— Conversation with Agnes Smedley[1]

(March 1, 1937)

Smedley asked: Has the Communist Party’s current united-front policy fundamentally changed from what you discussed with Mr. Snow last autumn?

Mao Zedong replied: If we look at it in its fundamental aspects, there has been no change. This is reflected in the following points:

First, our united front is directed against Japanese aggression. Therefore, it is not aimed at opposing all imperialism, but specifically at resisting Japanese imperialism, since Japan is currently invading China. At the same time, we call upon Britain, the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and other countries to sympathize with China’s anti-Japanese movement, or at least to refrain from opposing it. On this basis, we are willing to establish friendly relations with these nations.

Second, our united front is national in character. That is to say, it encompasses all parties and all social classes throughout the nation, with the sole exception of traitors. Some people claim that the Communist Party advocates a people’s front; this is incorrect. What we advocate is a national united front, which is far broader in scope than the people’s fronts in France or Spain.

Third, accordingly, the main program of this anti-Japanese national united front should include the following items:

(1) Domestic peace and national unification;
(2) War of resistance against Japan;
(3) Democratic freedoms for the people;
(4) The transformation of the Nanjing government into a genuine defense government that includes representatives of all parties and factions, while removing the pro-Japanese elements;
(5) The establishment of a democratic republic based on a general election system;
(6) Improvement of the people’s living standards;
(7) Development of industry and commerce;
(8) The formation of an alliance with countries sympathetic to China’s war of resistance.

Question: To achieve the anti-Japanese national united front, to what extent are you prepared to make sacrifices?

Answer: This depends on the historical circumstances. Beginning in the summer of 1927, the Kuomintang abandoned the united front between the KMT and the CPC, renounced Sun Yat-sen’s policies of allying with Russia, uniting with the Communists, and supporting workers and peasants, discarded the program of national independence and democratic freedom, and moved in precisely the opposite direction. As a result, we were compelled to shoulder the responsibility for the Chinese revolution on our own and implement the policies of soviet power and land revolution, placing us in opposition to the Kuomintang. At that time, our policy of opposing the Kuomintang was entirely correct and necessary. However, after the Mukden Incident in 1931, the Communist Party issued a manifesto[2] calling for an end to the civil war and offering to conclude an agreement with the Kuomintang on domestic peace and joint resistance against Japan under three conditions. Yet only the 19th Route Army agreed with our proposal, while the Nanjing authorities remained firmly opposed and even launched large-scale encirclement campaigns. When the North China crisis[3] erupted and the national peril reached an extremely grave stage, we further issued on August 1, 1935 a declaration advocating the organization of an anti-Japanese allied army and a defense government[4]. In December of the same year, the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution establishing the anti-Japanese national united front[5] and formulated a concrete program for the united front. This new policy immediately won the support of the broad masses, and many patriotic elements within the Kuomintang also endorsed it. The reason was that with a greater enemy now confronting us, only by ending the civil war could we effectively resist Japanese aggression and usher in a new phase in Chinese politics. Nevertheless, the Kuomintang still refused to abandon its old policies. Last August, we wrote another lengthy letter to the Kuomintang[6], strongly urging them to shift their focus from internal conflict to the Japanese aggressors, restore Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, transform the political system into a democratic republic, convene a general assembly elected by universal suffrage, and sincerely repent of past mistakes to start afresh with the people. We declared that the Soviet areas would adopt the same democratic system as the rest of the country. This letter garnered widespread sympathy within the Kuomintang. However, the central leadership did not respond. When the Xi’an Incident broke out and the nation faced imminent danger—specifically, the likelihood that Japan would seize the opportunity to launch a full-scale invasion—the peaceful resolution of the crisis was truly a blessing from heaven. In order to consolidate domestic peace and swiftly initiate the war of resistance, on the eve of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee[7], we sent the party a crucial telegram on February 10, stating the following:

(1) The Soviet government would be transformed into a special administrative region of the Republic of China, and the Red Army would be reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army under the command of the Nanjing government and the Military Commission;
(2) A thoroughgoing democratic system would be implemented within the special administrative region;
(3) The policy of overthrowing the Nationalist government would be suspended nationwide (a policy we had already begun to pursue last year, which we merely reiterated here);
(4) The policy of confiscating landlords’ land would be halted.

