create harmful rifts-such is our prayer and hope.
Mao [Zedong]
Zhou [Enlai]
Peng [Dehuai]
The Fourth Front Army Should Move
Northward Immediately
(September 27, 1936, 2:00 P.M.)
To Comrades Zhu [De] and Zhang [Guotao]; Chen [Changhao] and Xu [Xiangqian]; and for them to inform He [Long], Ren [Bishi], and Liu [Bocheng]:
1. The two successive telegrams sent on the 26th¹ have been received, and
the contents are respectfully acknowledged, including words to the effect that,
without explicit orders from the Party Central Committee to call it off, the plan
to cross [the Yellow River] westward will definitely be carried out. The Central
Secretariat and the Politburo have carefully and methodically discussed this
operational problem, and we hereby present to you our conclusions as follows:


2. The Central Committee holds that if our First and Fourth Front Armies are
combined, their strength is great; when they are separated, their strength is small.
If they are combined, they can occupy both Ningxia and western Gansu and
accomplish the task entrusted to us by the International; if they are separated, it
will be difficult for them to occupy either place, and there is the danger that they
may not actually be able to accomplish the task. If the First and Fourth Front
Armies combine their strength to move northward, then the Second Front Army
may check the enemy from the outer flank. If the First and Fourth Armies are
separated and the Second Front Army moves north, then the outer flank will be
weak and all three Front Armies will be located in narrow strips of territory, the
enemy will blockade us relying on the Yellow River, and we will find it difficult
to expand in the future. Moreover, because the road between Xi'an and Lanzhou
has been cut, Enemy Hu [Zongnan] fears that we may attack him with a pincer
movement and also fears that the Northeastern Army may not be reliable. He
does not dare to move in the direction of Longde and Jingning and apparently
intends to move toward Tianshui in order to be nearer to Wang Jun. If the Fourth
Front Army crosses [the river] westward, the other side will dispatch Mao's unit

--- Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 598-600, where it is
reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to two telegrams from Zhang Guotao and others to Mao Zedong,
Zhou Enlai, and others, sent at 12:00 noon and 10 P.M. on September 26. A note to Mao
Zedong junshi wenji indicates that the first telegram stated that the most important thing at
that moment was to occupy northern Gansu; the second declared, as indicated below in
this telegram, that the Fourth Front Army would continue to follow the plans for the
western expedition unless clear orders to the contrary were received from the Central
Committee.