c. small landlords whose living conditions are very poor;
d. those who originally were not landlords but were forced to rent out their
land because they had lost the capacity to work;
e. those who rent out their land yet hire themselves out to work for others.
Any small proprietors in the foregoing categories who are Chinese traitors
selling out the country will be dealt with as such.
4. The land of all anti-Japanese soldiers and those who dedicate themselves
to the anti-Japanese cause is not to be confiscated.
5. None of the land of rich peasants or their extra tools of production (farm
implements, livestock, etc.) are to be confiscated. When equal distribution of all
land is carried out, according to the demands of the basic level of peasants, rich
peasants and landlords should have their land redistributed as well. Rich peasants,
however, should receive land according to the regular conditions for equal distribution (that is, they are to receive land of the same class as ordinary peasants).
6. As for land belonging to owners of large farms and enterprises (mainly
proprietors who do not rely for a living on exploitation by renting out land, but
rather on hiring large numbers of farm laborers to engage in working the land or
raising livestock), because their mode of production has certain progressive characteristics, it should be handled according to the policy for treatment of rich
peasants. If a majority of the peasants call for equal redistribution of the land,
farm animals, grain, etc. belonging to the owners of large farms and enterprises,
it should be handed over and redistributed equally.
7. In the case of a merchant who is also a big landlord, his land is to be
handled like that of an ordinary landlord, but there is to be no encroachment
upon the mercantile portion [of his assets].
8. It should be proclaimed that usury is abolished. The Soviet People’s
Government is to promulgate a new set of regulations on loans, which will limit
the interest rate on loans for the people of the soviet areas. Commercial loans and
loans between working people themselves, however, are not to be abolished.
9. It is permitted to rent out land within the soviet areas, but no matter what
sort of proprietor is renting out his land, he must without fail abolish the cruel
and enslaving rental methods of the past, and follow to the letter the regulations
on rentals promulgated by the Soviet Government. There will be no exceptions.
10. Living conditions of rural workers should be improved. The Soviet Gov-ernment will draw up and enforce specific regulations on hiring farm laborers.
The above decisions should all be carried out immediately in the newly
established soviet areas. In older soviet areas where land has already been redistributed, old measures are to remain in force and not be changed. As for various
specific regulations and fine points of carrying out these decisions, they will be
drawn up separately and promulgated by the Central Soviet Government.
Central Committee
Telegram to Zhu [De], Zhang [Guotao], and
Ren [Bishi] on the Second and
Fourth Front Armies’ Rapid Advance
to Southern Gansu

(July 22, 1936)

Comrades Zhu [De], Zhang [Guotao], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. At present in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia [Base Area] we are under
attack by a total force of more than 150 regiments under Tang Enbo, Yang
Hucheng, Gao Guizi, Gao Shuangcheng, Zhang Xueliang, He Zhuguo, Yu
Xuezhong, and Ma Hongkui, all of them under pressure from Chiang Kaishek’s
orders. All of Mao Bingwen’s forces and part of Ma Bufang’s have also been
lured by us to the vicinity of northern Gansu, and they are attempting to rout us
first and then block your northward advance.
2. We are now mobilizing the entire Red Army forces and the people of the
soviet areas to smash the enemy’s attack and greet your northward advance.
3. It would be advantageous for the second and fourth Front Armies to
advance rapidly toward southern Gansu. When you have advanced to a suitable
place in southern Gansu, then the First Front Army will be ordered to cooperate
with you in a north-south pincer attack to wipe out the forces of He Zhuguo,
Mao Bingwen, and the others. This will accomplish a complete joining of the
three Front Armies, and open up a glorious situation in the Northwest.
4. Communications with the radio station of the International have been
established as of the sixth. It is hoped that Elder Brother Guotao will report by
telegram the situation and opinions of the Fourth Front Army, so that they may
transmitted to the International.

[Lin] Yuying
[Zhou] Enlai

[Luo] Fu [Zhang Wentian]
Bo Gu

[Mao] Zedong
[Peng] Dehuai

The Principles of Concurrent Concentration
and Dispersal of Local Armed Forces
(July 23, 1936, 3:00 A.M.)

