Comrade Hannian:

Your telegram of 11:00 today received. Reply as follows:

A. What worries the Red Army cadres is the danger of a continuation of the "Communist-suppression" war. If such a possibility exists, it would be dangerous for the Red Army to be confined between the Wei River and the Yellow River. This is because, first, even if the actual strength of the Red Army is maintained as before, with only a very small amount issued for food expenses, it would still require over 500,000 yuan per month. Once the practice of attacking local tyrants ceases, there will absolutely be no way to manage. Second, counties such as Qingyang, Chunhua, Fu County, and Yan'an have very little grain; stationing many troops there for a long period would also be absolutely unworkable. Therefore, we request: first, that Chiang give us a personal letter stating the cessation of "Communist-suppression" and unity against Japan, and further specifying the garrison areas and agreeing to issue monthly funds. Second, agree to station a part of the Red Army in southern Shaanxi. We do not request important places like the Shangluo thoroughfare or Hanzhong, but please designate the eight counties of Zhashui, Zhen'an, Xunyang, Ankang, Hanyin, Ziyang, Shiquan, and Zhenba; most of these counties were originally Soviet areas. As for the main force of the Red Army, please designate Qingyang, Heshui, Zhengning, Ning County, Xifeng [2], Xunyi, Chunhua, Zhongbu [1], Luochuan, Fu County, Ganquan, Fushi [2], Qingjian, Yichuan, Wayao Fortress, Anbian, Yuwang [3], and other fifteen counties and three towns [4]. We originally intended to request Chiang to transfer the two Gaos [5] of northern Shaanxi and Ma Hongkui [6] of Ningxia, and cede their defense areas to the Red Army, but at present, this might increase difficulties for Chiang, so it is left for discussion when possible in the future. Furthermore, the Red Army units near Suzhou [7] are now also compelled to return eastward due to grain difficulties; this is not to reinforce Xi'an, and we ask Chiang not to misunderstand. Also, discuss with Chiang: if he can halt Ma Bufang's [8] offensive, then order Ma's army to relinquish the cities west of Liangzhou [9], so they have grain to eat, and that army can naturally cease its eastward advance. If Chiang agrees, please expedite this.

B. Adopt a policy of cherishing and protecting Zhang and Yang [10] and the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army. The manner should be manifested in the distribution of defense areas and the treatment of Zhang and Yang personally. From the standpoint of unity against Japan, they will absolutely not create separatism or obstruct national defense policies. If they act incorrectly, we shall, together with Chiang, intervene against them. What worries them now is entirely the fear that after the incident is resolved, there may be no guarantee for the realization of the anti-Japanese proposition and the preservation of their troops. Chiang should show magnanimity on this point to set their minds at ease. In jointly dealing with Japan and the traitors, they absolutely will not and cannot diverge from Chiang.

C. Explain the following viewpoint to Chiang: We are a revolutionary party, and the policies we ourselves determine will absolutely not waver. Our policy is to unite the whole nation together with Chiang (i.e., oppose division and civil war) and jointly oppose Japan. In the future, we are willing to consult with Chiang on many matters. Anything that benefits Japan and the traitors and harms national strength and the cooperation between the two parties, we shall, together with Chiang, resolutely oppose.

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai
22nd, 21-23 hours