Deployment for the Campaign
Against Hu Zongnan's Forces
(October 29, 1936)
Peng [Dehuai]:
To fight a decisive battle against the enemy forces in the south is of the utmost
importance. At present, the enemy troops are treating us lightly and advancing
rapidly. Moreover, Hu's vanguard troops are the two divisions under Zhou and
Kong¹ of Guo Huazong's old forces, and a big victory can be won if we fight
well. I have the following suggestions:
1. Control of the entire campaign should be kept in your hands alone.
2. Use the whole of the field army as the main force, select half of the troops
from the Second Front Army to assist you, and fight only the two divisions of
Zhou and Kong. The Fourth Front Army will pin down the enemy on the right
wing, or it may be responsible for the assault on part of the right wing, concentrating on Hu's western column and the two columns of Mao [Bingwen] and
Wang [Jun].
3. Have half of the troops of the Second Front Army take over the tasks in
Qiying and Tongxincheng so that the entire First Front Army will be able to
concentrate its forces.
4. It is necessary to have adequate preparations, and to call He [Long] and
Ren [Bishi], Zuo [Quan] and Nie [Rongzhen], and Xu [Haidong] and Cheng
[Zihua] to a meeting. The troops must have ample rest and encouragement.
5. In carrying out the battle, there must be favorable topographical conditions, and the first campaign should be limited to attacking two divisions only,
and to wiping out one of them first. If these conditions cannot be met, take a step
backward, with the overall goal of winning the fight.
Mao


First Strike at Hu Zongnan, Then Attack
Ningxia
(October 30, 1936, 4:00 P.M.)
Zhu [De] and Zhang [Guotao]:
The current policy is to strike first at Hu Zongnan and then to attack Ningxia;
otherwise, it will be impossible to attack Ningxia. You two elder brothers should
please base your leadership on this crucial theme. Apart from the Ninth Army
and the Thirtieth Army, which have crossed the river, the rest that is, the entire
First and Second front armies and the three armies of the Fourth Front Army should all be used according to Dehuai's arrangements of the 29th,¹ to fight one
battle and win it. Then the entire situation will take a turn for the better.
Mao [Zedong] Zhou [Enlai]


We have translated this telegram from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 636-37,
where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.


Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 638-39, where it is
reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.



--- Notes



1. The reference is to the forces under Zhou Xiangchu (1900-?), a native of Gansu,
and Kong Lingxun (1898-?), a native of Shandong, respectively, commanders of the
Forty-third and Ninety-seventh divisions of the Second Column of the First Route of the
Northwest Bandit-Suppression General Headquarters.



1. For a summary of Peng Dehuai's telegram of October 29, see note 3 to this text in
Mao Zedong junshi wenji.