——•()— (1) Based on our experience since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, under the present conditions—namely, the nation’s sustained resistance and extensive mass work on the front lines—it is feasible to broadly develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hebei and Shandong provinces and to persist in such guerrilla operations in those areas.  (2) The Party and the Eighth Route Army units in the plains of Hebei and Shandong should resolutely adopt a policy of expanding guerrilla warfare as widely as possible, mobilizing the broadest masses to engage in open armed struggle. Secret anti-Japanese activities should remain the primary method only in enemy-occupied cities and near railway lines.  (3) In accordance with the above policy, several guerrilla zones should be immediately delineated in the plains of Hebei and Shandong, and guerrilla headquarters established within the military regions, so as to systematically and plannedly promote the widespread development of guerrilla warfare and to broadly organize self-defense forces that do not leave their productive occupations.  (4) In liberated areas, governments should be set up without delay to restore, to whatever extent possible, the local anti-Japanese order. These governments may be appointed by higher authorities or by the command headquarters, or elected by mass organizations; they will accompany a particular guerrilla unit, issue simple proclamations and decrees, organize the people in the anti-Japanese war effort, suppress collaborationist elements, safeguard the interests of the populace, and assist the troops in procuring supplies and provisions.  (5) In the areas under Commissioners Fan and Ding, the original local governments still exist. Through the impetus of the United Front, these governments should be swiftly reformed and strengthened to become genuine people’s anti-Japanese governments, incorporating resolute and capable personnel while purging corrupt and incompetent elements, thereby forging close ties between the government, the armed forces, and the people.  (6) Civilian firearms should be absorbed into the guerrilla forces and the army through propaganda and persuasion. Grain and funds should be collected on the principles of voluntary contribution and equitable apportionment, with particular attention paid to apprehending large numbers of collaborationists in cities and at railway stations for the purpose of raising funds.  (7) The people’s self-defense forces should serve as the principal form of mass organization; where feasible, peasant associations and youth groups should also be organized.  (8) A prudent approach should be adopted in dealing with sectarian sects and bandit groups, seeking to reform them according to specific, practical conditions.  (9) The development of Party organizations should generally be conducted in strict secrecy. ()•