all imperialisms but, rather, opposes Japanese imperialism because Japanese imperialism is now invading China. But we ask that Britain, America, France, the
Soviet Union, and other countries sympathize with China's anti-Japanese movement, or at least not oppose it. On this basic premise, we wish to establish
friendly relations with these countries.
factions and all classes within the nation, excluding only the Chinese traitors.
Some say that the Communist Party advocates a popular front, but this is not
true. What the Communist Party advocates is a national front. This sort of national front is much more extensive than the popular fronts in France or Spain.
should include the following:
a. Domestic peace and unification;
b. War of resistance against Japan;
c. Democratic rights and freedom for the people;
d. The Nanjing government transformed into a genuine government of national defense, accommodating all parties and all factions and removing
from office all pro-Japanese elements;
e. The state system transformed into a democratic republic based on general
elections and a parliamentary system;
f. Improving the livelihood of the people;
g. Developing industry and commerce;
h. Uniting with all countries sympathetic to China's war of resistance against
Japan.
Smedley: What level of sacrifice are you prepared to make in order to form the
national united front against Japan?
Mao: That depends on the historical situation. Beginning in the summer of 1927,
the Guomindang abandoned the united front of the two parties, the Guomindang
and the Communist Party, abandoned Mr. Sun Yatsen's policy of uniting with
Russia, uniting with the Communist Party, and uniting with the peasants and
workers, abandoned the political program of national independence, democracy,
and freedom, and headed instead in the opposite direction. This presented us with
no choice but to take responsibility for the Chinese revolution single-handedly,
and to carry out the policies of soviet political power and the land revolution,
placing us in opposition to the Guomindang. At the time, this policy we adopted,
which was in opposition to the Guomindang, was absolutely correct and necessary. After the September 18 Incident took place, however, the Communist Party
issued a statement demanding a halt to the civil war and expressing our willingness to conclude with the Guomindang an agreement for internal peace and a
war of resistance against Japan, on three conditions. But at that time only the
Nineteenth Route Army accepted our proposal, whereas Nanjing not only totally
disagreed but also launched a large-scale "Encirclement and Suppression"
against us. When the North China problem arose, the nation faced extremely
serious peril because of foreign aggression, and we further issued a statement on
August 1, 1935, proposing to organize a united anti-Japanese army and a government of national defense. In December that same year we issued our Party's
resolution on establishing a national united front against Japan and designed a
concrete program for the united front. After this new policy was announced, it
met with immediate approval from the broad popular masses, and more than a
few patriotic elements in the Guomindang embraced the policy as well. This was
because, when faced with an even bigger enemy, only by ending the civil war
could Japan be fought and foreign aggression resisted, thereby opening a new
stage in Chinese politics. The Guomindang, however, was unwilling to abandon
its old policy, and last August we wrote another long letter to the Guomindang,
resolutely demanding a shift in the target of hostility from the domestic [front] to
the Japanese invaders and restoration of Sun Yatsen's three basic principles, at
the same time suggesting that the state system be changed into a democratic
republic and a parliament be convened on the basis of general elections, and
demanding that they realize and redress their past mistakes and make a fresh
start. We proclaimed: the soviet areas wish to practice the same democratic
system as that practiced throughout the country. This letter won broad sympathy
within the Guomindang. Yet the Guomindang Central Committee made no reply
to us at all. When the Xi'an Incident broke out, the country was placed in great
peril. The danger lay in the fact that Japan would necessarily take advantage of
the opportunity to launch an attack, so its peaceful solution was truly an immeasurable blessing. In order to consolidate domestic peace and hasten resistance against Japan, we sent an important telegram to the Guomindang on February 10, the eve of the convening of the Guomindang's Third Plenum. In the
telegram we expressed the following points:
Republic of China and the Red Army as the National Revolutionary Army,
[respectively] subject to the direction of the Nanjing government and the Military Commission;
jurisdiction of the Special District Government;
National Government (we already began to carry out these guidelines last year
and are merely reiterating them now).
These new declarations were meant entirely to eliminate suspicions harbored
in various circles and to abolish the state of hostile opposition so as to form a
national united front with the Guomindang against Japan. As for the
Guomindang, we demanded that they fundamentally change their past policy and
carry out the program of resisting foreign invasion, practicing democracy at
home, improving the livelihood of the people, and so on.
Smedley: How are you going to apply your principle of the united front here in
this area and other areas? For example, by what means will you deal with
merchants, intellectuals, landlords, peasants, workers, the armies, and so on?
Mao: In our relationship with the merchants, there is no difference between the
past and the present. We have always advocated the development of national
industry and commerce. Nowhere has the Red Army failed to protect the merchants. It is widely known as fact that, recently in areas around Xi'an and
Sanyuan, not only did the Red Army protect the merchants, but it did not confiscate the land from any landlord, thus earning praise from all circles. Commerce
within the soviet boundaries is completely free.
In our relationship with intellectuals, the present policy is consistent with the
past policy of protection. We give preferential treatment to technical personnel
and are respectful in our attitude toward cultural workers and artists.
Landlords will not be deprived of their land on the condition that they do not
oppose the policy of fighting Japan and saving the nation.
As to workers, all sorts of measures to improve their treatment will be taken,
in line with actual conditions.
As for the question of our attitude toward the Guomindang armies: All Chinese armies, especially the Huangpu armies, which boast a glorious history,
should become closely united under the national front in a concerted effort
against Japan, pointing their guns outward and avoiding civil war. Although the
Red Army and the Guomindang have been fighting each other for ten years, we

