To Mr. Min:
During the May Fourth Movement period, in the classrooms of Peking University, at the gatherings in the old capital, at the lectures in Xiangcheng, I respectfully listened to your esteemed and grand discussions. Unexpectedly, ten years have passed in a flash. Your generation, the middle-aged like Zedong's generation, and the younger, who are today's students, regardless of rich or poor, without distinction of worker, peasant, merchant, or student, without differentiating belief or reverence, are about to be herded by the hands of foreign aggressors. The rivers and mountains will no longer be our rivers and mountains, the people will no longer be our people, the cities and towns will no longer be our cities and towns. What is called the subjugation of the nation and the extinction of the race is, throughout all antiquity and all ages, without parallel. How will you, sir, deal with this? The Communist Party has proposed an anti-Japanese united front, and the people of the country all say it is feasible. I know you, sir, will also say it is feasible. Yet among the multitude of gentlemen in power and position, some say it is not feasible, while others say it should be delayed. When a thief enters the door, they do not resist; when a tiger devours a person, they do not fight. They lead the entire nation into a desperate state of numbness, insensibility, stagnation, and waiting for death. How will you, sir, deal with this? Mr. Sun Zhongshan's policy of allying with Russia, allying with the Communists, and supporting the peasants and workers was implemented and effective during the First Great Revolution from 1925 to 1927. The period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was also the most revolutionary period of the Kuomintang. Mr. Sun's revolutionary policy was abandoned, and civil war has been incessant as a result; foreign aggression has broken through the dikes and is flooding uncontrollably. The Communist Party's letter to the Kuomintang on August 25, though a re-proposal of an old policy, is in fact the supreme plan for national salvation. How will you, sir, deal with this? You, sir, were the one whose name was conspicuously listed first on the "Opinion on New Literature." Ten years later, I suddenly see my respected Mr. Zimin has published a brand-new argument, strikingly different from the common new and old die-hard parties. You, sir, should know that those who see it and rejoice are by no means just me alone, by no means just the Communist Party, but must be countless people! Hearing from comrades and friends of your sympathy for the cause of resisting Japan and saving the nation, those who rejoice are, again, by no means just me alone, by no means just the Communist Party, but must be all the honest sons and daughters of the entire nation, of this there is also no doubt. However, to take one more step from the top of a hundred-foot pole, to uphold this great righteousness and take the lead, as a national great man of the Guangfuhui and Tongmenghui, as an academic leader of Peking University and the Academia Sinica, at this moment of national peril, to devise a plan to turn back the wild tide; not only to speak while sitting, but also to rise and act; not only to sympathize, but also to advocate; to sternly rebuke the Nanjing authorities to immediately stop the civil war, to abandon their erroneous policy of yielding to foreign powers while being harsh at home, to abolish their nation-destroying guideline of "patriotism is a crime, treason is rewarded"; to mobilize the nation's army, navy, and air force to carry out a genuine war of resistance against Japan; to restore the spirit of Mr. Sun Zhongshan's revolutionary Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies; to save the 450 million compatriots from the depths of water and the heat of fire; to convene a national salvation representative conference of all parties, all factions, all circles, and all armies to resist Japan; to convene a national congress elected by the people; to establish a unified national defense government to face the outside world; to establish a true democratic republic; to lead the country to the realm of wealth, power, and prosperity; to place the nation in the forest of freedom and liberation. If so, then you, sir, will surely shine for ten thousand ages and leave a fragrance for a thousand generations, with people throughout the country vying to embroider your likeness, and your name transmitted by post to the mouths of