described above
97. Necessary → Absolutely necessary
Struggle to Win the Masses in Their Millions
for the Anti-Japanese National United Front
Concluding Remarks at the Party Congress
of the Soviet Areas
(May 7, 1937)
Comrades! In the course of the discussions over the past few days, except for the
case of a few comrades who have raised different views, there has been unanimous agreement with my report "The Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National
United Front at the Present Stage."¹ But the dissenting views were rather significant, and therefore in my concluding remarks I shall first answer their questions²
before discussing certain other issues.
I. The Question of Peace
For nearly two years our Party has fought for internal peace. After the Third
Plenum of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee, we declared that
peace had been attained, that the stage of "fighting for peace" was over, and
that the new task was to "consolidate the peace." We also pointed out that this
was linked to "fighting for democracy” consolidating the peace through fighting for democracy. A few comrades, however, argue that this view of ours is
untenable. It follows that they must either arrive at the opposite view or hover
between the two. Because they say, "Japan is retreating and Nanjing is wavering
more than ever; the contradiction between the two nations is on the decline and
the contradiction within the country is on the rise." Naturally, according to this
appraisal, there is no such thing as a new stage or new tasks, and the situation
has reverted to its old stage or even deteriorated. I believe this view to be
incorrect.
In saying that peace has been attained, we do not mean that it is consolidated;
on the contrary, we have said that it is not consolidated. Bringing about peace
and consolidating peace are two different things. History might reverse its course
for a while, and peace might meet with setbacks because of the existence of
Japanese imperialism, Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese faction. But peace
has been the reality since the Xi'an Incident and was the product of several
factors (Japan's fundamental policy of invasion, the favorable attitude of the
Soviet Union and also Britain, the United States, and France toward peace in
China, the pressure of the Chinese people, the Communist Party's guidelines for
peace during the Xi'an Incident and its policy for eliminating the confrontation³
between the two régimes, the differentiation within the bourgeoisie, the differentiation within the Guomindang, and so on); it is not something that can be made
or unmade by Chiang Kaishek alone. To unmake the peace, he would have to
fight against many forces and draw closer to Japanese imperialism and the proJapanese faction. There is no doubt that Japan and the pro-Japanese faction are
still endeavoring to provokes civil war in China. That is precisely why peace is
not yet consolidated. Such being the case, we have come to the conclusion that,
instead of reverting to the slogans and the stage of "end the civil war" and
"fight for peace," we should take a step forward and point to the slogan and
stage of "fight for democracy," for this is the only way to consolidate the peace
and bring into being the war of resistance against Japan. Why do we put forward
the three closely related slogans of "consolidate the peace," "fight for democracy," and "carry out armed resistance"? The answer is that we desire to push
the wheel of revolution forward and that circumstances allow us to do so. To
deny the new stage and the new tasks, to deny that the Guomindang has "begun
to change," and as a necessary consequence of this logic, to deny the achievements of all the forces that have been struggling for peace during the last year
and a half is only to remain where one was before, without advancing a step.
Why is such an unsound appraisal made? Because they start not only from
fundamental points (Japan's retreat, Nanjing's further wavering, the decline of
national contradictions, and the rise of domestic contradictions) but also from a
number of limited and transient phenomena (Sato's diplomacy, the Suzhou trial,
the suppression of strikes, the eastward transfer of the Northeast Army, Yang
Hucheng's journey abroad, and so on), and link the two together, thereby forming a dismal picture. We say that the Guomindang has already begun to change,
but at the same time we also say that it has not changed completely. It is
inconceivable that the Guomindang's reactionary policy over the past ten years
would change completely without new efforts, without more and greater efforts,
by us and by the people. Quite a number of reputedly "left-leaning" people,
who often bitterly denounce the Guomindang and who during the Xi'an Incident
advocated putting Chiang to death and "fighting our way out through
Tongguan," are now astonished when events like the Suzhou trial occur immediately after peace is attained, and ask, "Why does Chiang Kaishek still do
such things?" These people ought to understand that neither the Communists nor
Chiang Kaishek are gods, nor are they isolated individuals but, rather, members
of a party, a class, or a nation. The Communist Party has the ability to push the
revolution forward by degrees but is unable to clear away all the evils in the
country overnight. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang have begun to observe
these changes, but the accumulated filth of the past ten years will certainly not be
cleansed overnight without greater efforts by the whole people. We maintain that
the trend of the movement is toward peace, democracy, and armed resistance,
but this does not imply that the old evils of civil war, dictatorship, and nonresistance can be swept away without effort. It is only through struggle and hard
work, extending over a long period, that the old evils, the old filth, and certain
setbacks and even possible reversals in the revolution may be eliminated.
"They are bent on destroying us." Quite true, they are always trying to
destroy us. I fully acknowledge the soundness of this appraisal, and indeed one
would have to be fast asleep to overlook this point. But the question is whether
there has been any change in the way they are trying to destroy us. I think there
has been a change, from a policy of war and massacre to one of reform and
deceit, from a tough policy to a soft one, from a policy of elimination to one of
persuasion, from a military policy to a political one. Why has there been such a
change? Confronted with Japanese imperialism, the bourgeoisie has no choice
but to seek an ally in the proletariat, just as we are seeking an ally in the
bourgeoisie, and this should be the point of departure in considering the question. Internationally, by the same token, the age-old hostility between France and
the Soviet Union has turned into alliance. Our task10 has also changed from a
military to a political one. We, for our part, have no use for plotting or scheming;
our aim is to defeat Japanese imperialism in a common effort by uniting with all
members of the bourgeoisie and the Guomindang who favor resistance against
Japan.