Peng [Dehuai]:
Regarding the question of the concurrent concentration and dispersal of local armed forces:
1. As for the principles of concurrent concentration and dispersal of local armed forces, dispersal is to stop at the level of the squad, and concentration should stop at the level of the independent division. In between there are the various configurations of platoon, company, and regiment, which are to be appropriately deployed according to the enemy’s situation and the degree to which the soviet area is consolidated. When the enemy’s presence is serious and the soviet area is not yet consolidated, deployment should be weighted toward dispersal.
2. In the Central Soviet Area in the past and in the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area during the spring of this year, deployment was overconcentrated. This caused the _xian_, districts, and townships to lose the military power for self-defense and the Party and government at the _xian_, district, and township levels to lose the ability to command guerrilla warfare. Thus when the enemy attacked, it became disadvantageous for us.
3. As for the new Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia soviet areas, faced as they are with the tasks of wiping out the landlord militias and other bandits, defense against activities of external enemies, and establishing and consolidating the political power of the masses, generally speaking within one or two _xian_, or in special cases within one or two districts, self-defense forces of at least a company, a platoon, or a squad must be deployed. For example, in the two _xian_ of Ding[bian] and An[bian], there are seven to eight bandit gangs, and because there are no armed forces in these localities, it has been impossible to establish political power to this day, and more than ten staff people were killed by the bandits.
4. Please consider the questions of dispersed deployment of independent divisions and avoiding overconcentration of other local armed forces.

Zedong

Interview with Edgar Snow
on Special Questions
(July 23, 1936)

Snow: In actual practice, if the Chinese revolution were victorious, would the economic and political relationship between Soviet China and Soviet Russia be maintained within the Third International or a similar organization, or would there probably be some kind of actual merger of governments? Would the Chinese Soviet government be comparable in its relation to Moscow to the present government of Outer Mongolia?

Mao: I assume this is a purely hypothetical question. As I have told you, the Red Army is not now seeking the hegemony of power, but a united China against Japanese imperialism.
The Third International is an organization in which the vanguard of the world proletariat brings together its collective experience for the benefit of all revolutionary peoples throughout the world. It is not an administrative organization, nor has it any political power beyond that of an advisory capacity. Structurally it is not very different from the Second International, though in content it is vastly different. But just as no one would say that in a country where the Cabinet is organized by the social-democrats the Second International is dictator, so it is ridiculous to say that the Third International is dictator in countries where there are Communist parties.
In the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party is in power, yet even there the Third International does not rule, nor does it have any direct political power over the people at all. Similarly, it can be said that although the Communist Party of China is a member of the Comintern, still this in no sense means that Soviet China is ruled by Moscow or by the Comintern. We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow!
The Chinese Communist Party is only one party in China, and in its victory it will have to speak for the whole nation. It cannot speak for the Russian people or rule for the Third International, but only in the interests of the Chinese masses. Only where the interests of the Chinese masses coincide with the interests of the Russian masses can it be said to be “obeying the will” of Moscow. But of course

this basis of common benefit will be tremendously broadened, once the masses
of China are in democratic power and socially and economically emancipated,
like their brothers in Russia.

When Soviet governments have been established in many countries the problem of an international union of soviets may arise, and it will be interesting to
see how it will be solved. But today I cannot suggest the formula; it is a problem
which has not been and cannot be solved in advance. In the world of today, with
increasingly close economic and cultural intimacies between different states and
peoples, such a union would seem to be highly desirable, if achieved on a
voluntary basis.

Clearly, however, the last point is of utmost importance; such a world union
could be successful only if every nation had the right to enter or leave the union
according to the will of its people, and with its sovereignty intact, and certainly
never at the “command” of Moscow. No Communist ever thought otherwise, and
the myth of “world domination from Moscow” is an invention of the Fascists and
counterrevolutionaries.

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in
the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the
people’s revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic
will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at its own will. The
Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics
attached to the China federation. The unequal treatment of national minorities, as
practiced by the Guomindang, can have no part in the Soviet program, nor can it
be a part of the program of a democratic republic.

Snow: Please explain why it is that such help as the U.S.S.R. might render to a
victorious Soviet China would differ fundamentally from imperialist activity in
China in the past. Why are the charges of “Red Imperialism” in this connection
in your opinion absurd?