These new proposals were made entirely to dispel doubts and eliminate antagonism, so that a national united front against Japan could be established with the Kuomintang. In return, we asked the Kuomintang to fundamentally change its previous policies, engage in external resistance, introduce internal democracy, improve the people’s living standards, and so forth.

Question: How do you intend to implement the principles of your united front here and in other regions—for example, with regard to merchants, intellectuals, landlords, peasants, workers, and the military?

Answer: Our approach to merchants has remained unchanged, both in the past and today. We have always advocated the development of national industry and commerce, and wherever the Red Army went, it protected merchants. Recently, around Xi’an and Sanyuan, the Red Army not only protected merchants but also refrained from confiscating any landlords’ land, earning widespread praise—a fact well known to all. Within the Soviet areas, commerce is completely free.

As for intellectuals, our policy has consistently been one of protection and preferential treatment for technicians, cultural figures, and artists, whom we treat with respect.

With regard to landlords, as long as they do not oppose the anti-Japanese salvation movement, their land will not be confiscated; however, they must work to improve the lives of the peasants.

For workers, we implement various measures to improve their conditions, depending on the specific situation.

Regarding our attitude toward the Kuomintang’s armed forces, all Chinese troops, especially those from the prestigious Whampoa Military Academy, should unite closely under the banner of the national united front, stand together in resisting Japan with their guns pointed outward, and avoid any internal fighting. Although the Red Army and the Kuomintang forces fought for ten years, we harbor no grudges and are willing to join hands with them, fighting side by side under unified command to defend our homeland. We believe that they too share this common aspiration.

We are open to discussing these policies with the Kuomintang and all sectors of society, seeking consensus and incorporating them into the main provisions concerning the anti-Japanese strategy, the political system, and other key issues, thereby including them in the program of the national united front for implementation nationwide.

Question: Does this new united-front policy mean that the Chinese Communist Party, in its pursuit of a national united front, has abandoned class struggle and become nationalist?

Answer: As mentioned earlier, the specific policies the Communist Party has decided to implement are entirely aimed at effectively resisting Japan and defending China. To achieve this, domestic peace must be restored, and the dual-power situation eliminated; otherwise, a genuine war of resistance against Japan would be impossible. This involves subordinating particular interests to the overall interest and class interests to the national interest. Every political party and individual in China should understand this principle. The Communists will never confine themselves to the interests of a single class or a particular moment in time; rather, they are deeply concerned with the interests of the entire nation and its long-term welfare. Regarding the issue of class struggle, we propose addressing it appropriately from two perspectives:

First, regarding landlords and capitalists: They possess wealth and power, and therefore should first and foremost respect the national interest, making every effort to improve the living conditions and treatment of workers and peasants. If landlords and capitalists continue to subject workers and peasants to cruel oppression and exploitation, prioritizing only their own narrow class interests, then the working masses will be unable to survive, let alone resist Japan. In such a scenario, the nation itself will perish, and even the landlords and capitalists will ultimately become slaves of a defeated country. Therefore, any landlord or capitalist with a shred of conscience should awaken their patriotic spirit and, in the interest of national salvation, support improvements to the economic and political lives of workers and peasants. It is unacceptable for some to enjoy food while others go hungry, or for certain groups to have political freedom while others are deprived of it. I believe that only Japanese collaborators—traitors—would disregard the overarching national interest and, at a time when the very existence of the nation is at stake, continue to oppress and exploit the working masses. We have already raised these demands on behalf of workers and peasants across the country to the Kuomintang, and the Kuomintang, acting in the national interest, should provide a satisfactory response.

Second, regarding the poor and oppressed masses of workers and peasants: They have neither wealth nor power, yet they constitute the foundation of the nation and represent the largest social class. At this critical juncture, their most important task remains to resist Japanese aggression and defend China. They will be the main force in the war of resistance, and without them, the cause of national salvation cannot succeed. Once their economic and political conditions are improved, their grievances against landlords, capitalists, and the Kuomintang may naturally diminish. However, workers and peasants must also keep the larger national interest in mind; therefore, we do not advocate pursuing demands that are incompatible with the goal of national salvation. The Communist Party’s advocacy of improving people’s living standards while halting land confiscation serves precisely this purpose.