II. The Question of Democracy
"To put the emphasis on democracy is wrong; the emphasis should be solely on
resistance to Japan. Without direct action against Japan, there can be no movement for democracy. The majority of the people want only resistance to Japan,
not democracy, and what is needed is another December Ninth Movement."
Let me first put a few questions. Can it be said that what the majority of the
people wanted in the previous stage (from the December Ninth Movement to the
Third Plenum) was merely resistance to Japan and not [domestic] peace? Was it
wrong to emphasize peace in the past? Was it impossible to have a movement for
peace without direct action against Japan (the Xi'an Incident and the Third
Plenum took place after the battle in Suiyuan was over, and today, too, there is as
yet nothing equivalent to the Suiyuan battle or the December Ninth Movement)?
Everyone knew that, in order to resist Japan, there had to be [domestic] peace,
that without peace there could be no resistance to Japan, and that peace was a
condition for resistance. All the anti-Japanese activities in the previous stage,
whether direct or indirect (beginning with the December Ninth Movement and
ending with the Third Plenum), were centered on the struggle for peace, which
was during the first stage the central link, the most essential thing, in the antiJapanese movement.
Similarly today, in the new stage, democracy is the most essential thing for
the task of resistance against Japan, and to work for democracy is to work for
resistance against Japan. Resistance and democracy are interdependent conditions, one for the other, just as are resistance against Japan and internal peace,
democracy and internal peace. Democracy is the guarantee of resistance to
Japan, while resistance can provide favorable conditions for developing the
movement for democracy.
In the new stage we hope there may be and indeed, there will be many
direct and indirect struggles against Japan, and these will give an impetus to the
war of resistance and greatly assist the movement for democracy. But the core
and essence of the revolutionary task history has set us is the winning of democracy. Is it, then, wrong to keep stressing democracy? I do not think so.
"Japan is stepping back, Britain and Japan are headed toward equilibrium,
and Nanjing is wavering more than ever." Ignorance of the laws of historical
development has given rise to this needless anxiety. If there were a revolution
in Japan and she really withdrew [from China], it would help the Chinese
revolution and would be just what we want, marking the beginning of the
collapse of the world front of aggression. What room for anxiety would there
be then? This is not what is happening for the time being;11 Sato's diplomatic
moves are preparations for a major war, and a major war confronts us.
Britain's policy of wavering can get her nowhere; her clash of interests with
have proposed, is quite correct, but this complements, rather than in any way
conflicts with, the fight for democracy and a national assembly; the essential
thing is still the national assembly and freedom for the people.
It is correct and indisputable that the day-to-day struggle against Japan and
the people's struggle for a better life must be linked to the movement for democracy. Nevertheless, the central and essential thing in the present stage is democracy and freedom.
III. The Question of the Future of the Revolution
Several comrades have raised this question, and my answer here can only be
brief.
In the writing of an article, the second half can be written only after the first
half is finished. Resolute leadership of the democratic revolution is the prerequisite for the victory of socialism. We are fighting for socialism, and in this respect
we are different from any revolutionary partisan of the Three People's Principles. Our efforts of today are directed toward the great goal of tomorrow; 15 if we
lose sight of that great goal, we cease to be Communists. But, likewise, we cease
to be Communists if we relax our efforts of today.
We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution, and we are
for the transition of the democratic revolution in the direction of socialism. The
democratic revolution will develop through several stages, all under the slogan of
12. The aggressor country → Japan
13. Dictatorship → Reactionary dictatorship
14. Economic collaboration "Economic collaboration"
15. Our efforts of today are directed toward the great goal of tomorrow → Our present
efforts are directed toward the great future goal

