Comrades, Japanese imperialism has invaded North China! Beiping and Tianjin have fallen! If we do not mobilize to resist the war of aggression, Japanese imperialism will soon reach our very doorstep. Do not think that Beiping and Tianjin are far away from us; beyond Shanxi lies precisely the region—Beijing and Tianjin—that Japanese imperialists are now bombarding with artillery and aircraft. Therefore, at this critical moment when the survival of the Chinese nation is at stake, it is imperative that every corner of the country be urgently mobilized. The Soviet areas serve as model zones for national resistance against Japan. In these dire circumstances in North China, when our nation stands at a crossroads, convening this rally to launch a nationwide campaign of resistance carries immense significance. We must set an example and demonstrate our unwavering resolve to fight. For a long time, we have repeatedly urged them to wage resolute resistance, yet they remained indecisive, never truly committed to a determined struggle. The fall of Beiping and Tianjin was directly attributable to their vacillation and lack of resolve. The authorities in North China consistently adopted a policy of compromise, failing to make adequate military preparations and harboring unnecessary suspicion toward the populace. Rather than mobilizing the people or expanding the patriotic movement, they issued proclamations calling for “calm” and imposed martial law, effectively paralyzing the patriotic masses who were burning with fervor. As a result, Beiping and Tianjin were lost! I earnestly hope that all soldiers defending our homeland across the country will heed this painful lesson. At present, we have but one guiding principle: resolutely fight against Japan! We must immediately mobilize workers, students, and soldiers throughout the nation, uniting all parties, factions, and social classes in a united front against imperialist aggression. This is the only path to national independence and freedom. Today’s rally marks our advance along this very path. This gathering is not merely a sports event; it is a call to mobilize for the war of resistance. To safeguard our country and our territory, we must rouse the entire population. Comrades, prepare to set out for the front lines of the anti-Japanese struggle, carrying our principles and methods to every region of the country, and taking our determination to the very forefront of the resistance! Long live the liberation of North China!

The work of the Field Service Corps is of paramount importance, for fighting Japan—both domestically and on the world stage—is a matter of utmost gravity. For years, we have been advocating for national unity in the resistance against Japan, and today that goal can finally be said to be within reach. This war may well prove to be the decisive, final conflict. Members of the Field Service Corps should accompany the Red Army to the frontlines, where you will engage the enemy through your pens and your voices, while the troops wield their guns. Together, we shall strike at Japanese imperialism from both the cultural and military fronts, ensuring its eventual and irreversible defeat.

On August 29, 1937, Mrs. Snow accompanied the army to the front to handle communications with foreign correspondents. Please extend every possible assistance to her, including arrangements for her living expenses.

Chairman Mao received a telegram from the Central Military Commission stating: Zhu De and Zhou Enlai have returned from Nanjing. The Red Army has been reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu De appointed as Commander-in-Chief and Peng Dehuai as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. A nationwide war of resistance has officially begun. My vanguard units will depart on the 19th, while the remaining forces will move forward only after the joint declaration of cooperation is issued. Local cadres are to be selected; at present, no suitable personnel are available for assignment elsewhere. The Hui ethnic group may establish its own national party, which could be named the Hui Anti-Japanese Salvation Association, among other possibilities. I have been instructed not to return to Shaanxi. Nanjing has already commenced its resistance against Japan, marking an initial success in cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

