**Chapter I: What Is Guerrilla Warfare?**

Guerrilla warfare is an essential component of all revolutionary wars. Especially in a national liberation war fought across a vast territory, the development of extensive, mass-based guerrilla warfare is necessary and inevitable.

Under China's existing conditions—a vast territory, weak technology, and poor transportation—the correct policy for defeating a powerful enemy, Japanese imperialism, is undoubtedly to extensively develop popular guerrilla warfare and coordinate it with the main regular warfare.

Without doing so, the goal of defeating the enemy is difficult to achieve.

However, guerrilla warfare should not be regarded as an independent form of war. It is one form and one stage within warfare, and fundamentally speaking, it is one form and one stage within revolutionary war.

Specifically, guerrilla warfare is the inevitable product of the contradiction between an oppressed nation or people and their oppressors when that contradiction develops to a certain historical stage. The current anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare erupted because Japanese imperialism's oppression of the Chinese nation and its people had become unbearable.

Lenin said: "National uprisings and national wars are not only possible and probable, but inevitable." (Lenin: "On National Revolutionary War") Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is one form or one aspect of such a national revolutionary war. Combined with other forms or other aspects, it forms the entire national revolutionary war.

Likewise, guerrilla warfare has no absolute independence. It is also a stage of war, because guerrilla warfare cannot independently resolve the entire issue of war. It must, during the course of the war, gradually develop and elevate its main forces into a regular army, cooperating in combat with all lower-stage guerrilla units and both existing and newly formed regular armies, in order to achieve the political objective of the war.

From this, it can be seen that guerrilla warfare has its objective laws. When a powerful enemy carries out armed aggression and armed occupation against a weak country, the enemy's troops and weapons are undoubtedly in a superior position, while the troops and weapons of the invaded and oppressed are in an inferior position. However, the latter not only refuse to submit but also seek their own liberation. Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare that uses inferior troops and weapons to counter superior troops and weapons.

On the other hand, when an invading enemy penetrates deep into a country's territory, carrying out armed occupation and brutal oppression, many conditions—the people, terrain, nature, and society—are undoubtedly more unfavorable to the enemy and more favorable to the resisting people. Guerrilla warfare precisely uses and creates these favorable conditions to seek resistance and victory over the enemy, and through struggle, to develop into a regular army that combines with other existing and newly formed regular armies to wage war against the oppressors.

Thus, when existing and newly formed regular armies, regular armies developed from guerrilla units, and the extensive guerrilla units that have not yet developed into regular armies combine, they form the entirety of the armed forces of the national revolutionary war, thereby being able to strive for the war's final victory.

In this way, objective realistic conditions endow revolutionary guerrilla warfare with its own inherent laws. These laws become the principles governing the existence and development of guerrilla warfare itself.

By analyzing these basic ideas, the following observations can be made:

First, Guerrilla Warfare and Politics. "War is the continuation of politics." Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is a form of the War of Resistance Against Japan; therefore, it is a continuation of the politics of a semi-colony against imperialism. It must have a clear political objective and must resolutely carry out the current political task, i.e., the political program of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It must, first and foremost, politically mobilize and unite the broad masses of the people, politically unify its own ranks, politically disintegrate the enemy and destroy the enemy's political power, restore and establish anti-Japanese political power, recover lost territory, create anti-Japanese base areas, coordinate with all anti-Japanese armed forces, and strive for the ultimate political objective—the realization of national liberation. Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare not only has no reason whatsoever to be divorced from politics, but on the contrary, must subordinate everything to the politics and policies of resistance against Japan. Only those who misinterpret guerrilla warfare think: "Guerrilla warfare is not a political issue, but a purely military one." (Ren Qishan) This purely military viewpoint causes guerrilla warfare to lose its political objective, thereby inevitably leading to the abandonment of political work, the loss of popular support, and the certain failure of the guerrilla war.

Second, Guerrilla Warfare and the People. Without a political objective, guerrilla warfare is inevitably doomed to failure. If the political objective of guerrilla warfare does not align with the political objectives of the people, and if it cannot gain the people's support, participation, assistance, and coordinated actions, it will also inevitably fail. This is the fundamental reason why guerrilla warfare can only be a form of revolutionary war, and also the fundamental reason why any counter-revolutionary war cannot adopt guerrilla warfare. Because guerrilla warfare is fundamentally composed of the people and supported by the people. If it is divorced from the people, or if it fails to mobilize the participation and coordination of the broad masses, it has absolutely no possibility of survival and development. Only those who do not understand guerrilla warfare deny popular guerrilla warfare, believing that "only regular troops can wage guerrilla warfare." Only those who do not wish for the victory of guerrilla warfare make the fundamentally wrong claim: "Guerrilla units are just small specialized combat bodies and have no need for the people." (Ren Qishan) And only those who insult the people and undermine the war of resistance rant: "The people simply have no consciousness of voluntarily participating in the war of resistance." (Ye Qing) If anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare separates from the people, it will inevitably separate from the victory of resistance against Japan.

Third, the Organizational Nature of Guerrilla Warfare. Guerrilla warfare possesses an organizational nature. Although all spontaneously formed popular guerrilla units inevitably display some laxity at their inception, guerrilla warfare itself should be organized. Regardless of whether guerrilla warfare is initiated by the local populace themselves, formed by a mix of regular army units and the people, or carried out by detachments sent by the regular army in coordination with popular action—whether in terms of numbers it consists of guerrilla squads of a few individuals, guerrilla units of dozens to several hundred people, or guerrilla corps of several hundred to several thousand people—it is necessary to equip them with strong political and military leadership, strong political work, sound and loyal elements, a high degree of revolutionary consciousness, unyielding confidence and perseverance, necessary management and education, strict discipline towards the masses, exemplary mass work, and resolute counter-espionage struggles. Only by gradually overcoming laxity and undisciplined behavior through combat can the units be consolidated, combat effectiveness be enhanced, and the execution of anti-Japanese tasks be facilitated. Victory is inconceivable for undisciplined guerrilla units. Only those who do not understand guerrilla warfare regard guerrilla units as anarchistic or bandit-like gangs, calling them "useful to disgruntled soldiers, local bullies and corrupt officials, hooligans and bandits" (Ren Qishan), thereby slandering guerrilla warfare. We do not deny that it is hard to avoid undesirable elements infiltrating guerrilla units, that some such elements use the pretext of organizing guerrilla units or falsely claim the name of guerrillas to commit misdeeds, nor do we deny the existence of laxity in guerrilla units, even serious laxity. But one absolutely cannot use these pathological or temporary phenomena to condemn guerrilla warfare as a whole. Instead, under the policy of broadly promoting guerrilla warfare, these lax and undesirable phenomena must be addressed with a patient, positive attitude to elevate and reform them, making them sound and combat-effective. "This is a difficult task, needless to say, it cannot be solved all at once. The entire populace must remake itself in the process of struggle. Likewise, they must be educated in any case, must be reformed according to the experience of the time." "What is evil is not guerrilla warfare, but the lack of organization, order, and party character in guerrilla actions." (Lenin: "On Guerrilla Warfare").

Fourth, the Tactical Principles of Guerrilla Warfare. The tactics of guerrilla warfare should be based on the principles of initiative, flexibility, planning, and offensive action, adapting to the specific conditions of the time and place concerning the enemy situation, terrain, communications, climate, troop strength, and the populace. In combat, it adopts the guiding principles of making a feint to the east and attacking in the west, avoiding the solid and striking the hollow, being able to advance and retreat, and seeking a quick decision. Against an enemy stronger than ourselves, it adopts the principles of "when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts, we harass; when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue." Under such principles, operations like raids, harassment, interdiction, and sabotage are carried out against the enemy's rear, flanks, weak points, and vulnerable spots to achieve the objectives of exposing the enemy, confusing the enemy, pinning down and dispersing the enemy, immobilizing and exhausting the enemy, and striking and annihilating the enemy. In this way, it fulfills the tasks of both independent operations and coordination with regular army operations. Even if all conditions are present, victory is impossible if the military command is mistaken.

Guerrilla warfare built upon these basic principles (political character, mass character, organizational nature, and tactical flexibility), conducted under conditions of vast territory, weak technology, and poor transportation within the anti-Japanese national liberation war, will undoubtedly play a tremendous role. It is "something that can truly become a factor in warfare," and "one should not miss any opportunity to strike at the enemy's strength" (Lenin: "On Guerrilla Warfare"). It is a transitional form leading to large-scale combat, the initial stage of developing into a regular army, a necessary assistant to regular warfare, a strategic detachment of the entire anti-Japanese armed forces for recovering and defending Chinese territory, people, and sovereignty in front of the enemy, and especially behind enemy lines, and an inseparable part of the strategic composition of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

Although fundamentally speaking, guerrilla warfare can only be one form and one stage of revolutionary war, because it cannot be divorced from the people, this does not mean that counter-revolutionary war cannot organize guerrilla units at all. Therefore, distinguishing between these two becomes necessary. For example, the Red guerrilla warfare during the Soviet Civil War; the guerrilla warfare during the past era of the Chinese Red Army; the anti-Italian guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia over the past three years; the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the three northeastern provinces of China over the past seven years; and today's most extensive anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in China, etc.—these all represent the interests of the entire nation or the broad masses of people, are based on popular strength, and their existence conforms to the laws of historical development. Therefore, as long as no principled errors are made in political and military guidance, they can all exist, develop, and achieve victory.

Conversely, all "guerrilla warfare" that goes against the laws of historical development—for example, the White guerrilla units organized by the Japanese, Poles, Denikin, Kolchak, and others during the Soviet Civil War; the guerrilla units organized by Italy in Abyssinia; and the Mongol "guerrilla units" driven by the Japanese aggressors now, and the traitor "guerrilla units" being or about to be organized, etc.—are all things that invade the people, oppress the people, and violate the people's interests. These kinds of "guerrilla warfare," lacking a popular base, easily disintegrate and collapse or are ultimately bound to disintegrate and collapse. They are precisely the "guerrilla warfare" we should resolutely oppose. If these two are not distinguished, it is easy to blur the basic concept of guerrilla warfare, possibly misuse the opponent's experience, exaggerate the effectiveness of the opponent's "guerrilla" actions, or even draw the conclusion that "invaders can also mobilize the people to carry out guerrilla warfare," thereby diminishing confidence in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and neglecting the application of historical revolutionary guerrilla warfare experience.

