**Chapter One: Idealism and Materialism**

**I. The Two Opposing Armies in Philosophy**

The entire history of philosophy is the history of the struggle and development of two mutually antagonistic philosophical schools—idealism and materialism. All philosophical currents and schools are merely variations of these two fundamental schools.

All philosophical doctrines are created by people belonging to specific social classes. The consciousness of these people is historically determined by specific social conditions of life. Every philosophical doctrine expresses the needs of a particular social class and reflects both the level of development of society's productive forces and the historical stage of humanity's understanding of nature. The fate of a philosophy depends on the extent to which it satisfies the needs of a social class.

The social roots of idealism and materialism lie in the structurally contradictory nature of class society.

Initially, idealism arose as a product of the ignorance and delusion of primitive, barbaric humans. Thereafter, as productive forces developed, scientific knowledge developed alongside them. Idealism should have declined, and materialism should have risen to take its place.

Yet from ancient times to the present, idealism has not only failed to decline but has instead developed, competing with materialism, neither giving ground. The reason lies in the division of society into classes: on the one hand, the oppressor class, for its own interests, must develop and consolidate its idealist doctrines; on the other hand, the oppressed class, likewise for its own interests, must develop and consolidate its materialist doctrines. Both idealist and materialist doctrines exist as instruments of class struggle. Before classes are abolished, the struggle between idealism and materialism will not cease.

In the course of its historical development, idealism represents the ideology of the exploiting classes and plays a reactionary role. Materialism, on the other hand, is the worldview of the revolutionary classes; within class society, it grows and develops out of the continuous struggle against the reactionary philosophy of idealism.

Thus, the struggle between idealism and materialism in philosophy always reflects the struggle of interests between the reactionary classes and the revolutionary classes. Whether the philosophers themselves are conscious of it or not, a particular tendency in philosophy is ultimately governed by the political orientation of the class to which they belong. Any tendency in philosophy always directly promotes the fundamental political interests of the class to which they belong. In this sense, the thorough implementation of a particular tendency in philosophy is a special form of the policy of the class to which they belong.

The characteristic feature of Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—lies in its clear understanding of the class nature of all social consciousness (philosophy included), its open declaration of its proletarian character, its resolute struggle against the idealist philosophy of the propertied class, and its subordination of its own specific tasks to the general tasks of overthrowing the capitalist system, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, and building socialism.

In China's present stage, the task of philosophy is subordinated to the general tasks of overthrowing imperialism and the semi-feudal system, thoroughly realizing bourgeois democracy, and preparing for the transition to a socialist and communist society. Philosophical theory and political practice must be closely linked.

**II. The Distinction Between Idealism and Materialism**

Wherein lies the fundamental distinction between idealism and materialism?

It lies in their opposite answers to the fundamental question of philosophy, namely, the question of the relationship between spirit and matter (the question of the relationship between consciousness and existence).

Idealism regards spirit (consciousness, ideas, the subject) as the source of everything in the world, with matter (nature, society, and the object) being merely its appendage. Materialism, on the other hand, holds that matter exists independently of spirit, and that spirit is merely its appendage.

From these opposite answers to this fundamental question arise divergent views on all issues.

In the view of idealism, the world is either a synthesis of our various perceptions, or it is our own, or the world's reason, creating a spiritual process. The external material world is either regarded entirely as a fictitious illusion or as the outer shell of spiritual elements. Human knowledge is the autonomous activity of the subject, a self-generated product of spirit.

Materialism, by contrast, holds that the unity of the universe lies in its materiality. Spirit (consciousness) is one of the inherent properties of matter, arising only when matter reaches a certain stage of development. Nature, matter, the objective world, exist outside spirit, independent of it. Human knowledge is a reflection of the objective external world.

**III. The Roots of the Emergence and Development of Idealism**

Idealism regards matter as the product of spirit, thus inverting the true posture of the real world. Where, then, lie the roots of the emergence and development of such a philosophy?

As stated earlier, idealism originally arose as a product of the ignorance and delusion of primitive, barbaric humans. However, after production developed, the primary condition that prompted idealism to form into a philosophical current was the split between physical labor and mental labor. As society's productive forces developed, the social division of labor occurred. This division of labor further developed, giving rise to a group of people engaged exclusively in mental labor. But during the period of weak productive forces, this split had not yet reached a point of complete separation. A great change occurred when classes emerged, private property arose, and exploitation became the foundation of the ruling class's existence. Mental labor became the privilege of the ruling class, while physical labor became the fate of the oppressed class. The ruling class began to view the interrelationship between itself and the oppressed class in an inverted fashion—it was not the laborers who provided them with the means of subsistence, but rather they who provided the means of subsistence to the laborers. Consequently, they despised physical labor and gave rise to idealist views. Abolishing the distinction between physical and mental labor is one of the conditions for eliminating idealism.

The social root that enables idealist philosophy to develop lies chiefly in the fact that this philosophical consciousness expresses the interests of the exploiting classes. The ascendancy of idealist philosophy in all realms of culture must be explained by this. If the exploiting classes did not exist, idealism would lose its social foundation. The final elimination of idealist philosophy must await the abolition of classes and the establishment of communist society.

To understand how idealism has been able to develop, deepen, and possess the capacity to struggle with materialism, one must also seek the roots within the process of human cognition. When humans think using concepts, the possibility of slipping into idealism exists. When humans think, they cannot but use concepts, and this easily causes our cognition to split into two aspects: on the one hand, individual things with particular, specific properties; on the other hand, concepts of a general nature (for example, the judgment "Yan'an is a city"). The particular and the general are originally interconnected and indivisible; to separate them is to depart from objective truth. Objective truth manifests itself in the unity of the general and the particular. Without the particular, the general cannot exist; without the general, the particular cannot exist either. To detach the general from the particular, that is, to treat the general as an objective entity in itself, and to treat the particular merely as a form of the general's existence—this is the method employed by all idealists. All idealists substitute consciousness, spirit, or ideas for the objective reality that exists independently of human consciousness.

Proceeding from this, idealism emphasizes the active agency of human consciousness in social practice. Unable to point out the materialist truth that consciousness is constrained by matter, they instead assert that only consciousness is active, and that matter is nothing more than an inert aggregate. Driven by their class nature, idealists use every method to exaggerate the active agency of consciousness, developing it one-sidedly, causing this one aspect to swell limitlessly within the mind into something dominant, obscuring the other aspect, making it subservient, and establishing this artificially swollen element as a universal worldview, even transforming it into a fetish or idol.

In economics, idealism excessively exaggerates one non-essential aspect of exchange, elevating the law of supply and demand to the fundamental law of capitalism. Many people, seeing that science plays an active role in social life, do not realize that this active role is prescribed and delimited by specific social relations of production, and thus draw the conclusion that science is the driving force of society. Idealist historians regard heroes as the creators of history; idealist politicians regard politics as omnipotent; idealist military commanders engage in desperate, all-or-nothing combat; idealist revolutionaries advocate Blanquism; and some say that to revive the nation, one need only restore old morality. All these are the results of excessively exaggerating subjective agency.

Our thinking cannot reflect the object viewed as a whole in a single stroke; rather, it forms a living, dialectical process of cognition, possessing countless nuances of every kind that approximate reality. Idealism seizes upon this characteristic of thinking, exaggerates one particular aspect, and, unable to provide a correct reflection of the process, instead distorts it. Lenin said: "Human knowledge is not a straight line, but a curve. Any segment of this curve can become a separate, independent straight line, and this straight line has the potential to lead you into the mire of error. Linearity and one-sidedness, seeing only the trees and not the forest, rigid obstinacy, subjectivism, and subjective one-sidedness—these are the epistemological roots of idealism." "Philosophical idealism is the one-sided exaggeration of one fragment or one aspect of cognition into a deified absolute, divorced from matter and nature. Idealism is a religious doctrine." This is entirely correct.

Pre-Marxist materialism (mechanical materialism) did not emphasize the active agency of thought in cognition, treating it only as a passive role, viewing it merely as a mirror reflecting nature. Mechanical materialism adopted a blunt, dismissive attitude toward idealism, paying no attention to its epistemological roots, and therefore it could not overcome idealism. Only dialectical materialism correctly points out the active agency of thought, while simultaneously pointing out that thinking is constrained by matter, that thinking arises from social practice and can actively guide practice. Only this dialectical theory of "the unity of knowing and doing" can thoroughly overcome idealism.

**IV. The Roots of the Emergence and Development of Materialism**

The recognition of matter existing in the external world independently of consciousness is the foundation of materialism. This foundation is something humans have obtained from practice. The practice of labor and production, the practice of class struggle, and the practice of scientific experimentation gradually enabled humans to break away from superstition and delusion (idealism), to gradually understand the essence of the world, and thus to arrive at materialism.

Primitive humans, prostrate before the forces of nature and capable only of using simple tools, could not explain the events around them and therefore resorted to gods and spirits—this is the origin of religion and idealism. However, in the long course of production, humans came into contact with the surrounding natural world, acted upon it, transformed it, and created the things for clothing, food, shelter, and use, making them suitable for human benefit. This caused humans to firmly believe that matter exists objectively.

In the social life of human communities, people interact with and influence one another, and in class society, they also engage in class struggle. The oppressed classes assess situations, estimate their strength, and formulate plans. When their struggles succeed, they become convinced that their views are not products of fantasy, but reflections of the objectively existing material world. When the oppressed classes fail because of mistaken plans, and then succeed by correcting those plans, they learn that subjective plans can only achieve their goals if they rely on a correct understanding of the materiality and regularity of the objective world.

The history of science proves to humanity the materiality and regularity of the world, making humans realize the futility of the illusions of religion and idealism, and thus arrive at materialist conclusions.

In short, the history of human practice—the history of the struggle against nature, the history of class struggle, the history of science—over long ages and out of the necessities of life and struggle, has taken into account material reality and its laws, proven the correctness of materialist philosophy, and found its own ideological instrument of struggle: materialist philosophy.

The more the development of social production advances to a high level, the more class struggle grows, and the more scientific understanding exposes the "secrets" of nature, the more materialist philosophy will develop and consolidate, and humanity will be able to gradually liberate itself from the dual oppression of nature and society.

The bourgeoisie, when necessary for the struggle against the feudal classes and at a time when the proletariat did not yet threaten them, also once found and used materialism as an instrument of their struggle. They too once firmly believed that the things around them were products of matter, not of spirit. It was only when they themselves became the rulers and the struggle of the proletariat threatened them that they abandoned this "useless" instrument and once again took up another instrument—idealist philosophy. The changes in the thinking of the spokesmen for the Chinese bourgeoisie, Dai Jitao and Wu Zhihui, before and after 1911 (or 1917) — a change from materialism to idealism—serve as living evidence of this at present.

The gravediggers of capitalism—the proletariat—are essentially materialist. However, because the proletariat is the most progressive class in history, its materialism differs from bourgeois materialism; it is more thoroughgoing and more profound.

Only possessing the nature of dialectics and not the nature of mechanism, the proletariat has absorbed all the practical achievements throughout human history. At the same time, through its own practice and via its spokespersons and leaders—Marx and Engels—it has created dialectical materialism.

Not only does it assert that matter exists independently of human consciousness, but it also maintains that matter is in a state of change, thus forming a complete and systematic new worldview and methodology. This is Marxist philosophy.

Chapter Two: Dialectical Materialism
I. Dialectical Materialism Is the Weapon of Proletarian Revolution
This issue has already been discussed in Chapter One. Here, a brief additional point is made: dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat.

History has assigned the proletariat the task of abolishing classes, and the proletariat employs dialectical materialism as the spiritual weapon in their struggle and as the philosophical basis for all their views.

The worldview of dialectical materialism can only be correctly and fully grasped when we stand on the standpoint of the proletariat to understand the world; only from this standpoint can the real world be truly and objectively recognized.

This is because, on one hand, the proletariat is the most advanced and most revolutionary class; on the other hand, only dialectical materialism is a worldview and methodology that closely integrates a high degree of rigorous scientific nature with thorough and uncompromising revolutionary character, making it the most correct and most revolutionary.

The Chinese proletariat, bearing the historical task of achieving socialism and communism through the bourgeois-democratic revolution, must adopt dialectical materialism as its spiritual weapon.

