Interview with Edgar Snow
on Japanese Imperialism
(July 16, 1936)
Snow: If Japanese militarism is defeated and driven from China, do you think
the major problem of foreign imperialism will in general have been solved here?
Mao: Yes. If other imperialist countries do not act as Japan, and if China defeats
Japan, it will mean that the Chinese masses have awakened, have mobilized, and
have established their independence. Therefore the main problem of imperialism
will have been solved.
Snow: The Chinese Soviet government has issued many appeals and proclamations calling for a United Front of the parties, armies, etc. to fight to the death
against Japanese imperialism and to drive Japan's armies from China. Does it
believe that China is now capable of defeating Japan alone-i.e., without the
help of any foreign power?
Mao: Let me first remind you that neither China nor Japan is an isolated country; the problem of peace or war in the Orient is a world problem. Japan has her
potential¹ allies Germany and Italy, for example and to oppose Japan successfully China also must seek assistance from other powers. This does not
mean, however, that China is incapable of fighting Japan without foreign help.²
It does not mean that we must wait for foreign alliances before we begin to resist
Japan.
China is a vast reservoir of unutilized power which in a period of great
struggle can be canalized through organization into mighty lines of resistance. In
the long period of internal conflict begun by the counterrevolutionaries in 1927
the Chinese people has already learned much about this power, and has found a
good means of directing it, through the struggle of the Communist Party. In their
long political experience the Chinese masses have mastered the use of very
effective weapons to oppose their enemies.
Now, especially since September 18, 1931, the traitors' demagogy has been
bankrupted and few people today are deceived by it. The masses increasingly
recognize those who lead in their real interest. Even some of the Guomindang
members have participated, or want to participate, in the anti-Japanese movement.
We are confident that the Chinese people will not submit to Japanese imperialism. We are confident that they will mobilize their great reserves of power
to resist Japan on the field of battle, and with their utmost vigor meet the
challenge of the invader. In this struggle ultimate victory will certainly be
China's. If she fights alone the sacrifice will be comparatively great and the
duration of the war will be comparatively long, for Japan is a strong, wellequipped power and will have, besides, her own allies. In order to achieve
victory over Japanese imperialism within the shortest time possible, and with the
smallest waste, China must first of all realize a United Front within her own
borders, and secondly must seek to extend it to all those powers whose interests
are the interests of peace in the Pacific.
Snow: Under what conditions can the Chinese people defeat and exhaust the
forces of Japan?
Mao: Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the
National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the
oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the
central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves.
Snow: How long do you think such a war would last?
Mao: That depends on the strength of the Chinese People's Front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan, and the degree of international help given to
China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If the Chinese
People's Front is powerfully homogeneous, if it is effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China is considerable from those
governments which recognize the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own
interests, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will be short and victory
speedily won. If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very
long, but in the end just the same Japan will be defeated, only the sacrifices will
be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world. The Chinese
Communist Party, the Soviet government, the Red Army, and the Chinese people are ready to unite with any power to shorten the duration of this war, but if none
joins us we are determined to carry on alone.3
Snow: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a
war, politically and militarily?
Mao: Two questions are involved here the policy of the foreign powers, and
the strategy of China's armies.
Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed and it is well known.
Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making
economic, political, or territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the
advance of Japan, are only indulging in utopian fancy. Nanjing has in the past
adopted erroneous policies based on this strategy, and we have only to look at
the map of East Asia to see the results of it.
But we know well enough that not only North China but the lower Yangzi
Valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental
program. Moreover, it is just as clear that the Japanese navy aspires to blockade
the China seas and to seize the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, and the
Dutch East Indies. In the event of war Japan will try to make them her strategic
bases, cutting off Great Britain, France, and America from China, and monopolizing the seas of the southern Pacific. These moves are included in Japan's plans
of naval strategy, copies of which we have seen. And such naval strategy will be
coordinated with the land strategy of Japan.