Even within revolutionary guerrilla warfare, it is also inappropriate not to differentiate between national revolutionary guerrilla warfare and class revolutionary guerrilla warfare. The former is guerrilla warfare waged by the people of the entire nation, regardless of class or party, under the leadership of the state political power, against foreign aggressors. Its popular base is much broader than that of the latter. "When an alien enemy invades, the entire populace sympathizes with and assists the guerrillas." (Gusev: "Lessons of the Soviet Civil War") At the same time, the forces cooperating in combat with the guerrilla units are also much more extensive in the former than in the latter. "Under civil war conditions, guerrilla units, no matter how enormously they develop, can never play as huge a role as they do when an alien enemy occupies the country." (Ibid.) However, the strength of guerrilla warfare during civil war lies in its internal purity, which makes unity easier, and the work of winning over enemy troops is also more convenient (due to a common language). National guerrilla warfare is somewhat weaker in these respects, thus heightening the tasks of the national united front and propaganda directed at the enemy. These are the points of difference between the two.

Yet, the two share common points: politically relying on the people and militarily employing assault (offensive action). Experience in these aspects should be mutually adopted.

National guerrilla warfare, though essentially identical, exhibits different characteristics across different eras and different nations due to their specific conditions. The anti-British national guerrilla warfare of the Guangzhou Pingying Tuan during the Opium War in China, the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the Northeast since the "September 18th" Incident, and the current anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the interior all have their respective differences.

The guerrilla warfare waged by the Riffian people of Morocco against French and Spanish oppression from 1911 to 1914 differs somewhat from China’s anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare.

These differences are reflected in the characteristics of their respective eras and nationalities.

It is necessary to recognize both their essential similarities and their formal distinctions.

In his *On War*, Clausewitz stated: "In every age, war has its own independent nature and unique conditions... Each era should have its own independent theory of war."

In his *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Lenin stated: "On the question of methods of struggle, an unconditionally historical examination is required, based on the concrete historical environment at various stages of economic evolution, governed by various political, national, cultural, customary, and other conditions... An unconditional hostility toward all abstract formulas and all manner of dogmatic prescriptions demands an attentive attitude toward the ongoing mass struggle. This struggle, as the movement develops, as the masses’ self-awareness grows, and as political and economic crises intensify, continually generates new and increasingly complex methods of defense and attack."

In light of Lenin’s famous words, it is essential to concretely study the guerrilla warfare (and all forms of warfare) of a given time and place, examining all the changing and evolving subjective and objective conditions, and to identify their common laws (general theoretical principles), and especially their respective special laws.

If today’s anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare fails to skillfully apply the laws of general revolutionary guerrilla warfare in history, the following error may occur: the belief that under the onslaught of the Japanese bandits’ mechanized forces, "guerrilla warfare has lost its historical role" (Tao Xisheng); or the claim that "the guerrilla warfare of the era of old tactics was merely an auxiliary tactic, and now there is almost no opportunity to employ guerrilla warfare" (Ren Qishan). These are extremely harmful assertions.

On the other hand, if one fails to account for the characteristics of China’s anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and mechanically applies the experiences of guerrilla warfare (and all forms of warfare) from history in a formulaic manner, another error may arise. Viewing the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare as identical to the guerrilla warfare of other eras and other nations will inevitably lead to setbacks in action, which is equally detrimental to the war of resistance and to guerrilla warfare itself.

In summary, what is anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare?

It is an indispensable component of the overall War of Resistance Against Japan.

Under China’s conditions—a vast territory, weak technology, and poor transportation—in operations against the savagely invading Japanese imperialist army, it serves as a strategic tool that develops broadly, conducts attacks everywhere, reduces the enemy’s occupied territory, bolsters the prestige of our forces, supports regular troops, and ultimately defeats the enemy.

It is an organized people’s armed force that carries out the political tasks of anti-Japanese resistance, cannot for a moment be separated from the masses, and employs flexible tactics.

Based on the characteristics of China’s present national war, it differs in certain respects from the guerrilla warfare in civil wars and in national wars of other times and places. It is a great and special anti-Japanese armed force in China’s anti-Japanese war today, and it is indispensable for the final defeat of the Japanese bandits.

**Chapter One: The Relationship Between Guerrilla Warfare and Regular Warfare**
Mobile warfare and positional warfare both belong to regular operations, while guerrilla warfare belongs to irregular operations. It is fundamentally different from mobile warfare and positional warfare. This can be seen in terms of the numbers of operational units, in organization, in equipment, in supply, in tactics, in command relationships, in the relationship between the front and rear, and in operational tasks.

First, guerrilla units and guerrilla contingents, even though they may be numerous when viewed in terms of the total armed forces of the entire war, are, from the standpoint of their operational units, small guerrilla forces ranging from a few dozen to several hundred men, or at most guerrilla contingents of several hundred to several thousand men. Compared with regular troops, they are vastly different.

Second, because guerrilla warfare primarily relies upon small units and contingents temporarily organized from the masses when the enemy arrives, its organization must suit local conditions and small-unit characteristics; its weapons are generally of low grade; and its provisions are obtained locally. All these differ from regular troops.

Further, guerrilla tactics also display their irregular nature, being mainly characterized by flexibility and maneuverability, and generally involve no decisive battles. They do not employ the relatively rigid tactics of regular troops in positional warfare, such as positional defense and positional attack along fixed fronts, engaging in direct combat with powerful enemies. Nor do they adopt the orderly and systematic tactics of regular troops in mobile warfare, such as regular reconnaissance, security, advance, deployment, attack, and defense along fixed or non-fixed fronts, engaging in direct combat with powerful enemies. As for the ability of regular troops’ mobile warfare to transition into positional warfare, guerrilla warfare is even less capable of this.

In terms of command relationships, guerrilla warfare takes independent, autonomous, and decentralized command as its principle; excessive interference is inappropriate. Regular warfare, especially mobile warfare, although it permits and must grant maneuver latitude to war zones and subordinate levels, still takes centralization as its principle. This is because the composition of regular warfare extremely demands coordinated combat, operational, and strategic actions among various units, contingents, arms, and war zones. In guerrilla warfare, however, such demands should never and cannot be made. It only requires a certain degree of operational mutual coordination with neighboring units, a general strategic resonance with regular warfare, and for certain guerrilla units to coordinate in close proximity with regular troops in combat or operations. It cannot itself have strict coordinated actions, nor does it involve coordinated operations among many different arms.

In the relationship between the front and rear, although guerrilla warfare also has its fluid, never fixed operational lines within each base area, it is primarily located behind enemy lines and isolated from the nation’s general rear. From this perspective, it essentially has no rear. Regular troops, except in special exceptions (such as the former Red Army’s Long March of tens of thousands of *li*, or the various armies in Shanxi now), generally cannot operate in this manner.

In terms of operational tasks, guerrilla warfare is for eliminating small enemies, weakening large enemies, raiding enemy communication routes, establishing independent operational base areas from behind enemy lines, strategically pinning down the enemy, and supporting regular troops in operations in distant war zones and on distant fronts. These too differ greatly from regular troops. All of this illustrates the distinction between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare. It is incorrect to conflate the two.

Undoubtedly, the Eighth Route Army is a regular army. However, given the tasks assigned to it and the demands of its situation behind enemy lines during this phase of its operations in North China, it has primarily engaged in guerrilla warfare, not regular warfare. It cannot be denied that the Battle of Pingxingguan and many other battles were part of regular warfare’s mobile warfare, nor can it be denied that the leaders of this army often plan to concentrate larger forces in hopes of destroying more enemies in mobile warfare. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the policy of "primarily guerrilla warfare, but not letting slip mobile warfare under favorable conditions" is correct. Moreover, after the loss of Fenglingdu, all the anti-Japanese forces in North China (including the Central Army, the Shanxi-Suiyuan Army, and others), before they changed their tasks or shifted their positions, also largely engaged in guerrilla warfare rather than regular warfare. It cannot be denied that these forces are all regular troops, nor can it be denied that even after the loss of Fenglingdu, it was still possible and necessary to strive for mobile warfare. However, it must be acknowledged that Generalissimo Chiang’s operational guidance to "conduct guerrilla warfare using the brigade as a unit" is correct.

From this, it can be seen that not only are the operations carried out by guerrilla units and guerrilla contingents composed of people’s armed forces classified as guerrilla warfare, due to the special nature of all their conditions and operational tasks, but also that operations carried out by regular units and regular contingents, merely because of changes in some conditions and operational tasks (dispersed actions, decentralized command, changes in the relationship between front and rear), are temporarily transformed into guerrilla warfare.

There is no doubt that guerrilla warfare can also be transformed into regular warfare. Not only can dispersed regular troops be reassembled and immediately resume carrying out regular warfare tasks, but also all guerrilla units and guerrilla contingents of the people’s armed forces, when certain conditions are met, can develop into regular troops (becoming a great source of regular forces), and their operations will thus be transformed into regular warfare.

While in the guerrilla warfare stage, they are like countless fleas, biting a giant here and there, making this so-called giant weary and weakened, forcing it to admit they are some "hateful" and "fearsome" "monsters" that it can do nothing about. When these little things grow up and themselves become a giant, the previous "giant" will not only be weary and weakened but will, in truth, face a mortal danger. It is for this reason that Japanese imperialism has recently begun to express distress in the face of China’s guerrilla warfare.

Therefore, it is incorrect not to distinguish between guerrilla forces and regular forces, and between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare. Yet, it is also incorrect to treat the two as absolute, believing there is an unbridgeable chasm between them. Only by acknowledging the distinction between the two and also accepting their mutual transformability under certain concrete conditions can one correctly understand their relationship.