If dialectical materialism is adopted by the Chinese proletariat, the Communist Party, and the broad revolutionary elements among all those willing to stand on the proletarian standpoint, then they will acquire the most correct and most revolutionary worldview and methodology. They will be able to correctly understand the development and changes of the revolutionary movement, put forward revolutionary tasks, unite their own ranks and those of their allies, overcome reactionary theories, take correct actions, avoid errors in work, and achieve the goals of liberating and transforming China.

Dialectical materialism is an especially essential subject for cadres guiding the revolutionary movement, because the two erroneous theories and work methods—subjectivism and the mechanical view—often exist among cadres, frequently leading them to violate Marxism and go astray in the revolutionary movement.

To avoid and correct such shortcomings, one must consciously study and understand dialectical materialism and rearm one's mind anew.

II. The Relationship Between the Old Philosophical Heritage and Dialectical Materialism
Modern materialism is not a simple inheritor of past philosophical doctrines; it emerged and grew out of the struggle against the previously dominant philosophies and from the effort to free science from its idealism and mysticism.

Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—not only inherited the achievements of the highest product of idealism—the Hegelian doctrine—but also overcame the idealism of that doctrine, materialistically transforming his dialectics. Furthermore, Marxism is not only the continuation and completion of all past materialist developments but also an opponent of the narrowness of all past materialism, namely, the opponent of mechanical, intuitive materialism (chiefly French materialism and Feuerbach's materialism).

Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—inherited the scientific legacy of past culture, while simultaneously subjecting that legacy to revolutionary transformation, forming a philosophical science that is unprecedented in history, the most correct, most revolutionary, and most complete.

In China, after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, along with the Chinese proletariat's conscious entry onto the political stage and the rise in scientific level, a Marxist philosophical movement emerged and developed. However, in its first period, within China's materialist current of thought, the understanding of materialist dialectics was still very weak, and mechanical materialism influenced by the bourgeoisie and the subjectivist atmosphere of the Deborin school constituted the main components.

After the defeat of the 1927 Revolution, the understanding of Marxism-Leninism advanced a step, and the thought of materialist dialectics gradually developed. More recently, due to the severity of the national and social crises, and also influenced by the philosophical purge movement in the Soviet Union, a broad materialist dialectics movement has developed in China's intellectual circles. Although this movement is still in its youthful stage, judging from its broad scope, it will, along with the development of the revolutionary struggles of the Chinese and world proletariat and revolutionary peoples, sweepingly establish its authority, guide the Chinese revolutionary movement boldly forward, and lay the foundation for the Chinese proletariat to lead the Chinese revolution onto the path of victory.

Due to the backwardness of China's social evolution, the current of dialectical materialist philosophy developing in China today does not stem from inheriting and transforming its own philosophical heritage but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. However, to enable the current of dialectical materialist thought to deepen and develop in China and to determinately guide the Chinese revolution toward the path of thorough victory, it is necessary to struggle against all existing reactionary philosophies, raise a critical banner on the national intellectual front, and thereby critically reassess China's ancient philosophical heritage, in order to achieve the goal.

III. The Unity of Worldview and Methodology in Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat, and simultaneously it is the method by which the proletariat understands the surrounding world and the method of revolutionary action; it is a unified body of worldview and methodology.

The idealist Marxist revisionist school holds that the entire essence of dialectical materialism lies solely in its "method." They sever method from the general philosophical worldview and separate dialectics from materialism. They do not understand that the methodology of Marxism—dialectics—is not an idealist dialectics like Hegel's but a materialist dialectics, and that the methodology of Marxism cannot be separated from its worldview in the slightest.

On the other hand, mechanical materialists regard Marxist philosophy merely as a general philosophical worldview, cutting away its dialectics, and moreover consider this worldview to be the various conclusions of mechanical natural science. They do not understand that Marxist materialism is not simple materialism but dialectical materialism. Both of these divisive views on Marxist philosophy are erroneous. Dialectical materialism is a unified body of worldview and methodology.

IV. The Question of the Object of Materialist Dialectics (What Does Materialist Dialectics Study?)
Lenin regarded materialist dialectics (viewed as the philosophical science of Marxism) as the science of the developmental laws of the objective world and the developmental laws of cognition (reflecting the objective world in the various categories of dialectics). He said: "Logic is not the science of the external forms of thought, but the science of the developmental laws of all material, natural, and spiritual things, that is, the science of the developmental laws of all concrete content of the world and its cognition. In other words, logic is the historical summation, sum total, and conclusion of the cognition of the world."

Although Lenin emphasized the significance of materialist dialectics viewed as a general scientific methodology, this was because dialectics is derived from the conclusions reached in the history of world cognition. Hence, he said: "Dialectics is the history of cognition."

In the above-mentioned definition given by Lenin regarding materialist dialectics seen as a science and its object, his meaning is: First, materialist dialectics, like any other science, has its own object of study, and this object is the most general developmental laws of nature, history, and human thought. Moreover, when studying, the task of materialist dialectics is not to conceive out of the mind the connections existing among various phenomena, but to observe within the phenomena themselves the relationships between them. Lenin’s view fundamentally differs from that of the Menshevizing idealists, who take the study of categories (which actually are detached from concrete sciences and concrete knowledge) as the object of materialist dialectics. This is because the Menshevizing idealists attempt to establish a philosophical system of various categories isolated from the real development of the history of cognition, social sciences, and natural sciences, and in doing so they in fact abandon materialist dialectics.

Second, each branch of science (mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, physics, biology, economics, and other natural and social sciences) studies various aspects of the development of the material world and its cognition; therefore, the laws of each science are narrowly and one-sidedly limited by their respective concrete fields of study. Materialist dialectics, however, is not so limited. It is the summation, conclusion, processing, and universalization of all valuable general content found in all concrete sciences and all other scientific cognitions of humanity. Thus, on one hand, the concepts, judgments, and laws of materialist dialectics are extremely broad (encompassing the most general laws of all sciences, and thus also the laws and determinations of the essence of the material world). In this respect, it is a worldview. On the other hand, materialist dialectics is the foundation of genuine scientific logic and epistemology, liberated from all fantasy, clericalism, and metaphysics; therefore, it is simultaneously the only reliable methodology possessing objective truth for studying the concrete sciences. Here it becomes even clearer why we say materialist dialectics, or dialectical materialism, is a unified body of worldview and methodology. In this way, the errors of those who distort and vulgarize Marxist philosophy by denying the right of philosophy to exist can also be understood.

Regarding the question of the object of philosophy, Marx, Engels, and Lenin all opposed detaching philosophy from actual reality and turning philosophy into something with an independent substance. They pointed out the necessity of a philosophy that grows out of the analysis of real life and real relations, and opposed taking merely logical concepts and the nature of logical concepts as the object of study, in the manner of formal logic and Menshevizing idealism. The philosophy that grows out of the analysis of real life and real relations is precisely materialist dialectics, the doctrine of development. Marx, Engels, and Lenin all explained materialist dialectics as the doctrine of development. Engels called materialist dialectics the doctrine "of the general developmental laws of nature, society, and thought." Lenin viewed materialist dialectics as "the most many-sided, richest in content, and most profound doctrine of development." They all considered that all other philosophical doctrines outside this doctrine, with their formulas of developmental principles, are all narrow and contentless, "something that cuts away the actual developmental process of nature and society" (Lenin). The reason why materialist dialectics is called the most many-sided, richest in content, and most profound doctrine of development is because materialist dialectics most many-sidedly, richly, and profoundly reflects the contradictory nature and leap character of the process of change in nature and society, and not because of anything else.

Within the question of the object of philosophy, another problem must be resolved: the problem of the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology. Lenin emphatically pointed out the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology, saying this is "an extremely important problem," and that "the three terms are superfluous; they are one and the same thing," fundamentally opposing the approach of those Marxist revisionists who treat the three as completely separate and independent doctrines. Materialist dialectics is the only scientific epistemology and also the only scientific logic. Materialist dialectics studies the occurrence and development of our cognition of the external world, studies the transition from ignorance to knowledge, from incomplete knowledge to more complete knowledge, and studies the increasingly deep and numerous reflections of the developmental laws of nature and society in the human mind. This is the unity of materialist dialectics and epistemology. Materialist dialectics studies the most general developmental laws of the objective world and studies the forms of reflection in thinking of the most developed postures of the objective world. This means that materialist dialectics studies the laws of the occurrence, development, disappearance, and mutual transformation of the various processes and phenomena of real things, and at the same time studies the forms of human thinking that reflect the developmental laws of the objective world. This is the unity of materialist dialectics and logic. To thoroughly understand why dialectics, logic, and epistemology are one and the same thing, we can understand it by looking at how materialist dialectics solves the problem of the interrelationship between the logical and the historical, as shown below. Engels said: "For the thinking methods of all philosophers, the strength of Hegel's thinking method lies in the extremely rich historical sense that lays sideways at its foundation. Although its form is abstractly idealist, the development of his thought often runs parallel to the development of world history, and history originally serves as the verification of thought."

History often progresses in leaps and bounds, in a disorderly tangle. Because of this, if one were to always strictly follow history, not only would one have to pay attention to many unimportant details, but one would also inevitably be forced to interrupt the train of thought. At such times, the only appropriate method is the logical method.

Yet this logical method is still fundamentally the historical method, only stripped of its historical form and contingent elements."

This idea of "the unity of logical development and historical development" received full attention from Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

"The categories of logic are abridgements of the countless individualities of external determinate being in activity." "Categories are stages of separation, helping us to know this network and its nodal points."

"Human practical activity, having repeated the application of human consciousness billions of times to various logical formulas, thus causes these formulas to acquire the significance of axioms."

"Only after human practice had been repeated billions of times did it become fixed in human consciousness as logical formulas. These formulas possess the permanence of ingrained prejudice, and it is precisely because they are the result of billions of repetitions that they possess an axiomatic character." Lenin's words above point out the characteristic of the logic of materialist dialectics: unlike formal logic, which treats its laws and categories as empty forms detached from content and indifferent to it; and unlike Hegel, who treated them as ideal elements developing independently and detached from the material world; instead, they are treated as expressions of material motion reflected and transplanted into our minds, and processed and remolded by our minds. Hegel, based on the identity of being and thinking, treated the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology as the identity of idealism. Conversely, in Marxist philosophy, the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology is founded on materialism.

Only by resolving the relationship between being and thinking from a materialist standpoint, and only by adopting the standpoint of the theory of reflection, can the problems of the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology be thoroughly solved.

The best model for solving the interrelationship between the logical and the historical using dialectical materialism is, first and foremost, Marx's *Capital*. *Capital* contains both the historical development of capitalist society and the logical development of that society. What *Capital* analyzes is the dialectics of the development of economic categories, which reflect the emergence, development, and demise of capitalist society.

The materialist nature of this problem's solution lies in its taking material objective history as its basis, and in treating concepts and categories as reflections of this actual history. The unity of the theory and history of capitalism, and the unity of the logic and epistemology of capitalist society, are exemplarily manifested in *Capital*, from which we can thus understand the gateway to the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology. The above concerns the object of dialectical materialism.

**V. The Theory of Matter**
Marxism continues and develops the materialist line in philosophy, correctly solving the problem of the relationship between thinking and being. That is, it thoroughly and materialistically points out the materiality of the world, the objective reality of matter, and matter's primacy in relation to consciousness (or consciousness's dependence on being).

Acknowledging matter's primacy in relation to consciousness presupposes the materiality of the world and its objective existence. The first condition for belonging to the materialist camp is to acknowledge that the material world exists independently of human consciousness—it existed before the emergence of humanity, and after humanity's emergence, it still exists independently of human consciousness.

Acknowledging this is the fundamental premise of all scientific research.

What proves this point? There is an abundance of evidence: humanity is in constant contact with the external world and must also use harsh means to deal with the oppression and resistance of the external world (both nature and society); it not only must but also can overcome this oppression and resistance. All these actual circumstances of human social practice, manifested in the historical development of human society, are the best evidence. The Red Army, having traversed the Long March, does not doubt the objective existence of the regions passed through, along with the great rivers, snowy mountains, grasslands, and the enemy troops it fought. Chinese people do not doubt the objective existence of the invading Japanese imperialism, nor their own objective existence. Students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University do not doubt the objective existence of the university and of themselves as students. These things are all material things that exist objectively, independent of our consciousness. This is the fundamental viewpoint of all materialism, and this is the philosophical conception of matter.