all the people. Will you, sir, not let the person listening to your teachings from thousands of li away slightly diminish his feeling of joy, but rather increase it, and increase it without end? Mr. Song Qingling, Mr. He Xiangning, Mr. Li Shizeng, Mr. Wu Zhihui, Mr. Zhang Puquan, Mr. Yu Youren, Mr. Sun Zhesheng, Mr. Ju Juexian, Mr. Tan Liming, Mr. Liu Yazi, Mr. Ye Chucang, Mr. Shao Lizi, Mr. Wang Jingwei, Ms. Chen Bijun, Mr. Jing Hengyi, Mr. Chen Gongbo, Mr. Gu Mengyu, Mr. Zeng Zhongming, Mr. Gan Naiguang, Mr. Zhang Jingjiang, Mr. Dai Jitao, Mr. Chen Guofu, Mr. Ding Weifen, Mr. Song Ziwen, Mr. Chen Shuren, Mr. Chu Minyi, Mr. Peng Zemin, Mr. Li Renchao, Mr. Li Delin, Mr. Chen Youren, Mr. Zou Haibin, Mr. Xu Jilong, Mr. Zhu Jiqing, Mr. Bai Yunti, Mr. Enkebatu, Mr. Li Fulin, Mr. Chen Jifang, Mr. Cheng Songyun, Mr. Tang Mengxiao, Mr. Zhu Yizhi, Mr. Li Xiehe, Mr. Bai Liewu, Mr. Liu Zhenhuan, Mr. Tan Yiru, Mr. Zhang Zhiben, Mr. Feng Ziyou, Mr. Xie Huisheng, Mr. Mao Zuquan, Mr. Jiang Xiyan, Mr. Kong Geng, Mr. Guo Moruo, Mr. Shen Yanbing, Mr. Chen Wangdao, Mr. Li Heming, Mr. Hu Shi, Mr. Zhang Xingyan, Mr. Zhou Zuoren, Mr. Qian Jieshi, Mr. Fu Sinian, Mr. Luo Jialun, Mr. Duan Xipeng, Mr. Chen Bao'e, Mr. Zhang Dongsun, Mr. Peng Yihu, Mr. Peng Quanfang, Mr. Yang Duanliu, Mr. Hu Zijing, Mr. Chen Fenghuang, Mr. Zhou Gucheng, Mr. Shu Xincheng, and all old friends of the party and state, teachers and friends in academia, and old acquaintances in society, I send this message to all. The invaders are deep, the calamity is urgent, I have spoken frankly. We are in the same boat in a storm, and I wish to hear your enlightened instruction. With best wishes for your well-being.
Respectfully,
Mao Zedong
September 22, 1936

Comrade Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Soviet Government, issued a statement today, saying: "The Central Soviet Government and the Military Commission of the People's Red Army have now issued an order. 1. All Red Army units are to cease any offensive actions against the National Revolutionary Army. (2. Only when attacked are they permitted to take necessary self-defense measures.) 3. All personnel and weapons of the National Revolutionary Army captured by us because of their attacks on us will be returned in their entirety when that army resists Japan. Those who wish to join the Red Army may do so. 4. If the National Revolutionary Army moves toward anti-Japanese positions, any obstructive actions are to be stopped, and all possible assistance must be given. We have decided to once again earnestly request all National Revolutionary Army units and the Nanjing government to cease hostilities with us and join hands to resist Japan; this request is currently being drafted. At present, the situation in the three provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Shanxi is already extremely critical. We are extremely willing to cooperate with the Nanjing government to achieve the goal of aiding Suiyuan, resisting Japan, and saving the nation from peril. If the Nanjing government can truly be mindful of the national crisis, stop the civil war, and dispatch troops to resist Japan, the Soviet is willing to assist with all its strength, and is willing to have the main force of the nation's Red Army as the vanguard to fight a decisive battle to the death with the Japanese invaders."
People here comment on the statement issued by Comrade Mao Zedong today, saying that the earnestness of its words and the sincerity of its attitude are truly unsurpassed. The Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors are certainly spouting nonsense every day, attempting to prove that the Soviet Red Army's proposal for an anti-Japanese united front is merely a means to overthrow the Kuomintang. Today, Chairman Mao's statement has swept away such rumors and slanders. We know that Chairman Mao's statement can sweep away the clouds of doubt from the minds of the patriotic elements in the Kuomintang and the National Revolutionary Army, because the Red Army has, through Chairman Mao's mouth, declared that it does not wish to capture the personnel and weapons of any National Revolutionary Army unit, much less to annihilate any National Revolutionary Army unit or to overthrow the Kuomintang's Nanjing government. The objective of the Soviet government is to use completely peaceful methods to enable China to unite as one, establish a Chinese Democratic Republic, and expel Japanese imperialism from China. This proposition is now extremely clear.