The policies currently being advanced by the Chinese Communist Party are undoubtedly imbued with a patriotic character. Some argue that the Communist Party is internationalist and disregards national interests, refusing to defend the motherland. This is a gross misunderstanding. The Chinese Communist Party is indeed internationalist and champions the ideal of world unity; at the same time, it is a staunch patriot dedicated to defending the nation and willing to fight to the last drop of blood against Japanese aggression. The fifteen-year-long national liberation struggle led by the Communist Party is a matter of public record. There is no contradiction between patriotism and internationalism, because only through China’s independence and liberation can it contribute to the global movement for world unity.

Question: If a Chinese national united-front government is established, what peace terms would be acceptable to China? Should negotiations be held between China and Japan?

Answer: If Japan is willing to seek peace, we are not opposed to negotiations. Our peace terms are as follows:

First, Japan must rescind its policy of aggression against China—that is, abolish its so-called “continental policy”[8] and the “Hirota Three Principles”[9]—respect China’s independence, and place the two countries on an equal footing;

Second, Japan must return the four northeastern provinces and northern Chahar[10], dissolve the “Manchukuo”[11], and abolish the Yin Rukeng-led Jehol Government[12];

Third, Japan must withdraw its North China Garrison Force;

Fourth, Japan must cease allowing its aircraft to fly freely over Chinese territory;

Fifth, Japan must dismantle all its intelligence-gathering organizations operating within China, namely the so-called secret service agencies;

Sixth, Japanese nationals in China must be prohibited from engaging in abusive and arbitrary behavior toward the Chinese people;

Seventh, smuggling must be banned.

Peace negotiations should proceed only on the basis of Japan’s agreement to these terms. Any negotiations that involve sacrificing China’s territorial sovereignty will be opposed. However, it should be noted that meaningful negotiations on these terms are only possible once a legitimate Japanese government is established. Currently, Japan is governed by a military regime, and such negotiations are therefore not feasible.

Question: Has war with Japan become inevitable?

Answer: It is inevitable. Until the Japanese people overthrow the military regime, Japan’s aggressive policies will not cease, and thus war is unavoidable. Following the Germany–Japan Pact[13], the threat of war has grown even more acute.

Question: The Japanese side claims that cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang is hindering peace in the Far East. How do you respond to this argument?

Answer: The “peace in the Far East” touted by the Japanese military regime refers to a situation in which Japan occupies China, China offers no resistance, and other countries involved in the Chinese question—such as Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union—do not object. This is “conquering a country without a fight,” and it is precisely the kind of “peace in the Far East” that the Japanese military needs. However, there is another kind of peace in the Far East—one achieved by implementing the measures I have just outlined: Japan abandons its aggressive policies, returns the four northeastern provinces, withdraws its garrison forces, and so forth. Under such conditions, the Chinese people can live in peace, and countries around the world can engage in peaceful trade with China. This is a different kind of peace in the Far East. Only this kind of peace is genuine, and it is what the Chinese people need, as well as what all peace-loving nations require—and even what the Japanese people themselves desire. The only ones who have no use for this kind of peace are the Japanese military regime and its aggressive allies, Germany and Italy, the two fascist powers. Therefore, we can say that we oppose the former “peace in the Far East”—that is, the kind of “peace” advocated by the Japanese military—and we support the latter—namely, the true peace in the Far East. We advocate replacing the former “peace” with the latter, because what the Japanese military calls “peace” is nothing more than another name for war, another name for reducing the Chinese people to slavery, another name for threatening all peace-loving nations, and yet another name for inflicting great harm on the Japanese people themselves. In my view, this so-called “peace” deserves to be “obstructed.”

Question: Is there a contradiction between the Sino–Japanese War and world peace? Can a point of reconciliation be found?

Answer: Of course, there is a contradiction between the Sino–Japanese War and world peace. The vast majority of countries and peoples around the world desire peace, while the Japanese military regime seeks war. According to the Japanese regime’s current stance, this contradiction cannot be reconciled. The only way to resolve it is for the peace-loving nations of the world, together with China, to jointly oppose Japan’s aggressive policies and compel the Japanese military to submit to international public opinion. On the other hand, if war cannot be avoided, China must resolutely carry out its war of resistance. Only these measures are compatible with world peace. The only basis for reconciling the two lies in policies that sanction and resist aggression.