The philosophical conception of matter differs from the natural scientific conception of matter. If the philosophical conception of matter consists in pointing out the objective existence of matter—matter meaning the entire world which exists independently of human consciousness (this world acts upon human sense organs, giving rise to sensations, and is reflected in sensations)—then this assertion is eternally unchanging, absolute. The natural scientific conception of matter, on the other hand, consists in studying the structure of matter, for example, the former atomic theory, the later electron theory, etc. These assertions change thoroughly with the progress of natural science and are relative.

Distinguishing the philosophical conception of matter from the natural scientific conception of matter based on the viewpoint of dialectical materialism is a necessary condition for thoroughly implementing the materialist line in philosophy. It has great significance in the struggle against idealism and mechanical materialism. Idealists, relying on the discovery of the electron theory, loudly propagate the fallacy of the annihilation of matter. They do not know that the progress of scientific knowledge concerning the structure of matter precisely proves the correctness of the materialist theory of matter in dialectical materialism. Certain material properties expressed in old conceptions of matter (weight, hardness, impenetrability, inertia, etc.), through the discoveries of modern natural science, i.e., the discovery of electron theory, have been proven to exist only in certain material forms, and not in others. This fact shatters the one-sidedness and narrowness of the old materialism's conception of matter, yet it exactly proves the correctness of the dialectical materialist conception of matter, which acknowledges the materiality of the world and its objective existence. The dialectical materialist conception of matter, indeed, views the unity of the material world precisely through diversity; it is the unity of material diversity. This conception of matter contains no contradiction whatsoever with the fact of the eternally universal motion and change of matter, transforming from one form into another. Ether, electrons, atoms, molecules, crystals, cells, social phenomena, thought phenomena—these are all various stages in the development of matter, various temporary forms in the development of matter. The deepening of scientific research, the discovery of various material forms (the discovery of material diversity), only enriches the content of the dialectical materialist conception of matter; how could there be any contradiction?

It is necessary to distinguish the philosophical conception of matter from the natural scientific conception of matter, as there is a difference between the broad and the narrow sense; however, they are not contradictory, for matter in the broad sense includes matter in the narrow sense. The dialectical materialist conception of matter does not admit the existence of anything non-material (independent spiritual entities) in the world. Matter is eternal and universal, infinite in both time and space. If one speaks of something that has 'always been so' and is 'everywhere so' (in terms of its unity), that is precisely what philosophy calls objectively existing matter.

Viewing consciousness from the standpoint of thorough materialism (i.e., the standpoint of materialist dialectics), consciousness is nothing else but a form of material motion, a special property of the human material brain—that special property of the material brain which reflects material processes outside consciousness into consciousness itself. From this, it can be known that our distinguishing matter from consciousness and setting them in opposition is conditional; that is, it has meaning only from the standpoint of epistemology. Because consciousness or thinking is only an attribute of matter (the brain), the opposition between knowing and being is the opposition between the knowing material substance and the known material substance, nothing more. Thus, the opposition between subject and object has no meaning outside the realm of epistemology. If, outside of epistemology, one still opposes consciousness to matter, it is tantamount to betraying materialism. In the world, there is only matter and its various manifestations; the subject itself is also material. The so-called materiality of the world (matter is eternal and universal), the objective reality of matter, and matter's primacy in relation to consciousness—this is what is meant. In a word, matter is everything in the world. 'All under heaven returned to Sima Yi'; we say, 'All under heaven returns to matter.' This is the principle of the unity of the world.

The above is the materialist theory of dialectical materialism.

**VI. The Theory of Motion (Theory of Development)**
The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of matter, i.e., acknowledging the materiality of the world, the objective reality of matter, and matter's primacy in relation to consciousness. This principle of the unity of the world was already resolved in the preceding section on the theory of matter. The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of motion (or theory of development), i.e., acknowledging that motion is the mode of existence of matter, its intrinsic attribute, and the manifestation of material diversity. This is the principle of the development of the world. The principle of the development of the world, combined with the aforementioned principle of the unity of the world, forms the complete world outlook of dialectical materialism. The world is nothing else but the infinitely developing material world (or, the material world is infinitely developing).

The dialectical materialist view of motion is intolerant of: (1) considering motion apart from matter, (2) considering matter apart from motion, and (3) simplifying material motion. The dialectical materialist theory of motion was established through a clear and resolute struggle against these idealist, metaphysical, and mechanistic viewpoints.

The dialectical materialist theory of motion is first and foremost opposed to philosophical idealism and religious theism. The essence of all philosophical idealism and religious theism lies in their starting point of denying the material unity of the world, imagining that the world's motion and development exist without matter, or were initially without matter, being instead the result of spiritual agency or divine power. The German idealist philosopher Hegel believed the present world developed from the so-called "World Idea." China's *Book of Changes* philosophy and the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism both constructed idealist views of cosmic development. Christianity says God created the world; Buddhism and all fetishistic religions in China attribute the motion and development of all things in the universe to divine power. All these assertions of motion considered apart from matter are fundamentally incompatible with dialectical materialism.

Not only idealism and religion, but also all materialism before Marx, and all current anti-Marxist mechanical materialism, are materialists in their theory of motion when speaking of natural phenomena, but when it comes to social phenomena, they invariably depart from material causes and resort to spiritual causes. Dialectical materialism resolutely refutes all these erroneous views of motion, pointing out their historical limitations—limitations imposed by class position and the degree of scientific development—and establishes its own view of motion on the basis of thorough materialism, grounded in the proletarian standpoint and the most advanced level of science.

Dialectical materialism first points out that motion is the mode of existence of matter, its intrinsic attribute (not impelled by external force). To imagine motion without matter is just as inconceivable as to imagine matter without motion. It sharply contrasts the materialist view of motion with the idealist and theistic views of motion.

Considering matter apart from motion leads to the metaphysical theory of an immobile universe or the theory of absolute equilibrium. They hold that matter is eternally unchanging, that there is no development within matter, and that absolute rest is the general or original state of matter. Dialectical materialism resolutely opposes this view, holding that motion is the most universal mode of existence of matter, its inseparable intrinsic attribute. All rest and equilibrium have only relative significance, while motion is absolute. Dialectical materialism acknowledges that all material forms can have relative rest or equilibrium, and considers this a most important condition for distinguishing matter, and thus also life (Engels). However, it holds that rest or equilibrium is merely one element of motion, a particular case of motion. The error of examining matter apart from motion lies precisely in exaggerating this element of rest or equilibrium, letting it obscure and replace the whole, generalizing and absolutizing a particular case of motion. The saying loved by ancient Chinese metaphysical thinkers, "Heaven does not change, nor does the Way," exemplifies this theory of an immobile universe. They also acknowledged changes in the phenomena of the universe and society, but denied any change in their essence. In their view, the essence of the universe and society is eternally unchanging.

The reason they do so mainly lies in the limitations of their class. If the feudal landlord class were to acknowledge that the essence of the universe and society is motion and development, it would be tantamount to theoretically pronouncing the death sentence on their own class. All reactionary forces hold a philosophy of immobility.

The revolutionary class and the masses, however, see with their own eyes the principle of the world's development and therefore advocate transforming this society and this world. Their philosophy is dialectical materialism.

Furthermore, dialectical materialism does not accept a simplistic view of motion, that is, reducing all motion to a single form, namely mechanical motion. This is a characteristic of the worldview of old materialism.

Old materialism (French materialism of the 17th and 18th centuries, and Feuerbachian materialism of 19th-century Germany) also acknowledged the eternal existence and eternal motion of matter (acknowledging the infinity of motion), but it still did not break free from a metaphysical worldview.

Needless to say, in their views on society, they still adhered to an idealist conception of development. Even in their views on nature, they reduced the material world uniformly to some one-sided attribute, namely, to one form of motion—mechanical motion.

The cause of this motion lies in external forces; like a machine, it is set in motion by an external push.

They do not explain all the diversity of material motion or relations from their essence or internal causes, but instead explain them from the superficial form of external discovery, from external causes. In doing so, they actually lose the diversity of the world. They interpret all motion in the world merely as changes in location and increases or decreases in quantity. An object occupies one place at a certain moment and another place at the next moment—this is called motion. If there is change, it is only change in quantity, with no qualitative change; change is cyclical and repeatedly produces the same results.

In contrast, dialectical materialism does not view motion as mere changes in location or cyclical motion but sees it as infinite qualitative diversity, as transformation from one form to another. The unity of world matter and material motion is precisely the unity and motion of the infinite diversity of world matter.

Engels said: "All higher forms of motion are necessarily bound up with mechanical (external or molecular) forms of motion. For example, without changes in heat and electricity, chemical action would be impossible; without mechanical (molecular), thermal, electrical, chemical, and other changes, organic life would also be impossible. This, of course, cannot be denied. However, the existence of only some lower forms of motion can by no means encompass the essence of the principal forms in various situations."

This statement is absolutely true and corresponds to the facts.

Even purely mechanical motion cannot be explained from a metaphysical viewpoint.

It must be understood that all forms of motion are dialectical, although the depth and multifacetedness of their dialectical content vary greatly.

Mechanical motion is still dialectical motion.

The so-called "being" of an object in a certain place at a certain moment is actually simultaneously "being" and "not being" in that place. The so-called "being" in a place, or "immobility," is only a special case of motion. Fundamentally, it is still in motion. The object moves within limited time and limited space.

The object constantly overcomes these limitations and breaks out beyond the boundaries of this specific, finite time and space, becoming an uninterrupted stream of motion.

Moreover, mechanical motion is only one of the forms of material motion. In the actual real world, it has no absolutely independent existence; it is always connected with other forms of motion.

Heat, chemical reactions, light, electricity, and even organic phenomena and social phenomena are all qualitatively specific forms of material motion.

The epoch-making achievement of natural science at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries lies in discovering the law of the transformation of motion, pointing out that material motion always transforms from one form into another, and the new form thus transformed is essentially different from the old form.

The reason for the transformation of matter lies not externally but internally. It is not due to the push of external mechanical forces, but because there exist internally two contradictory elements of different natures that struggle against each other, driving the motion and development of matter.

Due to the discovery of this law of the transformation of motion, dialectical materialism is able to extend the principle of the material unity of the world to the history of nature and society. It not only examines the world as matter in eternal motion but also examines it as matter advancing infinitely from lower forms to higher forms, that is, examining the world as development, as process.

In other words: "The unified material world is a process of development."

In this way, the cyclical theory of old materialism is shattered.

Dialectical materialism, through profound and multifaceted observation of the forms of motion in nature and society, holds that the developmental process of the world viewed as a whole is eternal (without beginning or end), while at the same time, each specific historical form of motion is temporary (with a beginning and an end). That is, it occurs under certain conditions and perishes under certain conditions.

It holds that the developmental process of the world generates higher forms of motion from lower ones, demonstrating its historicity and temporality. Yet at the same time, no single form of motion is absolutely primary or absolutely final; it exists within the eternal stream (the stream without beginning or end).

Relying on the law of the struggle of opposites (the cause of self-motion), each form of motion always advances to a higher stage compared to the preceding form; it advances directly forward. But at the same time, in terms of each form of motion (each specific developmental process), there can also occur directional changes or retrogressive movements. The combination of forward motion and retrogressive motion forms, on the whole, a complex spiral motion.

It holds that a new form of motion arises as the antithesis (opposite) of the old form of motion, yet at the same time, the new form of motion necessarily preserves many elements of the old form. The new grows out of the old.

It holds that the emergence of new forms, new qualities, and new attributes of things comes about through a break in continuity, i.e., a leap produced through conflict and rupture, while at the same time, the connections and interrelations of things are never absolutely destroyed.

Finally, dialectical materialism holds that the world is inexhaustible (infinite). This is true not only when viewed as a whole but also when viewed in its parts. Does not the electron, like the atom and molecule, present a complex and inexhaustible world?

The fundamental forms of material motion, in turn, define the fundamental natural sciences and various branches of social science.

Dialectical materialism examines the development of the world as a forward movement from the inorganic realm through the organic realm to the highest form of material motion (society). The hierarchical relations of these forms of motion become the basis for the hierarchical relations of the sciences corresponding to them (inorganic sciences, organic sciences, social sciences).