Mao: Some people say that the Fascists have no creative ability whatever. With
this, I don’t altogether agree. Because really they have created this epithet “Red
Imperialism” as their own product and it is a perfect example of the creative level
of Fascist cerebration. Behind this epithet the Japanese and Chinese Fascists hope
to subjugate China. But we do not have to go beyond the pages of Guomindang
history itself to see whether or not this kind of propaganda makes any sense.

If there is such a thing as “Red Imperialism,” the Nanjing government itself
owes its life to it. When Dr. Sun Yatsen led the Guomindang revolution, as
everyone knows, Borodin and General Galin were assisting the Guomindang and
the Communist Party was cooperating, and Communists led many of the best
cadres of the Nationalist movement. At that time no Guomindang member talked
about “Red Imperialism.” But after the Guomindang became counterrevolutionary, betrayed Dr. Sun’s principles, began to oppress the peasants and workers,
and compromised with Imperialism, its worst elements then created the epithet
“Red Imperialism,” which became in the reactionary press a cloak behind which
they could hide their treachery from the Chinese people.

What are the facts? Even Chiang Kaishek cannot deny that when the
Guomindang cooperated with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party the revolution reached a high level, imperialism shook to its foundations, and the prospect of
national liberation was very bright. With Sun Yatsen’s death the worst members
of his party began to betray his principles and policies, the national movement
suddenly began to decline, the Guomindang lost all its revolutionary content,
compromised with imperialism, gave the best parts of China to Japan without
resistance, and accepted imperialist help to carry on a long civil war against the
people’s revolution.

Only after ten years of imperialist aggression, and the rapid enslavement of great
masses of the Chinese people, is Nanjing now beginning to realize that in the Soviet
Union China has a true friend, and that the Guomindang can resist imperialism only
by reuniting with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party.

Today the struggle has sharpened to a war between two camps: the first, led by
Japan, is composed of traitors and reactionaries, who form the so-called anti-Red
front jointly with Japanese imperialism; the second is composed of the great majority
of the Chinese people, and of those countries which sympathize with the Chinese
revolution, and this is the front against Japanese imperialism. The anti-Red front is
based on cooperation with Japanese imperialism. The anti-Japanese front is based on
cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and those countries which sympathize with China’s
struggle for independence. The anti-Red front means national enslavement. The
anti-Japanese front means national liberation. The Chinese people must gradually
form themselves on one front or the other; the two are irreconcilable.

It is true that many members of the Guomindang are now forced by circumstance, and in order to maintain their self-preservation, to reconsider their policy.
In the past there have been such patriots as Song Qingling, He Xiangning,² Chen
Mingshu, Cai Tingkai, Li Jishen,³ and Jiang Guangnai,⁴ and these men understood the fundamental mistake of the Guomindang in trying to “annihilate the
Reds.” Today, Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang, Sun Fo, Song Ziwen, Zhang
Xueliang, and others are changing their point of view and appear to be willing to
revive their cooperation with the Soviet Union.

--- Notes

Our source for this telegram is the 1986 annual compendium of Wenxian he yanjiu, p. 103.


Our source for this telegram is _Mao Zedong junshi wenji_, Vol. 1, pp. 558–59, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.


Our source for this text is once again Edgar Snow’s typescript. (For details, see above, the source note to the interview of July 15.) Substantial extracts from this interview appeared in Stuart Schram, _The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung_ (New York, Praeger, 1963).

1. “Special Questions” refers here to miscellaneous questions not dealt with in Snow’s interviews of July 15 on foreign affairs, July 16 on Japanese imperialism, and July 18–19 on internal affairs.


² Regarding Song Qingling and He Xiangning, see below, the relevant notes to
Mao’s letters of September 18, 1936, to Song Qingling, and June 25, 1937, to He
Xiangning.
³ Here Snow’s manuscript has the Cantonese rendering of this name, Li Chai-sum.
For biographical information about Li, see below, the relevant note to Mao’s letter to him
dated September 22, 1936.
⁴ For biographical information about Cai Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai, and Chen
Mingshu, see below, the relevant notes to Mao’s letter of September 22, 1936, to Jiang
and Cai.