(1) Since instigating the so-called North China autonomy last year, Japanese imperialism has not ceased its aggression against China for a single moment. Regardless of how its methods and forms of aggression change with specific circumstances, its fundamental policy of annexing the whole of China remains unaltered. Following the deployment of troops in North China, the loudly proclaimed "economic cooperation" is, in reality, nothing but a method of economic plunder to consolidate the gains already made and to lay the groundwork for new offensives. The reinforcement of troops in the Beiping-Tianjin and Chahar North regions, the offensive in eastern Suiyuan, and the provocations in Chengdu, Beihai, Haikou, Shanghai, and Fengtai all indicate that new acts of aggression by the Japanese bandits are about to commence. The national crisis has become even more severe than before. This shows that the task of waging a national revolutionary war to defend North China, defend the Northwest, defend China, recover the lost territories in the Northeast, and drive Japanese imperialism out of China has been placed with even greater urgency upon the revolutionary parties and the entire nation.

(2) Over the past year, the extensive development of the nationwide anti-Japanese national salvation movement and the initial launch of the anti-Japanese united front have dealt a considerable blow to the Japanese bandits' plans for aggression and temporarily halted their efforts to establish a puppet state in North China and an "anti-communist united front." This represents a victory for the Chinese people's anti-Japanese national salvation movement over the past year. However, because the movement has not yet developed broadly enough and its strength remains insufficiently powerful, the organized anti-Japanese national united front encompassing all parties, groups, circles, and armed forces nationwide is still only in its initial stages. The largest political party—the Kuomintang—along with the armed forces under its leadership and influence, has yet to fully join this front, and the Kuomintang's policies have not undergone a fundamental shift. As a result, the national revolutionary war has not yet been launched. Consequently, not only have we failed to halt the Japanese bandits' continuing aggression and prevent further infringement upon China's territorial sovereignty, but the Japanese bandits have also consolidated their position in North China, gained new encroachments on China's territorial sovereignty, and are poised for a large-scale offensive. This proves that Japanese imperialism can be defeated, but it requires joint action and arduous, unyielding struggle by all parties, groups, circles, and armed forces across China.

(3) Under the unrelenting offensive of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people's anti-Japanese national salvation movement has now entered a new stage. This is chiefly manifested in the continued growth of the anti-Japanese national salvation movement among the broad masses of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie; the nationwide support for the anti-Japanese national salvation proposals of the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviets, and the Red Army; the concentration of the main Red Army forces on the forward positions against Japan in the Northwest; the beginning of a shift by a segment of the national bourgeoisie toward the anti-Japanese front; the growing anti-Japanese sentiment among a large proportion of Kuomintang army officers and soldiers; and the resulting differentiation and wavering within the Kuomintang and its Nanjing government. The vacillating domestic and foreign policies of the Nanjing government, its self-contradictory words and actions, and the debates among its various factions on the anti-Japanese issue all visibly demonstrate that it is currently in a state of vacillation. Under conditions of continued Japanese bandit offensives, the ongoing development of the anti-Japanese national salvation movement, and new changes in the international situation, there is a possibility that the Nanjing government will reduce or even end its wavering stance and turn toward participation in the anti-Japanese movement.

(4) In order to concentrate the strength of the entire nation to resist the aggression of the Japanese bandits and drive them out of China, we must not only rally the broader power of the masses and all truly revolutionary, conscious, and unsullied elements but also strive to draw in every possible segment from all classes and strata into the anti-Japanese struggle. This will further expand the anti-Japanese national united front and strengthen its ranks and forces. Pushing the Kuomintang's Nanjing government and its armed forces to participate in the War of Resistance Against Japan is a necessary condition for waging a nationwide, large-scale, and serious armed anti-Japanese struggle. However, this must absolutely not mean relaxing the severe criticism and struggle against all erroneous policies of the Nanjing government that contravene the national interest. Only in this way can the anti-Japanese tendencies within the Nanjing government gradually grow, extend the influence of anti-Japanese elements, overcome the government's own vacillation, defeat the pro-Japanese faction, and set it on the path of anti-Japanese national salvation. The Central Committee must emphatically point out: In the struggle to realize the broadest anti-Japanese national united front, the Communist Party must not only wage a stern struggle against those who openly or secretly oppose the united front but also retain complete freedom to criticize those who verbally endorse it yet remain practically passive, as well as all kinds of fellow travelers. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party supports the initiation of all genuine anti-Japanese wars, even if such initiatives are partial. But most importantly, it must use every method and every ounce of strength to promote, as rapidly as possible, a large-scale, nationwide, genuine armed war of resistance against Japan. To this end, the Communist Party shall continue to uphold the slogan "Stop the Civil War and Unite to Resist Japan" and oppose all internecine warfare at a time when the nation faces peril.