Engels said: "The various kinds of sciences analyze specific forms of motion or a series of interconnected and mutually driving forms of motion. Therefore, the classification of sciences consists precisely in arranging and ordering the various forms of motion according to their inherent sequence, and only in this respect does classification have meaning."

The entire world (including human society) assumes materially different forms of motion with qualitatively distinct natures. Therefore, one must not forget the problem of the various concrete forms of material motion. There is no such thing as "matter in general" or "motion in general."

In the world, there exist only different forms of concrete matter or motion. "The words matter and motion are merely simple terms in which, according to their common properties, we subsume all the various sensible things."

(Engels).

The above is the theory of world motion or the principle of world development of dialectical materialism.

This doctrine is the essence of Marxist philosophy and the worldview and methodology of the proletariat. If the proletariat and all revolutionary people wield this thoroughly scientific weapon, they will be able to understand this world and transform it.

VII. On Space-Time Motion is the form of the existence of matter. Space and time are also forms of the existence of matter. Moving matter exists in space and time, and the motion of matter itself presupposes space and time as these two forms of the existence of matter.

Space and time cannot be separated from matter. The statement "matter exists in space" means that matter itself possesses extension and that the material world is a world internally possessing extension; it does not mean that matter is placed in a non-material, empty space.

Space and time are neither independent non-material things nor subjective forms of our sensibility. They are the forms of existence of the objective material world. They are objective, not existing outside of matter, and matter does not exist outside of them.

The view that regards space and time as forms of the existence of matter is a thoroughly materialist view.

This view of space-time is fundamentally opposed to the following idealist views of space-time: (1) the Kantian view of space-time, which holds that time and space are not objective realities but forms of human intuition; (2) the Hegelian view of space-time, which holds that the developing concepts of time and space increasingly approach the Absolute Idea; (3) the Machist view of space-time, which regards time and space as "species of sensation" or "instruments for harmonizing experience." All these idealist viewpoints deny the objective reality of time and space, and deny that the concepts of time and space, in their own development, reflect the forms of the existence of matter. These erroneous theories have been refuted one by one by dialectical materialism.

On the issue of space and time, dialectical materialism must struggle not only against the above idealist views but also against mechanistic materialism. A particularly notable example is Newton's mechanistic theory, which treats space as an immovable, empty framework unrelated to time, into which matter is placed.

Dialectical materialism opposes this mechanistic theory and points out that our concepts of space and time are developing.

"In the world there is nothing but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions, in their accumulation, constitute absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, advance along the line of absolute truth and draw ever closer to absolute truth. The variability of human conceptions of space and time can no more refute the objective reality of the two than the variability of scientific knowledge concerning the forms of matter in motion and its organization can refute the objective reality of the external world" (Lenin).

The above is the dialectical-materialist theory of space-time.

VIII. On Consciousness Dialectical materialism holds that consciousness is a product of matter, a form of the development of matter, and a property of a certain form of matter.

This materialist and historicist theory of consciousness is fundamentally opposed to the views of all idealism and mechanistic materialism on this issue.

According to the Marxist view, the source of consciousness evolves from the unconscious inorganic realm to the animal realm with lower forms of consciousness, and then develops into humanity with higher forms of consciousness.

Higher forms of consciousness are inseparable not only from the development of the higher nervous system in physiological evolution but also from labor and production in social development.

Marx and Engels emphatically pointed out the dependence of consciousness on the development of material production, and the relationship between consciousness and the development of human language.

The so-called consciousness is a property of a certain form of matter, and this material form is the nervous system with complex organization. Such a nervous system can only occur at the higher stages of natural evolution.

The entire inorganic realm, the plant kingdom, and the lower animal realm lack the capacity to recognize the processes occurring within or outside them; they are without consciousness.

Only animals with a higher nervous system possess the capacity for cognitive processes, i.e., the capacity for internal reflection or apprehension of these processes.

The objective physiological processes in our nervous system are accompanied by their subjective manifestation in the form of consciousness internally. What is, in itself, objective—a certain material process—is at the same time, for the entity possessing a brain, a subjective, psychological act.

There is no such thing as a special mental substance of thought; there is only the matter that thinks—the brain. This thinking matter is a substance of a particular quality, a substance that reaches a high level of development along with the development of language in the life of human society.

This substance possesses the special property of thought, a property not found in any other kind of matter.

However, vulgar materialists regard thought as a substance secreted by the brain. This view distorts our conception of the issue. It must be understood that acts of thought, emotion, and will are not things possessing weight and extension. Consciousness is a different property of the same material substance that possesses weight, extension, and the like.

Consciousness is the internal state of moving matter, a special property that reflects the physiological processes occurring in moving matter. This special nature is inseparable from the objective processes of neural activity, yet it is not identical with those processes. To conflate the two and thereby negate the special nature of consciousness is the viewpoint of vulgar materialism.

Similarly, the mechanistic theory of pseudo-Marxism, aligning itself with the views of certain left-wing bourgeois schools in psychology, essentially negates consciousness altogether.

They interpret consciousness as physicochemical physiological processes, maintaining that the study of the behavior of higher entities can be carried out through the research of objective physiology and biology.

They fail to understand the qualitative specificity of the essence of consciousness and do not see that consciousness is a product of human social practice. They replace the concrete historical unity of object and subject with the equivalence of subject and object, substituting a one-sided, mechanistic objective world. This view, which conflates consciousness with physiological processes, effectively eliminates the fundamental philosophical question of the relationship between thought and being.

Menshevik idealism attempts to replace the Marxist theory of consciousness with a compromise theory, reconciling materialism with idealism. They counterpose an "integration" of objectivism and subjectivism, a "mutual aid" of two methods, against the principle of dialectics. This dialectical principle, however, is neither mechanistic objectivism nor idealist subjectivism, but the concrete historical unity of object and subject.

Yet there is an even stranger argument: Plekhanov's animistic view on the question of consciousness, fully expressed in his famous statement that "even a stone has consciousness."

According to his opinion, consciousness does not arise in the process of material development but exists inherently in all matter from the very beginning. The difference between the consciousness of a stone, a lower organism, and a human being is merely a matter of degree. This anti-historical viewpoint fundamentally opposes the dialectical materialist view that consciousness is the last to emerge and possesses qualitative specificity.

Only the dialectical materialist theory of consciousness is the correct theory on this question.

**IX. The Theory of Reflection**

To be a thorough materialist, merely acknowledging that matter is the root source of consciousness is not enough. One must also acknowledge that consciousness can know matter.

The question of whether matter can be known is a complex one, a question with which all past philosophers felt powerless to deal. Only dialectical materialism can provide a correct resolution.

On this question, the stance of dialectical materialism is opposed both to agnosticism and to naive realism.

The agnosticism of Hume and Kant separates the knowing subject from the object, holding that it is impossible to transcend the boundaries of the subject, and that an unbridgeable chasm exists between the "thing-in-itself" and its image.

The naive realism of Machism equates the object with sensation, believing that truth is already achieved in sensation in its completed form.

At the same time, they fail to understand not only that sensation is the result of external stimuli, but also the active role of the subject in the process of cognition—that is, the transformative work performed by external stimuli in the subject's sensory organs and thinking brain (manifested in two forms: impressions and concepts).

Only the dialectical materialist theory of reflection provides a definitive affirmative answer to the question of knowability and constitutes the "soul" of Marxist epistemology.

According to this theory, it is demonstrated that our impressions and concepts are not only caused by objective things but also reflect objective things.

It shows that impressions and concepts are neither the products of the subject's autonomous development, as idealists claim, nor mere labels for objective things, as agnostics claim, but are reflections, photographs, and copies of objective things.

Objective truth exists independently of the subject. Although it is reflected in our sensations and concepts, it is not obtained in its completed form all at once, but is completed step by step.

The naive realist view that objective truth is already obtained by us in its completed form within sensation is an erroneous view.

Although objective truth in our sensations and concepts is not achieved in a completed form at once, it is not unknowable.

The dialectical materialist theory of reflection opposes agnosticism, holding that consciousness can reflect objective truth in the process of cognition.

The process of cognition is a complex process, in which the previously unperceived "thing-in-itself" is reflected in our sensory impressions and concepts, thereby becoming a "thing-for-us."

Sensation and thought are not, as Kant claimed, what separate us from the external world, but what connect us to it.

Sensation and thought are reflections of the objective external world. Things of thought (impressions and concepts) are nothing other than "the material world translated and transformed in the human mind" (Marx).

In the process of cognition, the material world is reflected in our knowledge ever more closely, more accurately, in a more multifaceted way, and more profoundly.

Waging a struggle on two fronts against Machism and Kantianism, and exposing the errors of naive realism and agnosticism, is the task of Marxist epistemology.

The dialectical materialist theory of reflection holds that our capacity to know the objective world is limitless, fundamentally opposing the agnostic view that human cognitive capacity is limited.

However, our approach toward absolute truth has its historically defined limits each time.

Lenin stated: "The approach of our knowledge toward objective absolute truth is historically limited, but the existence of this truth is absolute, and our ceaseless approach toward truth is also absolute.

The external form of the picture is historically conditional, but the fact that this picture depicts an objectively existing model is absolute."

We acknowledge that human knowledge is conditioned by historical limitations, and truth cannot be obtained all at once, but we are not agnostics. We also acknowledge that truth can be realized in the historical movement of human knowledge.

Lenin further stated: "The reflection of nature in human thought should not be understood rigidly or absolutely.

Knowledge is not without movement or contradiction; it is situated in a perpetual process of movement."

That is, "in a perpetual process of movement where contradictions arise and are resolved." Cognitive movement is a complex movement full of contradictions and struggles. This is the view of the epistemology of dialectical materialism.

All philosophies that hold anti-historical views in epistemology do not treat knowledge as a process, and therefore all suffer from narrowness.

The narrowness of sensationalist empiricism carves a deep ditch between sensation and concept.

The narrowness of the rationalist school detaches concept from sensation.

Only the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge (the theory of reflection), which treats knowledge as a process, thoroughly eliminates this narrowness, placing knowledge in a materialist and dialectical position.

The theory of reflection points out that the process of reflection is not limited to sensation and impression but also exists in thought (in abstract concepts). Knowledge is a process of movement from sensation to thought.

Lenin once said: "Knowledge reflecting nature is not a simple, direct, integral reflection, but a process of forming many abstract thoughts, concepts, laws, etc."

At the same time, Lenin indicated that the cognitive process from sensation to thought proceeds in a leap-like manner.

On this point, Lenin precisely elucidated the dialectical materialist view of the interrelationship between the empirical and rational elements in cognition.

Many philosophers do not understand the sudden change that occurs in the movement process of cognition, that is, in the movement process from sensation to thought (from impression to concept).

Therefore, understanding this leap-like transformation caused by contradiction—that is, understanding the unity of sensation and thought as a dialectical unity—is the most essential element for comprehending the essence of Lenin's theory of reflection.

**X. The Theory of Truth**

Truth is objective, relative, and absolute—this is the truth view of materialist dialectics.

Truth is, first and foremost, objective. After acknowledging the objective reality of matter and the rootedness of matter for consciousness, this is tantamount to acknowledging the objectivity of truth.

So-called objective truth means that the objectively existing material world is the sole source of the content of our knowledge or concepts; there is no other source.

Only idealists, who deny that the material world exists independently of human consciousness—this being the fundamental principle of idealism—maintain that knowledge or concepts are subjectively self-generated, requiring no objective content, thereby endorsing subjective truth and denying objective truth. Yet this does not accord with the facts. Any piece of knowledge or any concept, if it does not reflect the laws of the objective world, is not scientific knowledge, not objective truth, but subjectively deceptive superstition or delusion.

All practical actions of humans aimed at changing the environment—whether acts of production, class struggle, national struggle, or any other kind—are directed by thought (knowledge).

If this thought does not correspond to objective laws—that is, if the objective laws are not reflected in the mind of the acting person and do not constitute the content of his thought or knowledge—then such action is definitely incapable of achieving its goal. The so-called errors in subjective guidance within revolutionary movements refer precisely to this kind of situation.

The reason Marxism is revolutionary scientific knowledge is that it correctly reflects the actual laws of the objective world; it is objective truth.

The reason all anti-Marxist ideas are wrong is that they are not based on correct objective laws but are entirely subjective delusions.