China will, of course, be in an extremely difficult position at such a time. But
the majority of the Chinese people believes it can overcome these difficulties.
Only the rich men in China's seaports are defeatist. They are afraid they will lose
their property.
So as China considers questions of economy, of sources of supplies of war
materials, etc., these questions of the Japanese naval blockade, of the cessation
of commerce, etc. must inevitably come up for answer by the foreign powers. If
Japan is to be allowed to isolate China as easily as she did Manchuria, if the
powers are to do nothing more than they did there, then naturally Japan's task
will tend to be minimized.
Ideally, of course, our military strategy should be the strategy of the "inner
front." That is, if the foreign nations, if Great Britain, America, France, and the
U.S.S.R. resist the Japanese blockade, they will arrange themselves in the strategy of the "outer front." China would then fight in the milieu of Japanese
imperialism, while the other countries opposed Japan on the periphery. In such a
situation the possible encirclement and crushing of Japan's imperial war machine
in a brief period would be manifest.
Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue her fight
against Japan, once the latter had seized certain strategic points on the coast, and
enforced a blockade. This is nonsense. To refute it we have only to refer to the
history of the Red Army. In certain periods our forces have been exceeded
numerically some ten or twenty times by the Guomindang troops, which were
also superior to us in equipment. Their economic resources many times surpassed ours, and they received material assistance from the outside. Why, then,
has the Red Army scored success after success against the White troops, and not
only survived but increased its power till today?
The explanation is that the Red Army and the Soviet Government had created
among all people within their areas a rocklike solidarity, because everyone in the
Soviet was ready to fight for their government against its oppressors, because
every person was voluntarily and consciously fighting for his own interests and
what he believed to be right. Secondly, in the struggle of the Soviets the people
were led by men of ability, strength, and determination, equipped with deep
understanding of the strategic political, economic, and military needs of their
position. The Red Army won its many victories beginning with only a few
dozen rifles in the hands of determined revolutionaries because its solid base in
the people attracted friends even among the White troops, among the civilian
populace as well as among the troops. The enemy was infinitely our superior
militar[il]y, but politically it was immobilized.
In the anti-Japanese war the Chinese people would have on their side greater
advantages than those the Red Army has utilized in its struggle with the
Guomindang. China is a very big nation, and it cannot be said to be conquered until
every inch of it is under the sword of the invader. If Japan should succeed in
occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many
as 100 or even 200 million population, we will still be far from defeated. We shall
still have left a great force to fight against Japan's warlords, who will also have to
fight a heavy and constant rear-guard action throughout the entire war.
As for munitions, the Japanese cannot seize our arsenals in the interior, which
are sufficient to equip Chinese armies for many years, nor can they prevent us
from capturing great amounts of arms and ammunition from their own hands. By
the latter method the Red Army has equipped its present forces from the
Guomindang; for nine years they have been our "ammunition-carriers." What
infinitely greater possibilities would open up for the utilization of such tactics as
won our arms for us if the whole Chinese people were united against Japan!
Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of
China's economy also presents advantages in a war against the highly centralized and highly concentrated economy of Japan. For example, to sever Shanghai
from the rest of China is not as disastrous to the country as would be, for
instance, the severance of New York from the rest of America. Moreover, it is
impossible for Japan to isolate all of China; China's northwest, southwest, and
west cannot be blockaded by Japan, who is continentally still a sea power.

Thus, once more the central point of the problem becomes the mobilization
and unification of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a People's
United Front, such as has been advocated by the Communist Party ever since
1932.
Snow: In the event of a Sino-Japanese war do you think there will be a revolution in Japan?
Mao: The Japanese revolution is not only a possibility, but a certainty. It is
inevitable and will begin to occur promptly after the first severe defeats suffered
by the Japanese Army.
Snow: Do you think Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia would become involved
in this war, and would come to the assistance of China? Under what circumstances is that likely?
