To Zhang Naiqi, Tao Xingzhi, Zou Taofen, Shen Junru, and all members of the National Salvation Association — August 1936
— Naiqi, Xingzhi, Taofen, Junru, and all members of the National Salvation Federation!

Not long ago, we read in the newspapers the "Basic Conditions and Minimum Requirements for Uniting and Saving the Nation" published by you, Messrs. Zhang, Shen, Tao, and Zou, as well as the declaration and program of the National Salvation Federation. These documents have aroused our great sympathy and satisfaction. We believe they represent the opinions and demands of the vast majority of people across the country who are unwilling to become slaves of a lost nation. On behalf of our Party, the Soviet government, and the Red Army, I express sincere agreement and declare to you and the people of the whole country: We approve of your declaration, program, and demands, and sincerely wish to cooperate with you and with all political factions, organizations, or individuals willing to participate in this struggle, so that, as stated in your program and demands, we may jointly carry out the struggle to resist Japan and save the nation.

You said:
"What we hope is that the Chinese Communist Party will demonstrate, through concrete actions, its sincerity in advocating cooperation with all parties and factions to resist Japan and save the nation. Therefore, on the part of the Red Army, it should immediately cease attacking the Central Army to facilitate peace negotiations. In areas occupied by the Red Army, a lenient attitude should be adopted toward rich peasants, landlords, and merchants. In major cities, efforts should be made to avoid labor-capital conflicts that could weaken the anti-Japanese forces. Only then will the development of the national salvation united front not be obstructed."

Indeed, we ought to do this, and we are already doing it. In our actions, we have always been faithful to our own proposals and political line. Since the onset of the Mukden Incident, we were the first to propose to all parties and factions nationwide our willingness to cooperate in resisting Japan. Some have said that our proposals are merely for propaganda purposes and that in reality we are unwilling to carry them out. However, the events of the past few years prove such claims to be utterly false. We have cooperated with the 19th Route Army and the Fujian government. Not long ago, when southwestern faction leaders issued public statements expressing their intention to resist Japan, we declared our agreement with their anti-Japanese stance. At the same time, we issued a proposal for cooperation in resisting Japan to the military and political leaders of the southwestern faction and to all parties and social organizations, solemnly stating: Not only in words but also in deeds, we sincerely hope for united alliance and joint struggle to save the life of our motherland. For more than a year, we have waged a long and arduous struggle to realize our goal of going north to resist Japan. Although we have reached the north, our desire to concentrate our forces in Hebei to directly engage in resistance against Japan has yet to be fulfilled. This spring, after crossing the Yellow River, had it not been for the blockade and obstruction by over 100,000 Central Army troops stationed along the Tongpu Railway and other areas, we could undoubtedly have achieved our wish. At that time, if we had concentrated our forces to break through the blockade, it certainly could have been done. However, this would inevitably have caused great sacrifices on both sides. In order to avoid the cost of worthless civil war, we temporarily withdrew back across the Yellow River to Shaanxi. After returning, despite the continued persecution against us, we once again expressed to the Nanjing government, General Yan Xishan of Taiyuan, and General Song Zheyuan of Hebei our willingness to concentrate our forces in Hebei to resist Japan, and requested their consent. Although we have yet to receive a satisfactory response, we will not, for this reason, abandon the goal of resisting Japan and saving the nation, which we have consistently and resolutely advocated. At this critical moment of national survival, we are unwilling to continue any civil war of mutual slaughter. We will not, at any time, attack the Nanjing Central Army or other troops, provided they do not attack us or obstruct the anti-Japanese struggle of the Chinese military. If the Nanjing Central Government or other armies undertake to resist Japan and do not suppress the patriotic movements of the masses, we are prepared to assist them sincerely with all our strength. We are willing to cooperate with any army, any political party, or any faction, so long as they agree to permit full freedom for anti-Japanese, anti-traitor activities and patriotic movements.

Some people doubt that the Red Army is currently strong enough to resist Japan alone. Others say that the prerequisite for resisting Japan is national unity and internal peace. Still others argue that partial resistance is harmful. But we do not think so. Our Northeast Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army has been able to carry out a sustained and heroic struggle. Even enemy newspapers admit that the volunteer army has cost the enemy over 100,000 lives and hundreds of millions in money, and has prevented the Japanese imperialists from rapidly invading China's interior. Although they have not yet achieved complete victory, they have already rendered immense service and aid to the nation. No one can now claim that the Northeast Volunteer Army cannot resist Japan alone. In every respect, our Red Army is no weaker than the Northeast Volunteer Army, and the patriotic fervor of the northern people is no less than that of the people in the Northeast. Unless one seeks to deceive the people, there is no basis for saying the Red Army cannot resist Japan on its own. The reasons for the failure of the Shanghai and Great Wall resistance were solely the hesitation and lack of resolve among the leaders at the time, their failure to employ flexible mobile warfare tactics, and insufficient broad-based cooperation with the people. However, the Chinese Red Army does not have these shortcomings, so we believe the Red Army can resist Japan alone, endure prolonged resistance without easily suffering setbacks. Although we cannot expect the Red Army, with its existing forces, to achieve the final victory in the anti-Japanese war, it can, in any case, resist Japan on its own. Moreover, in the course of the Red Army's sustained resistance, it will inevitably be able to unite the strength of the entire nation and all armed forces willing to resist Japan, thereby achieving final victory.

