Preparing to Counter the Offensive of the Pro-Japanese Clique[1]

(January 1, 1937)

Zhou, Bo, and inform Peng, Ren[2]:

The internal struggle in Nanjing is extremely intense. The pro-Japanese clique is unwilling to step down and is at risk of making a final desperate struggle, detaining Li Yi, and attacking Xi’an. Yesterday, He Yingqin[3] ordered Liu Zhi[4] to halt all demobilized troops in place and conduct exercises. Today, He ordered Li Mo’an[5], claiming that Zhang and Yang have already united with the Red Army, the situation is critical, and that the army should use exercises as a pretext to secretly advance toward Luonan. The political situation has already undergone changes. Please immediately make the following arrangements:

[1] On December 25, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek, who had been detained by the patriotic generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, accepted the proposal to resist Japan and returned to Luoyang under Zhang Xueliang’s escort, leading to the peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident. After returning to Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek went back on his word, imprisoned Zhang Xueliang, and mobilized 25 divisions to deploy in Shaanxi and Gansu. Starting from January 1937, they again approached Xi’an. Under these circumstances, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided that the Red Army should actively prepare for war and be ready to support the Northeast Army and the 17th Route Army in repelling the offensive of the Kuomintang army’s “punitive expedition” forces. This is a telegram from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), the representatives dispatched by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Xi’an.

[2] Peng and Ren refer to Peng Dehuai and Ren Bishi, who were then respectively serving as the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Red Army’s front-line forces.

[3] He Yingqin was then serving as the Minister of Military Affairs of the Nationalist Government and the commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang army’s “punitive expedition” forces.

[4] Liu Zhi was then serving as the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Route Group Army of the Kuomintang army’s “punitive expedition” forces.

[5] Li Mo’an was then serving as the commander of the 10th Division of the Eastern Route Group Army of the Kuomintang army’s “punitive expedition” forces.

A. Consult with Yang and Wang[1] to plan unity against the enemy.

B. Secretly issue a general order for the urgent mobilization of the Northeast and Northwest Armies to defend against the offensive of the pro-Japanese clique.

C. Deploy positions on the northern bank of the Wei River and in Weinan, Luonan, Shangxian, and Lantian, with a view to holding them firmly.

D. The Red Army should prepare to advance to Xingping and Fufeng to coordinate support.

E. Intensify activities in Jin, Sui[2], Chuan, Gui, Zhi, and Lu to oppose civil war.

F. Arrange the rear areas for Zhang and Yang.

Mao Zedong

24:00, 1st

[1] Yang refers to Yang Hucheng. Wang refers to Wang Yizhe, who was then serving as the commander of the 67th Army of the Kuomintang’s Northeast Army. After Zhang Xueliang escorted Chiang Kai-shek to Nanjing, he was one of the de facto leaders of the Northeast Army in Xi’an.

[2] Sui refers to Suiyuan, an old provincial name encompassing the central region of what is now the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It was abolished in 1954.