(5) The Central Committee believes that under the present circumstances, it is necessary to raise the slogan of establishing a democratic republic, because this is the best way to unite all anti-Japanese forces to safeguard China's territorial integrity and forestall the calamity of national subjugation and genocide for the Chinese people. Moreover, it is the most appropriate slogan for the united front, arising from the democratic demands of the broad masses—a democracy more widespread in geographical reach than the soviet system in only some territories, and a political system that represents a great advance over the one-party dictatorial rule of the Kuomintang in the major regions of China. Consequently, it can better ensure the universal launching and thorough victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan. At the same time, a democratic republic would not only enable the broadest masses of the Chinese people to participate in political life, raising their level of consciousness and organizational strength but also provide the Chinese proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, with a free stage for the struggle toward future socialist victory. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party proclaims: It actively supports the movement for a democratic republic. Furthermore, it declares: When the democratic republic is established throughout China and a national assembly based on universal suffrage is convened, the soviet areas shall become a constituent part of it. The people of the soviet areas shall elect representatives to participate in the national assembly, and the same democratic system shall be fully implemented within the soviet areas.

(6) The Central Committee emphatically points out: Only by continuing to develop the nationwide anti-Japanese national salvation movement among the Chinese people, expanding the anti-Japanese national united front encompassing all parties, groups, and armed forces, strengthening the political leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party within the national united front, enormously consolidating the Soviets and the Red Army, and waging resolute struggle against all words and deeds that dishonor the nation and weaken the strength of the national united front—only then can we push the Kuomintang's Nanjing government toward resisting Japan and prepare the preconditions for realizing a democratic republic. Without arduous and protracted struggle, without the mobilization of the entire Chinese people and a revolutionary upsurge, the realization of a democratic republic is impossible. In the course of struggling for a democratic republic, the Chinese Communist Party should ensure that this democratic republic begins by implementing our Party's Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, and proceeds all the way to the complete fulfillment of the fundamental tasks of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution.

(7) The political line of the anti-Japanese national united front set forth in the Central Committee's political resolution of last December is fundamentally correct. In the past half year or more, the Party has achieved many successes in carrying out this general line, chiefly in that the strength of the Soviet Red Army has been reinforced, the Party's political influence nationwide has expanded, and progress has been made in united front work with various parties, groups, and armed forces. These achievements should serve as a favorable foundation for future work. However, many Party organizations are extremely inept at concretely applying the tactics of the united front. They often fail to properly engage with each person, group, social organization, armed contingent, class, and stratum—based on their differing circumstances, needs, and demands—under the general policy of resisting Japan and saving the nation, through approaches, consultations, and negotiations, with the aim of concluding various local, partial, temporary or lasting, written or oral, specific and practical programs of action. And in the joint struggle to realize these programs, they fail to guide, promote, and organize them toward the highest forms of the anti-Japanese national united front—a National Anti-Japanese National Salvation Congress (or National Defense Congress), a national defense government, an anti-Japanese allied army, and ultimately a democratic republic. Many of our Party organizations are not adept at doing this but instead content themselves with general calls for an anti-Japanese national united front and the activities of a small minority of progressive elements, dealing with concrete problems through abstract, rigid, and mechanical methods. Meanwhile, where the united front cannot be established for the time being, they display a slackening or inadequacy in "the Communist Party's independent work in educating, mobilizing, and organizing the masses in the spirit of communism." These weaknesses are a major subjective reason why the anti-Japanese national united front has, to this day, not yet secured the actual participation of millions upon millions of the anti-Japanese masses.