If one says that it is necessary to unify national strength to strive for the final victory in the anti-Japanese war, that is correct. But if one says there must first be unification, and only then resistance to Japan, that is incorrect. It should be remembered that partial forces are already capable of waging resistance; it should be remembered that in places where the resistance movement has yet to begin, the enemy will never allow us to concentrate our forces. The enemy is already harshly monitoring the Nanjing central and local governments, and is occupying our territories province by province. Under such circumstances, only by beginning resistance can the possibility of a nationwide general mobilization arise. Waging resistance and carrying out a nationwide general mobilization should begin simultaneously. Under conditions of "peace," it would be very difficult for a nationwide general mobilization to occur.

You demand freedom for all patriotic movements, but the enemy will naturally immediately use armed force to suppress patriotic movements, making war clearly unavoidable. The situation is becoming increasingly critical by the day. If the war of resistance against Japan does not begin immediately, national unified self-defense and nationwide general mobilization will inevitably become even more difficult. If we let this opportune moment slip away, the possibility of unified self-defense and general mobilization may even be lost entirely. Even today, nationwide general mobilization can no longer encompass the Northeast and parts of the northern regions. If this continues, the enemy can organize more puppet armies, carve up larger regions of China, and seize all key cities and transportation routes. By then, our general mobilization will only be possible in a very small portion of territory and rural areas. Can we now use pretexts such as incomplete unification or insufficient preparation to delay resistance against Japan?

We do not oppose genuine preparation, but we do oppose using the name of preparation to pursue non-resistance in practice. Any resistance struggle will never hinder the work of preparation and general mobilization. Any act of resistance is itself a form of immense mobilization—the experience of the Shanghai and Great Wall resistance is the best proof.

Carrying out secret preparations under enemy surveillance might take several years to achieve results that could perhaps be realized in just a few weeks after the start of resistance. Moreover, the strength cultivated through secret preparation can never compensate for the strength lost through the passage of time, nor can it match the forces the enemy can amass and prepare during the same period.

Some say our independent resistance undermines their "master plan for resisting Japan." We have no way of knowing what they mean by this "master plan." All we demand is that those who lag behind quickly catch up to us, and that military-political leaders and factions that have not yet prepared for the war of resistance immediately join us in the anti-Japanese struggle. There is no basis whatsoever to demand that we abandon our policy of resisting Japan or halt our anti-Japanese actions to conform to the platforms and actions of these "critics."

The war of resistance against Japan will be a protracted and brutal war. Final victory cannot be won without enduring countless bitter battles. In the course of this long, bitter struggle, it is inevitable that all the nation's forces will be mobilized and concentrated; the war of resistance against Japan must absolutely not be delayed until after such mobilization and concentration is complete.

Therefore, we demand the immediate commencement of the war of resistance against Japan. First, let the Red Army be concentrated in Hebei, so that the Red Army can be the first to begin the war of resistance against Japan. We oppose using any pretext to delay or avoid resistance against Japan. We sincerely hope you will help make these demands a reality.

In order to concentrate national strength for the war of resistance against Japan, we have improved Soviet laws and work in various respects. Besides changing the Workers' and Peasants' Government and Workers' and Peasants' Red Army into the People's Soviet Government and the People's Red Army, we have supplemented the Soviet electoral law so that all petty-bourgeois employees, professionals, specialists, small merchants, and small business owners have the right to vote and stand for election. We have proclaimed that within Soviet areas, all political parties, social organizations, and mass groups enjoy the rights of citizens. We welcome representatives of all parties and social groups willing to jointly resist Japan to participate in the Soviet government and jointly shoulder responsibilities. We have already passed resolutions not to confiscate the land of rich peasants; if they wish to join us in resisting Japan, we will not refuse to unite with them. We will not confiscate the property and factories of large or small industrialists and merchants but will protect their enterprises and help them develop, in order to increase the material supplies necessary for the anti-Japanese movement in Soviet areas. We will not confiscate the land and property of military officers and landlords who actively resist Japan. We invite all unemployed officers, soldiers, employees, and specialists to come to the Soviet areas and will give them appropriate work so that they can develop their talents. Specific measures have been adopted to give preferential treatment to captured officers and soldiers: those who wish to return home will be provided with travel expenses; those willing to stay in the Soviet areas and jointly resist Japan will be given jobs. All exorbitant and miscellaneous taxes have been abolished, and a moderate unified progressive tax has been levied.

