Annotations on A Course on Dialectical Materialism
By Shirokov, Eisenberg, et al.
Translated by Li Da and Lei Zhongjian
(Third Chinese Edition)
(November 1936–April 1937)

A Course on Dialectical Materialism

Introduction: The Partisan Nature of Philosophy

II. Philosophy Is a Partisan Science

Mechanism submits dialectics, viewed as epistemology, to Ilyich’s doctrine. From blind nature, theory and practice are inseparably united to conquer it. To conquer blind necessity—this is the sole task. “The unity of theoretical thought (cognition) and practice—this is the unity in epistemology”—Ilyich thus clearly and forcefully stated one of the central ideas of his commentaries on Hegel’s dialectics. [p. 13]

The Struggle Between Spontaneity-ism and Revolutionism

Bernstein, using his self-created theory of capitalism’s peaceful evolutionary development, opposed the dialectical theory of leaps and revolution.

The revision of materialist dialectics was carried out against its most essential aspect—dynamism and revolutionary character. This revision was an attempt to break the unity of theoretical activity and practical activity, a unity that, within materialist dialectics, is precisely “internally and inseparably” combined. Instead of elevating the dynamism and enthusiasm in the struggle of the proletariat, Bernstein preached the impossibility of transforming capitalist reality.

Although Plekhanov exposed Bernstein’s idealism, he did not demolish the foundation upon which the revisionists distorted Marxism on the question of dialectics. In particular, he did not concern himself with the fact that the revisionists had abandoned “the decisive element in dialectics”—the unity of opposites. Bernstein and his faction established the theory of class harmony to replace the law of the unity of opposites. … Finally, the greatest manifestation of a lack of understanding of the essence of dialectics occurred when Plekhanov and other Mensheviks, during the imperialist war of 1914, openly raised the bourgeois slogan of “defense of the fatherland.” … [pp. 14–15]

III. Ilyich’s Struggle Against Menshevism for a Partisan Philosophy

The Menshevik view of practice is an opportunistic accommodation of practice to reality. This view of practice produces a reflection of reality, and a theory, entirely different from reality itself. The Mensheviks … ultimately excluded from the concrete image of reality that which gives it concreteness, namely, the revolutionary action of a specific class. Ilyich estimated how we are proceeding and in what direction, so as to be able to concretely and better drive the forces of various classes. The Mensheviks, however, did not do this; they merely described what was already in existence and did not point out what could occur based on the active revolutionary tasks of the proletariat and the peasantry.

“They do not indicate how the proletariat should, at a given moment, ‘push the revolution forward’ … they merely describe the general course of the process, without raising our concrete tasks regarding reality. When we examine the methods by which the Neo-Iskraists expound their ideas, we are reminded of Marx’s critique of the old materialism, which had nothing to do with dialectical concepts. Marx said: The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. The Neo-Iskraists, though they strive to describe and explain the process of the struggle unfolding before their eyes, are completely unable to formulate the correct slogans for this struggle. They proceed haphazardly, and their guidance is clumsy; they ignore the work that the party—the party that consciously guides, the vanguard party of the foremost class, aware of its guiding role as the material condition for change—can and must do in history, thus lowering the level of the materialist conception of history.” (Ilyich) [pp. 25–26]

Marx’s revolutionary theory, through the hands of the Mensheviks, was severed from the concrete conditions under which it was realized, based on the reality of Russia in 1905. On the one hand, principles became empty, general propositions—formulaic. On the other hand, the recording of new facts detached from principles offered a roundabout empiricism, a theory content to record scattered, isolated facts removed from any general connection. People like this exist even now, satisfied with discrete, scattered facts divorced from their general interconnections.

Following the principles of dialectical materialism, Ilyich did not proceed from general propositions, but from the movement of objective reality, from an examination of all aspects of objective reality, and from an analysis of the positions and tasks of the various classes. … To proceed not from concrete reality, but from empty theoretical propositions—this error was committed by Li Lisan-ism, and later by both military adventurism and military conservatism. This is not only not dialectics, but also not materialism. It perfectly explains Li Lisan-ism, military adventurism, and conservatism.

Because the Mensheviks proceeded not from concrete reality, but from empty theoretical propositions, they consequently violated the first and fundamental requirement of the materialist worldview. How the betrayal of dialectics and the betrayal of materialism are interconnected can be seen from the example of the Mensheviks. The Mensheviks took dead abstractions, divorced from concrete development, as their object, creating the ground for producing arbitrary, subjective, non-materialist interpretations of facts.