Hence, it becomes very clear that if guerrilla warfare and regular warfare are conflated, or if guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare are regarded as the same thing, one is prone to the following error: theoretically exaggerating the role of guerrilla warfare while belittling the role of regular warfare. For example, claims that "guerrilla warfare is the primary strategy for all oppressed nations to achieve freedom and liberation" (Zhang Zuohua), or that "guerrilla tactics are the basic tactics of the Chinese nation’s war of resistance" (Zhao Kang), or even that "guerrilla tactics are the only tactics for we oppressed nations" (Hu Tianmin). The intent of these opinions is to elevate the status of guerrilla warfare and oppose the tendency to belittle it, and they have a certain positive role. But these enthusiastic friends have not understood that unless guerrilla warfare is placed in its proper position, it cannot be genuinely promoted. Not only can opponents exploit such overestimations by us to turn around and attack us, but from the standpoint of guerrilla warfare operations, it can lead guerrilla forces to mistakenly attempt to carry out regular warfare tasks they cannot fulfill and which are detrimental to their own survival and development. At the same time, it inevitably risks hindering the guerrilla forces’ inherent significant role of actively coordinating with regular troops in combat and developing toward regular forces.

On the other hand, if this "solely-guerrilla-ism" is truly elaborated upon and put into practice, it can weaken and disintegrate regular warfare, causing it to degenerate into guerrilla warfare, as with the notion of "turning all regular troops into guerrilla fighters." This would lose the essential prerequisite of relying mainly on regular warfare to defeat the enemy, and could lead to the conclusion that "the War of Resistance Against Japan will fail."

Conversely, there are various incorrect opinions of the following types: Some strictly separate guerrilla warfare from regular warfare, believing that guerrilla warfare is ultimately always guerrilla warfare. For instance, claiming that guerrilla warfare can only ever remain in its original position, denying that it can, under certain conditions, be transformed into regular warfare. This is an opinion that acknowledges guerrilla warfare but views it in isolation, reflecting an underestimation of guerrilla warfare. Such a view is undoubtedly harmful.

Others fundamentally oppose guerrilla warfare, believing that there can be no form of warfare other than regular warfare. This arises because they notice certain undesirable phenomena among guerrilla forces, such as poor discipline and instances of individuals exploiting guerrilla units for personal gain, and thereby draw the incorrect conclusion of fundamentally denying the people’s armed guerrilla forces, saying things like "Only regular troops can wage guerrilla warfare." This is liquidationism toward people’s guerrilla warfare and is indisputably a thorough error.

Therefore, it is necessary to correctly assess the relationship between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war.

We consider that it should be stated thus: Although in the Anti-Japanese War, guerrilla warfare may temporarily become the primary operational form at certain times, and behind enemy lines it will generally be the primary form, nevertheless, from the perspective of the entire Anti-Japanese War, regular warfare is undoubtedly primary and fundamental; it plays the decisive strategic role, while guerrilla warfare is the assistant to regular warfare. Regular warfare can, under certain conditions, be temporarily transformed into guerrilla warfare, and guerrilla warfare, under certain conditions, can also be transformed into regular warfare. Both guerrilla warfare and regular warfare should, according to the demands of the overall war situation and tasks, each be enabled to develop correctly, and be correctly coordinated with each other. Together with other necessary conditions, this will lead to the final defeat of Japanese imperialism.

As for the relationship among mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare, in accordance with the characteristics of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, and considering the present conditions of technological weakness, it should generally be said that mobile warfare should be the mainstay, with positional warfare supporting it under certain conditions, and with widely developed guerrilla warfare serving as an auxiliary.

It is clear that, although mobile warfare and positional warfare may interchange on the battlefield, and although positional warfare is necessary under certain conditions to complement mobile warfare—indeed, as technical conditions improve, the necessity and possibility of positional warfare effectively supporting mobile warfare increase—and even though launching large-scale strategic counteroffensives to recapture major cities and vital communication lines occupied by the enemy would be virtually impossible without the coordination of positional warfare, the fundamental mode of combat in revolutionary warfare should still be predominantly mobile warfare. Therefore, mobile warfare must be vigorously promoted. Denying this point would make it impossible to resolve the issue of victory or defeat in the overall war.

As for guerrilla warfare, as mentioned earlier, it is an absolutely necessary and indispensable strategic auxiliary to all regular warfare and holds an important strategic position. Hence, it must also be vigorously promoted. However, it cannot be considered to occupy the primary position, and therefore guerrilla warfare cannot replace mobile or positional warfare.

Thus, the relationship among mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare is established on correct principles beneficial to the War of Resistance Against Japan.
Chapter Three: Historical Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrilla warfare did not emerge only today or in China; it has long existed in the history of human struggles against aggression and oppression, and under suitable conditions, it has played great roles on many occasions.

Throughout history, many guerrilla wars, each with their distinct characteristics, have varied in the magnitude of their impact, and their processes and outcomes have differed accordingly. Yet, the glorious significance and the lessons of experience, built upon the blood and flesh of our predecessors, are worthy of our respect and study.

Regrettably, the valuable experience of hundreds of peasant wars in Chinese history has not yet been systematically compiled to this day. The examples cited here only pertain to the experience of guerrilla warfare demonstrated in several spectacular wars in China since the era of foreign and imperialist aggression.

Nevertheless, this can still greatly assist our compatriots, now engaged in struggle nationwide, in understanding the necessity of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and in building confidence in its victory.

In September 1821, Napoleon of France, with an ambition to swallow all of Europe, led an army of hundreds of thousands of infantry, cavalry, and artillery into Russia.

At that time, before Russia's weak and unprepared regular army could be concentrated, the primary method used was the scorched-earth policy, along with Cossack cavalry and a portion of peasant self-defense guerrillas, to progressively obstruct the advance of the French forces.

After the Battle of Borodino ended inconclusively for the Russian army, they resolutely abandoned Moscow, reorganized their forces, and deployed nine guerrilla detachments of 500 men each, together with a vast number of peasant self-defense guerrillas, to constantly harass, weary, and strike the French army, rendering them unable to advance further.

In October, when the French army, suffering from cold and hunger, was forced to retreat, the guerrillas along the route rose up in great numbers, coordinating with the strategic counteroffensive of the regular army to intercept and pursue the enemy, inflicting a crushing defeat on the French forces. Napoleon’s once-invincible grand army was nearly annihilated. The guerrillas captured many officers and soldiers and seized a considerable number of firearms and artillery. Although the various conditions contributing to Russia's complete victory in this war primarily relied on its regular army, the role of guerrilla warfare was immensely great.

"A poor and poorly governed nation actually managed to defeat and drive out the massive European army commanded by the world's strongest renowned generals. It emerged victorious, even though its potential had not yet been fully realized—because the famous guerrilla movement had not been well-organized; even assembling large units was forbidden, and the supply of weapons to the guerrillas was extremely difficult. In Russian parlance, they 'fought with axes and fists.'

Given better organization and trust in the populace, Napoleon’s army might have been annihilated even earlier."

(Ivanov)
From 1918 to 1920, during the war of the Soviet Russian people against imperialist intervention and domestic White forces, the population in enemy-occupied territories rose up everywhere, forming armed contingents to wage a genuine war against the enemies of Soviet power.

In Siberia, in the Urals, and in the rear areas of the reactionary General Denikin in Ukraine and of the Poles, numerous Red guerrilla units emerged. They not only frequently disrupted and halted enemy rear communications but also often blocked enemy advances. When the White forces retreated, they further completely wiped out the enemy regular units already shattered by the regular Red Army.

Thus, enemies such as Kolchak, Denikin, and those from Japan and Poland had to withdraw many regular troops from the front lines to combat the guerrilla units.

"This not only weakened the enemy's own front-line strength, but also rarely resulted in complete victory against these elusive and mobile guerrilla forces."

("How the Guerrillas Operate")
At that time, guerrilla warfare developed to the point where some guerrilla detachments numbered in the thousands.

Most young men and adults joined the fight, while the elderly were organized into rear propaganda teams. There were elderly "Silver Companies," adult guerrilla units, Young Pioneer detachments, ski guerrilla units, and cavalry guerrilla units.

These guerrilla units had strong Communist Party leadership, extensive political work, and were able to become one with the masses.

They opposed the "leftist" guerrilla-ism that overemphasized guerrilla warfare and denied the need to organize a regular army, while also opposing right-leaning notions that underestimated the role of guerrilla warfare.

Experience further teaches us: "The regular army is the fundamental and primary force; guerrilla forces are an auxiliary force of the first order, assisting the regular army in fulfilling combat missions."

("Lessons from the Soviet Civil War")
Many of their guerrilla units later gradually transformed into regular army units and, in battle, were able to perform on a par with the regular forces.

The renowned General Galen's army was built from guerrilla units.

From 1935 to 1936, Abyssinia's war of resistance against Italy failed in seven months. Besides the primary political reasons (the feudal-tribal system and the absence of a strong political party), the military failure stemmed from not persisting in mobile warfare, not coordinating mobile warfare with extensive guerrilla warfare and certain possible positional engagements, and ultimately adopting a purely defensive positional warfare that could not withstand the powerful Italian army.

Additionally, Abyssinia's limited territory and small population were also contributing factors to the defeat.

Nevertheless, with its backward army and weaponry, Abyssinia held out for seven months against 400,000 mechanized Italian troops. During a certain period, guerrilla and mobile warfare played significant roles, repulsing the Italian forces on several occasions and recapturing some cities, with Italian casualties reaching 140,000.

Had they persisted in this manner, the final outcome of victory or defeat would have been unpredictable.

Even now, guerrilla warfare continues in Abyssinia. If its internal political contradictions can be resolved, the development of guerrilla warfare there is possible.

In the Guangdong Anti-British War of 1841–1842 (the Pingying Tuan of the Sanyuanli people in Guangzhou), the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom War of 1850–1864, and the Boxer War of 1899, guerrilla warfare all played tremendous roles.

Especially during the Taiping War, guerrilla warfare was one of the great forms of combat, exhausting the Qing forces to the point of collapse.

The failure of these wars to achieve victory was not the fault of guerrilla warfare itself but stemmed from overall political and military reasons.

Experience teaches us that without political and military conditions superior to the enemy, and without persistent regular warfare, guerrilla warfare cannot decide the ultimate issue of victory or defeat.

In these wars, either guerrilla warfare did not develop into regular forces, or regular forces did not properly coordinate with guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, the absence of strong political leadership within the guerrilla warfare led to failure to secure final victory in all these cases.

From 1917 to 1936, the combat history of the Chinese Red Army is filled with the great achievements of guerrilla warfare.