This little book was written in the autumn of 1936 as a textbook for the Red Army University at that time, with the purpose of summing up the experience of the civil war. Only five chapters were completed; strategic offensive, strategic shift, political work, and many other problems, there was no time to write more. For four years there was only a mimeographed version. Now, at the request of the Military and Political Journal, it is being published in letterpress to serve as a reference for comrades within the Party. This is the result of a great debate, representing the opinion of one line against another, and it is still useful for the current War of Resistance Against Japan.

1. The Laws of War Are Developmental
The laws of war are a problem that anyone directing a war cannot but study and solve.
The laws of revolutionary war are a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war cannot but study and solve.
The laws of China's revolutionary war are a problem that anyone directing China's revolutionary war cannot but study and solve.
We are now engaged in a war; our war is a revolutionary war; and our revolutionary war is being waged in China, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Therefore, we must study not only the laws of war in general, but also the laws of special revolutionary war, and also the laws of special Chinese revolutionary war.
Everyone knows that in doing anything, if you do not understand the situation of that thing, its nature, and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws of that thing, you will not know how to do it, and you will not be able to do that thing well.
War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups. Without understanding the situation of war, its nature, and its relations to other things, one will not know the laws of war, will not know how to direct war, and will not be able to win victory.
Revolutionary war, whether a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war, has its special situation and nature, in addition to the situation and nature of war in general. Therefore, in addition to the laws of war in general, it has its special laws. Without understanding these special situations and natures, without understanding its special laws, one cannot direct a revolutionary war and cannot win victory in a revolutionary war.
China's revolutionary war, whether a civil war or a national war, is waged in China's special environment. Compared with war in general and revolutionary war in general, it has its special situation and special nature. Therefore, in addition to the laws of war in general and revolutionary war in general, it has some of its own special laws. If you do not understand these, you cannot win victory in China's revolutionary war.
Therefore, we should study the laws of war in general, we should also study the laws of revolutionary war, and finally, we should also study the laws of China's revolutionary war.
There is one opinion that is incorrect, and we have long refuted this opinion. It says: it is enough to study the laws of war in general; or, to be specific, it is enough to follow the regulations published by the Chinese government or military academies. They do not know that these regulations are merely the laws of war in general, and moreover are entirely copied from foreign countries. If we copy them and use them as they are, without changing their form or content in the slightest, it would be like cutting the feet to fit the shoes, and we would be defeated. Their reason is: why can't we use things for which blood has been shed in the past? They do not know that while we should respect the experience of past bloodshed, we should also respect the experience of our own bloodshed.
There is another opinion that is also incorrect, and we have also long refuted this opinion. It says: it is enough to study the experience of the Russian revolutionary war; or, to be specific, it is enough to follow the guiding laws of the Soviet civil war and the regulations promulgated at that time. They do not know that the laws and regulations of the Soviet Union contain the special characteristics of the Soviet civil war and the Soviet Red Army. If we copy them and use them as they are, not allowing any change, it would also be like cutting the feet to fit the shoes, and we would be defeated. Their reason is: the Soviet war was a revolutionary war, and ours is also a revolutionary war, and the Soviet Union was victorious, so why is there still room for selection? They do not know that we should respect the Soviet experience, because it is the experience of the most recent revolutionary war. But we should also respect the experience of the Chinese revolutionary war, because the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army also have many special circumstances.
There is yet another opinion that is also incorrect, and we have also long refuted this opinion. It says: the experience of the Northern Expedition of 1926-1927 is the best, and we should learn from it; or, to be specific, learn the long-drive-straight-in and capture-of-big-cities of the Northern Expedition. They do not know that the experience of the Northern Expedition should be learned, but it cannot be copied mechanically, because the situation of our present war has already changed. We should only adopt those things from the Northern Expedition that are still applicable under the present circumstances, and we should formulate our own things according to the present circumstances.
