THE IMPORTANT THING
IS TO BE GOOD AT LEARNING¹
December 1936

Why have we organized the Red Army? For the purpose of
defeating the enemy. Why do we study the laws of war? For the
purpose of applying them in war.
To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned
is even harder. Many people appear impressive when discoursing
on military science in classrooms or in books, but when it comes
to actual fighting, some win battles and others lose them. Both the
history of war and our own experience in war have proved this
point.
Where then does the crux lie?
In real life, we cannot ask for "ever-victorious generals", who
are few and far between in history. What we can ask for is generals
who are brave and sagacious and who normally win their battles
in the course of a war, generals who combine wisdom with courage.
To become both wise and courageous one must acquire a method,
a method to be employed in learning as well as in applying what
has been learned.
What method? The method is to familiarize ourselves with all
aspects of the enemy situation and our own, to discover the laws
governing the actions of both sides and to make use of these laws
in our own operations.
The military manuals issued in many countries point both to
the necessity of a "flexible application of principles according to

circumstances" and to the measures to be taken in case of defeat.
They point to the former in order to warn a commander against
subjectively committing mistakes through too rigid an application
of principles, and to the latter in order to enable him to cope with
the situation after he has committed subjective mistakes or after
unexpected and irresistible changes have occurred in the objective
circumstances.
Why are subjective mistakes made? Because the way the
forces in a war or a battle are disposed or directed does not fit
the conditions of the given time and place, because subjective
direction does not correspond to, or is at variance with, the objective conditions, in other words, because the contradiction between
the subjective and the objective has not been resolved. People
can hardly avoid such situations whatever they are doing, but
some people prove themselves more competent than others. As
in any job we demand a comparatively high degree of competence,
so in war we demand more victories or, conversely, fewer defeats.
Here the crux is to bring the subjective and the objective into
proper correspondence with each other.
Take an example in tactics. If the point chosen for attack is on
one of the enemy's flanks and it is located precisely where his
weak spot happens to be, and in consequence the assault succeeds,
then the subjective corresponds with the objective, that is, the
commander's reconnaissance, judgement and decision have corresponded with the enemy's actual situation and dispositions. If the
point chosen for attack is on another flank or in the centre and the
attack hits a snag and makes no headway, then such correspondence is lacking. If the attack is properly timed, if the reserves are
used neither too late nor too early, and if all the other dispositions
and operations in the battle are such as to favour us and not the
enemy, then the subjective direction throughout the battle completely corresponds with the objective situation. Such complete
correspondence is extremely rare in a war or a battle, in which the
belligerents are groups of live human beings bearing arms and

keeping their secrets from each other; this is quite unlike handling
inanimate objects or routine matters. But if the direction given
by the commander corresponds in the main with the actual situation, that is, if the decisive elements in the direction correspond
with the actual situation, then there is a basis for victory.
A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgements, and
his correct judgements stem from a thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering on and piecing together the
data of various kinds gathered through reconnaissance. He applies
all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance, and ponders
on the information gathered about the enemy's situation, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and
retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from
the outside to the inside; then, he takes the conditions on his own
side into account, and makes a study of both sides and their
interrelations, thereby forming his judgements, making up his
mind and working out his plans. Such is the complete process of
knowing a situation which a military strategist goes through before he formulates a strategic plan, a campaign plan or a battle
plan. But instead of doing this, a careless military strategist bases
his military plans on his own wishful thinking, and hence his plans
are fanciful and do not correspond with reality. A rash military
strategist relying solely upon enthusiasm is bound to be tricked
by the enemy, or lured on by some superficial or partial aspect of
the enemy's situation, or swayed by irresponsible suggestions
from subordinates that are not based on real knowledge or deep
insight, and so he runs his head against a brick wall, because he
does not know or does not want to know that every military plan
must be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful
consideration of the enemy's situation, his own situation, and
their interrelations.

The process of knowing a situation goes on not only before
the formulation of a military plan but also after. In carrying out

the plan from the moment it is put into effect to the end of the
operation, there is another process of knowing the situation, namely, the process of practice. In the course of this process, it is necessary to examine anew whether the plan worked out in the
preceding process corresponds with reality. If it does not correspond with reality, or if it does not fully do so, then in the light of
our new knowledge, it becomes necessary to form new judgements,
make new decisions and change the original plan so as to meet the
new situation. The plan is partially changed in almost every operation, and sometimes it is even changed completely. A rash man
who does not understand the need for such alterations or is unwilling to make them, but who acts blindly, will inevitably run his
head against a brick wall.