From the very beginning, it adhered to correct political leadership. Through repeated failures and victories, it established numerous base areas, gradually developing many guerrilla units into regular forces. Even after regular armies were formed, guerrilla warfare continued to develop extensively, with many new guerrilla units actively and broadly coordinating with the regular forces in combat, thereby achieving numerous victories.

Although its weapons were backward and the number of guerrillas was very small compared to the enemy, in their own engagements and in battles supporting the main forces, strong political work and close integration with the people allowed them to hold their positions, preserve the backbone of the main forces and guerrilla units, and ultimately form the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army that emerged on the anti-Japanese battlefields today. These forces shoulder the responsibility of waging a tenacious, unyielding, and persistent struggle for the sacred cause of national liberation.

This process entailed much valuable experience, but it primarily relied on strong political leadership, on unremitting political work to forge internal unity, to become one with the masses, to adopt correct policies towards enemy forces, to appropriately coordinate guerrilla warfare with mobile warfare at the strategic and campaign levels, to employ flexible guerrilla tactics, to elevate the issue of establishing political and military base areas to a position of importance, and to actively develop guerrilla warfare into regular warfare. In this way, they sustained the war for ten years, overcame countless difficulties, and achieved the goal of directly participating in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

We have no desire to see such experience applied again in a civil war; undoubtedly, China should henceforth unite internally forever. But using it to counter Japanese imperialism is both beneficial and necessary.

After the "September 18th" Incident in 1931, a great anti-Japanese guerrilla war unfolded across the northeastern provinces.

No matter how brutally or deceitfully the Japanese invaders attempted to subjugate the compatriots in the Northeast, and despite deploying numerous troops for "punitive expeditions" over seven years, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war there has persisted and evolved.

The struggle there can be broadly divided into two periods.

In the first period (from September 18, 1931, to January 1933), widespread anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare erupted across all three northeastern provinces. In Heilongjiang, there were the anti-Japanese armies of Ma Zhanshan and Su Bingwen; in Jilin, the National Salvation Army and Self-Defense Army of Wang Delin and Li Du; in various counties in the eastern part of Fengtian, Tang Juwu and other anti-Japanese forces emerged. These forces were massive in scale and significantly harassed and threatened the Japanese invaders. However, due to a lack of clear political objectives, the absence of unified military and political leadership, and the lack of political work within the army and mass mobilization efforts, the organizations were weak, the forces were scattered, actions were uncoordinated, and they were defeated piecemeal by the enemy.

But in the second period (from January 1933 to the present), thanks to the continuous uprisings of the oppressed masses, the Chinese Communist Party's policy of an anti-Japanese national united front and its arduous work within the volunteer armies, the gradual improvement of guerrilla tactics, better integration with the local population, and the cultivation of new national cadres, the guerrilla war in the Northeast has once again become a vast undertaking. Seven or eight large guerrilla corps and many smaller guerrilla units have been created, forcing the Japanese invaders to allocate significant forces month after month, year after year, to guard against and besiege them.

These forces not only effectively attract and pin down the Japanese troops deployed to invade China but also actively impact Japan's rule in the Northeast and influence the national movement in Korea. This plays a truly great role in today's war of resistance and in the struggle for ultimate victory.

Although many weaknesses still exist among them—such as insufficient implementation and development of the national united front policy, not yet broad enough mass participation, still weak internal political and organizational work, and very poor efforts to win over Japanese troops, particularly puppet forces—these weaknesses can be overcome with sustained effort.

Experience teaches us that no matter how brutal and deceitful the Japanese invaders have been over seven years, they have not only failed to eliminate the guerrilla war in the Northeast, but will inevitably provoke an even larger guerrilla war that will coordinate more powerfully with the nationwide Chinese resistance.

These foreign and Chinese guerrilla wars cited above prove that in revolutionary war, guerrilla warfare is possible, necessary, and inevitable.

To secure the final victory of the anti-Japanese national liberation war, there is no doubt that anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare must be greatly developed. The clear and proven effectiveness throughout history serves as ironclad evidence and a lesson written in blood.

It must be pointed out, however, that today's Chinese anti-Japanese guerrilla war will be an unprecedentedly grand act in the history of all guerrilla warfare. It will not only demonstrate its great power within China's War of Resistance but, globally speaking, will also be a momentous development—a unique product of the realized conditions of the Sino-Japanese war.

Chapter Four: Can the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War Achieve Victory?
Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is a part of the entire War of Resistance Against Japan. The question of whether anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare can achieve victory must be addressed through an examination of the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves in the overall war.

The characteristics of this balance of forces are as follows:
The Japanese invader is a powerful imperialist power. In its war of aggression against China, it possesses relatively advanced industrial production and superior technical capabilities in its army, navy, and air force—this must be taken into account first. However, although it has advanced industries, it remains an inherently deficient imperialist power, inadequate in manpower, material resources, and financial capacity to sustain a prolonged war or manage a vast battlefield.

Furthermore, anti-war sentiment among the Japanese people is growing, which is gradually fostering discontent among junior officers and the broad ranks of soldiers in the invading army.

Additionally, Japan’s enemies are not limited to China alone; it cannot devote its entire strength to the invasion of China. At most, it can dispatch only around one million troops, with the remainder of its forces necessarily held back to deal with other countries.

Given all these reasons, the Japanese aggressors' war of invasion is by no means favorable for a prolonged conflict or for occupying vast territories. Strategically, they are compelled to seek a quick decisive battle. If we can sustain the war for more than three years, it will become extremely difficult for them to hold out.

In terms of operations, the Japanese aggressors are forced to rely on key lines of communication and major cities to fully leverage the power of their weaponry and rapidly seek a decisive engagement with our main forces. They are decidedly disadvantaged in fighting across expansive rural areas with poor transportation.

For this reason, within the occupied zones, they seek to control strategic points, demand stability in their rear areas, and ensure unobstructed communications, so as to concentrate their limited forces on the primary battlefields and engage our regular troops. They are decidedly disadvantaged by spreading their forces thinly and fighting on multiple fronts; what they fear most is instability in their rear and disruption of their supply lines.

Furthermore, they strive to exploit the material, financial, and even human resources of the occupied regions to compensate for their own deficiencies. They are decidedly disadvantaged by losing these resources and manpower, and they particularly fear expending their strength on engagements that are “not worth the cost.”

Therefore, the widespread development of guerrilla warfare in all enemy-occupied areas and wherever the enemy reaches will undoubtedly deal a significant blow to the Japanese aggressors. This effectiveness has already been demonstrated in the five provinces of North China and the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and elsewhere.

(1) China is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal nation. In the war of national liberation, it appears backward politically, economically, and militarily—a fact that must be taken into account.

However, China is also a country with vast territory, abundant resources, a large population, complex terrain, and poor transportation. These conditions can serve as the foundation for a protracted war.

These conditions favor our use of large-scale mobile warfare and the development of extensive guerrilla warfare, enabling the establishment of numerous anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines. This forces the enemy to fight everywhere, on all fronts, continuously, leading to relentless attrition.

We, in turn, will combine the strength of the military and the populace to strike at the enemy’s weak points, creating comprehensive battlefields in the enemy’s front, rear, and flanks. This disperses the enemy’s forces in all directions and consumes their strength from every angle, thereby buying time and gradually shifting the overall balance of strength between us and the enemy. We will strive to gradually turn the tide of the resistance in our favor, and when that day comes, it will mark the moment of our ultimate victory.

(3) Although China has a large population, it lacks organizational cohesion—a weakness that must be acknowledged.

On one hand, the Japanese aggressors’ large-scale invasion of China not only forcibly seizes our territory but also employs brutally savage policies aimed at annihilating our race. This compels our entire nation, regardless of party or class, to unite as one and persist in the policy of resisting to the very end.

On the other hand, today’s China is no longer the China of the past. Today’s China is not only different from Abyssinia but also distinct from all previous historical periods of China. In other words, China today stands in the most progressive era of its history.

The awareness of the entire populace is rising. The Anti-Japanese National United Front, based on cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, is being consolidated and developed. The government, the army, and mass mobilization efforts are being strengthened. Human, material, and financial resources can be continuously mobilized, and unorganized people can become organized.

Therefore, not only can we sustain the war for a long time with our current strength, but even if the Japanese aggressors manage to occupy more of our territory—even the greater part of it—we can still achieve ultimate victory.

China’s is a nationwide war of resistance. Not only are the people in the interior organizing to resist, but those in areas occupied by the enemy are also rising up in organization. True traitors and Trotskyites who “serve the enemy as their father” ultimately constitute only a tiny minority. Those who vow to die rather than become slaves to the fallen nation undoubtedly form the overwhelming majority. With such a force resisting the enemy, what foe cannot be destroyed? Who can say that ultimate victory is not inevitable?

(4) Japan’s war is regressive and barbaric. Consequently, it not only provokes class antagonisms domestically and national opposition from China but also arouses the opposition of a broad international coalition.

China’s war, on the other hand, is progressive and just. Therefore, it can not only unite all domestic strata and parties to stand together against the enemy but also earn the sympathy of the people in the enemy nation and widespread international support.

This constitutes another crucial condition for the enemy’s inevitable defeat and China’s inevitable victory.

The entire Anti-Japanese National Liberation War is being waged under these aforementioned conditions.

Similarly, based on these conditions, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can coordinate with the regular forces to achieve victory. All those engaged in guerrilla warfare who love their motherland must possess this firm confidence.

Chapter Five: Organizational Issues of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War
Four questions must be addressed here: How are guerrilla units formed? How are they organized? How are they equipped? What is their composition? These questions all pertain to the organizational aspects of armed forces in guerrilla warfare. They are matters that people without guerrilla warfare experience do not understand and urgently need resolved; otherwise, they will not know how to begin. Below, these issues are explained one by one:

I. How Are Guerrilla Units Formed?
Guerrilla units may arise in the following various forms: directly formed from the populace, temporary detachments dispatched by regular forces, permanent detachments dispatched by regular forces, mixed formations combining regular force detachments with civilian guerrilla units, local militia transformed into guerrilla units, enemy troops defecting and transforming into guerrilla units, and bandit forces converted into guerrilla units. The organizational composition of the great anti-Japanese guerrilla war will undoubtedly include sources from many such directions.

