Organize into Southern and Northern Columns
to Attack the Enemy
(November 22, 1936)
Peng [Dehuai]:
It seems best that you personally lead the one division of the First Front Army
that was not used in yesterday's campaign and the two armies of the Fourth
Front Army. Organize them into the northern column, move to Qingshanjie
tonight or tomorrow morning, and, in cooperation with the Twenty-eighth and
Twenty-ninth armies, wipe out the First Brigade as well as Ma Quanliang's
forces. If Zhou [Xiangchu] and Kong [Lingxun] continue to march toward
Shanchengbao, we can organize a southern column, with the First Front Army as
the main force, under the command of He [Long] and Ren [Bishi] of the Second
Front Army, and we will be assured of wiping out one of their divisions. Or, after
destroying or driving away the First Brigade, you may march toward and attack
the rear of Zhou and Kong in Mengcheng and Tianshuibao from Qingshanjie, so
that Zhou and Kong will be trapped and will not know whether to advance or
retreat. So far as the topographical conditions in the Mengcheng area are concerned, it is very difficult to maneuver if we concentrate all our troops, and
besides, after the fiasco of Ding's division,¹ Zhou and Kong should be more
cautious while advancing. If our main forces can strike from one wing while the
enemy troops are moving away from Shanchengbao, it will be what the enemy
least expects, and in this way we may win one or two battles, while at the same
time letting the enemy know that he does not have much hope. If the enemy later
shifts to a defensive position, our northern column may maneuver in the east of
Jinling so that the overall situation will change. Please work out how this can be
done.


Grasp the Contradictions of the Enemy Forces,
and Thoroughly Smash Hu Zongnan
(November 23, 1936, 12:00 noon)
Zhu [De] and Zhang [Guotao], Peng [Dehuai], He [Long] and Ren [Bishi]:
There are currently four kinds of contradictions developing among the enemy
forces. The first kind is the contradiction between resisting the Japanese and
"suppressing the Communists." The second kind is the contradiction between
Chiang's forces and the Northeastern Army. The third kind is the contradiction
between the stern order to attack the Red Army from the higher levels and the
fear of the Red Army at the lower levels; such contradictions are developing
greatly at present. The fourth is the contradiction between the officers and the
soldiers; this last kind of contradiction is becoming more acute because of the
recent material difficulties and exhaustion. Our task is to grasp these contradictions, to unite as one even more closely, to unify our command, to endure and
overcome every difficulty, not to lose a single favorable opportunity, move our
troops around flexibly, be prepared to fight continuously, resolutely shatter every
attacking enemy, and, above all, to smash Hu Zongnan thoroughly.
Mao
Mao


We have translated this text from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 675-76, where it
1. Regarding the attack on Ding Delong's division, see above, the text of November
21 entitled "After Achieving Victory over Ding Delong, Immediately Attack Zhou
Xiangchu and Kong Lingxun."




is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.


Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 677-78, where it is
reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.