Second, that the Four Northeastern Provinces and northern Chahar be returned, that Manchukuo be abolished, and that the eastern Hebei government of
Yin Rugeng2 be abolished;
Third, that troops stationed in North China be withdrawn;
Fourth, that Japanese planes cease flying at will within the boundaries of
China;
Fifth, that Japanese spy organizations, or what are called special agencies, all
over China be abolished;
Sixth, that brutal and irrational behavior by any Japanese person within Chinese territory toward any Chinese person be prohibited;
Seventh, that smuggling be prohibited.
Only when Japan agrees to discuss these conditions should peace negotiations
be started. We oppose any negotiations that would jeopardize China's territorial
sovereignty. You should know, however, that negotiations on these conditions
are possible only when a people's government is established in Japan. The present government in Japan is one of warlords, so this possibility does not exist.

Smedley: Has war against Japan become unavoidable?

Mao: It is unavoidable. Until the Japanese people overthrow the government of
the warlords, Japan's policy of aggression will not come to an end, so the war is
unavoidable. After Germany and Japan concluded their treaty, the threat of war
was intensified somewhat.

Smedley: Japan asserts that cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in China hampers peace in the Far East. How would you answer
this sort of theory?

Mao: What the Japanese warlords really mean by the so-called "peace in the Far
East" is the Japanese occupation of China and the latter's allowing this occupation without any resistance; it also means no objection from countries concerned
with the China question such as England, America, France, the Soviet Union,
and so on. This is "subjugation of other countries without having to fight," the
so-called "peace in the Far East" that the Japanese warlords need. But there is
another kind of peace in the Far East, which is to carry out the means I discussed
earlier, where Japan abandons its policy of aggression, hands back the Four
Northeastern Provinces, withdraws its troops, and so on, which would allow the

Japanese warlords is nothing but another name for war, another name by which
the Chinese are to be made slaves, the people of all peaceful countries in the
world threatened, and another name in which great harm is to be done to the
Japanese people. As far as I can see, this kind of "peace" should be
"hampered' by all means.

Smedley: Is there not a contradiction between Sino-Japanese war and world
peace? Is it possible to find a point of compromise?

Mao: There is certainly a contradiction between a Sino-Japanese war and world
peace. The majority of countries and peoples of the world want peace, but the
Japanese warlords, on the contrary, want war. This sort of contradiction could
never be reconciled according to Japanese policy. There is only one way to
resolve the contradiction, which is, on the one hand, that peaceful countries in
the world join China in opposing the Japanese policy of aggression and compel
the Japanese warlords to comply with world public opinion, and, on the other
hand, that if war is unavoidable, China should resolutely wage a war of resistance. These are the only ways that accord with world peace. The basic premise
for compromise in the world as well can only be founded on a policy of sanctioning and resisting aggressors.