(8) The Central Committee holds that it is necessary to promptly correct the view that the initiation of class struggle would impede the national united front. Victory in the national revolution can never be achieved merely by a minority of upper-class elements. Without drawing millions upon millions of workers, peasants, and petty-bourgeois masses into the anti-Japanese national united front, it will be impossible to forge a powerful anti-Japanese national salvation force, to push and compel the vacillating and hesitating upper strata and those in power onto the path of genuine resistance to Japan, or to realize a democratic republic. Leading the daily economic and political struggles of the workers, peasants, and petty-bourgeois masses and addressing their pressing livelihood needs are the key to organizing them into the anti-Japanese national united front. Yet in leading these daily economic and political struggles, the Communist Party must similarly be adept at applying united front tactics, drawing the broadest masses into the struggle. And, on the basis of their level of consciousness and organizational strength, it must elevate the masses' day-to-day struggles to a higher stage, making such struggles a driving force for the continued expansion, development, and advancement of the anti-Japanese national united front, and a solid foundation for it.

(9) In the course of the struggle to establish the anti-Japanese national united front and realize a democratic republic, the strength of the Soviet Red Army must absolutely not be weakened. The national defense government and the anti-Japanese allied army of the anti-Japanese national united front are political and military agreements established between the Soviet Red Army and other regimes and armed forces under a certain program, but they do not merge with those other regimes and armed forces. They may operate under the unified command of the national defense government and the anti-Japanese allied army, but this does not abrogate the organizational and leadership independence of the Soviet Red Army. Full attention must be paid to the expansion and consolidation of the Red Army. The suggestion of admitting, without proper selection, students and former officers from other armies into the Red Army is erroneous, as this would undermine the unity and solidarity of the Red Army. Full attention must be paid to strengthening the leading composition of the Soviet Red Army. The suggestion of allowing members of the bourgeoisie to participate in the political management of the soviet areas is likewise erroneous, as they could sabotage the soviet organs from within. Even after the establishment of a democratic republic, the Communist Party shall never relinquish its absolute leadership over the people of the soviet areas and the existing armed forces. On the contrary, while resolutely leading the Chinese masses in the anti-Japanese struggle and in their daily economic and political struggles, the Party must persist in expanding and consolidating its own political and military strength, ensuring the complete victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the democratic republic, and striving for the realization of the socialist future.

(10) Expanding and consolidating the Communist Party, and ensuring its complete political and organizational independence and internal unity and cohesion, are the most fundamental conditions for achieving the thorough victory of the anti-Japanese national united front and the democratic republic. Therefore, it is very necessary to recruit Party members systematically, both in the soviet areas and especially in the non-soviet areas. However, mass enrollment must be avoided; only workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals who have been examined and tested should be admitted into the Party. In this context, the opinions in last December's Central Committee resolution that "all those willing to struggle for the Communist Party's propositions may join the Party, regardless of their social origin," and that "the Party is not afraid of certain opportunist elements infiltrating it" are incorrect. Leading Party organs at all levels must adopt practical measures to train Party cadres, for capable cadres with independent working ability hold decisive significance in thoroughly implementing the Party's political line, whether in the soviet or non-soviet areas. Mobilizing thousands upon thousands of Party members to go among all the unorganized and organized masses, winning millions upon millions of the masses to stand around them, and correctly establishing the linkage between open and secret work—this is a task the Chinese Communist Party must not relax for a single moment in the face of the great political mission of fulfilling the anti-Japanese national united front. In the process of expanding the anti-Japanese national united front and struggling for a democratic republic, rightist opportunist tendencies—such as neglecting the Party's political and organizational independence, neglecting the consolidation of the Soviets and the Red Army, slackening leadership over the daily economic and political struggles of the broad lower masses, and insufficiently criticizing fellow travelers—must be promptly corrected. But for the present, the "Left" closed-door tendency remains the main danger in thoroughly realizing the tactics of the anti-Japanese national united front. The correct development of inner-Party ideological struggle will be a powerful weapon for accomplishing all the Party's political tasks.

(Originally published in the first volume of *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, compiled by the Central Bureau of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Region, p. 245)