Some say that what is generally recognized is objective truth (the subjective idealist Bogdanov said this). According to this opinion, then religion and prejudice would also be objective truths, for although religion and prejudice are essentially fallacies, they are often recognized by the majority of people. Sometimes, correct scientific thought is not as widespread as these fallacies.

Materialist dialectics fundamentally opposes this opinion, holding that only scientific knowledge which correctly reflects objective laws can be called truth. All truth must be objective.

Truth and fallacy are absolutely opposed. The sole criterion for judging whether any piece of knowledge is truth is whether it reflects objective laws.

If it does not conform to objective laws, then no matter how generally it is accepted, or no matter how floridly elaborating a theory appears within a revolutionary movement, it can only be treated as fallacy.

The first question of the materialist dialectical theory of truth is the question of subjective truth and objective truth, and its answer is to deny the former and acknowledge the latter.

The second question of the materialist dialectical theory of truth is the question of absolute truth and relative truth. Its answer is not to one-sidedly acknowledge or deny one aspect, but to acknowledge both simultaneously and point out their correct interrelationship, that is, to point out their dialectical nature.

When materialist dialectics acknowledges objective truth, it thereby acknowledges absolute truth.

For when we say that the content of knowledge is a reflection of the objective world, this is equivalent to acknowledging that the object of our knowledge is that eternal, absolute world.

"All true knowledge of nature is eternal and infinite knowledge, and therefore it is essentially absolute" (Engels).

However, objective absolute truth does not become our knowledge all at once, but arrives at absolute truth through the introduction of countless relative truths in the infinite developmental process of our cognition.

The sum total of these countless relative truths is the expression of absolute truth. Human thought, by its nature, can provide us with absolute truth.

Absolute truth is accumulated from many relative truths. Each stage of scientific development adds new seeds to this sum total of absolute truth.

However, the truth limits of every scientific principle are always relative. Absolute truth can only manifest itself upon countless relative truths; without expression through relative truths, absolute truth cannot be known.

Materialist dialectics does not deny the relativity of all knowledge, but this refers only to the historical conditionality of the limits of our knowledge's approach toward objective absolute truth, and not that knowledge itself is only relative.

All scientific discoveries are historically limited and relative.

However, scientific knowledge differs from fallacy; it reveals and depicts objective absolute truth. This is the dialectical view on the interrelationship between absolute truth and relative truth.

There are two views: one is metaphysical materialism, and the other is idealist relativism. Both are incorrect regarding the question of the interrelationship between absolute truth and relative truth.

Metaphysical materialists, based on their fundamental metaphysical principle that "the material world is unchanging," hold that human thought is also unchanging—that is, they believe that in human consciousness, this unchanging objective world is captured all at once and in its entirety.

In other words, they acknowledge absolute truth, and they hold that this absolute truth is obtained by humans in a single act. They regard truth as motionless, dead, and undeveloped. Their error lies not in their acknowledgment that absolute truth exists—acknowledging this is correct—but in their failure to understand the historical nature of truth, their failure to view the acquisition of truth as a cognitive process, and their failure to understand that so-called absolute truth can only be gradually unfolded in the developmental process of human cognition. Every forward step in understanding manifests content of absolute truth, but relative to the totality of truth, it possesses only relative significance; the entirety of absolute truth cannot be obtained all at once.

The metaphysical materialist view on truth represents one extreme in epistemology.

The other extreme in epistemology concerning the question of truth is idealist relativism.

They deny the absolute truthfulness of knowledge, recognizing only its relative significance.

They hold that all scientific discoveries contain no absolute truth and are therefore not objective truth; truth is only subjective and relative.

If that is the case, then all fallacies would have the right to exist.

Imperialist aggression against weak and small nations, and the ruling class's exploitation of the laboring masses—these systems of aggression and exploitation would also be truth, since truth is, after all, only subjective and relative.

The denial of objective truth and absolute truth inevitably leads to such a conclusion.

Moreover, the aim of idealist relativism has always been to defend the ruling class. For example, the purpose of relativist pragmatism (or experimentalism) lies precisely in this.

Seen in this light, neither metaphysical materialism nor idealist relativism can correctly resolve the problem of the interrelationship between absolute truth and relative truth.

Only materialist dialectics provides both a correct answer to the question of the interrelationship between thought and existence, and consequently establishes the objectivity of scientific knowledge, and at the same time yields a correct understanding of absolute and relative truth. This is the truth theory of materialist dialectics.

XI. On Practice (On the relationship between cognition and practice, the relationship between theory and reality, the relationship between knowing and doing)

Pre-Marxist materialism examined the problem of cognition apart from the social nature of man, apart from his historical development, and therefore could not understand the dependence of cognition on social practice, that is, the dependence of cognition on production and class struggle.

First of all, Marxists hold that human productive activity is the most fundamental practical activity, determining all other activities. Man's understanding depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena of nature, the nature of nature (the laws of nature), and the relations between man and nature; and through productive activity he also comes to know, at the same time, the mutual relations between man and man. None of this knowledge can be acquired apart from productive activity. Each person, as a member of society, joins with other members of society in carrying out productive activities to solve the problems of human material life; this is the basic source from which man's knowledge develops.

Human social practice is not confined to productive activity alone; it takes many other forms—class struggle, political life, and scientific activity; in short, all spheres of the actual life of society are participated in by social man. Therefore, man's knowledge, in addition to material life, also comes from political and cultural life (which is closely bound up with material life), through which he comes to know the various complex relations among men. Among these, the various forms of class struggle in particular exert a profound influence on the development of man's cognition; it is for this reason that in class society every kind of thought bears the stamp of a class.

Thus Marxists hold that only the social practice of the people constitutes the criterion of the truth of their knowledge of the external world. The actual situation is as follows: only when, in the process of social practice (in the process of material production, class struggle, and scientific experiment), people achieve the results they had anticipated in their thinking, does their cognition demonstrate its force. If the peasants fail to reap a harvest, if the workers fail to turn out manufactured goods, if strike struggles, military operations, or national revolutions all fail to achieve victory—then what is the reason? The reason is that people's cognition has not reflected the laws of these processes in accordance with the actual conditions of the external processes, and consequently they cannot attain the anticipated results in their practical activities. If people want to achieve victory (that is, to attain the anticipated results), they must make their thinking conform to the laws of the objective external world; if it does not conform, they will fail in practice. After suffering failure, they draw lessons from the failure, revise their thinking to make it correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into victory. This is the truth of the sayings "Failure is the mother of success" and "A fall into the pit, a gain in your wit."

The epistemology of dialectical materialism places practice in the primary position, holding that man's knowledge can in no way be separated from practice, and repudiating all erroneous theories that deny the importance of practice and separate knowledge from practice. Lenin said: "Practice is higher than (theoretical) cognition, for it possesses not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality." Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—has two most striking characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that dialectical materialism serves the proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, that theory is derived from practice and in turn serves practice. The determination of whether knowledge or theory is true is not settled by how one subjectively feels, but by how the results of objective social practice turn out. The criterion of truth can only be social practice. The standpoint of practice is the primary and fundamental standpoint in the epistemology of dialectical materialism.

Yet how exactly does man's cognition arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This will become clear if we examine the process of development of cognition.

Originally, in the process of practice, people at first see only the phenomenal aspect of the various things in the process, see only the one-sided aspects of the various things, and see the external connections among the various things. For example, on the first day or two when the inspection group of the Kuomintang arrived in Yenan, they saw the terrain, streets, and buildings of Yenan; they came into contact with many people; they attended banquets, evening parties, and mass meetings; they heard various speeches and saw various documents. All these are the phenomena of things, the one-sided aspects of things, and the external connections among these things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, that is, the stage of sensations and impressions. That is, these separate things of Yenan acted upon the senses of the gentlemen of the inspection group, aroused their sensations, and gave rise in their minds to many impressions and to the rough external connections among these impressions. This is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, people cannot yet form deep concepts or draw theoretical conclusions.

As social practice continues, the things that give rise to sensations and impressions in people during practice are repeated many times; then in the human brain a sudden change occurs in the process of cognition, and concepts are produced. Concepts are no longer the phenomena of things, nor their one-sided aspects, nor their external connections, but grasp the essence of things, the totality of things, and the internal connections of things. Concepts differ from sensation not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Proceeding further in this way, using the methods of judgment and inference, one can produce theoretical results. What is described in *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* as "knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind" and what we ordinarily say "let me think it over" is precisely the work of employing concepts in the human brain to form judgments and inferences. This is the rational stage of cognition or the logical stage, which is the second stage of cognition. After the gentlemen of the inspection group had collected all kinds of materials and after they had "thought them over," they were able to reach the judgment that "the policy of the Communist Party's Anti-Japanese National United Front and KMT-CPC cooperation is thorough, sincere, and genuine." After they had made this judgment, if they themselves are also sincere about unity for national salvation, they could then go a step further and draw the conclusion: "KMT-CPC cooperation can succeed." This stage of concepts, judgments, and inferences is the most important stage in the entire process of a person's cognition of a thing. The real task of cognition is not perceptual cognition but rational cognition. The real task of cognition is to pass from sensation to thought, to arrive at understanding the internal contradictions of objective things, understanding their laws, understanding the internal connections between this process and that process, and understanding the internal connections among the various objective processes—that is, to arrive at theoretical cognition. To repeat, the reason that logical cognition differs from perceptual cognition is that perceptual cognition pertains to the one-sided, phenomenal, and externally connected aspects of things, while logical cognition takes a great step forward and reaches the totality, the essence, and the internally connected aspects of things, reaches the revelation of the internal contradictions of the surrounding world, and can thereby grasp the development of the surrounding world in its totality and in the internal connections of all its aspects.

This theory of the developmental process of cognition, based on practice and proceeding from the shallow to the deep in the manner of materialist dialectics, had never before been resolved by anyone prior to Marxism. Marxist dialectical materialism correctly solved this problem for the first time, pointing out materialistically and dialectically the movement of the deepening of cognition, pointing out the movement by which social man, in the complex and constantly repeated practice of production and class struggle, shifts from perceptual to rational cognition. Lenin said: "The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, more correctly, and more completely." Lenin further pointed out: the characteristics of the two stages of the cognitive process are such that at the lower stage cognition appears as perceptual, and at the higher stage cognition appears as logical, but every stage is a stage in a unified cognitive process. Perceptual and rational cognition differ in nature, yet they are not separate from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is felt cannot immediately be understood by us; only what is understood can be felt more deeply. Sensation only solves the problem of phenomena; only understanding solves the problem of essence. The solution of these problems can in no way be separated from practice. No matter who wants to know something, there is no way to resolve it except by coming into contact with that thing, that is, by living (practicing) in the environment of that thing. One cannot, in feudal society, know in advance the laws of capitalist society, for capitalism had not yet appeared and there was no such practice; Marxism could only be the product of capitalist society. One cannot, in the era of laissez-faire capitalism, know in advance certain specific laws of the imperialist era, for imperialism had not yet appeared and there was no such practice; only Leninism could shoulder this task. Marxism-Leninism also could not have arisen in economically backward colonies, because, although at the same time, the place was different. The reason that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were able to produce their theories was, apart from the condition of their genius, mainly that they personally participated in the practice of the class struggle and scientific experimentation of their time; without this latter condition, no amount of genius could have succeeded. "The scholar who does not go out of his door knows all the world's affairs"—in ancient times, when technology was undeveloped, this was merely an empty phrase. In the present age of developed technology, though this saying can be realized, those who truly have direct knowledge are the people who practice throughout the world; it is they who, in the course of practice, acquire "knowledge," which, through the transmission of writing and technology, reaches the hands of the "scholar," who can thereby indirectly "know all the world's affairs." If one wishes to know a certain thing or certain things directly, one must personally participate in the practice of changing reality, of changing that thing or those things, for only thus can one come into contact with the phenomena of that thing or those things; and only by personally participating in the practice of changing reality can one uncover the essence of that thing or those things and understand them. This is the actual path of cognition that everyone follows in practice, though some people deliberately distort it and talk in opposition.