This is the policy we have adopted and implemented in our Soviet areas. We will never be hostile toward anti-Japanese classes among the nation. When the Red Army enters the territory of friendly forces resisting Japan, provided that the friendly forces abide by agreements, the Red Army agrees to observe the laws and regulations set by those friendly forces and will not interfere in the local administration of their territories. Regarding the issue of labor-capital relations, regulations have been set for minimum conditions to improve workers' lives. Labor-capital agreements are to be concluded according to the actual circumstances of each enterprise, and both labor and capital must abide by them, avoiding unnecessary strikes and slowdowns. The previous laws on supervision of production and workers' leadership of factories have been repealed. Workers are advised not to raise demands exceeding their enterprise's capacity. In non-Soviet areas, we advocate the necessity of improving workers' lives but hope not to intensify the struggle against capitalism. We believe that striving for customs autonomy and opposing imperialist aggression benefits both workers and capitalists. On the contrary, under continued imperialist aggression, neither workers nor capitalists can expect any improvement in their situation. The common interest of labor and capital is founded on opposing imperialist aggression.

As for the guerrilla forces currently operating in Hebei, Shuonan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, and other regions, they have not yet been able to implement the laws we recently passed. This is due to numerous obstacles preventing them from receiving our directives. Moreover, the cycle of brutal slaughter may provoke certain retaliatory measures, but we consider such actions to be mistaken. We earnestly hope to immediately correct these errors among the guerrilla units. (Two sentences in the English translation here are vague and unsatisfactory, so they have been omitted; they will be supplemented once the original text is obtained.) Regrettably, we cannot immediately enforce these conditions, because the decisive power does not rest with us. We believe that the Red Army is the army of the Chinese people and unconditionally respects and implements the criticisms, opinions, and demands expressed by the people of the whole nation. On all questions concerning the Chinese people, we are willing to submit to the democratic resolutions of a people determined not to become slaves of a lost nation.

Of course, our Party members should participate in national salvation organizations and various forms of national salvation movements in every locality. We are willing to sacrifice all our strength to support these movements and organizations, in order to struggle together with all parties and factions and the people who refuse to become slaves of a lost nation, and to rescue the Chinese people from peril and destruction. Our Party members unconditionally abide by the rules, guiding principles, and resolutions adopted by the majority in these organizations. Likewise, in practical work, even when we disagree in principle, we unconditionally defer to the majority’s opinion. Our Party members will not set themselves in opposition to other factions within these organizations or engage in struggles to seize the masses and leadership. On the contrary, we are willing to support the thoroughly anti-Japanese leaders of any faction, enabling them to exercise their abilities among the masses without hindrance. Our Party members are willing to work under their leadership. To achieve the goal of defeating a powerful enemy, we need not only our own development and victory but also the victory and development of all united forces. Our slogan for the united front is: "All political parties and classes unite under the banner of resisting Japan and saving the nation." Therefore, we consider it wrong to raise slogans within the united front that call for overthrowing a particular class or a particular political party. We believe that within the Kuomintang and the National Government, there should be many leaders, Party members, and officials capable of resisting Japan, and we are entirely willing to unite with them. Hence, blanket opposition to the Kuomintang and local governments is inappropriate. We disagree with and oppose sectarianism, monopolization, manipulation, and rigid control, as well as the methods some young people currently use in practice to forcibly compel the masses to join national salvation movements. Finally, we consider it most important that all parties and factions understand the mission of resisting Japan and saving the nation and change their hostile attitudes toward us. Opinions on other questions are not important. Yet some people attach great importance to many opinions on other issues, which consequently gives rise to numerous conflicts and contradictions. We are completely willing to change these points of contention. If our Party members have committed such errors in the national salvation movement, we hope that leaders and youth of other parties and factions, motivated by patriotic fervor, will engage in mutual remonstrance. We believe that if, for the necessity of resisting Japan and saving the nation, all mutual hostility is eliminated, and mutual forbearance and mutual respect are practiced, then the nationwide united front can be victoriously completed and can ensure a broad and bright future. Depending on the degree of development of the united front’s strength, not only can Japanese imperialism and the traitorous elements be defeated, but through certain stages of the united front movement, the Chinese nation can be freed from all imperialist shackles and achieve a truly democratic unification of all China. Therefore, we believe the united front is by no means a very short or temporary phenomenon. Of course, at various stages of the united front, there may be individuals who waver, betray, or leave, but this absolutely cannot be regarded as the collapse of the united front.