In order to fulfill the Central Committee’s commitment to the Kuomintang’s Third Plenary Session regarding the renaming of the Red Army—to transform it into a model force for the national war of resistance and to propel this struggle as a revolutionary war of the entire nation aimed at achieving complete and final victory—I hereby announce, based on the outcomes of political negotiations with the Kuomintang and the Nanjing government, that the Red Army is being renamed the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Accordingly: The former General Headquarters shall be reorganized into the Eighth Route Army Headquarters, with Zhu De serving as Commander-in-Chief, Peng Dehuai as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ye Jianying as Chief of Staff, and Zuo Quan as Deputy Chief of Staff. The General Political Department shall be transformed into the Eighth Route Army Political Department, with Ren Bishi as Director and Deng Xiaoping as Deputy Director. The First Corps, the Fifteenth Corps, and the Seventy-Fourth Division shall be merged to form the First One Hundred and Fifteen Division of the Army. Lin Biao will be appointed Division Commander, Nie Rongzhen as Deputy Commander, Zhou Kun as Chief of Staff, and Luo Ronghuan as Head of the Political Work Section, with Xiao Hua serving as Deputy Head. The First Front Army, the Eleventh, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Armies, Independent Unit No. 1, the First and Second Divisions, the Chishui Guard Regiment, and certain units formerly under direct command of the General Headquarters shall be consolidated into the First One Hundred and Ten Division of the Army. He Long will serve as Division Commander, Xiao Ke as Deputy Commander, Zhou Shidi as Chief of Staff, Guan Xiangying as Head of the Political Work Section, and Gan Siji as Deputy Head. The Fourth Front Army, the Nineteenth Army, the Thirtieth Army, Independent Units No. 1 and No. 222 from the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region, and other units shall be reorganized into the First One Hundred and Nineteen Division of the Army. Liu Bocheng will be appointed Division Commander, Xu Xiangqian as Deputy Commander, Ni Zhiliang as Chief of Staff, Zhang Hao as Head of the Political Work Section, and Song Renqiong as Deputy Head. Following these reorganizations, appointments of personnel will be made in accordance with previous directives from the General Headquarters. After each division is reconstituted as part of the National Revolutionary Army, it is essential to strengthen Party leadership, uphold and carry forward the glorious traditions forged over ten years of struggle, and strictly implement the directives of the Central Committee and the Military Commission. Only in this way can the Red Army, now reborn as a Party army, continue to fight in alignment with the Party’s line and policies, thereby fulfilling its great mission in the Chinese revolution.

Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission: Mao Zedong; Vice Chairmen: Zhu De, Zhou Enlai. August 15, 1937.

A. You are hereby authorized to travel to Nanjing together with Zhou Enlai. B. While in Shanxi, Hebei, and Beijing, you are to emphasize and ensure their full understanding and acceptance of our army’s fundamental principle of “independent, autonomous mountain guerrilla warfare.” C. This principle encompasses the following: (1) Complete freedom to deploy forces according to the specific situation. Currently, Jiang Dingwen continues to insist that Liu’s forces should promptly advance to the front lines. It is unclear whether he simply fails to grasp that employing large formations in confined terrain is ill-suited to guerrilla operations—or whether his intent is malicious, aiming to force the Red Army into conventional, attritional battles. (2) The Red Army possesses the liberty to mobilize the masses, establish base areas, and organize volunteer militias without interference from local authorities or neighboring friendly forces. Failure to clarify this point will inevitably lead to endless disputes, thereby undermining the Red Army’s vital role. (3) Nanjing is responsible only for formulating strategic guidelines; the Red Army retains full discretion in executing those strategies. (4) Adherence to the principles of operating in mountainous terrain and avoiding pitched battles. D. Until your return, you will remain under my direct command. Please inform Zhu De, Ren Bishi, and He Long accordingly.