a democratic republic, and not under the slogan of the soviets. The change from
the predominance of the bourgeoisie to that of the proletariat is a long process of
struggle, of struggle for leadership in which success depends on the work of the
Communist Party in raising the level of political consciousness and organization
both of the proletariat and of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. 16
The staunch ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, and next comes the petty
bourgeoisie. 17 It is the bourgeoisie that will contend with us for leadership.
To overcome the vacillation of the bourgeoisie and its lack of revolutionary
thoroughness, we must rely on the strength of the masses and on the correctness
of our policy; otherwise the bourgeoisie will instead come out on top in relation
to the proletariat.
A sound transition (that is, bloodless) is what we would like and we should
strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses.
We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution, not of the
Trotskyite theory of permanent revolution, 18 and not of the semi-Trotskyite
Lisanism. We are for the attainment of socialism by going through all the necessary stages of the democratic republic. We are opposed to tailism, 19 but we are
also opposed to adventurism and impetuosity.
To reject the bourgeoisie on the grounds that its [participation] is only temporary and to describe the alliance with the revolutionary sections20 of the bourgeoisie (in a semicolonial country) as capitulationism is a Trotskyite approach,
with which we cannot agree. Today's alliance with the revolutionary sections of
the bourgeoisie²¹ is in fact a necessary bridge on the way to socialism.
IV. The Question of Cadres
To shoulder the task of guiding a great revolution requires a great party and great
leaders and cadres. 22 In China, which has a population of 450 million, it is
impossible to carry through our great revolution, which is unprecedented in his16. Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie
17. Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie
18. The Chinese term zhuanbian, here translated "transition," is also the standard
Chinese equivalent for the Russian word pererastanie (growing over), which Lenin used
to characterize his own view of the succession of stages in the revolution (also called
"uninterrupted revolution”), in contrast to Trotsky's "permanent revolution." Although
Mao, as might be expected, supports Lenin against Trotsky, there is no evidence that he
had ever heard of "growing over"; he probably took zhuanbian to mean simply
"transition."
19. Khvostizm, a term coined by Lenin, is commonly rendered "tailism." Lenin used it
to stigmatize those members of the Communist Party who followed along behind the
workers, not realizing that it was the Party's mission to lead the working class.
20. The revolutionary sections → The anti-Japanese sections
21. Revolutionary sections of the bourgeoisie → Anti-Japanese sections of the
bourgeoisie
22. Great leaders and cadres → Many first-rate cadres
tory, if the leadership consists of a small, narrow group and if the Party leaders
and cadres are petty-minded, short-sighted, and incompetent. The Chinese Communist Party has been a large party for a long time, and it is still large despite the
losses during the period of reaction; it has many good leaders and cadres, but still
not enough. Our Party organizations must be extended all over the country, and
we must purposefully train tens of thousands of cadres and hundreds of first-rate
mass leaders. They are to be cadres and leaders versed in Marxism-Leninism,
politically far-sighted, competent in work, full of the spirit of self-sacrifice,
capable of tackling problems on their own, steadfast in the midst of difficulties,
and totally loyal and devoted in serving the nation, the class, and the Party. It is on
these cadres and leaders that the Party's line relies for its links with the membership and the masses, and it is by relying on their firm leadership of the masses that
the Party can succeed in defeating the enemy. Such cadres and leaders must be
free from selfishness, from individualistic heroism, ostentation, sloth, passivity,
and sectarian arrogance, and they are selfless national and class heroes. Such are
the qualities and the style of work demanded of the members, cadres, and leaders
of the Communist Party. Such is the spiritual legacy handed down to us by the
tens of thousands of members, the thousands of cadres, and the scores of first-rate
leaders who have laid down their lives for the cause. We ought to23 acquire these
qualities, do still better in remolding ourselves, and raise ourselves to a higher
revolutionary level; all this is no doubt necessary. But even this is not enough; we
must also regard it as our duty to seek out many more new cadres and leaders in
the Party and the country. Our revolution depends on cadres. As Comrade Stalin
has said, "Cadres decide everything."
V. The Question of Democracy Within the Party
To attain this aim, inner-Party democracy is essential. If we are to make the
Party strong, we must practice democratic centralism to stimulate the initiative of
the whole membership. There was more centralism during the period of reaction
and civil war. In the new period, centralism should be closely linked with democracy. Let us apply democracy, and so give scope to initiative throughout the
Party. Let us give scope to the initiative of the whole Party membership, and so
create24 new cadres and leaders in great numbers, eliminate the remnants of
factionalism, 25 and unite the whole Party as solidly as steel.
VI. Unity in the Conference and in the Whole Party
After explanation, the dissenting views on political issues voiced at this conference have given way to agreement, and the earlier difference between the line of
"The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance Against Japan"