Question: Do you think peace treaties such as the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg–Briand Pact, and the Covenant of the League of Nations[14] can prevent Japan from waging war against China? What role do you believe these treaties will play in the Sino–Japanese War, and how significant are they?

Answer: From today’s perspective, these treaties certainly express a desire for peace, and as such, they serve as a firm rebuke to aggressor states. However, for an aggressor like Japan, they are merely a moral sanction. They cannot actually prevent Japan from attacking China. These treaties will play little to no role in the Sino–Japanese War and therefore hold little practical political significance. To truly prevent Japan from waging war against China, a new treaty is needed—one that includes concrete measures to counter Japan’s acts of aggression through force, such as the conclusion of a Pacific collective security pact. Only such a treaty can effectively deter war and, should war break out, bring it to a swift end.

Question: After the establishment of a united-front government, can China immediately begin fighting Japan? Or will a considerable period of preparation be required?

Answer: That depends on the situation in Japan. Whenever Japan launches an attack on China, China must be ready to mount a resistance. However, we do not advocate provoking Japan; our policy is self-defense. Therefore, we must quickly and thoroughly prepare on all fronts so that China can respond to any contingency at any time. We do not object to preparation, but we oppose what might be called “protracted preparation” or using preparation as a pretext for compromise.

Question: Without international assistance, are China’s existing resources and financial strength sufficient to wage a victorious war of resistance against Japan? Can China bear the financial and economic burden of the war?

Answer: Even without foreign allies, China must fight, and given its natural resources and geographical conditions, it is capable of sustaining a prolonged war. The Red Army’s decade-long campaign provides living proof of this. Nevertheless, we are actively seeking allies, because Japan has already formed its gangster alliance, and China cannot afford to remain isolated. Therefore, we advocate the establishment of a Pacific united front among China, Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. Such a united front would not only aid China but also promote mutual assistance among these countries. After all, Japan’s aggression is not only a disaster for China but also for the entire world, much like Germany’s aggression. Moreover, these two aggressor nations have now joined forces. I believe that China, Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union should act swiftly and unite; otherwise, they risk being defeated one by one by the enemy.

Question: Given the current situation—the alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy—what impact will such a war have on Japan’s economy, finances, and trade? Can Japan overcome this war with the help of these two countries?

Answer: Japan’s aggression against China brings absolutely no benefit to the Japanese people. The ultimate outcome of Japan’s war against China will not be victory, but rather the collapse of Japan’s finances, economy, and political system. This is something that not only the Japanese people, but also forward-thinking members of the Japanese bourgeoisie, already recognize. However, the military regime remains stubbornly unaware of this reality. The Japanese military has forged a global alliance of aggressors and hopes to receive support and coordination from Germany and Italy. They not only hope to use this strategy to weather the war against China, but also plan to extend their aggression worldwide. Their dreams may seem quite grand, but in my view, their eventual outcome will be far from glorious. The Chinese people, on the other hand, should have confidence in their ability to defeat Japan.

Question: Why did the Communist Party advocate a peaceful resolution to the Xi’an Incident? Many people were surprised and would like an explanation.

Answer: It was not surprising at all; it was entirely expected. The surprise stemmed from a failure to connect this event with the Communist Party’s previous political positions. Since the beginning of Japanese aggression, we have consistently sought to end the civil war, because only through domestic peace can we effectively resist Japan. The declaration four years ago proposing an anti-Japanese agreement with the Kuomintang under three conditions, the August 1st Declaration of two years ago, and last year’s letter to the Kuomintang—all clearly demonstrated our sincere desire to establish a new united front with the Kuomintang. During the Xi’an Incident, certain elements within China were vigorously inciting civil war, and the danger of such a conflict was very real. Had it not been for Zhang Xueliang’s decision on December 25 to escort Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing, and had Chiang not properly handled the aftermath of the incident, a peaceful resolution would have been impossible. The continuation of hostilities could have led to unpredictable consequences, providing Japan with an excellent opportunity to launch a full-scale invasion. China might have been utterly destroyed, or at the very least suffered severe damage. During the Xi’an Incident, some within the Japanese military and among certain Chinese elements in Ningxia, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin claimed that the incident was a Communist plot. These accusations are entirely unfounded. The Xi’an Incident arose from differences of opinion within the Kuomintang regarding the anti-Japanese struggle and domestic reforms; it was a sudden and unexpected event about which we had no prior knowledge. Following the incident, tensions flared between Ningxia and Shaanxi, and some again alleged that the Communists intended to turn Xi’an into Madrid[16]. This too is false. The political environments of China and Spain are fundamentally different: Spain was inevitably headed toward civil war, whereas in China at that time the only priority was external resistance, with domestic affairs requiring peace. The fact that the Xi’an Incident was resolved peacefully has already proven these claims to be mere speculation, and in some cases malicious slander.