Smedley: Do you think that peace treaties such as the Nine-Power Treaty, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Treaty of the League of Nations, and other such peace
treaties are able to stop Japan from fighting a war against China? What kind of
role will these treaties play and what significance do they have in the war
between China and Japan?

Mao: Looked at from today's standpoint, these treaties are, indeed, an expression of the wish for peace, and for this reason the aggressor countries have
expressed their resolute opposition. With respect to an aggressor nation such as
Japan, however, these treaties have only the force of moral sanctions and cannot
possibly stop Japan from waging war against China. These treaties certainly
cannot play a very important role in a war between China and Japan, and therefore are not of much practical political significance. To prevent Japan from
waging war against China, a new kind of treaty is needed. Such a treaty should
include articles specifying the use of armed force to counter Japan's violent
aggression, as was done in the Pacific Collective Security Treaty. Only this kind
of treaty can truly prevent war or hasten its end when war does arise.
Smedley: Can China wage war against Japan immediately after the united front
government is set up? Or is a long period of preparation necessary?
Mao: This depends on the Japanese situation. When Japan attacks China, no
matter when this happens, China should immediately initiate its war of resistance. But we do not advocate making any provocations against Japan; our
principle is to fight a war of self-defense. Therefore we should make swift and
feasible preparations in every possible way so that China is able to deal with any
contingency at any time. We are not against making preparations but, rather,
against so-called "long-term preparations" and against actually compromising
in the name of making preparations.
Smedley: Without international assistance, can the Chinese people launch a
victorious war of resistance against Japan with the resources and wealth they
now possess? Can China sustain the war financially and economically?
Mao: China has to fight the war of resistance even without allies. Besides, with
China's resources and natural conditions, it is possible to sustain protracted
warfare. The history of the ten-year war that the Red Army fought is living
proof. But we are seeking friendly forces because Japan has already found its
bandit allies, so China should definitely not isolate itself. For this reason we
propose that the five countries China, Britain, the United States, France, and the
Soviet Union form a Pacific united front. This sort of united front is of assistance
to China and also of mutual help for each of the countries, because Japan's
aggression is a great disaster not only for China but also for the world, just as
Germany is a great bane to the world. Moreover, these two aggressor nations
have formed an alliance. I believe that China, Britain, the United States, France,
and the Soviet Union should hasten to unite as one, or else there is the danger
that the enemy will defeat the five countries one by one.
Smedley: Under the present circumstances that is, given the alliance of Japan,
Germany, and Italy-what sort of effects will such a war have upon Japan's
economy, finance, trade, and so on? Will Japan be able to pull through the war
with the help of these two countries?
Mao: Japan's invasion of China does not in the least serve the interests of the
Japanese people. The ultimate outcome of Japan's war against China will not be
Japan's victory but, rather, its financial, economic, and political collapse. This
point is known, not only to the Japanese people but also to those in the Japanese
bourgeoisie who have some vision. Yet the Japanese warlords will never understand this no matter what. The Japanese warlords, having formed an international
alliance of aggression, wish to gain the help and support of Germany and Italy by
coordinating operations. By using this method, not only do they hope to pull
through their war of aggression against China, but they are also preparing to use
such methods to gain the whole world. Their dream is, of course, quite satisfying, but the way I see it, their end will not be at all satisfying. The Chinese
should have confidence in their own victory over Japan.
Smedley: Why did the Communist Party advocate a peaceful solution to the
Xi'an Incident? Many people were quite taken aback and hope for an explanation.
Mao: It should have come as no surprise but, rather, should have been anticipated, but people failed to associate it with the past political position of the
Communist Party. Ever since Japan started its invasion of China, we have been
ready to put an end to the civil war, for only when China has gained internal
peace can there be a war of resistance. Our proclamation of four years ago
regarding our willingness to conclude an anti-Japanese agreement with the
Guomindang armies under three conditions, the August 1 Declaration the year
before last, our letter to the Guomindang last year, and so on, are all indications
of our sincerity in establishing a new united front with the Guomindang. During
the Xi'an Incident there were people in this country who tried hard to provoke a
civil war. The danger of a civil war was grave then. Had Zhang Hanqing not sent
Mr. Chiang Kaishek back to the capital on December 25, and had the aftermath
of the Xi'an Incident not been handled according to Mr. Chiang's methods, a
peaceful solution would not have been possible. The country might have been
ravaged by successive wars, and no one knows what might have ensued. This
would necessarily have given Japan the best opportunity for invasion, and China
might have been ruined because of this, or at least come to considerable harm.
During the Xi'an Incident, the Japanese warlords and some Chinese in Nanjing,
Shanghai, Beiping, and Tianjin claimed that it was a Communist Party plot. This
sort of allegation did not tally with the facts at all. The Xi'an Incident resulted
from political dissension within the Guomindang over the questions of fighting
Japan and domestic reforms. It was an altogether sudden occurrence of which we
had no prior knowledge whatsoever. When antagonism developed between Nanjing and Shaanxi after the incident occurred, there were again some people who
came up with the story that the Communist Party was going to turn Xi'an into a
pp. 355-6, offering to conclude an agreement with "any armed force" on three conditions:
a halt to attacks on the soviet areas, a guarantee of democratic rights, and the arming of
the popular masses to create a volunteer army to defend China and fight Japan.