The first type of guerrilla unit is formed directly from the populace. This is a fundamental form. When the enemy troops arrive, oppressing and massacring, the progressive elements among the people rally the populace for anti-Japanese struggle. They gather the active and courageous among them, acquire a few broken rifles, supplemented with spears and blunderbusses, and thus a guerrilla unit is born. The state has already decreed to call upon the people to organize guerrilla units to fight for the defense of their homeland. If local governments take the lead in promoting this, such organizations will undoubtedly proceed smoothly. Even if some local governments prove inept and flee first, the progressive elements among the people, relying on their full fervor for resisting Japan and saving the nation, can issue a call and garner a mass response, still managing to organize many guerrilla units. Under such circumstances, the leadership responsibility for guerrilla warfare often falls on the shoulders of young students. A number of teachers, university professors, cultural figures, soldiers in retirement, scientists, artists, and freelance professionals also step forward, willing to shed their last drop of blood. The extensive guerrilla warfare development in provinces such as Shanxi, Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shandong, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu in recent times, largely initiated and led by patriotic civilians, serves as the best evidence. The more of these guerrilla units, the better. Every district and township can organize numerous small guerrilla bands, which, when combined, form larger guerrilla forces. Some say, “I am a common citizen, a student, only good with words, not with martial skills”—this is wrong. Between common citizens and soldiers, there is no vast chasm; as long as you are willing to act, you can become a soldier in an instant. It does not matter that you are a civilian; being good with words is even better. Organize yourselves, and you become an army; take up a rifle, and you become a soldier. Guerrilla warfare is a military university; fight a few battles, and you become a battle-hardened general. Some who bear the title “soldier” may not even match you! Therefore, the vast source of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is, without a doubt, guerrilla units formed directly from the populace.

The second type of guerrilla unit is a temporary detachment dispatched by regular forces. For example, since the outbreak of the war, many armies have dispatched temporary detachments from corps, divisions, or brigades to carry out guerrilla missions. In some cases, entire regular army groups, responding to the needs of missions and situations, are temporarily dispersed to conduct guerrilla warfare. For instance, the Eighth Route Army in North China, except when concentrated for mobile warfare, is otherwise dispersed for guerrilla operations. This form of guerrilla unit is necessary because not only are regular force detachments needed to support mobile warfare operationally by conducting guerrilla warfare, but also because the practice of guerrilla warfare is not yet widespread, necessitating the dispatch of detachments by regular forces, or even the temporary dispersal of entire regular corps for guerrilla warfare. Under such circumstances, due to various historical reasons, the difficulty often arises that regular forces do not know how to fight guerrilla warfare. Therefore, the leaders of these types of guerrilla units must pay attention to modifying their various conditions. For instance, fostering initiative among officers and soldiers, maintaining good discipline, and learning guerrilla tactics are all absolutely essential. Because these guerrilla units are temporary in nature, their leaders must also pay attention to helping the people organize local guerrilla units, so that after their departure, the local area can still sustain guerrilla warfare.

The third type of guerrilla unit is a long-term guerrilla detachment dispatched by regular forces. This dispatched detachment is not intended to return to its original unit; it is positioned in a certain area behind enemy lines, serving as the leading backbone for guerrilla warfare in that region. For example, the regular army corps dispatched by the Route Army to the border region of Shanxi, Hebei, and Chahar provinces, centered on Mount Wutai, became the backbone for sustaining guerrilla warfare in that area, serving as the core from which many local guerrilla units proliferated and extensive guerrilla warfare developed. Any region at risk of being cut off from the rear should adopt this method. This is one of the strategic plans to deliver a mortal blow to the enemy and must not be overlooked. Units of regular forces that, for some reason, were unable to withdraw with the main army and remain behind enemy lines to fight guerrilla warfare also fall into this category. There are quite a few such guerrilla units in the Songhu area; although separated from the main force, they can still independently conduct guerrilla warfare.

The fourth type of guerrilla unit is a mixed formation combining a small unit dispatched by regular forces with a local guerrilla band. For example, a squad, a platoon, or a company is sent from the regular forces to integrate into a local guerrilla unit, providing leadership and rapidly boosting the local unit’s combat effectiveness. Alternatively, experienced military and political cadres are assigned to local guerrilla units, serving as the backbone of their leadership, which can also have a significant effect. These are good methods that enable the rapid development of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla units in the Mount Wutai region frequently employ such approaches.

The fifth type of guerrilla unit is transformed from militia, police, and security forces. Many already exist in the provinces of North China, and this should be the case everywhere. The government has issued orders that local officials are not permitted to abandon the war zone without authorization. County magistrates, security force commanders, and public security bureau chiefs must obey this order; they must not lead their forces in retreat but must remain locally to persist in the resistance. Military commanders also must not absorb militia, police, and security forces merely to expand their own strength, disregarding the local situation. The actions of Han Fuqu in Shandong should serve as a stern warning. Among these guerrilla units transformed from militia, police, and security forces, many often lack good discipline and must be improved. Active and courageous elements from the populace must be absorbed to bolster their combat effectiveness; patriotic youth must be recruited to serve as their cadres. Only then can they persist in guerrilla warfare without collapsing or scattering. Old-style semi-military groups like the Red Spears, when transformed into guerrilla units, also belong to this category.

The sixth type of guerrilla unit is organized from enemy troops who defect. Forces used by the Japanese aggressors, such as puppet troops, often have this potential. We should conduct extensive propaganda and liaison work to organize their defection. When they actually defect, we should properly accept and incorporate them. After obtaining the consent of their leaders and the support of their active elements, necessary ideological and organizational reforms should be implemented. Handled well, they can be transformed into useful guerrilla units. For such forces, intensifying political work is absolutely essential.

The seventh type of guerrilla unit is transformed from bandit forces. Though this is a difficult task, it must be undertaken patiently to prevent their exploitation by the enemy. Many bandits often falsely claim to be anti-Japanese guerrilla units. Wherever possible, they must be politically reformed. Many bandit groups with partially peasant backgrounds are easier to transform.

Guerrilla units from these diverse sources are all necessary. Converging, they form the vast sea of guerrilla warfare. As the ancients said: “Mount Tai does not reject any clod of earth, thus it can achieve its height; rivers and seas do not spurn any tiny stream, thus they can achieve their depth.” Paying attention to organizing and accepting guerrilla units of every form and from every source enables the anti-Japanese guerrilla war to fulfill its tremendous strategic role—this is something patriots must not overlook.

II. How Are Guerrilla Units Organized?
Many people wish to engage in guerrilla warfare but do not know the methods for organizing guerrilla units. For the vast populace and young students lacking military experience, this is indeed a problem awaiting resolution. Even those with military experience do not necessarily all understand guerrilla organization methods, as they lack guerrilla warfare experience and also because the so-called “organization of guerrilla units” encompasses the entire military structure of a guerrilla zone, not merely the formation of a single guerrilla force. Let us now use a large guerrilla zone behind enemy lines as an example to explain the organizational method. A small guerrilla zone essentially functions as a sub-zone of a larger one, following the organizational method for sub-zones. Individual guerrilla forces or guerrilla corps are organized according to the model of a certain type of guerrilla force or corps within either large or small guerrilla zones. This constitutes the overall organizational system for guerrilla warfare, offered as our opinion for the reference of our compatriots.

A large guerrilla zone encompassing multiple counties should be organized into a military sub-district, with a military sub-district commander and political commissar appointed as the highest leadership for guerrilla warfare across the entire zone. Under their leadership, various necessary working organs shall be established, such as the headquarters and the political department. Under the headquarters, there shall be sections for staff, adjutants, military supplies, and medical services, with the chief of staff, acting on behalf of the commanding officers, overseeing them; under the political department, there shall be sections for propaganda, organization, enemy forces, mass mobilization, and general affairs, with the director of the political department, under the authority of the political commissar, overseeing them.

The entire military sub-district shall be divided into several military sub-areas. Depending on the terrain, enemy situation, and the development of guerrilla warfare, either one or three counties, or five or six counties, shall be designated as a military sub-area. A military sub-area commander and political commissar shall be appointed to direct the guerrilla warfare of the entire military sub-area. Under their leadership, a sub-area headquarters and political department shall be established. Within these two departments, based on the number of guerrilla units, the necessary division of work shall be set up. The organs may have the same designations as those at the military sub-district level, but personnel shall be reduced—just enough to ensure the work can be carried out.

In order to unify the command of guerrilla units from different origins and to coordinate the relationship between military operations and local administration, both the military sub-district and the military sub-area may form a military-political committee of seven to nine members to serve as a deliberative and advisory body for military and political affairs across the entire zone. Committee members shall be nominated from the various guerrilla units and local administrative bodies, with the most authoritative figure among the military sub-district leaders serving as chairman.

In principle, the entire population of the military sub-district should be armed, adopting two forms: one type consists of full-time anti-Japanese guerrilla units that are detached from production; the other type consists of part-time, semi-military anti-Japanese self-defense forces that are not detached from production.

The full-time anti-Japanese guerrilla units that are detached from production are broadly further divided into three forms: the first type is a small guerrilla unit equivalent to a platoon (corresponding to a squad) or a company (corresponding to a company). Generally, there is one such unit per district, with three or four or five or six per county.

The guerrilla units of each district, depending on the circumstances, may conduct guerrilla operations across districts or even across counties, but fundamentally, they belong to that district.

The second type is a core guerrilla unit formed by combining two, three, or four companies. There is one per county, designated as the Guerrilla Battalion of a certain county. It may conduct guerrilla operations across counties, but fundamentally, it belongs to that county.

When conducting guerrilla operations in a particular district, it shall temporarily coordinate its actions with the small guerrilla units of that district, thereby benefiting not only from their combat strength but also from their familiarity with the enemy situation, terrain, local customs, and traditions.

The third type is a guerrilla detachment composed of two battalions, or three battalions, or up to four battalions.

When its strength is large, two, three, or up to four guerrilla detachments can also be combined into a guerrilla column.

