(July 1, 1936, 8:00 P.M.)
Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have received your various telegrams. We have basically understood
the situation with regard to Ma of Ning[xia],¹ the Red Army, local work, and the
pros and cons of fording the river westward.
2. The Second Front Army and Fourth Front Army have already set out and
will reach the Songpan area around the middle of July. In early August they may
leave southeast Gansu and attack Wang Jun and Mao Bingwen.² We should send
the Twenty-eighth Army southward to support by coordinated action, and subsequently have them enter southern Shaanxi and move toward the eastern side of
the river so as to support by coordinated action the efforts in Guangdong and
Guangxi.
3. The operational guidelines for our field armies should follow your
plan. The goal for July is to turn Red the present locations, and the goal for
August is to press close to the river and seek battle. As for September and
after, decisions will be made according to circumstances. If Outer Mongolia
can send troops and send armaments under guard, and the conditions exist for
our forces to cross the river and do battle, then it would be best to go to
Ningxia; otherwise we would have to wait for the freeze. If we must wait for
the freeze, then before December, aside from Lingwu and Jinji,³ the area of
operations for our troops should be extended to the areas around Guyuan,
Haiyuan, and Jingyuan so as to turn Red the entire area between Dingbian-Anbian-Jingbian and Jingyuan. At that time the Northeastern Army should
have no reason to advance northward, and it should be possible to consolidate
the Gansu-Ningxia border.
4. There is at present a possibility for our relationship with the Northeastern
Army to develop one step further. After the Second Front Army and the Fourth

3. I.e., from intelligence reports.
4. The editors of the Junshi wenji indicate that "a distant place" [yuanfang] refers
here to the Soviet Union and the Comintern. See above, the Introduction, regarding the
reestablishment of radio communications with Moscow in June 1936.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 553-55, where it is
reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. This refers to Ma Hongkui; see the previous text.
2. Wang was commander of the Third Army under the Guomindang army's
Northwest "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, and Mao was commander of the
Thirty-seventh Army.
3. Until 1960, the name of a xian in Ningxia.


Front Army move northward there will surely be a change in the situation, and that could perhaps be the time to establish a northwest government.⁴ Our policy is to strive to achieve this. Yet even if we can do so, fighting through to the Soviet Union to obtain assistance remains an important move in the overall strategic guidelines. It is necessary to do this, both for the Red Army and for the Northeastern Army, but there will be more favorable conditions for conducting operations at that time.
5. In July our work should be centered on the three tasks of turning areas Red, expanding the Red Army, and training. As for the importance of adding new recruits, the situation is that we are getting ready to receive gifts from a distant place,⁵ so that a related issue is to achieve more uniform training among the troops. Another subsidiary question is that we should make sure to acquire a large number of mules and horses. The number of new recruits and mules and horses should be sufficient to carry ten thousand rifles and three million bullets. In addition, more clothing will be needed upon crossing the river westward to pass the winter. Each person will need to have cotton-padded clothes and wind-breakers; care should be taken in winter.
6. In order to prepare for political and military initiatives in the Northeastern Army shortly after the Second Front Army and the Fourth Front Army move northward (it is extremely important to take action early for the purpose of supporting the Southwest through coordinated action), during the months of July and August great efforts must be put into the three levels of army, division, and regiment in said military forces. The division of labor at present is for you to take complete charge of things within the borders of Gansu, and for Zhou [Enlai] and me to be responsible for things within the borders of Shaanxi. The method: relatively capable people should be sent separately to meet with army, division, and regimental commanders and, according to their level of consciousness and receptivity, explain to them five or six basic, concrete questions such as “resist-ing Japan,” “opposing Chiang,” “uniting with Russia,” “uniting with the Com-munists,” “the question of the Northeastern Army itself,” and “organizational questions.” I ask that you now first recruit some cadres at the front (such as Deng Xiaoping, Huang Kecheng,⁶ and so on) and, after you have trained them and suitable leads have been found, send them out to travel back and forth between the other side and our side. After a few days we may send both [Li] Kenong and

4. At this time, the Central Committee advocated a Northwest Government of National Defense. Later, the policy changed; the slogan of creating such regional governments was replaced by a call for the establishment of a democratic republic on a national scale.
5. As in the previous text, dated June 29, this refers to the Soviet Union and the Comintern. Mao expected to get arms from the Soviet Union, so the Red Army would need more soldiers to use them.
6. At this time, Deng was deputy head of the Political Department of the First Army Group of the First Front Army; Huang was political commissar of the Fourth Division of the First Army Group of the First Front Army.


[Zhang] Yunyi as reinforcements.⁷ Please pay a great deal of attention to this matter. Over here we have mobilized [Ye] Jianying, [Li] Kenong, and [Bian] Zhangwu⁸ separately to make assaults on the three divisions, three brigades, and eighteen regiments of Wang [Yizhe]’s and Liu [Duoquan]’s forces.⁹ This middle stratum is the axle, and is most important at this time. As for the upper stratum, and establishing a foundation for the Party within the Northeastern Army, greater efforts are being made now and prospects are very good.
7. The content of this telegram is not to be revealed to lower levels. You yourselves are responsible for carrying out all the various items calling for action stipulated herein.

[Mao] Zedong

7. Li was head of the political security section of the Northwest Revolutionary Military Commission’s rear office, and Zhang was its chief of staff.
8. Bian Zhangwu was head of the Fifth Section of the Red Army First Front Army’s headquarters.
9. Wang was commander of the Sixty-seventh Army under the Guomindang army’s Northwest “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters, and Liu was commander of its 101st Division.