Madrid. This, too, did not tally with the facts at all. The political environment in
China is entirely different from that in Spain. The civil war in Spain was inevitable, whereas in China today the only war to be fought is one of resistance against
foreign invasion, and internal peace is essential. The fact that the Xi'an Incident
was resolved in a peaceful manner has proved that their stories were nothing but
conjecture or, with some people, vicious rumor.

Smedley: Many people not only ascribe the incident to the manipulation of the
Communist Party, but also say that red flags were hung out high over the city
wall there, and that the Red Army was capturing young men and women around
Sanyuan.4 What, then, is the true story?

Mao: As for things like red flags flying in Xi'an, the Japanese and the Chinese
traitors are probably the only ones who would have seen them, but Xi'an people
have not seen any to this day. As for stories about capturing young men and
women, they must also necessarily come out of the mouths of the Japanese and
the Chinese traitors. This, too, can only be made clear by going and asking the
young men and women of Sanyuan. Today there are official documents still
saying that the Red Army commits murder and arson, oppresses the popular
masses, and destroys the countryside. They have been saying such things for ten
years already, but they are not weary of them yet and would like to repeat them
again. Those who say these things have freedom of speech all right, but the
people all over China have the freedom to discern the facts with their own eyes.
So far the government has not yet passed a law forbidding people to discern the
facts with their own eyes, and anyone can visit the places where the Red Army
has passed through or been stationed and observe for himself the actual situation,
so there is no need for me to dwell on this.

Smedley: It is being said outside [China] that the present policy of the Communist Party is one of submission, capitulation, and repentance toward the
Guomindang. What would you say to this?

Mao: I am aware that some people outside are saying just that. But what merits
attention is that the Japanese would not want to say such things. The Japanese
wish only that the Guomindang and the Communist Party fight each other and
would certainly not advocate such a policy of "submission, capitulation, and
repentance." This is because the Japanese warlords know full well that the
Communist Party's adoption of the policy of cooperation with the Guomindang,
even though some call it "submission, capitulation, and repentance," actually
deals a serious blow to Japan's policy of aggression. In viewing matters related
to China, there is a standard to go by, which is that the Japanese are bound to
oppose all revolutionary policies, while they are bound to welcome all counter-