O. Regarding assessments of the situation and strategic deployment: A. Enemy forces invading North China appear to be advancing along four main axes, totaling approximately 150,000 to 110,000 troops. One column originates in Shandong and remains inactive. Another advances along the Jinpu Railway Line, comprising roughly one and a half divisions, currently pressing toward Mafang. A third follows the Pinghan Railway, consisting of approximately one division, which has yet to move north of Zhuo County. The fourth, centered on the Ping-Sui and Tong-Pu lines, comprises around three divisions forming the main striking force. Employing a wide enveloping maneuver, this column seeks to seize Taiyuan, threaten the central forces along the Pinghan Line, and ultimately break through, thereby gaining control of the region north of the Yellow River. By adopting this posture, they simultaneously menace the rear of Henan and Shandong, facilitating their ultimate conquest of Shandong and completing their plan to dominate all five provinces of North China. Their overarching strategic approach involves a right-flank encirclement. As for their advance toward Shanghai, aside from disrupting China’s economic lifelines, it also serves to pin down the enemy’s main forces, thus easing their takeover of North China. Such is the basic assessment of the Japanese invaders’ initial operational plan. B. The enemy’s right-wing spearhead further divides into three distinct columns, all advancing in pursuit: One group moves along the eastern section of the Ping-Sui Line and the northern segment of the Tong-Pu Line, targeting Yanmen Pass. Estimated strength: approximately one division. After occupying Datong, this force has temporarily halted. Another column, having captured Tianzhen and Guangling, is now pushing toward Lingqiu and Pingxingguan, executing a right-flank maneuver against the Jin-Sui forces. A third contingent, having seized Wuyi County from Zhangjiakou, now shows signs of advancing toward Laiyuan, undertaking a left-flank maneuver directed toward Wei Lihuang’s troops and the Zijing Pass garrison. These two groups together constitute a combined force of at least two divisions, poised to breach the enemy’s center in a first step toward flanking maneuvers on both wings. C. Jiang orders Wei Lihuang’s forces to withdraw to the Pinghan Line, as they find themselves encircled by enemy troops. Meanwhile, Yan intends to concentrate fourteen divisions north of Pingxingguan for a decisive battle, believing that a victory there might temporarily slow the enemy’s southward advance, provided we commit substantial reinforcements to press the attack. Should we fail, however, the enemy will swiftly overrun Pingxingguan and Yanmen Pass. Once their reserve forces arrive, they will drive straight for Taiyuan, forcing the Jin-Sui troops stationed along the western border of Suiyuan, as well as units positioned across the southern slopes of Mount Hengshan—including those in Wutai—and all forces along the northern section of the Pinghan Line—to retreat en masse. In this scenario, the enemy would secure these regions without engaging in combat, rendering the natural defenses of Nüziguan entirely ineffective. D. Laiyuan and Lingqiu are fiercely contested strongholds that the enemy is bound to capture. Fuping, Wutai, and Yu County might remain temporarily safe if they lack north-south road connections; otherwise, the enemy could dispatch a force southward to sever the Zhengtai Highway. Regardless, the Hengshan Range constitutes a strategic hub for controlling Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia. Concentrating their main forces here, the enemy aims to achieve decisive dominance over this key region—a fact already confirmed by the occupation of Hunyuan, Wuyi, and Guangling. E. Under Yan’s command, the Fu, Yang, Liu, and Tang forces have lost their combat effectiveness, precluding any conclusion that they could fundamentally disrupt the enemy’s strategic plan while holding their current positions. F. At present, the Red Army operates as a mobile detachment and does not play a decisive role in major engagements. However, with proper deployment, it can significantly support guerrilla warfare throughout North China, particularly in Shanxi. G. The earlier plan to establish guerrilla bases exclusively within the Hengshan Mountains is now wholly impractical given the current balance of power. Were we to proceed as originally envisioned, our forces would be entirely exposed to the enemy’s sweeping encirclement. Even if we initially dispersed toward the Taihang Mountains, we would still find ourselves ensnared within that larger enveloping maneuver—especially considering the likelihood of Taiyuan falling to the enemy—leaving us in a thoroughly passive and vulnerable position. H. Based on the foregoing analysis and assessment, I propose a strategic redeployment to a