The most ridiculous people in the world are those "know-it-alls" who, picking up a smattering of hearsay knowledge, proclaim themselves "the foremost under heaven." This merely shows how they overestimate themselves. The question of knowledge is a scientific one, which permits not the slightest trace of hypocrisy or pride. What is decisively required is its opposite—honesty and a humble attitude. If you want knowledge, you must participate in the practice of transforming reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must transform the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must conduct experiments in chemistry, transforming the state of the atom. If you want to know the concrete theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates from direct experience. Yet one cannot have direct experience in all matters; in fact, most knowledge consists of things from indirect experience—this is all the knowledge of ancient times and foreign lands. For the ancients and foreigners, such knowledge was derived from direct experience. If, at the time of their direct experience, it met the condition described by Lenin—namely, "scientific (correct, significant, and not fanciful) abstraction"—then it is reliable, otherwise it is not.

Therefore, an individual's knowledge comprises only two parts: direct experience and indirect experience. And what is indirect experience for me remains direct experience for others. Consequently, in terms of the totality of knowledge, no knowledge of any kind can be separated from direct experience.

The source of all knowledge lies in the physical senses' perception of the objective external world. Whoever denies this perception, denies direct experience, and denies personally participating in the practice of transforming reality is not a materialist.

It is precisely for this reason that the "know-it-all" is so ridiculous.

A Chinese merchant has a saying: "If you want to profit from animals, you must sleep with them." This saying holds true for the merchant's profit-making and is equally true for epistemology: knowledge divorced from practice is impossible.

To elucidate the epistemological movement of materialist dialectics—the movement of the gradual deepening of knowledge—arising from the practice of transforming reality, several specific examples will be cited below.

The proletariat's understanding of the capitalist process, in the early stages of its practice—the period of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle—remained only at the stage of perceptual knowledge: they recognized only the one-sided aspects of various capitalist phenomena and their external connections. At this time, they were still what is called a "class in itself."

But by the later stages of their practice—the period of conscious, organized economic and political struggle—thanks to practice and the lessons drawn from long-term struggle, they came to understand the essence of capitalist society, the exploitative relations between social classes, and produced the theory of Marxism. At this point, they became a "class for itself."

The understanding of the Chinese people regarding imperialism followed the same pattern.

The first stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, manifested in the indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement and the Boxer Rebellion, among others.

Only in the second stage did understanding advance to rational knowledge, perceiving the various internal and external contradictions of imperialism and grasping the essence of imperialism's alliance with China's feudal classes to crush the Chinese masses. This understanding began only around the time of the May Fourth Movement.

Let us now turn to war.

If the leaders of a war are people without war experience, they will not, in the initial phase, comprehend the profound guiding laws of a specific war (such as our Soviet War of the past decade).

In the beginning, they merely undergo many operational experiences—and suffer quite a few defeats.

Yet it is precisely through these experiences (victories, and especially defeats) that they come to understand the inner thread running through the entire war, namely the laws of that specific war, grasp strategy and tactics, and thereby confidently direct the war.

If, at such a juncture, an inexperienced person were to take over command, they would likewise have to endure some defeats (gain some experience) before they could comprehend the correct laws of the war.

We often hear comrades utter a phrase when they cannot bravely accept a work assignment: they say they lack confidence.

Why do they lack confidence?

Because they have no understanding of the laws governing the content and environment of this work, or they have never encountered such work before, or their exposure to it has been insufficient, leaving them unable to speak of understanding the laws of this kind of work.

Once the circumstances and environment of the work are analyzed in detail, they feel somewhat more confident and are willing to undertake it.

If this person spends a period in this work (gaining experience in it) and is someone willing to earnestly observe objective conditions—not someone who views issues subjectively, one-sidedly, and superficially—they will be able to draw conclusions for themselves on how the work should be carried out, and their courage in work will greatly increase.

Only those who view issues subjectively, one-sidedly, and superficially, who arrive in a place without inquiring into the environment's conditions, without looking at the whole picture (the history and full present state of the matter), and without touching upon the essence of things (the nature of a matter and its internal connections with other matters), will issue orders as if "self-righteous"—such people will always trip up.

From this, it can be seen that the first step in the process of knowing is initial contact with the things of the external world, belonging to the stage of perception. The second step is the synthesis, reorganization, and ordering of perceptual materials, belonging to the stage of concepts, judgment, and inference.

Only when perceptual materials are extremely rich (not fragmentary or incomplete) and correspond to reality (not illusory) can correct concepts and theories be constructed from them.

Here, two essential points must be emphatically pointed out. The first, already mentioned earlier, will be repeated: it is the issue that rational knowledge depends on perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist.

In the history of philosophy, there is a school known as "rationalism"—that is, one that recognizes only the reality of reason and denies the reality of experience, holding that only reason is reliable while sensory experience is not. The error of this school lies in turning facts upside down.

The reason why rational things are reliable is precisely that they originate from the perceptual; otherwise, rational things would be like water without a source or a tree without roots, something purely subjective and unreliable.

From the perspective of the order of the process of knowing, sensory experience is primary. We emphasize the significance of social practice in the process of knowing precisely because only social practice can enable human knowledge to begin—to obtain sensory experience from the objective external world.

A person who shuts their eyes, stops their ears, and completely severs themselves from the objective external world has no knowledge to speak of.

Knowledge originates from experience—this is the materialism of epistemology.

Second, knowledge requires deepening and must develop to the stage of reason—this is the dialectics of epistemology.

If one thinks that knowledge can halt at the lower perceptual stage, that only perceptual knowledge is reliable while rational knowledge is not, this merely repeats the historical theory of "empiricism." The error of this theory lies in not understanding that while sensory materials are indeed reflections of certain realities of the objective external world (setting aside the kind of idealist empiricism that treats experience merely as introspective testimony), they are only one-sided and superficial. Such reflections are incomplete and do not reflect the essence of things. To reflect the whole of a thing completely, to reflect its essence and its internal laws, one must, through the work of thought, refine the abundant sensory materials by discarding the coarse and selecting the fine, eliminating the false and preserving the true, proceeding from one to another, from the external to the internal, and transform them into a system of concepts and theories. One must transform perceptual knowledge into rational knowledge.

Such transformed knowledge is not more vacuous or less reliable; on the contrary, as Lenin said, it is something that reflects objective things more profoundly, more correctly, and more completely—provided it is scientifically transformed on the basis of practice during the process of knowing.

The vulgar pragmatist does not see it this way; they respect experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot comprehend the entire objective process, lack clear guidelines, have no broad prospects, and are self-satisfied with occasional successes and narrow insights. If such a person guides a revolution, they will lead it to a dead end.

Rational knowledge depends on perceptual knowledge, and perceptual knowledge requires development into rational knowledge—this is the epistemology of materialist dialectics.

Both rationalism and empiricism in philosophy fail to understand the historical or dialectical nature of knowledge, and although each holds a one-sided truth (referring to materialist rationalism and empiricism, not idealist rationalism and empiricism), they are both erroneous in the totality of epistemology.

The materialist-dialectical movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational holds true for a small process of knowing (such as a single thing or a single task) as well as for a large process of knowing (such as a society or a revolution).

Yet the movement of knowledge does not yet end here. If the epistemological movement of materialist dialectics stops at rational knowledge, then only half the problem is addressed—and, for Marxist philosophy, only the less significant half.

The issue that Marxist philosophy considers critically important is not merely understanding the laws of the objective world and thereby being able to explain the universe, but using this understanding of objective laws to actively transform the universe.

From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement: "Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement."

All human actions (practice) are guided by human thought; without thought, there is naturally no action whatsoever.

Yet Marxism values theory precisely and solely because it can guide action.

If we have correct theory but merely chatter about it for a while, shelve it, and do not implement it, then such theory, however fine, is useless.

Knowledge begins with practice; through practice, theoretical knowledge is attained, and it must then return to practice.

The dynamic role of knowledge manifests not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge but also, and more importantly, in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice.

Once knowledge that has grasped the laws of the actual world is attained, it must be reapplied to the practice of transforming the world—applied to the practice of production, the practice of revolutionary class struggle and national struggle, and the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the entire process of knowing.

The question of whether theoretical things, or rational knowledge, correspond to objective truth is not fully resolved, nor can it be fully resolved, in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational described above.

To resolve this question completely, rational knowledge must be brought back into social practice, applying theory to practice to see whether it can achieve the anticipated goal.

Many natural-science theories are called truths not only because they were discovered as such by their creators but also because they have been verified by subsequent scientific practice.

Marxism is called a truth not only because Marx and others scientifically formulated it as a doctrine but also because it has been verified by the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle. Whether dialectical materialism is true lies in the fact that it cannot be escaped by the practice of anyone.

The history of epistemology tells us that the truthfulness of many theories is incomplete; through the test of practice, their incompleteness is corrected. Many theories are erroneous, and through the test of practice, their errors are rectified.

The so-called "practice is the criterion of truth" and "practice is the primary and fundamental viewpoint of epistemology" are justified precisely for this reason.

Stalin put it well: "Theory divorced from practice is empty theory; practice divorced from theory is blind practice."

Does the movement of knowledge end here, then?

Our answer is both completed and not completed.

When people in society throw themselves into the practice of a certain definite objective process at a certain definite stage of its development (whether the practice of transforming a certain natural process or transforming a certain social process), due to the reflection of the objective process and the role of subjective dynamism, their knowledge shifts from the perceptual to the rational, producing theories, ideas, plans, or schemes that roughly correspond to the laws of that objective process.

Then, by reapplying such theories, ideas, plans, or schemes to the practice of that same objective process, if the anticipated goal can be realized—that is, if the predetermined theory, idea, plan, or scheme becomes or largely becomes fact in the practice of that same process—then the movement of knowledge for that specific process may be considered complete.

For example, in the process of changing nature, the realization of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the manufacture of an object, the harvest of a certain agricultural product; in the process of changing society, the victory of a certain strike, the victory of a certain war, the realization of an educational plan, or the establishment of a certain national salvation organization—all count as achieving the intended purpose.

However, generally speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or changing society, it is rare for people's originally set theories, ideas, plans, and schemes to be realized without any alteration.

This is because those engaged in changing reality are often subject to many limitations—not only to the limitations of scientific and technological conditions but also to the limitations of the degree to which the objective process itself is manifested (the aspects and essence of the objective process have not yet been fully exposed).

Under such circumstances, it is common for theories, ideas, plans, and schemes to be partially altered due to the discovery of previously unforeseen circumstances during practice.

There are also cases where they are entirely changed. That is to say, there are cases where the originally set theories, ideas, plans, and schemes are partially or wholly inconsistent with reality, and cases where they are partially or entirely wrong. Often, after repeated failures, one can correct erroneous understanding and arrive at correct understanding that conforms to the regularities of the objective process, thereby enabling the transformation of the subjective into the objective (i.e., achieving the anticipated results in practice). But in any case, at this point, people's cognitive movement regarding a specific objective process at a certain stage of development can be considered complete.

However, in terms of the progression of the process, the human cognitive movement is not complete.

Every process, whether belonging to nature or society, advances and develops forward due to internal contradictions and struggles, and the human cognitive movement must also advance and develop accordingly.

In terms of social movements, the value of a revolutionary guide lies not only in being adept at correcting one's own theories, ideas, plans, and schemes when they contain errors, as mentioned above, but also in being adept at enabling oneself and the revolutionary participants to shift and transform their subjective understanding when a certain objective process transitions from one stage of development to another. That is, it is necessary to ensure that the proposal of new revolutionary tasks and new working methods is suited to the changes in the new situation.

During revolutionary periods, situational changes are extremely rapid. If the understanding of revolutionaries cannot rapidly change accordingly, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.

However, it is common for thinking to lag behind reality. This is because human understanding is subject to many limitations.

Some people are restricted by class conditions (the reactionary exploiting classes have lost the ability to recognize any truth and thus also the ability to transform the universe; on the contrary, they have become enemies hindering the recognition of truth and the transformation of the world).

Some people are restricted by the division of labor (the division between mental and manual labor, and the division among various professions). Some are restricted by previously erroneous thinking (idealism and mechanism, etc., mostly belonging to exploiting elements, but also some exploited elements influenced by the education of exploiters). And the general reason lies in being limited by the historical conditions of technological and scientific levels.

The proletariat and its party should make use of their naturally superior class conditions (which no other class possesses), utilize new technology and science, apply the Marxist worldview and methodology, closely rely on the foundation of revolutionary practice, and make their own understanding change along with changes in objective circumstances, allowing theoretical matters to advance in parallel with historical matters, so as to achieve the goal of perfectly transforming the world.