The subjective, non-materialist stance goes even further. It accidentally isolates facts from reality, often artificially and mechanically unifies them superficially. In such circumstances, a basis for interpreting those facts in isolation is established. This is called eclecticism. Under eclecticism, the general basis and the interconnection between individual events are lost. The general basis that connects individual facts and individual aspects is precisely concrete reality, i.e., a specific society. If one does not proceed from concrete reality, but from extremely abstract theoretical propositions, all basis is lost in such a situation—the very basis by which various facts cannot but be unified in a specific way. When the general basis is lost, connections become artificial, arbitrary products, and important facts are discarded. Ilyich said: “In the realm of social phenomena, there is no method more popular, nor more futile, than the isolation of individual facts and the playing with examples. To lay a foundation in fact, one must, without exception, grasp the totality of facts related to the question under investigation, not just isolated facts. Otherwise, one arbitrarily selects and collects facts, ignores the objective, mutually dependent relations of the entire historical phenomenon, and adopts a ‘subjective’ method of treatment in order to focus on insignificant matters.” [pp. 27–29] One must, without exception, grasp the totality of facts related to the Chinese Soviet war, i.e., the characteristics of the revolutionary war, and not isolated facts like attacking central cities or fortification warfare. This totality of facts is precisely the general basis connecting individual facts and individual aspects.

… “Defense of the Fatherland,” the infamous slogan erected by the Mensheviks and others like them to justify their betrayal, combined, through sophistry, the movement for the defense of the fatherland with internationalism. Internationalism and the movement to defend the fatherland are not incompatible—such talk emanated from the ranks of the Second International. … [pp. 30–31] The War of Resistance Against Japan and the anti-Chiang Kai-shek war are not incompatible—said Sun Mingjiu.

Chapter I: Materialism and Idealism

I. The Essence and Roots of Materialism and Idealism

Practice convinces people that matter is objective reality. In the process of labor, humans act upon nature and directly change it, subjecting matter to human influence. Under such circumstances, humans are deeply convinced that matter exists objectively.

When the laboring class of the Soviet Union is building socialism, industrializing the country, electrifying it, transforming the peasant stratum, and waging class struggle against the kulaks, they do not doubt that the Soviet Union exists objectively, independent of their consciousness. They are deeply convinced from their daily practice that

The reality of the Soviet Union exists, and the struggle of the proletariat for socialism exists in reality. [p. 49]

V. Kant and the Neo-Kantian Revision of Marxism

A Similar Situation Among the Colonial Bourgeoisie

... The relatively backward development of the German bourgeoisie and their dependence on the feudal system determined the duality of their attitude toward the bourgeois revolution. On the one hand, the German bourgeoisie dreamed of revolution and of abolishing feudal shackles; on the other hand, they feared revolution, threw themselves upon the feudal lords, and compromised with them. [p. 121]

VI. Neo-Kantianism

... What, then, governs social life? It is precisely the answer to this question that reveals the characteristics of Rickert’s[1] idealist philosophy. In society, values hold sway. These values are not the standards used by humans in their practical activities to evaluate various events and phenomena. Rickert says these values are subjective and relative, depending on the consciousness of each individual. The values that govern society do not depend on individuals; in this sense,

[1] Rickert (1863–1936), now translated as Heinrich Rickert. A German philosopher and sociologist, one of the main representatives of the Baden School of Neo-Kantianism.

Notes on Reading "A Course on Dialectical Materialism"

they are "objective." Rickert then proceeds with an extremely confused exposition, demonstrating his inability to define values. ... [pp. 139–140]

Chapter II: Dialectics as Epistemology

I. The Unity of Cognition and Practice, Subject and Object

Materialist dialectics is the decisive element in Marxism. As stated in the previous chapter, within Marxism, materialist dialectics is the decisive element. According to Engels' definition, dialectics is the science of the general laws of development of nature, society, and thought. Dialectics differs from metaphysics. Metaphysics observes things and their intellectual reflections (i.e., concepts)[2] as immutable, fixed entities, while dialectics grasps things and their intellectual reflections (i.e., concepts) in their interconnections, in their movement, and in their emergence and disappearance. Dialectics teaches us that not only is objective reality in development, but cognition is also in development.

The objective world develops, and subjective cognition also develops. After the July Revolution, the objective situation developed, and subjective cognition had to develop along with it. Recognizing the new situation after the July Revolution of 1917, ... Ilyich clearly pointed out: it is necessary to understand how the changed reality leads people to recognize new contradictions and new connections. He pointed out that the slogan "All Power to the Soviets," up until the July Revolution, correctly reflected the class forces

[2] The parentheses around "i.e., concepts" in this paragraph were added by Mao Zedong.

New contradictions and new connections.

and the interrelations of the party during the 1917 revolution. At a certain stage of the 1917 revolution, "All Power to the Soviets" was "a slogan that represented a step forward on the path of peaceful development, a slogan that could be directly implemented as a first step. It was a slogan for the peaceful development of the revolution; from February 27 to July 4, it was possible and, of course, the most hopeful thing, but today it has unconditionally become impossible."[1] — Ilyich pointed out that the alignment of class forces had fundamentally changed, and wrote as follows. Today, this slogan is no longer correct because, under the new circumstances, the transfer of power is only possible through open revolution.

The theory of reflection is not a passive reception of objects but an active process. In production and class struggle, cognition is an active factor that plays a role in transforming the world.

Reality changes and develops. Our cognition of reality also changes along with reality. However, we must not think that our cognition is a passive reflection of reality, nor should we think that our cognition, like a camera, unconditionally captures images of all objects within its field of vision. Human cognition is an active process, embedded as a dynamic factor in multifaceted social practice. In production and class struggle, human cognition manifests as a dynamically functioning factor, participating in the transformation of the world.