Question: Many people not only claim that the Communist Party orchestrated the Xi’an Incident, but also allege that red flags were hoisted on the city walls and that the Red Army abducted young men and women around Sanyuan. What is the actual truth?

Answer: As for the story about raising red flags in Xi’an, it is likely that only the Japanese and their collaborators saw it, while the people of Xi’an themselves have never witnessed such a scene. Similarly, the allegation of abducting young men and women must have originated from the Japanese and their collaborators. Only the young people of Sanyuan themselves could confirm whether this actually occurred. Even now, official documents continue to assert that the Red Army committed murder and arson, oppressed the populace, and devastated the countryside. They have been repeating these falsehoods for ten years, yet show no sign of tiring. While individuals are free to express their views, all Chinese citizens also have the right to observe the facts with their own eyes. The government has yet to enact any laws prohibiting people from verifying the truth for themselves. Anyone is welcome to visit the places where the Red Army passed through or stayed and see the actual situation firsthand—there is no need for me to elaborate further.

Question: There is a rumor circulating that the Communist Party’s current policy amounts to capitulation, surrender, and repentance before the Kuomintang. What is your opinion on this?

Answer: I am aware that such talk is prevalent. Interestingly, the Japanese are reluctant to make this accusation. They prefer to see the KMT and the CPC locked in conflict and vehemently oppose any notion of “capitulation, surrender, and repentance.” This is because the Japanese military understands that the Communist Party’s policy of coordinating with the Kuomintang, despite being labeled as “capitulation, surrender, and repentance,” in fact delivers a severe blow to Japan’s aggressive policies. There is a standard criterion for assessing China-related issues: the Japanese invariably oppose any revolutionary policies, while they warmly welcome counter-revolutionary ones. To determine whether a particular policy or action is correct, one need only observe the Japanese attitude. By examining how the Japanese reject the so-called “capitulation, surrender, and repentance” policy, one can readily discern the revolutionary nature of our own policies. What the Communist Party has been asking of the Kuomintang is to put an end to their decade-long adherence to outdated policies and transition to new policies of national revolution and democratic reform. These requests were articulated in the Communist Party’s telegram sent to the Kuomintang’s Third Plenary Session, which addressed topics such as convening a national congress for salvation, ensuring democratic freedoms for the people, improving living standards, and accelerating preparations for war. In this context, the Communist Party proposed renaming the Soviet system and the Red Army, eliminating the confrontation with the Kuomintang, and halting the confiscation of landlords’ land. There is no doubt that these steps represent a significant concession on the part of the Communist Party. However, this concession was necessary because it was based on a larger and more urgent principle: the necessity and urgency of national salvation through resistance against Japan. This is what we call mutual concessions, mutual unity, and joint resistance. All wise leaders and members of the Kuomintang are fully aware of this significance. Unfortunately, a segment of the population, influenced by the “A-Q mentality,” proudly celebrates our concession as “capitulation, surrender, and repentance.” As everyone knows, the late Lu Xun depicted a character named A-Q in one of his novels[17]. In A-Q’s worldview, he is always victorious, while everyone else is a failure. Let them talk; after all, there are plenty of such individuals in the world. Furthermore, there is another group afflicted with “leftist infantilism,” which exists in various regions. Sun Mingjiu, the officer who shot Wang Yizhe[18], is an extreme representative of this tendency. They are filled with fervent patriotism and deeply moved by the tragic history of national loss and territorial disintegration; their hearts are pure. However, they lack political experience and often lose their bearings during major upheavals, failing to distinguish between the local and the national, the past and the present, or today and tomorrow. They initially opposed Chiang Kai-shek’s return to Nanjing and later resisted the peaceful resolution of the incident. In Xi’an, some individuals not only fail to understand the Communist Party but also misjudge Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the architects of peace. They fail to recognize that, although progress within the Kuomintang has been slow, the prospect of a united front against Japan does exist. The anti-Japanese sentiment within the Kuomintang’s National Revolutionary Army is steadily growing, and most leaders and members are capable of joining us and the people in the cause of national salvation. While the Kuomintang’s policy shift has yet to fully satisfy us, it has indeed begun, as evidenced by the resolutions passed at the Third Plenary Session. They also fail to differentiate between the patriotic majority and the few who are genuinely collaborating with the enemy—those known as the pro-Japanese faction—merging the two into one. Moreover, they do not realize that it is the responsibility of all progressive elements in society to patiently persuade those who still do not understand our position until they come to accept it, so that together they can confront the common enemy. This requires patience and sometimes a willingness to make concessions, as long as they do not violate the fundamental principles of national salvation through resistance. As for these hasty activists who misunderstand our policies, we can only offer them the above-mentioned self-criticism. As for those who prioritize personal or sectional interests over the national interest—whether they are pro-Japanese or merely vocal opponents of Japan—it is not a matter of self-criticism or mere mockery; rather, it involves exposing their schemes and preventing them from carrying out their machinations.