We oppose the diehards in the revolutionary ranks, whose thinking cannot advance in step with the changed objective circumstances, historically manifesting as right opportunism.

Chen Duxiuism in China in 1917 and Bukharinism in the Soviet Union both belong to this category. These people fail to see that the struggle of contradictions has pushed the objective process forward, while their understanding remains stuck in the old stage.

The thinking of all diehards has this characteristic: their thinking is divorced from social practice; they cannot stand at the forefront of the social wheel to serve as guides; they only follow behind the wheel, complaining that it moves too fast, and try to pull it backward, to reverse course.

We also oppose "left" phrase-mongering. Li Lisanism in China in 1930, Trotskyism in the Soviet Union when it could still be regarded as a communist faction (now it has become the most reactionary faction), and ultra-left ideas in various countries around the world all belong to this category.

Their thinking surpasses a certain stage of development of the objective process; some regard fantasies as truth, while others forcibly try to realize ideals that are only possible in the future in the present, divorcing themselves from the practice of the current majority of people and from current reality, manifesting in action as adventurism.

Both idealism and mechanism, opportunism and adventurism, lack the epistemological basis of materialist dialectics.

They are all characterized by the separation of the subjective from the objective, and the divorce of knowledge from practice.

Marxist epistemology, characterized by scientific social practice, must resolutely oppose these erroneous ideas. Marxists recognize that in the absolute total process of cosmic development, the development of each specific process is relative, and thus, within absolute truth, human understanding of specific processes at various definite stages of development is only relative truth.

The development of the objective process is a development full of contradictions and struggles; the human cognitive movement is also a development full of contradictions and struggles.

All dialectical movements of the objective world can, sooner or later, be reflected in human cognition.

The processes of development and extinction in practice are infinite, and so are the processes of the emergence, development, and extinction of human knowledge.

Based on certain theories, ideas, plans, and schemes, engaging in the practice of transforming objective reality time and again, people’s understanding of objective reality deepens time and again. The changing movement of the objective real world never ends, and people’s understanding of truth in practice also never ends.

Marxism does not end truth but continuously opens up the path to knowing truth in practice. Our conclusion is the concrete historical unity of the subjective and the objective, theory and practice, knowing and doing, and we oppose all "left" or right erroneous ideas that depart from concrete history.

From the great cosmos through the development of nature and society to the present era, the responsibility of correctly understanding the universe and transforming it has historically fallen on the shoulders of the proletariat and its party. This process of transforming the world, determined on the basis of scientific understanding, has reached a historical moment both in the world and in China—a moment of unprecedented significance never seen since the dawn of history—which is to completely turn the dark side around and transform it into an unprecedentedly bright world.

The struggle of the proletariat and the revolutionary people to transform the world includes accomplishing the following tasks: transforming the objective world, and also transforming their own subjective world—transforming their own cognitive abilities, and transforming the relationship between the subjective world and the objective world.

On a part of the Earth, this kind of transformation has already been implemented, namely the Soviet Union. They are still advancing this process of transformation for themselves and for the world.

The Chinese people and the people of the world are also beginning or about to undergo such a process of transformation. The so-called objective world to be transformed includes all those who oppose transformation; their transformation must pass through a stage of compulsion before they can enter a stage of consciousness.

When the world reaches the point where all humanity consciously transforms themselves and the world, that will be the communist era of the world.

Truth is produced through practice, and is verified and developed through practice. From perceptual knowledge, one actively develops rational knowledge, and from rational knowledge, one actively guides revolutionary practice, transforming the subjective world and the objective world.

Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge—this form cycles and develops endlessly.

With each cycle of practice and knowledge, the content advances to a higher degree. This is the entire epistemology of materialist dialectics.

This is the unity of knowing and doing of materialist dialectics.

Chapter Three: Materialist Dialectics
The two issues of "Idealism and Materialism" and "Dialectical Materialism" have been briefly discussed earlier.

Regarding the issue of dialectics, only a general mention has been made. Now we will systematically address this problem.

The Marxist worldview (or cosmology) is dialectical materialism, not metaphysical materialism (or mechanical materialism). This distinction is a world-shaking matter of great importance.

What is the world like?

From ancient times to the present, there have been three main answers: The first is idealism (whether metaphysical idealism or dialectical idealism), which says the world is created by the mind, and by extension, created by God.

The second is mechanical materialism, which denies that the world is a world of mind, asserting that the world is a material world, but that matter is non-developing and unchanging.

The third is the Marxist answer, which overturns the previous two, stating that the world is not created by the mind, nor is it non-developing matter, but rather a developing material world. This is dialectical materialism.

Marxism views the world in this way, turning the world as it appeared in people’s eyes throughout history upside down. Is this not a world-shaking proposition?

That the world is a developing material world—this idea was already mentioned in ancient Greece. However, due to the limitations of the era, it was only stated in a simple and general way, called naive materialism, lacking (and incapable of having) a scientific basis.

Nevertheless, the proposition was fundamentally correct.

Hegel created dialectical idealism, asserting that the world is developing but created by the mind—he advocated idealist development theory. Its correctness lies in the development theory (i.e., dialectics), and its error lies in its idealist development theory.

The bourgeois materialism of Western countries like Germany and France in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries was mechanical materialism. They said the world is a material world, which is correct, but they claimed it moves like a machine, with only quantitative increases or decreases, or positional changes, without qualitative changes—this is incorrect.

Marx inherited the naive dialectical materialism of Greece, reformed mechanical materialism and dialectical idealism, and created dialectical materialism based on a scientific foundation unprecedented in history, making it the revolutionary weapon of the proletariat and all oppressed people worldwide.

Materialist dialectics is the scientific methodology of Marxism, the method of cognition, the method of logic, and yet it is also the worldview.

The originally developing material world—this is the worldview.

Taking this worldview and turning it to look at the world, to study the problems of the world, to think about the problems of the world, to solve the problems of the world, to guide revolution, to perform work, to engage in production, to direct warfare, to discuss the merits and faults of others—this is methodology.

There is no other separate methodology besides this. Therefore, in the hands of Marxists, worldview and methodology are one and the same thing, and dialectics, epistemology, and logic are also one and the same thing.

To systematically discuss materialist dialectics, we must address its many issues, that is, its many categories, many laws, and many principles (these terms mean the same thing).

What laws does materialist dialectics actually have?

Among these laws, which are fundamental, and which are subordinate to the fundamental laws yet are indispensable and must be resolved as aspects, facets, or problems within the doctrine of materialist dialectics?

Why are all these laws not subjectively created, but rather the inherent laws of the objective world?

What is the purpose of studying and understanding these laws?

This complete revolutionary doctrine of materialist dialectics was founded by Marx and Engels, and developed by Lenin.

Up to the present, in the era of the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union and the world revolution, this doctrine has entered a new stage of development, further enriching its content.

The categories included in this doctrine are, first of all, the following: the law of the unity of contradictions, the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, and the law of the negation of the negation.

The above are the fundamental laws of materialist dialectics. Apart from the naive materialism of ancient Greece, which briefly and unsystematically pointed out some significance of these laws, and Hegel, who idealistically developed these laws, they were all negated by all metaphysical philosophies (metaphysics here refers to doctrines that oppose development theory), until Marx and Engels materialistically transformed Hegel's laws, making them the most fundamental part of the Marxist worldview and methodology.

In addition to the fundamental laws mentioned above, materialist dialectics also encompasses the following categories, which are connected to these fundamental laws: essence and phenomenon; form and content; cause and effect; ground and condition; possibility and reality; contingency and necessity; necessity and freedom; chain and link, and so on.

Some of these categories have been the focus of study in traditional metaphysical philosophy and idealist dialectics, some have been studied one-sidedly in past philosophies, and some are newly introduced by Marxism.

In the hands of Marxist revolutionary theorists and practitioners, these categories have been stripped of the idealist and metaphysical guises imposed on them by past philosophies, their one-sidedness has been overcome, their true forms have been discovered, and, as the times have advanced, their content has been greatly enriched. They have become important components of revolutionary scientific methodology. Taken together with the aforementioned fundamental categories, they form a complete and profound system of materialist dialectics.

All these laws or categories are not creations of human thought but are inherent laws of the objective world.

All forms of idealism assert that spirit creates matter. In their view, then, philosophical laws, principles, regularities, or categories are naturally all creations of the mind. This is how Hegel, who developed the system of dialectics, regarded dialectics.

In his view, dialectics is not a law extracted from the history of nature and society but a purely logical system within thought itself. After human thought creates this system, it is then imposed upon nature and society. Marx and Engels stripped away Hegel's mystical guise, discarded his idealism, and placed dialectics on the foundation of materialism.

Engels said: "The laws of dialectics are abstracted from the history of nature and human society, but they are nothing other than the most general laws of development of these two realms of historical development. In essence, they can be reduced to the three fundamental laws: the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, the unity of opposites, and the negation of the negation."

The laws of dialectics are laws of the objective world, and at the same time, they are laws within subjective thought, for the laws within human thought are nothing other than the reflection of the laws of the objective world in the human mind, mediated through practice.

Dialectics, theory of knowledge, and logic are one and the same thing, as has already been discussed.

Why do we study dialectics?

For no other reason than to transform this world, to transform the old relationships between people and between people and things in this world.

The vast majority of humanity in this world lives in suffering, oppressed by various political and economic systems controlled by a minority. The human beings living in our China suffer under the oppression of a dual system of inhuman cruelty—national oppression and social oppression. We must change these old relationships and strive for national liberation and social liberation.

To achieve the aim of transforming China and the world, why is it necessary to study dialectics?

Because dialectics is the most universal law of development of nature and society. Once we understand it, we gain a scientific weapon. In the revolutionary practice of transforming nature and society, we then have a theory and method suited to this practice.

Materialist dialectics itself is a science (a philosophical science); it is the starting point of all sciences and is also a methodology.

Our revolutionary practice itself is also a science, called social science or political science. If we do not understand dialectics, our affairs cannot be handled well, and every mistake in the revolution violates dialectics.

But if we understand it, it can yield tremendous results. Every action done correctly, upon examination, conforms to dialectics.

Therefore, all revolutionary comrades, first and foremost the cadres, should earnestly study dialectics.

Some say: Many people understand practical dialectics and are practical materialists as well. Although they have not read books on dialectics, they act correctly in practice, actually conforming to materialist dialectics. Thus, there is no special need for them to study dialectics.

Such a statement is incorrect.

Materialist dialectics is a complete and profound science. Revolutionaries who actually possess a materialist and dialectical mind may have learned a great deal of dialectics from practice, but it is not systematized, nor does it possess the completeness and profundity of the already established materialist dialectics. Therefore, they still cannot perceive the distant prospects of a movement, cannot analyze complex developmental processes, cannot grasp crucial political junctures, and cannot manage all aspects of revolutionary work. Hence, there is still a necessity to study dialectics.

Some also say that dialectics is abstruse and difficult to understand, and ordinary people have no possibility of learning it. This statement is also incorrect. Dialectics is the law of nature, society, and thought. Anyone who possesses some social experience (experience in production and class struggle) inherently understands some dialectics. Those with more social experience inherently understand more dialectics, though it remains in a fragmented state of common sense, lacking a complete and profound understanding. To organize and deepen this dialectics of common sense is not particularly difficult. The reason dialectics is felt to be difficult is that there are no books on dialectics that are adept at explanation. Many books on dialectics in China are either wrong, or poorly or not very well explained, making people view them with apprehension and stand in awe.

Books that are adept at explanation are those that use popular language to convey intimate experience. Such books will eventually be produced. This lecture of mine is also not good, because I myself am still beginning to study dialectics and do not yet have the possibility of writing a good book. Perhaps there will be this possibility in the future, and I have this aspiration, but it must be decided according to the circumstances of my study.

The various laws of dialectics are discussed separately below:

**I. The Law of the Unity of Opposites**

This law is the most fundamental law of dialectics. Lenin said: "In its proper sense, dialectics is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects." Therefore, Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics, and also called it the core of dialectics. Hence, our discussion of dialectics will begin with this issue and will address it in greater detail than other issues.

This issue encompasses many sub-issues, which are:

- The Two Conceptions of Development
- The Law of Identity in Formal Logic and the Law of Contradiction in Dialectics
- The Universality of Contradiction
- The Particularity of Contradiction
- The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction
- The Unity and Struggle of Opposites
- The Place of Antagonism in Contradiction

These issues are explained one by one below.

