Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party After the Kuomintang Third Plenary Session[1]

(March 23, 1937)

On the Question of the Sino-Japanese Contradiction and China’s Domestic Contradictions

On this question, there are many principles that need to be further clarified. (1) The Sino-Japanese contradiction is primary, and domestic contradictions have been relegated to a secondary position. I raised this question long ago, but it was not clearly defined in the resolution of the December 1935 Conference. The changes in domestic class relations were anticipated in the resolution of the December Conference, but the change in Chiang Kai-shek was not anticipated. That the Sino-Japanese contradiction is fundamental and primary—this understanding is a truth, and this assessment has been confirmed in political events, with the Kuomintang Third Plenary Session serving as clear proof. The changes in our policy and the changes in the Kuomintang’s policy are based principally on this primary contradiction. (2) The revolutionary aspects of the Three People’s Principles do not conflict with our current political programme; we should take up this weapon. The Three People’s Principles also need to be revised theoretically. (3) Class struggle should be conducted on the principle of taking the overall situation into account; both labour and capital must do so, adopting methods of consultation. Such reform is revolutionary. The agrarian revolution is not in a dominant position at present. (4) The Kuomintang Third Plenary Session

marked the beginning of a shift in Kuomintang policy; judging from the resolutions adopted, it is a shift from compromise to resistance and from dictatorship to democracy. This shift is due to Japan’s aggression, the expansion of the anti-Japanese faction, and our political influence. From the beginning of the shift to a thorough transformation will still require some time and will involve many twists and turns.

On the Question of the Transitional Stage

The first stage, the struggle for peace, has been achieved; the period from the Xi’an Incident to the start of the War of Resistance is the second stage. The main issue in this stage is democracy. “Improve the people’s livelihood” is not the main slogan, nor is “Resist Japan immediately” the main slogan; the main slogan is “Prepare to resist Japan.” To strive for democracy for the sake of resisting Japan is the main task at present and the main item on the agenda of this Political Bureau meeting. Everything must take on a national defence character; all political, military, cultural, and other aspects must serve the purpose of resisting Japan.

On the Question of Leadership

The bourgeoisie has always wanted the proletariat to submit to it and become its tail. This should be emphatically explained, and education of the masses should be intensified. The present situation is more favourable to us; the political offensive is on our side. The anti-Japanese national united front, the peace movement, and the democratic movement were all initiated by us. We can take up and use the weapon of the Three People’s Principles. However, we must secure the following guarantees: (1) active participation in the democratic and national movements, (2) the independence of the Party, (3) our task of propaganda throughout the country, (4) our task of organization throughout the country. On the 30th, Mao Zedong spoke on the second agenda item. He said: There is not the slightest doubt that Zhang Guotao’s line is entirely wrong. We welcome their change of heart; this is the Central Committee’s cadre policy. Zhang Guotao’s philosophy, to sum it up in one phrase, is confusion, in which the main elements are mechanism and empiricism.

He only acknowledges what he can see; therefore, his thinking is anti-theory and anti-principle. He always portrays himself as a practical man, which precisely confirms that he is a true empiricist. That time, after we received the news that Chiang Kai-shek had been captured, he listed dozens of reasons demanding that Chiang Kai-shek be killed. If Zhang Guotao wants to correct his errors, he must first abandon his empiricism. He sees only the part and not the whole, knows only today and not tomorrow. Because we conduct scientific analysis, we can foresee the laws of the movement and, in military affairs, possess a strategic mind—this is precisely what Zhang Guotao lacks. Zhang Guotao’s mechanism sees only form and not content. He regarded Japan and Chiang Kai-shek as devils with infinite power, suffering from the fear of Japan and the fear of Chiang, saying that even a force ten times our present strength could not defeat Japan, and in the revolutionary war he could only think of the role of the rear echelon. He failed to see that both Japan and Chiang Kai-shek are beset with all kinds of contradictions. He did not recognize the contradictions inherent within things, did not know that contradictions exist within the Red Army and within the Communist Party, and that only by strengthening inner-Party struggle, ideological education, and inner-Party democracy can these contradictions be resolved. In the early period in the E-Yu-Wan area, Zhang Guotao could not yet be said to have followed an opportunist line; it was after the campaign against Liu Xiang that his opportunist line fully took shape. After he arrived in northwestern Sichuan, he concocted a federal government and even wanted to create a political bureau. After the rendezvous, the Central Committee wanted to rapidly march north, but he stalled and refused to move. The Central Committee did its utmost to accommodate him and appointed him General Political Commissar of the Red Army. But as soon as they reached Mao’ergai, he revolted, wanting to use the gun to examine the Central Committee’s line and interfere with the composition and line of the Central Committee. This was completely wrong and fundamentally violated organizational principles. The Red Army cannot interfere with the line of the Party Central Committee. Zhang Guotao committed the greatest stain and crime on the question of splitting the Red Army. At the time of the Left Route Army and the Right Route Army, Ye Jianying secretly brought the secret order for us to see, and we were compelled to march north alone. For that telegram said: “March south, thoroughly launch inner-Party struggle.” At that time, if we had been slightly incautious, a fight would have broken out. After the anti-Party “Central Committee” was established, the Central Committee still adopted an attitude of forbearance. At that time, Zhang Guotao’s telegrams were extremely ferocious, even using phrases like “forbid you to use the name of the Central Committee any longer.” Yet we were extremely cautious; the resolution on opposing Zhang Guotao’s errors passed by the Central Committee at that time was only distributed to members of the Central Committee. Since Zhang Guotao joined the Party, there were still some periods when

he worked under the Party’s line, but the history of his opportunism must be pointed out. We should, with a sincere attitude, demand that Zhang Guotao change, abandon his errors, and start anew from the beginning in the future.

--- Notes

[1] From March 23 to 31, 1937, the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (called the Yan’an Meeting) was held in Yan’an. The meeting discussed two items on the agenda: 1. Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party After the Kuomintang Third Plenary Session; 2. Zhang Guotao’s Errors. The first item was discussed from the 23rd to the 26th (with a one-day recess on the 25th), and the second item from the 27th to the 31st. This is Mao Zedong’s speech on the first agenda item on the 23rd.