For example, when Ilyich raised the question of how the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" changed, he did not observe this slogan as a passive reflection of revolutionary reality but observed it as something that, in revolutionary practice, determined the direction in which the masses could advance and united their forces. ... As Ilyich said, the changed

A new situation leads to new slogans; new slogans

[1] See Lenin, "On Slogans" (Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 3, People's Publishing House, 1972, pp. 107–108).

reflect the new contradictions of the situation and guide the masses to unite and struggle to change the situation.

The situation changed further after September, once again giving rise to the Soviet slogan, but its content was greatly different from that of the previous Soviet slogan.

How reality leads to new slogans and new understandings; and this new understanding actively reflects the new contradictions of reality, itself becoming a path toward the transformation of reality. "Look forward, not backward. Do not use the old categories of classes and parties; use the new categories of the post-July Revolution." [1]

The changed class relations and the changed revolutionary practice in the period from July to September enabled Ilyich to once again raise the question of the Soviets as a means of seizing state power in the class struggle. ... This new slogan was not a repetition of what had been formulated before the July Revolution; it was something enriched by the new content of revolutionary practice. The Soviets at this new stage, whether viewed in terms of their class composition or their role in the revolutionary transformation, were different from the Soviets of the earlier period. [pp. 193–196]

The cognitive subject undergoes changes in the course of social practice.

The dialectical unity of subject and object is realized in practice.

Changing the external world while simultaneously changing oneself.

It was Marx who first elucidated the dialectics within this cognitive process and the movement full of contradictions between reality and cognition. Marx indicated that the dialectical unity of reality and cognition — object and subject — is realized in the historical development of social practice. Not only does the object of cognition change, but the subject of cognition also undergoes changes in the course of social practice. Humans act upon external nature, transforming it while simultaneously transforming their own nature — said Marx. ... Like metaphysical materialism, Feuerbach[2]

Feuerbach: Subject and object are not historically emerging and developing entities; cognition is an unchanging reflection of unchanging nature. The unity of the two is a unity in a static state.

Human sensory organs develop and differentiate in the process of labor.

Abstract humans and concrete humans.

The transformation of the subject and object of cognition becomes

[1] See Lenin, "On Slogans" (Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 3, People's Publishing House, 1972, p. 113).

[2] Feuerbach (1804–1872), now translated as Ludwig Feuerbach. A German materialist philosopher.

also did not regard cognition as a historical process. For Feuerbach, cognition is an unchanging reflection of unchanging nature. In his view, the cognitive subject, like the cognitive object, is an unchanging, non-developing entity, grasped outside the process of practice. He thought the unity of subject and object was a fixed, immutable thing, not something arising from human social activity. He failed to see that social practice transforms the object of cognition. ... He did not understand that the material, sensory human being, along with his five senses, is a product of world history. He did not know that human sensory organs, in the process of human labor and in the historical development of human practice, are not unchanging things but developed and differentiated things. ... The human being in Feuerbach's mind is not a subject that actively transforms the world through social activity but a contemplative entity. Marx criticized him, saying: "He does not leave the realm of abstract theory; he does not examine human beings within the specific social relations and the surrounding living environment that have made them what they are now, so he can never arrive at the real, actively existing human being but stops at the boundary of the abstraction called 'humanity,' able only to slightly recognize through the senses the 'real, individual, bodily human being.'" [1] ...

Marx said that the transformation of the subject and object of cognition becomes

[1] See Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology" (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, People's Publishing House, 1972, p. 50).

particularly intense and clear, as seen in the Russian proletariat and the Chinese peasantry.

particularly intense and clear during periods of revolution. This can be illustrated with revolutionary examples. The proletariat, in the process of the Russian Revolution, while transforming reality, fundamentally transformed their own nature at the same time. ...

... Hegel was an idealist; he did not recognize the reality of an objective world existing independently of consciousness, so he asserted that the agency of cognition primarily lay in the ability of thought or absolute spirit to actively create nature as the "otherness" of this spirit. According to Hegel, only active thought could achieve autonomous development. All stages of development in nature are already given within spirit. Thought, the "subjective spirit," develops through its active cognition of nature, while nature itself does not develop. When the active spirit, according to Hegel, cognizes nature, i.e., cognizes the objective world, it is cognizing its own "otherness," i.e., cognizing itself. In this way, the active subject of cognition and its object become identical, the same thing, in absolute spirit. Hegel did not use this to solve the problem of the subject-object relationship in cognition; instead, he dissolved the object into the ideal subject, straying ever further from a solution to this problem.

Feuerbach exposed the idealist nature of the view that identifies subject and object. He said that regarding the cognitive subject and the cognitive object as identical makes any cognition impossible, because cognition

Hegel dissolved the object into the subject, equating subject and object.

[1] Hegel (1770–1831), also translated elsewhere as Heizhier, etc., now translated as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. A German classical idealist philosopher.