Central Directive on the Xi’an Incident and Our Tasks*
(December 19, 1936)

I. The Situation Prior to the Xi’an Incident

(1) Following the commencement of localized resistance in eastern Suiyuan, the anti-Japanese movement surged forward with great momentum across the nation and in major northwestern cities (such as Xi’an, Taiyuan, and Suiyuan). This movement not only drew in the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie and the majority of the middle bourgeoisie but also triggered decisive divisions within the big bourgeoisie itself.

(2) The Nanjing government, confronted with this rapidly developing anti-Japanese movement, was compelled to slowly and unsteadily alter its previous policy of concession toward Japan. In the course of this shift, it still sought compromise with Japan, displayed a lack of enthusiasm for the localized resistance in eastern Suiyuan, pursued a policy of suppression toward the nationwide anti-Japanese movement, and refused to halt its attacks on the Red Army.

(3) Under the influence and impetus of the people across the nation and the Northwest, as well as the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and the Red Army, the officers and soldiers of the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army exhibited particularly high anti-Japanese fervor. Consequently, they demanded an immediate cessation of attacks on the Red Army, an end to all civil wars, and unity in resisting Japan. However, these demands were sternly rejected by Chiang Kai-shek.

II. The Significance of the Xi’an Incident

(1) This action was the result of dissatisfaction among a segment of China’s national bourgeoisie—representing a faction of the power-holders within the Kuomintang—with the Nanjing government’s policy toward Japan. They demanded an immediate halt to the “suppression of the Communists,” an end to all civil wars, and unity in resisting Japan, and they accepted the Communist Party’s anti-Japanese proposals. Thus, this action arose from the desire to resist Japan and save the nation, aiming to use the anti-Japanese united front in the Northwest as a catalyst to initiate a nationwide anti-Japanese united front.

(2) However, because this action employed methods akin to a military conspiracy, detaining Chiang Kai-shek, the supreme leader of Nanjing, and his principal generals, it placed Nanjing in a position of hostility toward Xi’an and created the possibility of a new large-scale civil war, which posed an extreme danger to the Chinese nation. Therefore, this action also hindered the unity of the nation’s anti-Japanese forces.

III. The Two Possible Futures of the Xi’an Incident and Their Proponents

(1) One possibility is that this action could trigger the outbreak of civil war, causing a portion or the majority of the centrist faction in Nanjing (the national reformists) to subjectively and objectively gravitate toward a pro-Japanese stance, thereby weakening the nation’s anti-Japanese forces, delaying the launch of a nationwide war of resistance, and creating favorable conditions for the Japanese aggressors’ invasion. This future is one fostered by the international aggressive bloc of Japan, Germany, and Italy—particularly Japan—and the pro-Japanese elements in China.[1]

(2) The other possibility is that this action could bring an end to the civil war of “suppressing the Communists,” enabling the early realization of a cessation of civil war and unity in resisting Japan, and leading to the more rapid and concrete establishment of a nationwide united front for anti-Japanese national salvation. This future is one that the international peace front, the people of the entire nation, and all parties, factions, circles, and armies willing to resist Japan and save the nation wholeheartedly support and strive to achieve.

[1] In the edition of *Since the Sixth National Congress*, this passage reads: “particularly welcomed by Japan and the pro-Japanese elements in China.”

IV. The Basic Policy of the Chinese Communist Party to Realize the Second Future

(1) Uphold the stance of being the organizer and leader in stopping all civil wars and uniting to resist Japan, oppose any new civil war, and advocate for a peaceful resolution between Nanjing and Xi’an based on unity and resistance to Japan.

(2) Employ all means to unite with the left wing in Nanjing, win over the centrist faction, and oppose the pro-Japanese elements, so as to push Nanjing toward a more resolute anti-Japanese position and expose the schemes of the Japanese aggressors and pro-Japanese elements to exploit calls to support Chiang Kai-shek and instigate civil war.

(3) Express sympathy for the Xi’an action and provide Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng with active, concrete assistance (both military and political) to ensure the thorough realization of the anti-Japanese propositions behind the Xi’an action.

(4) Make earnest preparations for a defensive war in the event of an attack by the punitive forces, dealing them a severe blow to prompt their reflection. Such a defensive war is not intended to replace the policy of unity in resisting Japan with one of expanding civil war but remains aimed at facilitating the establishment of a nationwide anti-Japanese united front and the launch of a nationwide war of resistance against Japan.

After the Xi’an Incident, the Red Army provided military assistance to the forces of Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, playing a significant role in the peaceful resolution of the incident. The photograph shows Red Army commanders Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi, and others together with some commanders of the Kuomintang’s Northeastern Army in Sanyuan, Shaanxi.