The nature of such detachments and columns is that of "county-level guerrilla corps," distinct from the "guerrilla units" at the battalion level and below. They fall under the direct jurisdiction of the military sub-area commander. When personnel are insufficient, or when certain other necessities arise, the military sub-area commander and political commissar may concurrently serve as the leaders of such guerrilla corps.

The main force of the military sub-area guerrilla corps, when circumstances require, may be deployed by the military sub-district commanding officers, temporarily leaving its own sub-area to conduct coordinated operations with guerrilla corps or guerrilla units from other sub-areas, but fundamentally, it belongs to its own sub-area.

In terms of organization, the three forms of guerrilla units are allowed to have certain distinctive characteristics.

For example, a small guerrilla unit of one platoon or one company may have as few as nine persons or as many as eleven persons forming a section (equivalent to a squad), with a section leader and deputy section leader. The entire section may have only two or three or four or five rifles, with the remainder consisting of homemade guns, bird guns, pikes, and large swords.

Two sections, three sections, or four sections form a platoon (equivalent to a platoon), with a platoon leader and deputy platoon leader.

If operating independently, a political instructor shall be appointed to assist the platoon leader in political work; if not operating independently, none shall be appointed.

The entire unit may have only seven or eight or a dozen or so rifles, with the remainder being bird guns and the like.

One platoon, three platoons, or four platoons form a company, with a company commander, deputy company commander, and company political instructor.

The aforementioned small guerrilla units are under the leadership of the district military organ but, at the same time, are subject to the command and dispatch of the county military organ.

The organization of the county's core guerrilla units should be somewhat more rigorous than that of the district's small guerrilla units; their weaponry should be as fully augmented as possible, and their personnel should be the outstanding individuals of the entire county.

If their formation involves concentrating various small guerrilla units, then for those districts from which units have been concentrated, a portion of personnel and firearms should be left behind to serve as a foundation for developing new guerrilla units for the defense of that district. Under no circumstances should all units be concentrated to the neglect of each district.

If the county's original armed forces, such as security forces, militia, or police, still exist, then the organization should center around these forces. One should not excessively organize districts' guerrilla units, and especially in districts with a serious enemy threat, their units should not be casually disbanded or incorporated.

Such a core guerrilla unit is roughly equivalent to a battalion, is designated a Guerrilla Battalion, and has a battalion commander, deputy battalion commander, and battalion political commissar.

For guerrilla corps at the detachment level and above, their organization should be even more rigorous. Any initial lack of rigor should be gradually rectified. Their personnel and weaponry should also be better than those of the county's core guerrilla units.

Generally, ten to thirteen persons form a section, with a section leader and deputy section leader.

Three sections form a platoon, with a platoon leader and deputy platoon leader.

Three platoons form a company, with a company commander, deputy company commander, and company political instructor.

Three companies form a battalion, with a battalion commander, deputy battalion commander, and battalion political commissar.

Three battalions form a detachment, roughly equivalent to a regiment, with a detachment commander, deputy detachment commander, and detachment political commissar.

If there are two or more detachments, they can be organized into a column, with a column commander, deputy column commander, and column political commissar.

In the north, cavalry guerrilla units should be organized. The military sub-district should have a cavalry detachment composed of two to four companies; the military sub-area should have a cavalry battalion composed of two to five platoons; a county should have a cavalry company (with personnel and firearms equivalent to an infantry platoon, plus horses) or a cavalry platoon (with personnel and firearms equivalent to an infantry squad, plus horses). Larger numbers are not restricted.

All the above, from small guerrilla units to large guerrilla corps, are detached from production. All matters such as provisions and supplies shall be uniformly handled by the public authorities.

Their detailed organization is listed in the following tables.

Table 1. I. Organizational system of an independent guerrilla company (equivalent to a company)
Document clerk, Management squad, Medical rescue squad, Company Commander, Political Instructor, Deputy Company Commander
Reconnaissance squad
Platoon 1, Platoon 2, Platoon 3, Platoon 4
Section 1, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9
(When expanding and replenishing, additional sections can be set up temporarily)
Mobile propaganda team (temporary)
(Each section has nine to eleven persons. If personnel and firearms are insufficient, the third platoon need not be established, or a directly subordinated section may be temporarily set up.)

Table 1. II. Personnel and Weapons of an Independent Guerrilla Company (Equivalent to a Company)
[The table includes listings of positions, number of personnel, weapons, and notes, such as: Political Instructor (1), Deputy Company Commander (2), Document Clerk (2), Bugler (1), Medical/Rescue personnel (9), Reconnaissance Squad (6 scouts, plus leaders, with certain weapons). Notes mention mobile propaganda teams, the source of personnel, equipment specifics, and recommendations for pistols.]

Table 2. I. Organizational system of an independent guerrilla battalion (equivalent to a battalion)
Battalion (Battalion) Commander, Political Instructor (Can be temporarily held concurrently)
Battalion Department: Document Clerk, Bugler, Supply personnel, Medical rescue squad, Cooking squad, Orderlies
Platoon 1, Platoon 2, Platoon 3 (If personnel are insufficient, a directly subordinated section may be temporarily set up instead of a third platoon)
Company 1, Company 2, Company 3, (Company 4 – when expanding and adding)
[Structure: Commander, Deputy, Political Instructor for Battalion; for Companies: Commander, Deputy, Political Instructor, plus Departments for administration, support, medical, etc.]

Table 2. II. Personnel and Weapons of an Independent Guerrilla Battalion (Equivalent to a Battalion)
[Table lists positions, number of personnel, weapons, and notes. Examples: Battalion Commander (1), Political Commissar (1), Deputy Commander (1), Staff including clerks, buglers, communications squad (7), cooks (5), medical rescue platoon (Doctor 1, Orderlies 3, Stretcher-bearers 0-2), reconnaissance platoon (Leader 1, Scouts 21, with specified weapons). Totals for battalion HQ, companies, and full battalion are provided. Notes cover expansion, reconnaissance platoon composition (with recommendation for plainclothes and cavalry), machine gun platoons/teams, temporary stretcher teams, and composition of smaller units.]

Table 3. I. Organizational system of an independent guerrilla detachment (or called an independent regiment)
Detachment (Regiment) Commander, Political Commissar
Chief of Staff -> Headquarters: 4 Staff Officers (Operations, Reconnaissance/Intelligence/Education, Communications/Liaison, Administration/Supply), Reconnaissance Platoon, Communications Platoon, Administrative Platoon, Documents/Finance, Transport Unit, Medical Unit
Political Department
1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Battalion
[Each Battalion has multiple Companies, e.g., Companies 1-4, 5-8, etc.]

Table 3. II. Personnel and Weapons of an Independent Guerrilla Detachment (or called an Independent Regiment)
[Table lists positions, number of personnel, weapons, and notes. Examples for Detachment HQ: Detachment Commander (1), Political Commissar (1), Chief of Staff (1), Staff Officers (4), Documents/Accountants (2), Supply/Transport personnel, Medical Unit (Doctor 1, Orderlies 1, Stretcher-bearers 8). Reconnaissance platoon (34 personnel, specific weapons), Communications platoon (32 personnel, specific weapons), Administrative platoon (13 personnel). Totals are provided for HQ (113 personnel, 94 weapons), Battalions (383 personnel minimum each), and Full Detachment (1262 personnel, 158x weapons). Notes mention battalion/company-level absence of reconnaissance/medical units, squad sizes (9-13), rifle quality/quantity, stretcher/cart additions, and calculation of numbers. Recommendations for pistols, carbines, Mauser pistols.]

[Text ends here; reference to "(or called Independent Division) organizational system" is a heading without subsequent detailed content.]

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General Issues of the Three-One-Five Protection Day Island Assault War at the Team Level


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5. Anti-Japanese Resistance Watch.. Organizational System of the Self-Defense Army: Military Region (or Province), County, District (Town, City), Village, Township Government. Military Region or Provincial Security District, County People’s Armed Mobilization Department, People’s Armed Mobilization Department. One-Three-One-Seven-Three-One-Eight Personnel. Reference: Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army Organization Law. I. Composition: All youth and adults aged 16 to 45 are organized into the Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army.

Regardless of gender

(but women are organized separately). Based on class background, religious belief, those belonging to the anti-Japanese people and physically fit may all participate, but on the principle of voluntariness.

II. Tasks: Taking on local security duties, strengthening defenses and clearing the countryside, reconnoitering enemy situations, capturing traitors, assisting regular anti-Japanese forces and guerrilla units in transporting military supplies, carrying wounded soldiers, cleaning battlefields, and even coordinating in combat operations.

III. Organization: Divided into four levels: squad, detachment, platoon, and brigade. The village is the lowest unit. Depending on the number of volunteers in the village, squads and detachments are formed. Ten to twelve people are organized into a squad. Two or more squads form a detachment. The township establishes a platoon, formed from two or more detachments. The district establishes a brigade, formed from two or more platoons. The brigade is the highest unit. Women are organized separately into squads and detachments within the township platoon, with training and tasks implemented independently.

IV. Cadres: The squad has a squad leader and deputy squad leader; the detachment has a detachment leader and deputy detachment leader; the platoon has a platoon leader and political instructor; the brigade has a brigade leader and political commissar. These cadres are selected from among the members, undergoing training at various levels. V. Combat Support Organizations: Using the Self-Defense Army as a foundation and following the principle of voluntariness, mobilize the people to join the following combat support units:
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(1) Transport Team: Transport military supplies;

(2) Stretcher Team: Carry the wounded;

(3) Communication Team: Deliver messages and guide the way;

(4) Reconnaissance Team: Scout enemy situations;

(5) Comfort Team: Comfort combat troops and wounded or sick personnel;

(6) Nursing Team: Care for the sick.

The first four types should mobilize the Self-Defense Army to take on these roles, but those under 18 should not join the transport or stretcher teams; the latter two types may include women, children, and the elderly.

VI. Model Self-Defense Army: The Model Self-Defense Army is the stage transitioning from the Self-Defense Army to guerrilla units or as a reserve force for the regular army. Its organization mirrors that of the Self-Defense Army. After ample propaganda and mobilization, and based on the principle of voluntariness, select young and middle-aged men who are physically strong and have higher political awareness to form these units, providing them with more advanced military and political training than the regular Self-Defense Army. Initially, one can call for the establishment of a platoon up to a brigade within a district or county, gradually expanding as circumstances permit and require. When needed, they can be transformed into guerrilla units or supplement the regular army.

