Make All Preparatory Arrangements in Accordance with the October Operations Program[1]

(October 13, 1936)

Comrade Peng:

A. How many li is it from Diaobaozi to Dalachi, and to Xiaohecheng? How many li from Huining to Dalachi, and from Xiaohecheng to Dalachi?

B. Have telegraphed Zhu and Zhang[2] to ask when they will arrive at Dalachi.

C. The Second Front Army will reach the line of Shanjiaji–Xiaohecheng in approximately seven days.

D. Please make preparations in accordance with the October Operations Program[3] and draft an outline plan for the Ningxia campaign. After discussing it face to face with Zhu and Zhang, submit it to the Military Commission.

E. Please prepare to dispatch a responsible person (how about Nie Heting[4]?) with a radio set, or use Chen Manyuan’s[5] radio set, to go to the Yellow River bank and join the corps dispatched by Zhu and Zhang to build boats and direct the river-crossing campaign.

F. The First and Second Divisions must concentrate north of Guyuan by the end of this month, so that the entire field army can concentrate for training for at least half a month, with grain prepared in advance.

G. Pay full attention to the possible vacillation of certain individual comrades. Prepare for the field army to carry out the Ice Period Plan[6] alone if no other units take part.

H. The situation between China and Japan is extremely tense. Tang Enbo[7] is under Chiang’s orders to concentrate and await orders to reinforce Suiyuan.[8]

Mao

13th, 17:00 hours

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A. In view of the present situation between the enemy and ourselves, and in order to concentrate all forces to overcome difficult conditions and accomplish the basic operational tasks, the October operations program is hereby drawn up as follows:

B. One corps of the Fourth Front Army, leading the boat-building technical unit, shall rapidly advance to the Jingyuan–Zhongwei sector, select a crossing point favorable for attacking Zhongwei and Dingyuanying, and accelerate efforts to build boats, completing all crossing preparations by November 10. The main force of the Fourth Front Army shall gather grain and rest in the Tong–Ma–Jing–Hui area, dispatch numerous detachments to form a fan-shaped mobile defense, press directly upon the vicinity of enemy forces in Dingxi, Longxi, Wushan, Gangu, Qin’an, Zhuanglang, and Jingning, and maintain contact with them. If the enemy does not advance, we shall not withdraw; if the enemy advances, we shall resist step by step, delaying their advance, so as to possibly keep the Xi’an–Lanzhou highway in our hands during October.

C. The Second Front Army shall advance to the area north of Tongwei and Maying and south of Jieshipu, rest for several days, then move to the area north of the Jingning–Longde line for rest and reorganization, dispatch detachments south of the Jingning–Longde line to threaten the flank of Hu Zongnan’s enemy forces and delay their westward advance, and prepare to later use its main force or a part to take over the defensive tasks of the First Front Army north of Guyuan.

D. The main force of the Western Field Army of the First Front Army shall keep the pivotal sector between Guyuan and Tongxincheng, and Yuwangcheng, in its hands. Its Second Division shall, when the opportunity arises, attack and occupy Zhuanglang, and after the Second Front Army reaches the Jingning–Longde line, move north to rejoin its organic unit. The First Division and Detachment Chen shall temporarily operate between the Yellow River and Haiyuan to threaten and pin down Yu Xuezhong’s troops, preventing them from moving east, and thereafter gradually shift westward to rejoin the main force. The Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth Armies shall concentrate in the Dingbian–Yanchi area, with one part pressing toward Lingwu, preparing conditions among the population and completing reconnaissance tasks. The Independent Fourth Division shall secure the Huanxian–Quzi Soviet area. The tasks of the remaining eastern units remain unchanged.

E. The force for attacking Ningxia shall be composed of the entire Western Field Army of the First Front Army, one part from Dingbian–Yanchi, and three corps of the Fourth Front Army. The remaining two corps of the Fourth Front Army, the entire Second Front Army, and the Independent Fourth Division of the First Front Army shall form the southward defense force, from which a part may be drawn to participate in the attack on Ningxia if possible and necessary.

F. The timing for launching the attack on Ningxia shall be decided based on the boat-building situation, but all attack preparations must be completed by November 10 at the latest.

G. Before November 10, all units shall emphasize rest, replenishment, and expansion, with special attention to training, so as to effectively carry out the new tasks.

H. Propaganda and agitation shall center on slogans such as celebrating the joining of forces, eliminating the enemy that blocks the Red Army’s path to resist Japan and harasses the rear of the anti-Japanese Red Army, winning over the Kuomintang troops to join the anti-Japanese national united front, opposing the Japanese bandits’ aggression against China, fighting bloody battles to the end to defend the Northwest, defend North China, and defend China, and uniting workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers to drive Japanese imperialism out of China. The task of Ningxia shall not be mentioned, so as to avoid leaks.

I. This program may be partially revised according to changes in the situation.

J. This program shall not be distributed downward. The tasks of each unit shall be carried out by individual orders from the two General Commanders, Zhu and Zhang, and the commanders of each front army.

--- Notes

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, commander of the First Front Army of the Red Army and commander and political commissar of the Western Field Army, on drafting an outline plan for the Ningxia campaign. In August 1936, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China put forward the strategic plan to seize Ningxia, preparing to cross the Yellow River during the ice period in December, occupy Ningxia, and open up a new phase of cooperation with the Northwest to resist Japan. To implement this plan, on October 11, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Military Commission issued the "October Operations Program," which laid out specific arrangements for the various preparations and tasks of each unit for the seizure of Ningxia.


[2] Zhu refers to Zhu De. Zhang refers to Zhang Guotao, then General Political Commissar of the Red Army.


[3] This refers to the "October Operations Program" issued by the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Military Commission on October 11, 1936. Its contents were as follows:


[4] Nie Heting, then Chief of Staff of the Western Field Army of the First Front Army of the Red Army.


[5] Chen Manyuan, then Political Commissar of the 73rd Division of the 15th Army Corps of the First Front Army of the Red Army.


[6] The Ice Period Plan refers to the Red Army’s plan to cross the Yellow River during the freeze-up period in 1936, eliminate the Kuomintang warlord forces in Ningxia, and occupy Ningxia.


[7] Tang Enbo, then Commander of the 13th Army of the Kuomintang Army.


[8] This refers to the operations to assist the Chinese military and civilians in the then Suiyuan Province (now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) in resisting Japanese aggression.