more advantageous position on the enemy’s flank, where we can effectively counter their advance toward Taiyuan and subsequent southward thrust, assist the Jin-Sui forces in preserving their combat potential, and create conditions conducive to genuine independent mountain guerrilla warfare. To achieve these objectives, we must broadly mobilize the masses, organize volunteer militias, establish guerrilla base areas, and support the ongoing guerrilla campaign in North China, while simultaneously strengthening the Red Army itself. Accordingly, I suggest the following revised deployment: (1) My First Front Army should assemble in Xinzhou County, north of Taiyuan, awaiting instructions. Upon securing Yan’s approval, it may then advance to operate in the northwest Shanxi region, specifically in the Guancen Mountains. (2) My Fourth Front Army should, at an appropriate juncture, deploy to the Liangshan Mountains. (3) My First Front Army, adopting a deliberately defensive posture, should immediately enter the southern portion of the Hengshan Range. Should the enemy continue its southward advance while friendly forces prove unable to repel it, we will gradually shift our focus southward, extending our operations into the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeastern Shanxi. (4) The headquarters should relocate to the vicinity of Taiyuan, selecting an optimal position based on evolving circumstances. I. What are your views? Please respond via telegram. o.I—Telegram to Peng Dehuai—September 12, 1937. Yan Xishan finds himself trapped in a paradox: he cannot avoid confronting the people of Shanxi without engaging in battle, yet he lacks any confidence in prevailing even if he does. This dilemma is insurmountable. Your assessment that he is wavering in his decision to abandon Pingxingguan and instead seek a decisive engagement at Shahe is entirely accurate. His subordinates exhibit no discernible resolve, and his army has virtually lost its fighting capacity. It is highly probable that they will be compelled to fight at Yanmen Pass, Pingxingguan, or Shahe; however, the overall momentum of the enemy makes such a prolonged resistance unlikely. Regardless of whether we win or lose, Taiyuan and the entirety of North China stand on the brink of collapse. Some comrades seem to lack a deep understanding of this objective inevitability, instead allowing themselves to be swayed by temporary circumstances. Should this mindset persist, the Red Army risks sharing Yan Xishan’s fate: becoming a passive, reactive force—constantly subjected to enemy attacks and gradually dismantled piece by piece. At present, the Red Army plays no decisive role in determining the outcome of major battles. Yet it possesses a unique strength—one upon which it can indeed exert decisive influence: true independent mountain guerrilla warfare (as opposed to maneuver warfare). To implement this strategy, we require robust forces positioned on the enemy’s flank, prioritize mass mobilization centered on establishing base areas, and disperse our troops rather than concentrating them for conventional combat. Concentrating forces prevents meaningful engagement with the populace, while focusing solely on mass mobilization renders concentrated combat futile. The two approaches cannot coexist. Nevertheless, only by dispersing our efforts to engage the masses can we decisively defeat the enemy and provide effective support to our allies. Concentrated combat yields no tangible results in the current context. The present situation differs fundamentally from that of past domestic conflicts; we cannot simply revert to old methods. I wholeheartedly agree with your telegraph dated the 18th, which stated that “even as the enemy penetrates deep into Shanxi, they remain surrounded on all sides by our guerrilla operations.” I urge you to steadfastly uphold this perspective, thinking strategically and on a broader scale. Provide thorough explanations to those comrades whose views diverge, so that our strategic direction may be unified. Comrade Lin Biao has sent a telegram fully endorsing my assessment and deployment plan of the 17th. He proposes concentrating only Chen’s brigade to deliver targeted strikes against the enemy, temporarily refraining from further dispersion. Such a temporary concentration of a single brigade is certainly permissible; however, when opportunities for decisive action remain scarce, it remains preferable to promptly redirect our focus toward mass mobilization. Similarly, Wang Zhen’s temporary deployment of a single regiment to Wutai is acceptable, provided we carefully consider the timing and ultimately shift our attention to the northwest Shanxi region. Judging from the current situation, even if Lin’s brigade succeeds in achieving one or two victories, it will soon need to pivot back toward Wutai. Please deliberate accordingly. o☆(•)•☆() A. All activities across