VII. Anti-Japanese Youth Corps: Youth aged 16 to 21 may be separately organized into the Anti-Japanese Youth Corps, which, for simplicity, is uniformly integrated into the Self-Defense Army structure.




Sixth Military District: Organizational Structure System, Guerrilla Detachments, Guerrilla Detachments, Guerrilla Detachments, Guerrilla Columns, Guerrilla Brigades, Staff and Supply Departments. Guerrilla Columns, Guerrilla Brigades, District Commander, Military Medical and Supply Departments, Commander; Deputy Commander, Military Staff, Medical Officers, Departments, Political Officers. Guerrilla Brigade District Section Members, Branch Affairs, Guerrilla Platoon. Local Supreme Government, Military Administration, Self-Defense Army, Military and Political Mobilization Departments, County Government Military Officers, District Government (District Office) Military Assistants, Guerrilla Platoon. Three-One-One-Zero. The Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army system is an excellent system in the War of Resistance Against Japan for militarizing the entire population. All youth, adults, men, and women aged 16 to 45 are organized into the Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army based on the principle of voluntariness, receiving a certain degree of military and political education training, becoming a semi-military, basic armed organization of the people, tasked with sentry duty and vigilance in their villages, reconnoitering enemy situations, capturing traitors, strengthening defenses and clearing the countryside, and harassing the enemy.

When the enemy attacks, they can be mobilized at appropriate locations to use methods such as firing indigenous guns and cannons, setting up deceptive formations, bluffing, and diverting the enemy’s rear to coordinate with guerrilla operations.

At the same time, well-organized stretcher teams can be mobilized to carry the wounded, transport teams to move food supplies, and comfort teams to visit guerrilla members, providing them with tea, water, and porridge.

With them in place, traitors find it hard to hide, and bandits find it hard to cause disturbances; guerrilla units gain significant assistance; and regular forces receive reinforcements (the Self-Defense Army system serves as a transitional step toward conscription, and the Model Self-Defense Army organization can directly supplement regular forces). It is truly an excellent anti-Japanese system for the people.

Provinces such as Shaanxi and Hunan have already begun organizing Self-Defense Armies, and Shanxi and Suiyuan provinces also once had National Army systems, along with the original able-bodied men’s corps in various provinces, all containing elements of the semi-military organization described here. However, they did not adhere to the principle of voluntariness, failed to stimulate the people’s initiative, and their organizational structures seemed somewhat unsuitable. Furthermore, they did not extend universally to all young and adult men and women, resulting in limited effectiveness. It is therefore advisable to adopt the universally applied new organizational system of the Self-Defense Army.

In principle, all personnel joining the Self-Defense Army do not leave their productive work. When performing duties in their villages, they are also, in principle, self-supplied. Only in special circumstances, such as when they are conscripted for long-distance or extended transport tasks, should the government provide their provisions.

Thus, during training and mobilization, thorough propaganda and mobilization efforts must be employed to stimulate the people's initiative. Force must never be used, as it would prove ineffective. This requires deep attention.

Their weapons are knives, spears, wooden clubs, indigenous guns, indigenous cannons, and the like. Each person must have one.

In all areas where the enemy has arrived or might arrive, guerrilla groups should be organized within the Self-Defense Army. Based on proximity of residence, groups can range from as few as three to as many as ten people, equipped with relatively better weapons such as single-shot rifles, nine-shot rifles, or even five-shot rifles, tasked with raiding the enemy while still not leaving their productive work.

This system is discussed under the "Organization of Guerrilla Units" merely for convenience of description. It does not mean that this system can only be applied in war zones or guerrilla zones; any province nationwide can and should implement this system.

However, when organizing Self-Defense Armies in rear provinces, the primary objectives are to strengthen the military and political education of the people, consolidate rear-area security, and mobilize the people in an organized and educated manner to supplement the regular forces. Tasks such as reconnoitering enemy situations, strengthening defenses and clearing the countryside, and coordinating in combat do not apply.

The organization of the Self-Defense Army is as shown in Table 5.

To command all anti-Japanese armed organizations throughout a guerrilla area—whether guerrilla units that have left production or Self-Defense Forces that remain in production—and to plan and execute the overall anti-Japanese guerrilla war, we believe it is necessary to adopt a military district system.

The organizational structure of the military district system is as shown in Table 6.

3. How Are Guerrilla Units Equipped?

On this issue: First, it should be understood that guerrilla units are lightly equipped raiding forces. Therefore, the principle for arming guerrilla units is "lightness and convenience," and anything cumbersome is strictly avoided.

Second, the equipment of guerrilla units must be determined according to their specific circumstances and tasks.

For example, lower-level guerrilla units naturally have cruder equipment; higher-level guerrilla corps should have better equipment; the equipment needed by guerrilla units tasked with railway sabotage differs from that of units without such tasks.

Third, the equipment of guerrilla units cannot be based solely on subjective desires but must rely on practical possibilities. It is supplemented gradually, not prepared all at once.

These are all points requiring attention.

When discussing the equipment items of guerrilla units, they include weapons, ammunition, clothing, communication equipment, medical equipment, transport tools, propaganda materials, and other items.

All these should be procured, distributed, and supplemented according to the aforementioned principles.

Weapons and ammunition for guerrilla units are often difficult issues, particularly hard to resolve at the initial stage of organization, but they can always be resolved.

People-organized guerrilla units, except under special circumstances, typically begin with a combination of lower-grade weapons such as nine-shot rifles, homemade guns, bird guns, spears, long lances, broadswords, indigenous cannons, pine-tree cannons, and indigenous mines, along with some new-style rifles. Only through prolonged combat, seizing from the enemy and collecting from the populace, can they gradually replenish themselves and increase the variety of their arms. The source of ammunition must especially depend on the enemy.

On this issue, raiding enemy transport convoys is most convenient, because when a raid succeeds, the enemy’s transport convoy effectively becomes our transport convoy.

When distributing, firearms (rifles, etc.) and cold weapons (swords, spears, etc.) should be used in coordination within squads.

Each guerrilla area should establish a repair workshop. In addition to repairing weapons, it should gradually develop the capacity to manufacture secondary rifles, secondary bullets, hand grenades, bayonets, and the like, so as to provide the guerrillas with certain supplements.

However, one must not overly rely on such manufacturing. The primary means of supplementing guerrilla weapons and ammunition lies in resolute combat, resolving the issue by seizing from the enemy's hands. This is the most important source of weapons, ammunition, and indeed all equipment.

To sabotage enemy railways, bridges, and stations, it is essential to obtain blasting materials and tools through multiple channels, recruit and train blasting personnel in various ways, and, if possible, organize specialized demolition units attached to the guerrilla corps.

Regarding the clothing issue: Each person requires at least two sets of summer clothing, one set of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of leggings, a blanket, and a cloth ration bag per year—plus an overcoat in the north.

The method of resolving this generally cannot rely on the enemy. Apart from raiding enemy clothing transport convoys, the practice of stripping uniforms from captured officers and soldiers should be prohibited.

To uphold the discipline of guerrilla units, the government and the military leadership organs in guerrilla areas should provide for these needs through coordinated issuance.

Methods such as confiscating the property of traitors and soliciting donations from the wealthy may be employed, but care must be taken to avoid errors and not undermine the united front policy.

Lower-level guerrilla units do not need uniform military attire.

Telephone and radio equipment may be unnecessary for lower-level guerrilla units, but higher-level guerrilla corps should possess them. To acquire such items, apart from capturing them from the enemy, regular corps should provide assistance.

In guerrilla units, and especially in guerrilla base areas, adequate medical facilities are indispensable.

Besides recruiting medical personnel through various means, the procurement of medicines is most important. Some may be taken from the enemy, but the primary reliance is on donations and purchases.

When Western medicine is difficult to obtain, traditional remedies may also be used.

The issue of transport tools for guerrilla units arises primarily in the north, where shoulder poles are generally not used, and a minimum number of mules and horses must be allocated.

Small guerrilla units can reduce this number or even dispense with them; guerrilla corps need a prescribed number of mules and horses.

As for officers' riding horses, those holding important posts above platoon (company) leader level should each be allotted one horse; sometimes two may share one. Those without important posts should not receive any.

Propaganda materials are important. For example, every larger guerrilla unit should be equipped with a mimeograph machine, stencils, paper, etc., for printing leaflets and proclamations. They should also have items such as chalk containers and coarse brushes for propaganda team members to write large-character slogans.

In a relatively large and stable guerrilla area, it is best to have a lithographic printing press; a simple letterpress would be even better.

For printing internal training and educational materials, mimeograph and lithographic machines are also very necessary.

Additionally, items such as military maps, binoculars, and compasses are essential. A capable guerrilla unit should ideally possess these things.

Given the great significance of guerrilla warfare within the War of Resistance Against Japan, the highest national military organs and the commanders of each war zone should do their utmost to supply, to key guerrilla areas, those items that the areas themselves cannot resolve but are particularly needed.

Nevertheless, it must be reiterated: The equipment issue for guerrilla units depends primarily on resolving it through their own struggles. Over-reliance on higher authorities in mentality will inevitably weaken their spirit of resolute struggle.

IV. The Issue of Guerrilla Unit Composition
The issue of composition discussed here refers to the cadres and rank-and-file soldiers of guerrilla units.

Every guerrilla unit must engage in prolonged and ruthless warfare with the enemy. Therefore, its cadres should be brave and active individuals, utterly devoted to the cause of national liberation.

Beyond this fundamental condition, they must also possess: (1) a style of arduous struggle, serving as models for subordinates and the people; (2) closeness to the masses, becoming one with the people; (3) skill in uniting cadres and soldiers, making the unit internally harmonious and unified; (4) attentiveness to the policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, ensuring the guerrilla unit's political line does not go astray; (5) attention to strategy and tactics, enabling the guerrilla unit to win many battles.

A guerrilla unit with a group of such cadres will be an invincible force.

Not every cadre is expected to possess all the necessary qualifications from the very beginning. Rather, we should seek out cadres who are inherently good in quality and let them learn and gradually temper themselves in the course of guerrilla warfare, so that they may come to meet these qualifications.