revolutionary ones. To judge whether or not a policy or an action is correct, all
one has to do is have a look at the Japanese attitude toward it. And now all one
has to do is have a look at how the Japanese oppose the so-called policy of
"submission, capitulation, and repentance" to prove just how revolutionary our
policy actually is. What the Communist Party demands of the Guomindang is
that it discard its old policy of the past ten years and change it to a new one of
national revolution and democratic revolution. These demands were expressed in
the Communist Party's telegram to the Third Plenum of the Guomindang, specifically about calling a conference of representatives on national salvation, guaranteeing democratic rights and freedom for the people, improving the livelihood of
the people, hastening preparations for a war of resistance, and so on. Under these
conditions, the Communist Party is willing to rename the soviets and the Red
Army, eliminate its opposition to the Guomindang, and cease confiscating land
from the landlords. Without a doubt, these sorts of measures represent a substantial compromise by the Communist Party toward the Guomindang. But this kind
of compromise is necessary because it stems from a greater and more important
principle, which is the necessity and urgency of resisting Japan and saving the
nation. This may be called mutual concession and unity in a concerted effort to
resist Japan. All sensible leaders and members of the Guomindang understand its
significance. But certain people in our country are imbued with the Ah Q spirit
and have self-righteously described our concession as "submission, capitulation,
and repentance." As everyone knows, Lu Xun, who died not long ago, portrayed
a man by the name of Ah Q in one of his stories. This Ah Q was forever the
winner, so that others were all the losers. Let them say what they like. In any
event, there are more than a few Ah Q types in this world. Besides, there are
some who suffer from "leftist infantile disorder." Such people are everywhere.
That Sun Mingjiu, who assassinated Wang Yizhe, is an extreme example of this
kind of person. Their patriotism is impulsive; they are indignant over the tragic
fate of being deprived of sovereignty and losing territory, and they are pure of
heart and mind. But they are lacking in political experience and tend to lose their
bearings in the midst of great change, and they do not understand the differences
and relationship between the part and the whole, between the past and the present, between today and tomorrow. At first they opposed Mr. Chiang's return to
Nanjing, and later the peaceful solution. As for Xi'an, there are some people
there who not only fail to understand the Communist Party, but who do not
understand Zhang, Yang, and other persons who favor peace. They do not know
that, although the Guomindang's progress is slow, there exists the possibility of
concerted resistance against Japan. Within the Guomindang, anti-Japanese sentiment in the National Revolutionary Army increases day by day, and most leaders
and party members are likely to join us and the people in the cause of fighting
Japan and saving the nation. Changes in Guomindang policy are admittedly not yet
altogether satisfactory, but it is, after all, the beginnings of change. The resolutions at
the Third Plenum may be regarded as evidence for such beginnings of change.

