Speech at a Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee[1]

(January 24, 1937)

The question of peace depends mainly on our decision; the problem is how to guarantee it. First, we must have Chiang Kai-shek write a personal letter to us, in which he must: first, stop the “suppression of the Communists”; second, clearly delineate defense areas; and third, guarantee provisions and supplies. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram asking exactly which places we want; we proposed eight places. Once we have these places, we can monitor them and establish contact with Sichuan. Regarding defense areas: Yan’an, Yanchang, Ganquan, and Fu County, with the addition of Wayaobao and Yuwang, etc. Chiang Kai-shek has already agreed that the area west of Liangzhou shall belong to us and has ordered Ma Bufang not to attack. Since the release of Chiang Kai-shek, our general policy has been peace; the same applies to Xi’an. China versus Japan—China is in the right; Xi’an versus Nanjing—Xi’an is in the right. Now there is a general trend toward peace. The reason peace can be achieved is precisely because the Red Army is close to Zhang and Yang. The current issue is to ensure that Gu Zhutong does not come and that Zhang Xueliang returns. Our concession is that Tongguan shall belong to Nanjing; our final concession is to withdraw north of the Wei River and leave Xi’an to Chiang Kai-shek, but Chiang must station few troops there, and Yang Hucheng’s forces shall garrison one division. What we cannot concede on is the Zhang Xueliang issue. The current difficulty is the fear that peace will have no guarantee.

[1] Part one of this text is an excerpt from a report made by Mao Zedong at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on negotiations with the Kuomintang; part two is an excerpt from another speech made by Mao Zedong at the meeting.

We should make a statement regarding the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, and this statement should contain new content. It should explain that this is not a people’s front but a national front, and that our position on the Xi’an Incident is peaceful resolution. The explanations on these issues are still insufficient. We now declare that we are willing to become a unified region without waiting for the establishment of a democratic republic. One type is a national revolutionary government, the other is a people’s revolutionary government; our Soviet area is a people’s revolutionary government. We are special, but we should be placed under its jurisdiction. When the Xi’an Incident occurred and Chiang was detained, we advocated peaceful resolution. After Chiang was released, we moved our troops in, still for the sake of peace. Our mistake was that in the December 1935 resolution we proposed resisting Japan without abandoning the opposition to Chiang; however, by May we were gradually changing, and the thorough change came after the Comintern directive. After the Xi’an Incident, in our circular telegram we said that Chiang should be handed over to the people for judgment; that was incorrect.