2. First answer their questions → First discuss these views


3. Confrontation → Antagonism

4. Japan Japanese imperialism

5. Provoke → Prolong

6. The reference is to the trial, held in Suzhou in April 1937, of the leaders of the
National Salvation Association, who had been arrested in November 1936. This group,
popularly known as the "Seven Gentlemen," included Shen Junru, Zhang Naiqi, the
eminent woman lawyer Shi Liang, and four others. According to Mao (see above, the text
of December 28, 1936), Chiang Kaishek had agreed to their release as one of the
conditions under which he was freed after the Xi'an Incident, but instead they were now
formally condemned. The seven were released only after the beginning of the war against
Japan.

7. Tongguan, near the border between Shaanxi and Henan, was the scene of a direct
confrontation between the forces sent toward Xi'an by the authorities in Nanjing, and the
armies of Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, which lasted from late December 1936 to
the end of January 1937. See above, the Introduction.

8. The bourgeoisie → The bourgeoisie and the Guomindang

9. Seek an ally → Temporarily seek an ally

10. Our task → Our task domestically


11. For the time being → As a matter of fact
MAY 1937 655
the aggressor country12 makes this certain. If Nanjing continues to waver for
long, it will become the enemy of the whole nation, which is something its own
interests do not allow. A temporary retrogression cannot change the general law
of history. Hence one cannot deny the existence of the new stage or the necessity
of setting the task of winning democracy. In any case, moreover, the slogan of
democracy is appropriate because it is obvious to everybody that the Chinese
people have far too little democracy, not too much. Actual events have also
shown that to define that new stage, and to set the winning of democracy as our
task, is to move a step closer to resistance. Events have moved forward; let us
not put the clock back.
"Why place so much emphasis on a national assembly?" Because it is something that can affect every aspect of life, because it is the bridge from dictatorship¹³ to democracy, because it is connected with national defense, and because
it is a legal institution. To recover eastern Hebei and northern Chahar, to combat
smuggling, to oppose economic collaboration, 14 and so on, as many comrades

23. We ought to → Beyond a doubt, we ought to

24. Create → Train

25. Factionalism → Sectarianism

--- Notes

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 5, pp. 207-18, where it is reproduced from
the 1944 edition of Mao's Selected Works.

1. "The Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National United Front at the Present Stage" →