4. Sanyuan is a locality some 25 miles north of Xi'an.

Those people do not know enough to differentiate the patriots and potential
patriots, who make up the majority of the Guomindang, from those elements
actually selling out their country, or the so-called pro-Japanese faction. They
lump these two together as one. Nor do they know that the responsibility of all
advanced elements in the country is to exercise persuasion from various angles
upon those who are not yet able to understand our point of view, and make them
understand so that they will join us in our fight against the enemy. Here patience
is required, and sometimes it is necessary to make some concessions, but as long
as the major principle of resisting Japan and saving the nation is not violated,
everything can be negotiated. As for this group of impatient people, with regard
to their failure to understand our policy, we can offer only the foregoing self-criticism. As for those who disregard the interests of the nation in their pursuit of
personal or partial interests, whether they be members of the pro-Japanese faction or those who pay lip-service to resisting Japan, it won't be a matter of
self-criticism, or simply making a few jabs at them; rather, their plot shall be
exposed so that they can never carry out their tricks.
People's Principles. We are fighting most resolutely and most earnestly to realize
a China of the Three People's Principles. Take our carrying out of the land
revolution in the past, for example. This is nothing other than Mr. Sun Yatsen's
proposal of "land to the tiller." As for the fact that we maintain faith in communism, there is no conflict there either. During his lifetime Mr. Sun Yatsen had
agreed with our simultaneously maintaining our faith in communism. Moreover,
among Guomindang members, there are many who believe in capitalism, many
who believe even in anarchism, and on the other hand some who believe in
Confucianism, Buddhism, or Christianity-all kinds of things and none of
them are excluded. As long as agreement is reached on the present revolutionary
political program, the foundation for unity and national salvation has been laid,
all suspicions may be dispelled, and we may embark on the road to joint resistance to foreign aggression. Herein lies, in fact, the basis for the Republic of
China's glorious and splendid future.
Smedley: What is your attitude toward the Three People's Principles?
Mao: We have had faith in the Three People's Principles for a long time. Otherwise, how could we have been admitted into the Guomindang between 1925 and
1927? Quite a number of people in our Party have been members of the
Guomindang Central Committee or its provincial party committees. I am one of
those, as are Lin Boqu,5 Wu Yuzhang, Dong Biwu, Xie Juezai, and Dong Weijian. There are quite a number of others who have served as leading officers in
the National Revolutionary Army, such as our Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Peng
Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, He Long, Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, and Xu Xiangqian. The
task at present requires fighting hard for the genuine realization of the revolutionary Three People's Principles: that is, a Nationalism of winning China's
independence and liberation by fighting a war of resistance against foreign aggression, a People's Rights of winning the establishment of a parliamentary
system based on general elections and a democratic republic by granting democratic rights and freedom domestically, and a People's Livelihood of winning the
alleviation of the misery of the majority of the people by improving the people's
lives. There is nothing contradictory between these Three People's Principles
and our present political program, and we are making just such demands of the
Guomindang at this time. Last August, in our letter to the Guomindang, we
already demanded that they restore Mr. Sun Yatsen's revolutionary Three

--- Notes
Talk on the Sino-Japanese Problem and
the Xi'an Incident
(March 1, 1937)
Smedley: Is there any basic change in the united front policy the Communist
Party is now carrying out from what you discussed last fall with the reporter
Snow?
Mao: On a basic level, there is no real change. This is reflected in the following
points:

This interview with Agnes Smedley was first published in Yan'an in Xin Zhonghua bao,
issues nos. 338-343, March 16-April 3, 1937. Our source is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 1,
pp. 479-94, where it is reproduced from that version. It can also be found in Mao Zedong
ji, Vol. 5, pp. 175-88. Smedley's own English text does not appear to be available.
puppet political entity which had been established in December 1935 under the leadership
of Yin Rugeng, a former Guomindang official. It controlled 22 xian, which were thus
removed from the jurisdiction of the government of the Republic of China. See above the
relevant note to Mao's talk of January 1936 with a correspondent of Red China Press.
Chinese people to lead peaceful lives and the countries of the world to trade with
China in a peaceful way. This is the other kind of peace in the Far East. But only
this sort of peace is genuine peace, the kind needed by the Chinese people, and
also the kind needed by all peaceful countries in the world, and also the kind
needed by the Japanese people. The only ones who do not need this sort of peace
are the Japanese warlords and their allies in aggression, the two fascist states of
Germany and Italy. Therefore, let us put it this way: we oppose "peace in the Far
East," meaning the first kind of "peace," but we favor peace in the Far East,
meaning the second kind of peace. We advocate substituting the second kind of
peace for the first kind of "peace." Because the so-called "peace" touted by the
joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, and took part in the reorganization of the
Guomindang in 1923-1924. In 1933 he was commissar for finance in the Jiangxi Soviet
Government. At this time, he was chairman of the Border Region government.


reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1. Our united front is directed against Japan. Thus it is not meant to oppose

2. Our united front is a national one. That is to say, it includes all parties and

3. Therefore, the major political program of this national front against Japan

1. Rename the Soviet Government as the Special District Government of the

2. Put into practice a thoroughly democratic system in the areas under the

3. In all parts of the country, abandon the policy aimed at overthrowing the

4. Abandon the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords.

3. The reference is to the proclamation of January 17, 1933, translated in Volume IV,

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 793-94, where it is

2. The Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government was a Japanese

5. Lin Boqu (1886-1960), also known as Lin Zuhan, was a native of Hunan. He