Question: What is your attitude toward the Three Principles of the People?

Answer: We have long been believers in the Three Principles of the People. Otherwise, why would we have joined the Kuomintang between 1924 and 1927? Several members of our Party served as central committee members or provincial committee members of the Kuomintang, including myself, Lin Boqu, Wu Yuzhang, Dong Biwu, Xie Juezai, and Dong Weijian. Many others also held leading positions in the National Revolutionary Army, such as Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, He Long, Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, and Xu Xiangqian. Our current task is to strive for the true realization of the revolutionary Three Principles of the People: nationalism, which seeks China’s independence and liberation through external resistance; democracy, which aims to establish a democratic republic with a system of universal suffrage through internal democratic freedoms; and people’s livelihood, which focuses on alleviating the suffering of the majority of the people by improving their living standards. Such a version of the Three Principles of the People is entirely compatible with our current program, and we are currently urging the Kuomintang to restore Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary interpretation of the Three Principles. We are the most resolute and loyal advocates for realizing the Three Principles of the People in China. Even our past policy of land revolution was simply an implementation of Sun Yat-sen’s principle that “the tiller shall have his field.” As for our belief in communism, it does not conflict with this. When Sun Yat-sen was alive, he explicitly approved of our simultaneous embrace of communism. Moreover, many Kuomintang members also adhered to capitalism, anarchism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and other ideologies—embracing a wide range of beliefs without exclusion. As long as the current revolutionary program achieves consensus, it forms the foundation for national unity and salvation, dispelling all doubts and setting us on the path to face national adversity together. The bright future of the Republic of China rests precisely on this basis.

Printed from issues 338 to 343 of the New China Daily, published from March 16 to April 3, 1937.

Notes:

[1] Agnes Smedley (1894–1950), an American progressive journalist and writer.

[2] Refers to the January 17, 1933 declaration by the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army opposing Japanese imperialist aggression. The declaration offered to join forces with all Chinese armies to resist Japan under three conditions: (1) an immediate cessation of attacks on Soviet areas; (2) immediate guarantees of democratic rights for the people (freedom of assembly, association, speech, strike, publication, etc.); and (3) the immediate arming of the people to form volunteer militias to defend China and strive for its independence, unification, and territorial integrity.

[3] Refers to a series of events in 1935 involving Japanese imperialist aggression in North China and the betrayal of North China’s sovereignty by the Kuomintang government led by Chiang Kai-shek, commonly known as the North China Incident.

[4] Refers to the August 1, 1935 “Address to All Compatriots on the Cause of National Salvation Through Resistance Against Japan” issued by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, commonly known as the August 1st Declaration.

[5] Refers to the resolution “On the Current Political Situation and the Party’s Tasks” adopted by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at its Wayaobao Meeting on December 25, 1935.