From this it can be seen that different situations of war determine different laws for directing war, with differences in time, place, and nature. In terms of time, both war and its guiding laws are developmental; each historical stage has its own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war also have their characteristics and cannot be mechanically transferred to different stages. In terms of the nature of war, revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war each have their different characteristics, and therefore the laws of war also have their respective characteristics and cannot be mechanically transferred to each other. In terms of place, each country and each nation has its characteristics, and therefore the laws of war also have their characteristics and likewise cannot be mechanically transferred. In studying the guiding laws of war in different historical stages, of different natures, and in different regions and nations, we should focus on their characteristics and their development, and oppose the mechanical approach to the problem of war.
And that is not all. A person directing a war, from being able to command a small formation to later being able to command a large formation, this is progress and development for him. A place and many places are also not the same. At first being able to fight in a certain familiar place, and later being able to fight in many places, this is also progress and development for him. Due to the development of technology, organization, tactics, and strategy on both the enemy and our sides, the situation in each stage of a war is also not the same. Being able to command at a lower stage and also being able to command at a higher stage, this is even more progress and development for him. To remain stagnant at a certain formation, a certain place, and a certain stage is called having no progress and no development. There is a kind of person who, holding on to a single skill and a narrow view, makes no more progress. Although this has some use for the revolution in one place and at one time, it does not have a great use. We demand war directors who can have a great use. All guiding laws of war develop according to the development of history and according to the development of war; there is nothing that is immutable.

2. The Aim of War Is to Eliminate War
War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will eventually be eliminated by the development of human society, and it will be eliminated in the not too distant future. But there is only one way to eliminate it, and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose class counter-revolutionary war with class revolutionary war.
There are only two kinds of wars in history: revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. We support revolutionary wars and oppose counter-revolutionary wars. We support sacred national revolutionary wars and sacred class revolutionary wars. Human life is composed of three great eras: an era of human peaceful life, an era of human warring life, and another era of human peaceful life. We are now at the junction of the second and third eras. The era of human warring life will be ended by our hands. The war we are fighting is, without a doubt, the final war. Our war is, without a doubt, also the greatest and most cruel one. The greatest and most cruel counter-revolutionary war is pressing upon our heads. If we do not raise the banner of revolutionary war, the majority of mankind will suffer destruction. The banner of human revolutionary war is the banner of saving mankind; the banner of China's revolutionary war is the banner of saving China. A war waged by the great majority of mankind and the great majority of the Chinese people is, without a doubt, a sacred war, a just war, a supreme and most honorable cause of saving mankind and saving China, and a bridge that will carry all of history to a new era. When we study the laws of revolutionary war, we start from our desire to eliminate all wars.

3. Strategy Is the Study of the Laws of a War Situation as a Whole
The situation of a war as a whole, the situation of a country's war as a whole, an independent guerrilla zone, or a major independent operational front, is also a war situation as a whole. Anything that has the nature of requiring consideration of various aspects and various stages is a war situation as a whole.
To study the guiding laws of a war situation as a whole is the task of the science of strategy. To study the guiding laws of a partial war situation is the task of the science of campaigns and tactics.
Why is it necessary for campaign commanders and tactical commanders to understand the laws of strategy to a certain degree? Because understanding the things of the whole makes one better at using the things of the part, because the things of the part are subordinate to the things of the whole. The opinion that strategic victory is determined by tactical victories has been refuted. This is because this opinion fails to see that the victory or defeat of a war is mainly and firstly determined by whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are well taken care of or not. If there are important shortcomings or mistakes in the consideration of the situation as a whole and its various stages, that war is bound to be lost. The saying, "one careless move loses the whole game," refers to a move that is of a general nature, that is, a move that is decisive for the whole situation, and not some move that is of a partial nature, that is, not decisive for the whole situation. This is true in chess, and it is also true in war.
