how, then, can they be completely overcome? The solution lies in widely promoting and deeply embedding Marxist methodology—specifically, dialectical materialism—among the broader cadre corps.
It is worth noting that the six errors identified by Luofu have now been essentially rectified at the central level.
In conclusion, a flawed tradition does indeed exist within our Party—manifesting as rigid, formulaic, and authoritarian approaches in mass work, propaganda and education, and intra-party relations, accompanied by tendencies toward isolationism, sectarianism, adventurism, and punitive measures. These unhealthy habits have yet to be fully eradicated across the entire Party, though systematic efforts to address them are beginning to unfold.
The changing circumstances and pressing new tasks urgently demand a thorough transformation in this regard, and we are currently undertaking that very process.
Printed based on records of meetings of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee preserved in the Central Archives.
Notes [1] This is part of Mao Zedong’s speech titled “Questions of Mass Work,” delivered at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Following the conclusion of the National Representatives’ Conference of the CPC in May 1937, the Central Committee convened a separate conference for white-area representatives. Liu Shaoqi presented a report entitled “On the Party’s Work in White Areas and Mass Work,” while Zhang Wentian offered a concluding report titled “The Current Central Task of the Party in White Areas.” As the Central Committee had not yet reached a clear, systematic assessment of the severe “leftist” errors in its previous work, some comrades remained influenced by those earlier “leftist” perspectives, leading to disagreements during the discussion of Liu Shaoqi’s report. On June 5 and 6 of the same year, the Political Bureau convened to deliberate these issues. Mao Zedong’s aforementioned remarks, together with Zhang Wentian’s summary report on behalf of the Central Committee, collectively affirmed Liu Shaoqi’s report while criticizing “leftist” isolationism and adventurism, and called for the Party to implement the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in its practical work in white areas. [2] When discussing the Party’s highest leadership bodies’ errors in the overall strategic line, Mao Zedong does not mention the third “leftist” deviation, represented by Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu). This omission reflects the fact that, at the time, the CPC had not yet undertaken a critical evaluation or comprehensive summary of that particular episode. The Zunyi Conference, held in January 1935, primarily focused on resolving crucial military and organizational issues, thereby ending the dominance of the third “leftist” line within the Central Committee. It was not until the Yan’an Rectification Movement of the 1940s that the errors of that “leftist” line were thoroughly criticized and formally concluded. [3] The three individuals referred to are Liu Shaoqi, He Kaifeng, and Li Weihan. He Kaifeng, whose real name was He Kequan (1906–1955), hailed from Pingxiang, Jiangxi Province, and served as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Li Weihan (1896–1984), also known as Luo Mai, was from Changsha, Hunan Province, and held the position of Secretary of the CPC Central Committee’s Organizational Department. All three delivered speeches at a meeting of the CPC Central Committee dedicated to work in white areas. [4] Boqu refers to Lin Boqu (1886–1960), a native of Linli, Hunan Province, who at the time headed the Northwest Office of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. [5] Luofu denotes Zhang Wentian; see Note [1] on page 373 of this volume.