The above applies to a strategic action, a campaign or a battle.
Provided he is modest and willing to learn, an experienced military
man will be able to familiarize himself with the character of his
own forces (commanders, men, arms, supplies, etc., and their sum
total), with the character of the enemy forces (likewise, commanders, men, arms, supplies, etc., and their sum total) and with
all other conditions related to the war, such as politics, economics,
geography and weather; such a military man will have a better
grasp in directing a war or an operation and will be more likely to
win victories. He will achieve this because, over a long period of
time, he has come to know the situation on the enemy side and
his own, discovered the laws of action, and resolved the contradictions between the subjective and the objective. This process of
knowing is extremely important; without such a long period of
experience, it would be difficult to understand and grasp the laws
of an entire war. Neither a beginner nor a person who fights only
on paper can become a really able high-ranking commander; only
one who has learned through actual fighting in war can do so.

All military laws and military theories which are in the nature
of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people
in former days or in our own times. We should seriously study

these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past wars.
That is one point. But there is another. We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is
useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically
our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we cannot
direct a war.

Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and the more
important kind of learning at that. Our chief method is to learn
warfare through warfare. A person who has had no opportunity
to go to school can also learn warfare — he can learn through
fighting in war. A revolutionary war is a mass undertaking; it is
often not a matter of first learning and then doing, but of doing
and then learning, for doing is itself learning. There is a gap between the ordinary civilian and the soldier, but it is no Great Wall,
and it can be quickly closed, and the way to close it is to take part
in revolution, in war. By saying that it is not easy to learn and to
apply, we mean that it is hard to learn thoroughly and to apply
skilfully. By saying that civilians can very quickly become soldiers,
we mean that it is not difficult to cross the threshold. To put the
two statements together, we may cite the Chinese adage, "Nothing
in the world is difficult for one who sets his mind to it." To cross
the threshold is not difficult, and mastery, too, is possible provided
one sets one's mind to the task and is good at learning.

The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are
reflections in our minds of objective realities; everything outside
of the mind is objective reality. Consequently what has to be
learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side
and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the
object of study, while the mind (the capacity to think) alone is
the subject performing the study. Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing their enemy, and some are
the other way round; neither can solve the problem of learning
and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of

Sun Wu Tzu, the great military scientist of ancient China, "Know
the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles
with no danger of defeat", which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing the laws of
the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own
action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the
enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states,
classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by
warring nations, states, classes, or political groups for the purpose
of achieving victory for themselves. Unquestionably, victory or
defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political,
economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these
alone. It is also determined by each side's subjective ability in
directing the war. In his endeavour to win a war, a military
strategist cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material
conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must
strive for victory. The stage of action for a military strategist is
built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can
direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour,
power and grandeur. Therefore, given the objective material
foundations, i.e., the military, political, economic and natural
conditions, our Red Army commanders must display their prowess
and marshal all their forces to crush the national and class enemies
and to transform this evil world. Here is where our subjective
ability in directing war can and must be exercised. We do not
permit any of our Red Army commanders to become a blundering
hothead; we decidedly want every Red Army commander to
become a hero who is both brave and sagacious, who possesses
both all-conquering courage and the ability to remain master of
the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire
war. Swimming in the ocean of war, he not only must not flounder
but must make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured
strokes. The laws for directing war constitute the art of swimming
in the ocean of war.
So much for our methods.

NOTES

¹ This is the fourth section of Chapter I of "Problems of Strategy in China's
Revolutionary War", the full text of which is included in the *Selected Works*
of *Mao Tsetung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 179-254. The article
is Comrade Mao Tsetung's summing-up of the experience of the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37), and is a systematic explanation of problems of
strategy in China's revolutionary war.

² *Sun Wu Tzu*, or *Sun Wu*, also known as *Sun Tzu*, was a famous Chinese
soldier and military scientist in the 5th century B.C., who wrote *Sun Tzu*, a
treatise on war containing thirteen chapters. This quotation is from Chapter
3, "The Strategy of Attack".