The Operational Deployment of Our
Troops After the Second Front Army Has
Crossed the Wei River
(October 2, 1936, 2:00 P.M.)
To Zhu [De] and Zhang [Guotao], Xu [Xiangqian] and Chen [Changhao], and to
be transmitted to Ren [Bishi], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], and Liu [Bocheng]:
location as well as the fact that they themselves need a rest, it does not seem a
good idea for them to fight a campaign alone south of the Wei River. We
therefore suggested that they find out about crossing the Wei River and prepare
to undertake strategic or campaign operations in one week. Now, according to
their telegram of the 1st, they plan to cross to the area north of the Wei River
after a week.¹ We feel that this is feasible. Please advise us of your opinions.


2. After the Second Front Army has crossed over to the north of the Wei
River, all three front armies will be operating on interior lines, and our major
enemies, the troops of Hu [Zongnan], Guan [Linzheng], Wang [Jun], and Mao
[Bingwen] will first build up their blockade line along the banks of the Wei
River, after which they will force us north of the Shaanxi-Gansu road and then
build another blockade line along this road. It will take about two months for the
enemy to complete their two steps, and if we can join our forces and impose a
considerable blow upon the enemy, the time may be extended. Starting from
December, our main forces will move northward to open up new prospects, and
the Second Front Army will resist the enemy in the south from interior lines until
next February, after which we will have entered new positions and will surely be
able to use some forces to break the blockade in the south and begin to maneuver
on exterior lines.


3. We predict that after the concentration of Hu's troops, if they are not
attacked by us, the Second Front Army will be able remain stationary for long
between the highway and the Wei River. By then they could naturally move a
step farther north, that is, to the area south of Guyuan, Zhenyuan, and Qingyang.
A serious drawback is that we will have to confront Li Yi.³ In addition, if we
stay too long, supplies will become something of a problem. Therefore, it seems
necessary during the months of October and November to concentrate all three
front armies and choose an appropriate opportunity to impose a heavy blow on
the enemy in the south. If, however, the Fourth Front Army's fording skills can
guarantee a swift crossing in the area around Qingyuan and Zhongwei, it would
be better to cross earlier rather than later. As for the enemy in the south, in
general we can for the time being use the method of pinning him down.

3. Zhang Xueliang.


Mao [Zedong]
Zhou [Enlai]
Peng [Dehuai]

--- Notes

1. In terms of the operations of the Second Front Army, given their current

--- Notes

--- Notes

We have translated this telegram from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 609-11,

--- Notes

where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. According to a note in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, He Long and his comrades did
indeed propose, in a telegram of October 1, that in the face of fierce attacks by the enemy,
they should cross the Wei River within a week.

2. The editors of the Junshi wenji suggest that there is a typographical error here, and
that the character bu ("not") should be inserted after "will."