Guidelines for the Operations of the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies Before Winter[1]

(August 30, 1936)

Comrades Zhu, Zhang, and Ren:

Regarding the operational guidelines for the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies before winter, we have the following opinions.

A. The Situation

(1) Japan is showing a tendency toward rapid advance into Suiyuan.[2]

(2) The nationwide anti-Japanese movement among the people is developing further.

(3) The struggle between Guangxi and Nanjing has yet to be resolved. It is estimated that after Chiang resolves the Southwest issue, there will still be about two months before he dispatches troops to the Northwest.

(4) On the 27th,[3] nearly ten thousand people in Chengdu staged an uprising, killing two Japanese and wounding two others. Japan

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong, Lin Yuying (Zhang Hao), Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian), Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) to Zhu De, General Political Commissar of the Red Army Zhang Guotao, and Political Commissar of the Second Front Army of the Red Army Ren Bishi. Based on the situation that Chiang Kai-shek would continue to reinforce the Northwest and further divide the Northeast Army after resolving the Guangdong-Guangxi Incident, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adjusted the deployment of the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army before winter.

[2] Suiyuan was an old province name, covering the central region of what is now the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It was abolished in 1954.

[3] In an attempt to gather intelligence in China’s interior, Japan, after establishing consulates in Jiujiang, Wuhan, and other places, sought to set up consulates in Chengdu, Kunming, and other cities, which provoked opposition from the Chinese people. On August 24, 1936, over ten thousand students and citizens in Chengdu staged a protest demonstration. Enraged crowds killed two Japanese, wounded two others, and destroyed the Daisan Hotel where the Japanese were staying, as well as the Jiaotong Company and the Yijin and Hengbao trading firms that dealt in Japanese goods. “Ganri” is a term from the rhyme-based date system, referring to the 27th. The date here is incorrect; it should be the 24th.

is poised to exploit this to exert massive pressure on China.

(5) The struggle between the anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese factions in Nanjing is quite intense.

(6) Hu Zongnan’s[1] brigade under Zhong Song[2] has begun moving from Zhengzhou toward Lanzhou.

(7) After resolving the Southwest issue, Chiang Kai-shek intends to divide the Northeast Army and replace Zhang Xueliang.[3]

B. Our Basic Policy

(1) Pressure Chiang into resisting Japan, creating conditions that compel the Kuomintang and Chiang’s forces to reach a compromise with us, so as to achieve the goal of the two parties and two armies uniting to oppose Japan.

(2) Closely ally with the Northeast Army and conduct negotiations for alliances with other forces in the Northwest, creating a new situation in the Northwest.

(3) Oppose Japan’s attempts to sever Sino-Soviet relations and prepare to open a route to the Soviet Union during the winter.

(4) Develop southern Gansu as one of the strategic base areas, while simultaneously consolidating and expanding the Soviet area in southern Shaanxi, making it another strategic base area that coordinates with northern Shaanxi and northern Gansu.

(5) Force Hu Zongnan’s troops to halt east of Gansu.

C. Specific Deployments from September to November

(1) The main force of the First Front Army shall occupy Haiyuan, Jingyuan, Guyuan, and the areas to their north and south. One part shall defend the Soviet areas of Dingbian, Yanchi, Yuwang,[4] and Huanxian. Another part shall defend the Soviet area of northern Shaanxi, and yet another part shall defend the Soviet area of Guanzhong (between the Jing, Huan, and Luo rivers).

(2) The Fourth Front Army shall occupy the areas of Lintan, Minxian, Zhangxian, Weiyuan, Wushan, and Tongwei,

[1] Hu Zongnan was then commander of the 1st Army and the 1st Division of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[2] Zhong Song was then brigade commander of the 2nd Division’s supplementary brigade of the 1st Army of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[3] Zhang Xueliang was then deputy commander of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[4] Yuwang was an old county name, now Tongxin County in Ningxia.

striving to capture the three cities of Minxian, Wushan, and Tongwei. However, if Minzhou[1] cannot be taken, a small force shall be used to keep it under surveillance.

(3) The Second Front Army shall swiftly move to the border area between Shaanxi and Gansu. First, it shall break through behind Wang Jun’s[2] defense line and occupy the areas of Fengxian, Baoji, Liangdang, Huixian, Chengxian, and Kangxian, and then engage Wang Jun in battle.

D. Benefits of the Above Deployments

(1) The result of the main force of the First Front Army moving to the Haiyuan-Jingyuan area and the Fourth Front Army moving to the Wushan-Tongwei area: On one hand, it gives Li Zhong’s[3] three divisions a pretext to fully control the Lanzhou and Dingxi areas, while part of Li Ren and Li Yi’s[4] forces can extend westward from Pingliang to control cities like Longde, Jingning, and Huining. On the other hand, it draws Mao Bingwen[5] away from Lanzhou, pulling him into the Longxi area, where we can seize opportunities to strike him. It also attracts the forces of the “Two Mas”[6] from Ningxia toward Zhongwei and areas to the west, where we can also seize opportunities to strike them, ensuring that the Soviet areas of Dingbian, Yanchi, and Yuwang are not threatened.

(2) The result of the Second Front Army moving eastward: First, it draws Zhong Song’s brigade to the Shaanxi-Gansu border, preventing it from advancing westward. Second, it provides an opportunity to strike Wang Jun. Third, it links the Soviet area in southern Shaanxi with southern Gansu.

(3) Among the operations of the three front armies, the eastward movement of the Second Front Army is the most critical. It is not only a necessary step for the Red Army’s northwestward operations during the winter but also essential for the upcoming negotiations between our leaders and Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives, which are to take place soon. Furthermore, it is necessary for protecting the Jia Army[7] and Li Yi,[8] shielding them from possible attacks by Chiang Kai-shek, and for resolving issues of supply and replenishment. Please consider these opinions and reply.

Yu, Luo, En, Bo, Ze

August 30

[1] Minzhou refers to Minxian in Gansu.

[2] Wang Jun was then commander of the 3rd Army of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[3] Li Zhong, i.e., Yu Xuezhong, was then commander of the 51st Army of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[4] Li Ren, i.e., Wang Yizhe, was then commander of the 67th Army of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters. Li Yi’s identity is unknown.

[5] Mao Bingwen was then commander of the 37th Army of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[6] The “Two Mas” refers to Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin. Ma Hongkui was then commander-in-chief of the 15th Route Army and commander of the newly organized 7th Division of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters. Ma Hongbin was then commander of the 35th Division of the Kuomintang’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[7] The Jia Army refers to the Northeast Army.

[8] Li Yi, i.e., Zhang Xueliang.