However, the things of the whole cannot exist independently of the parts; the whole is composed of all its parts. If some parts are destroyed or fail, the whole may not be seriously affected, because these parts are not things that are decisive for the whole. In war, a certain tactical or campaign failure or lack of success often does not lead to a deterioration of the war situation as a whole, precisely because these failures are not decisive things. But if the majority of the campaigns that make up the war situation as a whole fail, or if a certain decisive campaign fails, the whole situation immediately changes. The "majority of campaigns" and "a certain campaign" mentioned here are both decisive things.
In the history of war, there are cases where after a series of victories, one defeat leads to the loss of all previous gains, and there are cases where after suffering many defeats, one victory opens up a new situation. The "series of victories" and "many defeats" mentioned here are partial and not decisive for the whole situation. The "one defeat" and "one victory" mentioned here are both decisive things. All these illustrate the importance of considering the whole situation.
The most important thing for the person directing the whole is to place his attention on taking care of the war situation as a whole. The main thing is, according to the situation, to take care of the problem of the composition of troops and formations, to take care of the problem of the relationship between two campaigns, to take care of the problem of the relationship between various operational stages, to take care of the problem of the relationship between all our activities and all the enemy's activities. These are the most strenuous places. If one neglects this to busy oneself with some secondary problems, one will inevitably suffer losses.
Speaking of the relationship between the whole and the part, not only is this true of the relationship between strategy and campaign, but also of the relationship between campaign and tactics. The relationship between the actions of a division and the actions of its regiments and battalions, the relationship between the actions of a company and the actions of its platoons and squads, are examples. Any commander, his focus of attention should be placed on those problems or actions that are most important and most decisive for the whole he commands, and he should not be distracted by other problems or actions.
What is important, what is decisive, cannot be determined according to general or abstract situations, but must be determined according to concrete situations. In combat, the choice of the direction and point of assault must be determined according to the current enemy situation and the situation of one's own forces. In a place with abundant supplies, one should pay attention not to eat too much; in a place with insufficient supplies, one should pay attention not to go hungry. In the White areas, a battle may fail later on because of the leak of just one piece of information; in the Soviet areas, the problem of information leaks is often not the most important. In some campaigns, it is necessary for the high-level commander to participate personally; in others, it is not necessary. For a military school, the most important problem is to select the principal and teachers and to set the educational policy. For a mass rally, the main thing to pay attention to is mobilizing attendance and proposing appropriate slogans. And so on. In short, the principle is to pay attention to those important junctures that concern the whole situation.
To learn the guiding laws of a war situation as a whole, one must use one's mind to think. Because this kind of thing of the whole is not visible to the eye, it can only be thought through with the mind; if you don't use your mind to think, you won't understand. But the whole is composed of parts. People with experience of the parts, people with campaign and tactical experience, if they are willing to use their minds to think, can understand those higher-level things.
Strategic problems, such as taking care of the relationship between the enemy and ourselves, taking care of the relationship between various campaigns and various operational stages, taking care of certain parts that are decisive for the whole situation, taking care of the characteristics of the overall situation, taking care of the relationship between the front and the rear, taking care of consumption and replenishment, combat and rest, concentration and dispersion, attack and defense, advance and retreat, concealment and exposure, the main attack front and the secondary attack front, the assault front and the pinning-down front, centralized command and decentralized command, protracted war and war of quick decision, positional warfare and mobile warfare, our army and friendly armies, these arms and those arms, superiors and subordinates, cadres and soldiers, old soldiers and new soldiers, senior cadres and junior cadres, old cadres and new cadres, Soviet areas and White areas, old Soviet areas and new Soviet areas, central areas and border areas, hot weather and cold weather, victories and defeats, large formations and small formations, regular army and guerrilla units, annihilating the enemy and winning over the masses, expanding the Red Army and consolidating the Red Army, military work and political work, past tasks and present tasks, present tasks and future tasks, tasks under that kind of situation and tasks under this kind of situation, fixed fronts and non-fixed fronts, civil war and national war, this historical stage and that historical stage, etc., the distinctions and connections of these problems are all things that cannot be seen, but if one uses one's mind to think, they can all be understood, all be grasped, and all be commanded at will. That is to say, to raise all important problems of war or operations to a higher level of principle for resolution. This is the task of studying strategic problems.