[6] Refers to the August 25, 1936 “Letter from the Communist Party of China to the Kuomintang of China,” see pages 424–433 of this volume.

[7] Refers to the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of China, held in Nanjing from February 15 to 22, 1937. The meeting primarily discussed policies toward the Communist Party of China and Japan. Due to widespread calls from across the country for an end to the civil war and a united front against Japan, the session effectively adopted a policy of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC in the war of resistance, establishing principles such as domestic peace, electoral reform, expanded democracy, and the release of political prisoners.

[8] The “Continental Policy” refers to the invasion plan proposed in 1927 by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi to annex Northeast China and Inner Mongolia, ultimately aiming to destroy China and dominate the world; it is also known as the Tanaka Plan.

[9] The “Hirota Three Principles” refer to the so-called “Three Principles toward China” presented by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota Koki to the Chinese ambassador to Japan in October 1935. The main contents were: (1) China must suppress all anti-Japanese movements and abandon its reliance on Britain and the United States; (2) China must recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo and establish economic cooperation with Japan; and (3) China and Japan must jointly combat communism.

[10] See note [3] on page 382 of this volume for information on Chahar.

[11] “Manchukuo” was a puppet regime created by Japanese imperialism after its occupation of Northeast China in 1931. It was formally established in Changchun in March 1932, with Puyi installed as “regent.” In March 1934, it was renamed the “Manchukuo Empire,” and Puyi’s title was changed to “emperor.”

[12] See note [5] on page 434 of this volume for information on the Yin Rukeng-led Jehol Government.

[13] Refers to the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on November 25, 1936 between Germany and Japan. This pact was essentially an extension of the Berlin–Rome Axis formed by Germany and Italy through their own agreement signed on October 25 of the same year. On November 6, 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, officially forming the fascist alliance of Berlin–Rome–Tokyo.

[14] See note [7] on page 13 of this volume for information on the Nine-Power Treaty. The Kellogg–Briand Pact, also known as the Briand–Kellogg Pact, was initiated by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg. Representatives from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia signed the “General Treaty Concerning the Abolition of War as a Means of Conducting National Policies” (also known as the Non-Aggression Pact) in Paris on August 27, 1928. However, immediately after the signing, Britain, the United States, and France stated that each country retained the right to decide whether to resort to war based on its own circumstances. By 1933, sixty-three countries, including China, had joined the Non-Aggression Pact. The Covenant of the League of Nations refers to the treaty adopted at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to establish the League of Nations.

Talk on the Sino-Japanese Problem and
the Xi'an Incident
(March 1, 1937)

Smedley: Is there any basic change in the united front policy the Communist
Party is now carrying out from what you discussed last fall with the reporter
Snow?

Mao: On a basic level, there is no real change. This is reflected in the following
points:
1. Our united front is directed against Japan. Thus it is not meant to oppose
all imperialisms but, rather, opposes Japanese imperialism because Japanese imperialism is now invading China. But we ask that Britain, America, France, the
Soviet Union, and other countries sympathize with China's anti-Japanese movement, or at least not oppose it. On this basic premise, we wish to establish
friendly relations with these countries.
2. Our united front is a national one. That is to say, it includes all parties and
factions and all classes within the nation, excluding only the Chinese traitors.
Some say that the Communist Party advocates a popular front, but this is not
true. What the Communist Party advocates is a national front. This sort of national front is much more extensive than the popular fronts in France or Spain.
3. Therefore, the major political program of this national front against Japan
should include the following:
a. Domestic peace and unification;
b. War of resistance against Japan;
c. Democratic rights and freedom for the people;
d. The Nanjing government transformed into a genuine government of national defense, accommodating all parties and all factions and removing
from office all pro-Japanese elements;
e. The state system transformed into a democratic republic based on general
elections and a parliamentary system;
f. Improving the livelihood of the people;
g. Developing industry and commerce;
h. Uniting with all countries sympathetic to China's war of resistance against
Japan.

This interview with Agnes Smedley was first published in Yan'an in Xin Zhonghua bao,
issues nos. 338-343, March 16-April 3, 1937. Our source is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 1,
pp. 479-94, where it is reproduced from that version. It can also be found in Mao Zedong
ji, Vol. 5, pp. 175-88. Smedley's own English text does not appear to be available.