**1. The Two Conceptions of Development**

In the history of human thought, there have always been two views on the development of the world: one is the metaphysical conception of development, and the other is the dialectical conception of development. Wherein lies the difference between these two conceptions of development?

**(1) The Metaphysical Conception of Development**

Metaphysics, also called scholasticism, has held a dominant position in thought throughout history. The content of this philosophy explains what they call things beyond experience, i.e., doctrines concerning the absolute, substance, and so on. In modern philosophy, so-called metaphysics is a method of thought that observes things from a static viewpoint, regarding the forms and categories of all things in the world as forever unchanging. This mode of thought dominated Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a result of class struggle and scientific development, by the modern era, that is, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, dialectical thought advanced onto the world stage with tremendous strides. Yet metaphysics, in the form of vulgar evolutionism (vulgar, i.e., shallow, simplistic), stubbornly opposed dialectics.

The so-called metaphysical and vulgar evolutionist conception of development, in summary, holds that development is merely quantitative increase and decrease, propelled by external forces, and consists of changes in location. All things, and the reflections of these things in human thought, are forever thus. The characteristics of a thing are inherent to it from the beginning, merely appearing initially in an embryonic state and later advancing to a conspicuous state. When speaking of social development, they consider it to be the growth and repetition of certain characteristics whose nature never changes—characteristics like capitalist exploitation, competition, individualism, etc., which, in their view, can be found even in ancient slave societies and even primitive barbaric societies. When speaking of the causes of social development, they explain it by external geographical and climatic conditions. This conception of development seeks the causes of development outside things, opposing the doctrine that development is caused by internal contradictions within things. Consequently, it cannot explain the qualitative diversity of things, nor the phenomenon of one quality changing into another. This thinking was the theory of the absolute immutability of nature (mechanical materialism) in the 17th and 18th centuries—and in the 20th century, it appears as vulgar evolutionism (the theory of equilibrium of Bukharin and others), etc.

**(2) The Dialectical Conception of Development**

This conception advocates studying the development of things from within the things themselves, and from the relationships between one thing and other things—that is, viewing the development of things as the necessary, independent, self-movement internal to things, i.e., the self-motion of things. The fundamental cause of the development of things lies not outside but inside, in the contradictoriness internal to things. Every thing contains this internal contradictoriness, and it is this that gives rise to the movement and development of things.

Viewed in this way, the dialectical conception of development opposes the external cause theory or passive theory of metaphysics and vulgar evolutionism. It is clear that purely external causes can only produce mechanical motion in things, that is, changes in scale or quantity, but cannot explain why things in the world exhibit countless qualitative differences. In fact, even mechanical motion propelled by external forces must work through the internal contradictoriness of things. The simple growth of plants and animals is not merely a quantitative increase but simultaneously involves qualitative changes; simple growth is also development caused by contradiction. As for social development, similarly, the primary cause is not external but internal. Many countries exist under roughly similar geographical and climatic conditions, yet the disparity and unevenness in the development of various countries are extremely great. Take a single country: under circumstances where geography and climate have not changed, social change can be immense. Every country on Earth exhibits this situation. Old Imperialist Russia became the socialist Soviet Union; purely feudal, isolationist Japan became imperialist Japan—the geography and climate of these countries did not change. China, with its millennia-old feudal system, has changed the least, yet recently it has undergone great upheaval and is currently changing into a new China of freedom and liberation. Is there any difference between China's geography and climate today and that of several decades ago? Very clearly, the cause is not external but internal. Changes in nature result from the development of contradictions internal to natural things. Social changes result from the development of contradictions internal to society—the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, and contradictions between classes, push society forward.

Does dialectics exclude external causes? It does not exclude them. External causes are the conditions of change, while internal causes are the basis of change; external causes become operative through internal causes. An egg changes into a chick given an appropriate temperature, but temperature cannot make a stone change into a chick, because the basis of the internal cause is different. The pressure of imperialism accelerated changes in Chinese society, but this change also occurred through the inherent laws of China's own internal dynamics. When two armies clash, one wins and the other loses; victory and defeat are both decided by internal causes. The victor may win due to strength or flawless command; the loser may lose due to weakness or command errors—external causes bring about change through internal causes. In 1917, the bourgeoisie defeated the proletariat through the operation of opportunism within the proletariat (within the Communist Party). For a class or a political party to lead a revolution to victory, it must rely on making no errors in its political line, and on its political and organizational consolidation. The loss of Northeast China and the crisis in North China were primarily due to China's weakness (the failure of the 1927 revolution, political power not being in the hands of the people, creating civil war and a dictatorial system), which allowed Japanese imperialism to seize the opportunity to invade. Expelling the Japanese invaders relies mainly on the national united front executing a resolute revolutionary war. "Things must first rot, and then worms breed; people must first have doubts, and then slander enters." This is a famous saying of Su Dongpo. "If one examines oneself and finds no fault, what anxiety, what fear?" This is also a truthful saying of Confucius. If a person is robust and fulfilled in youth, they are not easily susceptible to chills and colds. The Soviet Union has not been invaded by Japan precisely because of its strength. "The Thunder God beats the tofu, picking on the soft to bully." Everything in the world depends on self-strengthening. Blaming heaven and others is useless. Man can overcome nature; difficulties can be overcome, external conditions can be changed. This is our philosophy. We oppose the metaphysical conception of development and advocate the dialectical conception of development. We are change theorists, opposing the theory of no change; we are internal cause theorists, opposing external cause theory.

**II. The Law of Identity in Formal Logic and the Law of Contradiction in Dialectics**

Above, the metaphysical conception of development and the dialectical conception of development were discussed. The struggle between these two worldviews gives rise to the struggle between formal logic and dialectical logic in methodology.

The old formal logic has three fundamental laws: the first is called the law of identity, the second the law of contradiction, and the third the law of excluded middle.

What is the law of identity?

The law of identity states: in the process of thought, concepts remain unchanged forever; they are always equal to themselves.

For example, elements are forever equal to elements, China is forever equal to China, a certain person is forever equal to that person.

Its formula is "A equals A." This law is metaphysical.

Engels said it is the fundamental law of the old worldview.

Its error lies in not recognizing the contradictions and changes within things, thereby removing temporality and relativity from concepts and endowing them with permanence and absoluteness.

It fails to understand that things and the concepts reflecting them are relative and changing; a certain element is not forever equal to that element—all kinds of elements are changing.

China is not forever equal to China either; China is changing, and the old feudal China of the past and the future free and liberated China are two different things.

A certain person is not forever equal to that person; people's physiques and thoughts are changing. Concepts in thought are reflections of objective things; as objective things change, the content of concepts also changes. In reality, there is not a single concept in the world that is forever equal to itself.

What is the law of contradiction?

The law of contradiction states: a concept cannot simultaneously contain two or more mutually contradictory meanings; if a concept contains contradictory meanings, it is considered a logical error.

Contradictory concepts cannot both be correct or both be incorrect at the same time; only one side can be correct.

Its formula is: "A is not equal to non-A."

Kant once cited the following four types of contradictory thoughts: The world is finite in time and limited in space; the world is infinite in time and unlimited in space.

This is the first.

Everything in the world is composed of simple (indivisible) matter; there is nothing simple in the world, everything is composite (divisible).

This is the second.

There exist causes of freedom in the world; there is no freedom in the world, everything is necessary.

This is the third.

There exists some necessary substance in the world; there is nothing necessary in the world, everything is contingent.

This is the fourth.

Kant called these irreconcilable, mutually opposed principles "antinomies."

But he said these are merely contradictions in human thought and do not exist in the actual world.

According to the law of contradiction in formal logic, these contradictions are errors that must be eliminated.

But in reality, thought is a reflection of things.

There is not a single thing that does not contain contradictions, and therefore there is not a single concept that does not contain contradictions. This is not an error of thought but precisely the correctness of thought. The dialectical law of the unity of contradictions is built upon this foundation.

Only the formal logical law of contradiction, which eliminates contradictions, is truly erroneous thought.

In formal logic, the law of contradiction is merely a negative expression of the law of identity, serving as a supplement to it, with the aim of reinforcing the so-called law of identity—that concepts are equal to themselves, that A equals A.

What is the law of excluded middle?

The law of excluded middle states: between two opposing meanings of a concept, the correct one is either this or that; it is absolutely impossible for both to be incorrect and for a third to emerge as the correct one.

Its formula is: "A either equals B or does not equal B, but it cannot equal C."

They do not understand that things and concepts develop; in the developmental processes of things and concepts, not only do their internal contradictory elements manifest, but one can also see these contradictory elements shift, negate, resolve, and transform into a third thing that is neither A nor B, transforming into a higher-level new thing or new concept.

Correct thinking should not exclude the third, nor should it exclude the law of the negation of the negation. The proletariat and the bourgeoisie are in contradiction; according to the law of excluded middle, the correct one is either the former or the latter, and there can be no classless society.

Yet precisely, the process of social evolution does not stop at class struggle but moves toward a proletarian society.

China and Japanese imperialism are in contradiction, but we not only oppose Japanese imperialist aggression, we also do not agree that after China's independence, it should remain in a state of permanent hostility with Japan. Instead, we advocate that, through national revolution and Japan's domestic revolution, the two nations progress to the stage of free union.

The same applies to the opposition between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy; their higher stage is an era without states or governments, achieved through proletarian democracy.

The formal logical law of excluded middle is also a supplement to its law of identity, recognizing only the fixed state of concepts, opposing their development, opposing revolutionary leaps, and opposing the law of the negation of the negation.

From this perspective, the entire set of laws of formal logic opposes contradictoriness and advocates identity, opposes the development and change of concepts and things, and advocates the rigidity and stasis of concepts and things—it is the exact opposite of dialectics.

Why do formal logicians do this?

Because they view things outside their interconnections, outside their uninterrupted mutual interactions—that is, they view things in stillness, not in motion; in isolation, not in connection. Thus, they think it is impossible to recognize the contradictoriness and the relations of the negation of the negation within things and concepts, and instead they advocate the rigid and ossified law of identity.

Dialectics, by contrast, views things in motion and interconnection and, in direct opposition to the formal logical law of identity, advocates the revolutionary law of contradiction.

Dialectics holds that contradictions in thought are nothing other than reflections of contradictions in the objective external world.

Dialectics does not get bogged down in cases where two principles appear superficially conflicting (such as the four antinomies cited by Kant and the many contradictory thoughts I have raised above) but penetrates to the internal essence of things.

The task of dialecticians is to do what formal logicians do not—focus their attention on the object of study to find the internal connections of its contradictory forces, contradictory tendencies, contradictory aspects, and contradictory determinations.

The objective world and human thought are both dynamic and dialectical, not static and metaphysical.

The revolutionary law of contradiction (i.e., the law of the unity of contradictions) therefore occupies the most important position in dialectics, and this is the reason.

The entire formal logic has only one core: the reactionary law of identity.

The entire dialectics also has only one core: the revolutionary law of contradiction. Does dialectics oppose the identity of things or concepts?

It does not.

Dialectics recognizes the relative identity of things or concepts.

Then why does dialectics oppose the formal logical law of identity?

Because the formal logical law of identity is an absolute law of identity that excludes contradictions.

The identity of things or concepts that dialectics recognizes refers to a simultaneous containment of contradictions and mutual interconnection. This identity refers precisely to the interconnection of contradictions; it is relative and temporary.

Since the formal logical law of identity is an absolute law of identity that excludes contradictions, it inevitably proposes the law of excluded middle, which opposes the transformation of one concept into another and one thing into another. Dialectics, however, views the identity of things or concepts as temporary, relative, and conditional, while the regularity whereby the struggle of contradictions drives the change and development of things or concepts is eternal, absolute, and unconditional.

Because formal logic does not reflect the true nature of things, dialectics cannot permit its existence.

There is only one scientific truth, and that truth is dialectics.

III. The Universality of Contradiction
This problem has two aspects: first, it means that contradiction exists in all processes; second, it means that in every process, there is a movement of contradiction from beginning to end. This is called the universality or absoluteness of contradiction.

Engels said: "Contradiction is motion."

Lenin, in defining the law of the unity of contradictions, stated that it is "the recognition (discovery)..."