4. The Important Problem Is to Be Good at Learning
Why organize the Red Army? It is to use it to defeat the enemy. Why learn the laws of war? It is to use these laws in war.
Learning is not an easy matter, and using is even more not easy. In the study of war, whether in the classroom or in books, many can talk about it very logically, but in fighting a war, there is a distinction between victory and defeat. The history of war and our lives both prove this point.
So, where is the key?
We cannot demand a general who is actually ever-victorious; this has never existed since ancient times. We demand brave and wise generals who generally win battles in the course of a war, generals who are both wise and brave. To achieve this goal, there is a method that must be learned, and this method must be used when learning, and also used when applying. What is this method? It is to be familiar with the situations of both the enemy and our own sides, to find out the laws of their actions, and to apply these laws to one's own actions.
The military regulations published by many countries all have the instruction to "apply principles flexibly according to the situation," and they all indicate how to handle a defeat. The former is to prevent commanders from making subjective mistakes by rigidly applying principles; the latter tells us how to handle it when a commander has made a subjective mistake, or when the objective situation has undergone unforeseen and irresistible changes.
Why do subjective mistakes occur? It is because the disposition and command of a war or battle do not fit the situation of the time and place; the subjective direction does not correspond to the objective reality, is not on target, or in other words, the contradiction between the subjective and the objective has not been resolved. It is difficult for people to avoid this situation in doing anything; there is only a distinction between being relatively good at it and relatively not good at it. To demand to be relatively good at it, in military terms, is to demand to win more battles; conversely, to demand to lose fewer battles. The key here lies in properly integrating the subjective and the objective.
Let's take a tactical example. The point of attack is chosen on a certain flank of the enemy's position, and that is precisely the enemy's weak point, so the assault succeeds. This is called the subjective and the objective being integrated, that is, the commander's reconnaissance, judgment, and determination are integrated with the actual situation of the enemy and his dispositions. If the point of attack is chosen on another flank or in the center, and it happens to hit the enemy's nail on the head, this is called not being integrated. The appropriateness of the timing of the attack, the use of the reserve force not too late and not too early, and all kinds of combat dispositions and combat actions being favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy, means that in the entire battle, the subjective command and the objective situation are thoroughly integrated.
Things that are thoroughly integrated are extremely rare in a war or battle. This is because the two sides in a war or battle are groups of armed living people, and they maintain secrecy from each other, which is very different from handling inanimate objects or daily affairs. However, as long as it is generally suited to the situation, that is, integrated in the decisive parts, that is the basis for victory.
A commander's correct dispositions stem from correct determination, correct determination stems from correct judgment, and correct judgment stems from thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from thinking that links together the various reconnaissance materials. Here, the commander uses all possible and necessary means of reconnaissance, and subjects the reconnaissance materials to a process of discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside; then, adding the situation of his own side, he compares the mutual relationships, thus forming a judgment, making a determination, and drawing up a plan. This is the entire process of cognition for a military expert before formulating a battle or war plan. A careless military expert does not do this; he builds his military plan on a foundation of wishful thinking. Such a plan is fanciful and does not conform to reality. The reason why a rash military expert who relies solely on enthusiasm is inevitably deceived by the enemy, lured by the enemy's superficial or one-sided situation, and incited by the irresponsible and ill-informed suggestions of his own subordinates, and thus inevitably runs into a wall, is because he does not know or is unwilling to know that any military plan should be based on necessary reconnaissance and on the enemy and our situations and their mutual relationships.