Mao: Of course the Soviet Union is also not an isolated country. It cannot ignore
events in the Far East. It cannot remain passive. Will it complacently watch
Japan conquer all China and make of it a strategic base from which to attack the
U.S.S.R.? Or will it help the Chinese people to oppose their Japanese oppressors,
win their independence, and establish friendly relations with the Russian people?
We think Russia will choose the latter course.
We believe that once the Chinese people have their own government and
begin the war of resistance and want to establish friendly alliances with the
U.S.S.R., as well as other friendly powers, the Soviet Union will be in the
vanguard to shake hands with us. The struggle against Japanese imperialism is a
world task and the Soviet Union, as part of that world, can no more remain
neutral than can England or America.
Snow: Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regain all the territories
lost to Japan, or only to drive Japan from North China, and all Chinese territory
above4 the Great Wall?
Mao: It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not
merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese
colony, but when we have reestablished the independence of the lost territories
of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese
imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for
independence. The same thing applies for Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia,
which is populated by both Chinese and Mongolians, we will struggle to drive
Japan from there and help Inner Mongolia to establish an autonomous state.5
Snow: In case the Sino-Japanese war extends over a very long period and Japan
is not completely defeated, would the Communist government agree to make a
peace recognizing Japanese control over Manchuria?
Mao: Impossible! The Chinese Communists, like the Chinese people, will not
permit Japan to retain one inch of Chinese territory!
Snow: In actual practice, how could the Soviet government and the Red Army
cooperate with the Guomindang armies in a war against Japan? I.e., in a foreign
war it would be necessary for all Chinese armies to be placed under a centralized
command. Would the Red Army agree, if allowed representation on a supreme
war council, to submit to its decisions both militarily and politically?
Mao: Yes. Our government will wholeheartedly submit to the decisions of such
a council provided it really resists Japan.
Snow: Would the Red Army agree not to move its troops into or against any
areas occupied by Guomindang armies, except with the consent or at the order of
the supreme war council?
Mao: Yes. Certainly we will not move our troops into any areas occupied by
anti-Japanese armies nor have we done so for some time past. The Red Army
would not utilize any wartime situation in an opportunist way.
Snow: What demands would the Communist Party make in return for such
cooperation?
Mao: It would insist upon waging war, decisively and finally, against Japanese
aggression. In addition it would request the observance of the points advanced in
the calls for a democratic republic and the establishment of a national defense
government.6
Snow: How large a base does the Red Army need, and how much support from
the outside, to engage in anti-Japanese war?

Mao: The Red Army can fight from a small base or a large base, but the greater it is,
naturally the greater and stronger will be the force it can mobilize for fighting the
Japanese. If we have three or four provinces we can summon to war a greater and
more effective anti-Japanese force than Nanjing's entire army. As for help, we need
much, the more the better, but still we can get along very well without any outside
assistance. We have already been fighting without anybody's help in a ten-year
revolutionary struggle. We are always prepared for war. We were prepared for it
when we went into Shanxi, toward the Japanese positions in North China. At the
time we did not get any help from outside, but on the contrary we were opposed by
the combined forces of Yan Xishan and Chiang Kaishek, the Generalissimo alone
concentrating his ten best divisions in our path. This movement presented a big
obstacle to our advance against the Japanese.
At that time, in order to avoid more futile fratricidal warfare, and further
weaken[ing of] the potential power of Chinese resistance, we did not engage
those troops, but voluntarily withdrew to our base in Shanxi, to try to negotiate a
truce and realize the United Front. Since then we have intensified our anti-Japanese
preparations. We are ready. The sooner the war begins, we believe, the better are
the chances for success for China. Meanwhile, we are prepared to fight Japan
whenever our forces have a front against Japan's troops in China.
Snow: How can the people best be armed, organized, and trained to participate
in such a war?
Mao: The people must be given the right to organize and to arm themselves.