North China should revolve around guerrilla warfare as the sole priority. Other endeavors, such as military logistics and united front work, must be subordinated to this overarching objective. We bear no responsibility if conventional warfare fails; however, we shall be held gravely accountable should guerrilla operations falter. B. Beyond the existing deployment in Shanxi, the Hebei Party should devote its full energy to guerrilla warfare. Leveraging the prestige of the Red Army’s resistance, we should mobilize all Party organizations across North China—including those in Shandong—to rally the masses, collect scattered soldiers and firearms, and systematically organize partisan detachments. To this end, please consider whether Zhou ought to engage in another round of consultations with Feng Zhi’an, Huang Shao-hong, and others. C. Special emphasis must be placed on appointing senior cadres and establishing independent Party-government-military leadership bodies. Our goal is to sustain a broad-based, resilient guerrilla campaign even after the enemy has occupied the entirety of North China. We must communicate to the entire Party that, going forward, guerrilla warfare is the only legitimate task—both within and outside Party ranks. To facilitate this, the Red Army should provide every possible form of support. D. Please report on the comprehensive deployment plan for North China. Reference Materials for Teaching the History of the CPC (Part II), People’s Publishing House, 1979, p. 10.
A. The situation in North China is extremely perilous. The enemy has broken through the gap between the Pinghan and Jinpu railways, capturing Baoding, and is now circling around Shijiazhuang. The situation in Hebei has effectively come to an end. Wei Lihuang, Zeng Wanzhong, and Sun Lianzhong have withdrawn their forces to the Fuping–Huolu line, establishing defensive positions along the Taihang Mountains. With Hebei lost, the enemy will land in Haizhou and occupy Xuzhou, leading to the swift fall of Shandong. Soon, China’s defensive lines will be reduced to holding the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. This development will inevitably bring about changes on the Shanghai front. Nanjing will face heavy bombing, and if the Kuomintang refuses to compromise, it will be forced to relocate its capital. It is anticipated that China’s political landscape will undergo significant transformation within a few months. By then, we should strive to achieve reforms in the government and the military, implement the Three Principles of the People and the Ten Major Policies, and continue supporting the national war effort. Only under such circumstances can a truly popular national war be realized. It is also likely that the Soviet Union will provide substantial military aid at that time. B. Shanxi will assume a special status in North China. This is primarily due to the presence of the Red Army, coupled with the collaboration between Yan Xishan and ourselves. Through this synergy, we can mobilize millions of people into guerrilla warfare. We must adhere to this principle, deploying guerrilla forces throughout the province, and persistently pursuing the abolition of oppressive taxes and levies, rent and interest reductions, popular participation in governance, and the fundamental reform of the Jin army. C. The Great Wall Resistance is currently only temporary and quite brief. Yan insists that our forces cooperate with him to fight one or two more battles. To better influence the Jin army, participation in these engagements is permissible under genuinely favorable conditions. However, it is crucial to recognize that this represents merely a tactical phase within the broader guerrilla campaign. The core strategy remains mobilizing and organizing the masses into partisan detachments. Within this overarching framework, conditional concentration of forces may be employed. You should demand that Yan Xishan provide ten thousand rifles to arm the people. Furthermore, you should establish a cadre school at the front lines, accommodating five hundred to one thousand students, jointly run by the Red Army and local Party organizations, to train guerrilla cadres. After six months, the majority of graduates from this school could be deployed to Shanxi. D. Regarding the use of the 115th Division in conjunction with two Kuomintang divisions to penetrate deeply into enemy territory and launch raids against Lingqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling, Wuyi, and surrounding areas, thereby striking at their rear echelons, please give this matter careful consideration. If implemented successfully, this operation could usher in a new phase, even though it may not fundamentally disrupt the enemy’s strategic plans. Nonetheless, the temporary disruption of certain elements could greatly benefit our efforts to establish base areas across Shanxi Province.