The process of understanding the situation is not only seen before the formulation of a military plan, but also after the formulation of the military plan. When a certain plan is being executed, from the beginning of its execution to the end of the war situation, this is another process of cognition, that is, the process of practice. In this process, there is a re-examination of whether the things in the plan conform to the actual situation. If the plan does not conform to the situation, or does not completely conform, then one must, according to the new understanding, form a new judgment, make a new determination, and change the already decided plan to make it suitable for the new situation. Partial changes are something that happens in almost every operation; complete changes also happen occasionally. A rash person does not know how to change and is unwilling to change, just blundering on blindly, and the result is that he cannot but run into a wall.
The above is about a battle action, or a campaign or war action. An experienced military man, if he is modest in learning, will become familiar with the temperament of his own troops (commanders, combatants, weapons, supplies, etc., and the whole constituted by them), and also become familiar with the temperament of the enemy troops (similarly, commanders, combatants, weapons, supplies, etc., and their whole), and become familiar with all other war environments (political, economic, geographical, climatic, etc.). Such a military man directing a war or operation will have more certainty and be more able to win battles. This is because over a long period of time, he has come to understand the situations of both the enemy and our sides, found the laws of action, and resolved the problem of the congruence or incongruence of the subjective and the objective. This process of cognition is very important. Without this kind of long-term experience, it is difficult to understand and grasp the laws of a whole war. A truly capable high-level commander is not someone who is merely good at armchair strategy or a fledgling who can do it; it must be learned in war.
All military rules and military theories of a principled nature are summaries of past wars made by people of the past or present. These bloody lessons left to us by past wars should be studied with emphasis. This is one thing. However, there is another thing, which is to verify these conclusions from one's own experience, to absorb those things that are useful, to reject those things that are not useful, and to create those things that are unique to oneself. This latter thing is very important. Without doing this, we cannot direct a war.
Reading books is learning, and using is also learning, and it is the most important learning. Learning warfare from warfare—this is our main method. A person who has no opportunity to go to school can still learn warfare, that is, by learning from war. Revolutionary war is a matter of the masses. Often, it is not a matter of learning well first and then doing, but of doing first and then learning; doing is learning. There is a distance between a "common person" and a soldier, but it is not a Great Wall; it can be quickly eliminated. Doing revolution, doing war, is the method to eliminate this distance. To say that learning and using are not easy is to say that learning thoroughly and using purely are not easy. To say that a common person can quickly become a soldier is to say that this door is not difficult to enter. To sum up the two, one can use an old Chinese saying: "Nothing in the world is difficult, if you put your heart into it." Since entering the door is not difficult, deep study is also achievable, as long as one has the heart and is good at learning.
The laws of military affairs, like the laws of other things, are the reflection of objective reality in our minds. Apart from our minds, everything is objective reality. Therefore, the object of study and understanding includes both the enemy and our sides. Both sides should be seen as objects of study; only our minds (thought) are the subject of study. There are some people who are good at knowing themselves but ignorant of the enemy, and there are others who are good at knowing the enemy but ignorant of themselves. Both are unable to solve the problem of learning and using the laws of war. The saying in the book of the great ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Wu Zi, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without defeat," is a statement that covers both the stage of learning and the stage of using. It includes understanding the laws of development in objective reality and, according to these laws, determining one's own actions to overcome the enemies one faces. We should not take this saying lightly.
War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, and political groups. All its laws are used for the purpose of striving for victory. The victory or defeat of a war is mainly determined by the military, political, economic, and natural conditions of both sides. This is not a problem. However, it is not only that; it is also determined by the subjective ability to direct. A military expert cannot, beyond what material conditions permit, attempt to win a war. However, a military expert can and must, within what material conditions permit, strive to win a war. The stage for the activities of a military expert is built on objective material conditions, but on this stage, a military expert can direct many dramas that are sonorous, colorful, majestic, and powerful. On the given objective material basis (military, political, economic, and natural conditions), one should exert one's power, lead the entire army to defeat the enemies of this nation and this class, and change this bad world. Here is where our subjective ability to direct can and must be used. We do not permit any Red Army