This is a freedom which Chiang Kaishek has in the past denied to them. The
suppression has not, however, been entirely successful-as, for example, in the
case of the Red Army. Also, despite severe repression in Beiping, in Shanghai,
and other places, the students have begun to organize themselves and have
already prepared themselves politically. But still the students and the revolutionary anti-Japanese masses have not yet got their freedom, cannot be mobilized, cannot be trained and armed. When the contrary is true, when the masses
are given economic, social, and political freedom, their strength will be intensified hundreds of times, and the true strength of the nation will be revealed.
The Red Army through its own struggle has won its freedom from the militarists to become an unconquerable power. The Anti-Japanese Volunteers have
won their freedom of action from the Japanese oppressors and have armed themselves in a similar way. If the Chinese people are trained, armed, and organized,
they can likewise become an invincible force.
The Red Army through its own struggle has won its freedom from the militarists to become an unconquerable power. The Anti-Japanese Volunteers have
won their freedom of action from the Japanese oppressors and have armed themselves in a similar way. If the Chinese people are trained, armed, and organized
they can likewise become an invincible force.
Snow: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy to be followed in this
"war of liberation"?
Mao: The strategy should be that of a war of maneuver, over an extended,
shifting, and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree
of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift
concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of maneuver rather than
the simple positional war of extensive trenchwork, deep-massed lines, and heavy
fortifications. Our strategy and tactics must be conditioned by the theater in
which the war will take place, and this dictates a war of maneuver.
This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be
defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must
be a war of maneuver, and important reliance must be placed on guerrilla and
partisan tactics. Fortified warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and
ultimately of secondary strategic importance.
Geographically the theater of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to
pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a
slow-moving war machine like Japan's cautiously feeling its way in front of
fierce rearguard actions. Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defense of a
vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical
advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Abyssinians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive
battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually to break the morale, the
fighting spirit, and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.
The mistake of the Abyssinians, quite aside from the internal political weakness
of their position, was that they attempted to hold a deep front, enabling the Fascists
to bombard, gas, and strike with their technically stronger military machines at
heavy immobile concentrations, exposing themselves to vital organic injury.
Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct, and politically
and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerrilla detachments among
the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units
of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power
of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasantry of all China. Properly led
and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy 24 hours a day and worry
them to death.
It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that
the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining

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Notes

Our source for this interview is Edgar Snow's typewritten manuscript (for details, see
above, the interview of July 15, 1936). The text was published largely as Snow had
written it in The China Weekly Review on November 14 and 21, 1936, but as indicated in
a note by the editor of that periodical, what he called "personal references" had been
excised from the original. In fact, the brief passages omitted were not so much personal as
potentially offensive to the Guomindang censors, or to Chiang Kaishek. The more important of these variants are noted below.
1. Note by Snow to his manuscript: "This was before the signing of the
Japan-German Anti-Communist Agreement [i.e., the Anti-Comintern Pact of November
1936], and Italian recognition of Manchukuo. The word 'potential' now seems
superfluous.-E.S."
2. The foregoing sentence is emphasized by underlining in Snow's manuscript, and is
set in italics in the text as published.
3. Here Snow added a note pointing out that Soviet China had officially declared war
on Japan in 1932. For the text of that declaration, see Volume IV, pp. 206-8.
4. The manuscript refers here to territory "above the Great Wall," but in the light of
Mao's reply this should obviously read "below the Great Wall"; this error is corrected in
the text as published in the China Weekly Review for November 14, 1936.
5. Here Snow inserted a footnote referring to the discussion of this question in his
interview of July 23, 1936, of which the full text appears below.
6. As indicated in a note by Snow here, the reference is to the proclamation of June 1,
1936, translated above, and other similar documents.
7. Here the published text omits a substantial passage printed below in italics.
8. The preceding two sentences were among the "personal references" omitted from
the text of this interview as published in The China Weekly Review.
9. The following paragraph has also been omitted from the published text.