This inherent good quality is "loyalty to the cause of national liberation."

With this, all other qualifications can be acquired; without it, nothing else can even be discussed. This should be noted when selecting cadres.

In addition, the majority of guerrilla unit cadres must be local people, because they are connected with the masses and more familiar with the local situation than outsiders.

In the beginning, when local cadres are few in number, attention must be paid to training them. Methods such as running training classes should be used to gradually increase their numbers, so as to sustain a long-term war.

Any discord between outside cadres and local cadres must be attended to and eliminated.

The principle for enlisting guerrilla fighters is to accept voluntarily those who are anti-Japanese elements; the method of forced recruitment is wrong.

As long as one is voluntarily anti-Japanese, social background need not be a restriction. However, brave and resolute individuals must be selected, for only they can withstand the greatest difficulties and persist in a long-term war.

Those accustomed to breaking discipline who do not change after education cannot be kept in the unit for long. The method of taking in large numbers of rogues and soldier riffraff is incorrect.

Those with an opium addiction must quit; those who cannot quit should not be accepted.

Maintaining the purity of the fighters' composition is a prerequisite for victory in guerrilla warfare.

In this life-and-death struggle of the nation, the national enemy will inevitably exploit certain elements with extremely weak national consciousness, train them, and send them to the vicinity of guerrilla zones to seize opportunities to infiltrate the guerrilla units and carry out sabotage schemes.

The leaders of the guerrilla units must, on the basis of relying on the masses, enhance the national consciousness and national vigilance of all unit members through continuous education, prevent the infiltration of saboteurs, and expose those saboteurs who have already infiltrated. This is the work of eradicating traitors.

Traitor elements and unit members already influenced by traitor elements must be dealt with separately; allowing them to exist freely is dangerous.

When dealing with traitor elements against whom there is solid evidence, all unit members must be mobilized to adopt a psychology of hatred toward them, in order to heighten the vigilance of the members.

If such elements exist among the cadres, their handling must be even more cautious and carried out with greater method.

In preventing and eradicating saboteur elements, this cannot be separated from the anti-traitor movement among the local populace, because hidden traitor elements among the local population are the source of traitor elements emerging within the troops.

For defectors from the puppet troops and bandits who surrender, whether individually or in groups, a warm welcome should be extended and preferential treatment given.

But when actually incorporating them into the unit, it is necessary to conduct an investigation and clearly distinguish whether they have a sincere intent to resist Japan or harbor ulterior motives, so as to handle them accordingly.

Chapter VI The Political Issues of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare The quite complex organizational issues have been resolved above. What follows next is to resolve the issues of political principles and military principles in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare.

In Chapter One, several fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare were already mentioned, noting that guerrilla units must have a clear political objective and political program, must rely on the masses, and must possess organization and discipline. These are the guiding political principles for guerrilla warfare.

The implementation of these principles is manifested in the political work of the guerrilla units. Therefore, political work is generally referred to as the lifeline of a revolutionary army, and thus, it is also the lifeline of a guerrilla unit.

First, the political work of anti-Japanese guerrilla units (as with all armies) must ensure that the political objective of "resisting Japan" is deeply instilled and solidified among all military and political commanders, and through them, deeply instilled and solidified among all combatants.

Do not think that because the unit is already anti-Japanese and called an anti-Japanese guerrilla unit, this issue does not exist. In reality, this issue still exists and will exist for a long time.

Because the enemy's temptations exist, the guerrilla unit's difficulties exist, and in a long, arduous war, those with a less profound national consciousness may waver and even defect.

Without widespread and thorough national education, without making everyone understand the clear and definite political objective of "expelling Japanese imperialism and building a free and happy new China," without making everyone understand why they are fighting, it is impossible to solidify the resolve of all commanders and combatants to carry the war of resistance through to the end.

This clear and definite political objective must be used by the guerrilla units to educate the entire population in the guerrilla zones, so that the level of the entire population's national consciousness deepens day by day as the war persists. Only then can the victory of the guerrilla units be assured.

When carrying out education for the guerrilla units and the people on the political objective, education on the specific political program to achieve this objective is an indispensable accompaniment.

Now that the Chinese Kuomintang has issued an "Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction," it should be widely publicized and explained in all guerrilla units and among the people of the guerrilla zones, in order to strive for "certain victory in the War of Resistance and certain success in national reconstruction."

Without a specific political program, there is no way to better unite the cadres, unite the fighters, and unite the people.

The study and understanding of this political objective and political program—that is, the study and understanding of the objective and program of the Anti-Japanese National United Front—is especially important for the military cadres of guerrilla units (and indeed, all armies).

There are often such military personnel who say they "care only for military affairs, not politics." For officers with such purely military minds who do not understand the relationship between politics and military affairs, it is quite necessary to guide them in understanding the correct relationship between the two.

All military means serve to achieve political objectives; military affairs themselves are also a form of expression of politics.

Although military affairs are distinct from politics and have their own particularities, they cannot be separated from politics and isolated.

In today's context, because the world is already in a new era of evolution, and today's wars are already approaching the final war, this point should also be understood.

The majority of humanity (including the 450 million Chinese people) has already engaged in or is preparing for a great, righteous war against the aggressors and oppressors of the world. No matter how many years this war extends, it undoubtedly approaches the final war in history.

After this protracted and brutal war, humanity will see a new era unprecedented in history, and thereafter, war will no longer be seen.

The Chinese national liberation war we are engaged in is a part of this war for the liberation of humanity. The independent, free, and happy new China we seek is a part of this new world of the new era.

This correct viewpoint is something that purely military-minded individuals cannot understand. If there exist in the troops, to some degree, persons who are purely military-minded or believers in the absolutism of war, it is necessary to explain this to them.

Political work, aside from the pervasive and thorough propaganda, explanation, and upholding of the aforementioned general political line—that is, the political objective and political program—so that it permeates all military and political work, all military and political personnel, and all local civilians, itself comprises three specific tasks: political work directed at the troops, political work directed at the population, and political work directed at the enemy forces.

The political guiding principles for these three tasks are: unity between officers and men, unity between the army and the people, and disintegrating the enemy forces.

The specific implementation of these three tasks and three principles is discussed in detail in the fourth volume of this series—"The Political Work of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Units." Here, only an outline is mentioned.

A revolutionary army is disciplined, but it also practices a certain degree of democracy.

All armies require internal discipline, meaning subordinates obey their superiors, in order to act and fight; the same applies to guerrilla units.

However, this discipline must be built upon the self-awareness of all unit members. Discipline based purely on coercion cannot be lasting or effective.

Because a revolutionary army has a common political objective openly shared by officers and men, it can also build self-aware discipline.

The discipline of guerrilla units is, in fact, somewhat weaker compared to regular forces. However, their requirement for self-aware discipline and their capacity to build it are the same.

Because only with self-aware discipline, where all unit members themselves understand why they fight and why they must observe discipline, can discipline be elevated to a high level, can discipline become a component part of combat effectiveness, and can internal unity be consolidated, rather than becoming something that alienates the relationship between officers and men, and between superiors and subordinates, as happens with the results of coerced discipline.

Based on this, the feudalistic system of beatings and verbal abuse should be abolished within the unit, because such a system violates self-aware discipline, reduces combat effectiveness, and undermines internal unity. This is the first point regarding what is called the democratic system in the army.

Democracy in the army is also manifested in political freedom and the sharing of hardships and comforts between officers and men.

The revolutionary army and guerrilla units grant political freedom to all unit members. Regardless of whether officer or soldier, concerning the objectives and methods of national liberation, they are not only permitted but encouraged to think, discuss, propagate, and act upon them.

This is the second point regarding democracy in the army.

The living conditions of officers and men cannot be too disparate. In particular, officers in guerrilla units should, on the whole, live at the same standard of living as the soldiers. Only then can they earn the soldiers' trust and sustain a long-term, arduous war.

Absolute egalitarianism is incorrect, but a certain degree of equality in living standards is demanded by arduous warfare.

This is the third point regarding democracy in the army.

All of the above aims to achieve the goal of "unity between officers and men." Only an army or guerrilla unit with genuine unity between officers and men and genuine internal solidarity can possess maximum combat effectiveness.

The principle of "unity between officers and men" refers to the relationship between superiors and subordinates within individual units and formations. As for the relationship among many units and formations, it is the principle of "unity between ourselves and friendly forces."

To enable the millions in the regular army and thousands of guerrilla units nationwide to unite as one, it is absolutely necessary to carry out education within each army and each guerrilla unit on the correct relationship between our own army and friendly armies, for without such unity, it will be impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism.

To achieve the goal of "unity between the army and the people," the political work directed at the local populace has a well-known set of methods used by the Eighth Route Army, manifested in their so-called "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention."

The Three Main Rules of Discipline are: "Obey orders in all your actions, do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the people, and turn in everything captured." The Eight Points for Attention are: "Speak politely, pay fairly for what you buy, return everything you borrow, pay for anything you damage, do not hit or swear at people, do not damage crops, do not take liberties with women, and do not ill-treat captives."

These rules and points for attention include certain items relevant to achieving unity between officers and men and disintegrating the enemy forces; they are not limited to the goal of unity between the army and the people. However, their primary purpose is to solve the army-people relationship and are established to strive for solidarity and unity between the people and the army.

The Red Army practiced them for ten years in the past, and the current Eighth Route Army still adheres to them. They can be quite suitably adopted by all armies, and all guerrilla units must pay even closer attention to them.

Some people find it difficult to conceive how a guerrilla unit can survive for a long period behind enemy lines. This is a view that fails to understand the army-people relationship.

The people are like water, and the army is like a fish. How can one argue that once there is water, it is difficult for the fish to survive?

An army with poor discipline sets itself in opposition to the people, drying up the water itself. Such an army certainly cannot survive. All guerrilla units should genuinely understand this principle.

The principle of disintegrating the enemy forces must be manifested in work such as propaganda directed at the enemy, granting lenient treatment to enemy captives, and providing medical care to enemy wounded. Otherwise, the enemy's unity is in fact consolidated, and the goal of disintegration achieves the opposite effect.

For guerrilla units and all armies of the war of resistance to strive for final victory, the implementation of this principle is indispensable.