Now, the united front possesses clearer premises and a more solid foundation than in 1927, because the national crisis is now a hundred times deeper than it was in 1927. The united front of 1927 was primarily directed against internal enemies (opposing the Northern Warlords); the united front now is directed against external enemies — Zhang Naiqi, Tao Xingzhi, Zou Taofen, Shen Junru, and all members of the National Salvation Association — foreign, hostile, oppressive, and plundering foes. In 1927, those who broke away from the united front could still organize semi-independent governments. But now, anyone who breaks away from or refuses to join the united front can no longer establish a semi-independent government, nor can they find support among any stratum of the Chinese people. Moreover, the experience of 1927 cannot be mechanically applied to any class. Because the international and domestic situation has now undergone radical changes compared to 1927, changes that are favorable to a nationwide united front. Therefore, we are not at all pessimistic about the prospects of the current united front; there is no basis whatsoever for pessimism here. For the cause of the united front, we do not fear being exploited by other parties and factions, because we have a carefully considered, firm anti-Japanese program. We are willing to cooperate to the end with all political groups and organizations that resist Japan and oppose the traitorous regime.

However, what is most dangerous now is that some people still harbor plans to achieve unification by military force. It is very clear that unification by military force means incessant civil war. If we recall the failures of Jing Shizhi and other warlords’ military unification plans, we can see how dark the prospects are for these people. And under current conditions, in any respect, the policy of military force harms the Chinese nation to a degree far greater than it did back then. Unfortunately, some people still adopt a hands-off attitude toward such a policy. There are also those who attempt to use another "united front of concentration" to oppose and undermine the Chinese people's united front. This is one of the main reasons why the united front cannot develop smoothly.

You say that past disputes have centered on the methods of the anti-Japanese struggle and the order of priority between "pacifying the interior" and "resisting foreign aggression." We believe this is only on the surface. In reality, it is about some people wavering between national self-determination and national heroism, choosing a path between resistance and surrender. We do not believe that those who advocate "first pacify the interior, then resist foreign aggression" fail to see the disastrous results their policy of "pacifying the interior" has produced. But why, then, do they still so firmly advocate "first resist foreign aggression, then pacify the interior"? We are not opposed to unification; what we oppose is civil war and national submission. We believe that today China has only one way out: for all parties and factions to unite on an equal footing, carry out resistance to Japan, and submit to the democratic political will of the people of the whole nation. If this path is not taken, and an attempt is made to use military force to unify, then the unification of the Chinese people will never come to pass; it will only further divide and destroy China. For this reason alone, we oppose such attempts. We advocate uniting China through joint resistance to Japan on an equal basis and through democratic means. We are willing to submit to the resolutions of any national congress that truly represents the entire Chinese people, and we advocate bringing all questions before such a congress for resolution. Moreover, we agree that the question of whether the Soviet system should be implemented throughout China should be left to the people of the whole nation to resolve democratically. However, we must declare that the draft constitution promulgated by the Nanjing government on May 5 of this year, along with the organizational regulations and election regulations for the National Assembly, we consider to be completely anti-democratic. We do not recognize that a National Assembly elected under these laws has the authority to represent the will of the people of the whole nation. We cannot participate in the election of such a National Assembly. Neither we nor the people of the whole nation should submit to the resolutions adopted by such a "National Assembly." We consider the existence of this "National Assembly" to be harmful. However, we agree to participate in any genuinely democratic people’s representative body created in accordance with democratic principles. Finally, we hope that you and all national salvation organizations in various localities will send representatives to participate in the Soviet government. We hope you will introduce representatives of other parties and factions to engage in negotiations for cooperation with us. All representatives willing to conduct negotiations with us are invited to come directly to the Soviet area, where we guarantee there will be no danger whatsoever. If any region outside the Soviet area likewise guarantees the safety of our representatives from danger, we are willing to dispatch representatives to other regions to conduct negotiations. We sincerely wish to add our signature to the program of the All-China United National Salvation Association.

With the salute of the national revolution! Mao Zedong, August 10, 1936. Letter to Zhang Naiqi, Tao Xingzhi, Zou Taofen, Shen Junru, and all members of the National Salvation Association.

Editor’s note from *National Salvation Times*, May 1936: This letter from Mr. Mao Zedong was obtained from an English translation from a British source and then retranslated into Chinese. There may be discrepancies in wording compared to the original text. Once the original Chinese version is obtained, it will be published again. We ask Mr. Mao and our readers for their understanding. As for the great political significance of Mr. Mao’s letter and the bright and great prospects for unity it reveals, every reader can fully understand it without any annotation.

*National Salvation Times*, "A Letter from Mr. Mao Zedong, Leader of the Soviet Government, to Messrs. Zhang, Tao, Zou, Shen — 1936, 10.〇," in *The National Salvation Association of the Three People*, China Social Sciences Press, 1981.10.