Central Committee's Guiding Principles on the Work Concerning the Northeastern Army
|| June 20, 1936, at Wayaobao ||
I. Assessment of the Northeastern Army
Given the special political position currently occupied by the Northeastern Army (a position of being partitioned by the powers), and given the revolutionary influence of the Red Army on the Northeastern Army, there is a very great possibility that the Northeastern Army can be transformed into an anti-Japanese revolutionary army.

However, the Northeastern Army is still in a transitional period of becoming an anti-Japanese revolutionary force. At present, it is generally still an army under the command of the traitorous chieftain Chiang Kai-shek; Chiang Kai-shek's fascist minions in the Political Training Office hold a position of legal supervisor and propagandist there. On the other hand, the highest leaders of the Northeastern Army as well as a portion of its senior officers have already shown determination and sincerity in resisting Japan. The anti-Japanese sentiment among the middle and lower-ranking officers and soldiers is very high, which facilitates our propaganda and activities for resisting Japan and saving the nation. However, the pace of transformation within the Northeastern Army is uneven: some units are in the most advanced stage, some are transforming extremely slowly, and others have yet to begin their transformation and are under the direct influence of Chiang Kai-shek's fascist Political Training Office. Consequently, the level of political awakening within the Northeastern Army also varies greatly—Central Committee's Guiding Principles on the Work Concerning the Northeastern Army 285
286. Yet this unevenness and inconsistency cannot negate the fundamental assessment that the entire Northeastern Army has a very great possibility of being transformed into an anti-Japanese army. Moreover, this unevenness and inconsistency should serve as the starting point for our work.
II. Winning Over the Northeastern Army to the Anti-Japanese Front is Our Basic Policy
To transform the Northeastern Army into an anti-Japanese army depends on our efforts to win it over. Winning the Northeastern Army over to the anti-Japanese cause is our basic policy.

Therefore, the objectives of our work within the Northeastern Army are twofold. First, it is not to disintegrate or split the Northeastern Army, but to provide it with a thorough anti-Japanese program, so that the Northeastern Army can unite around this program and become a strong anti-Japanese armed force. Second, it is not to turn the Northeastern Army into a Red Army that supports the basic political program of the Communist Party, but to make the Northeastern Army a friendly force to the Red Army, so that the program of resisting Japan and saving the nation proposed by the Communist Party becomes their own program. At present, all statements and actions that exceed this scope are to be excluded.

The method for winning over the Northeastern Army primarily relies on patient political work of persuasion and explanation, striving to win it over politically to the anti-Japanese front. Without political persuasion, there is no way to rely on schemes and tricks to make the Northeastern Army a strong anti-Japanese armed force that struggles to the end for the sacred cause of resisting Japan and saving the nation. But this does not exclude the necessity of taking military action against certain portions of the Northeastern Army. When portions of the Northeastern Army that lack sufficient political awakening, are self-satisfied and arrogant, and are under the pressure and coercion of Chiang Kai-shek and the Political Training Office, and take actively aggressive hostile action against us, our armed forces, under possibly favorable conditions, should strike a blow against them. Such action is, on the one hand, for self-defense, and on the other hand, to teach these portions of the Northeastern Army a lesson, thereby creating the possibility for smoothly conducting political work within them thereafter. Therefore, the purpose of such military action is likewise for political winning over, not for annihilating the Northeastern Army.
III. The Main Key to Currently Winning Over the Northeastern Army
To transform the Northeastern Army into an anti-Japanese army, the main key at present is to make the Northeastern Army break away from the control and influence of the traitorous chieftain Chiang Kai-shek, openly rise up against all of Chiang Kai-shek's shameless acts that forfeit sovereignty and humiliate the nation, and refuse to carry out Chiang Kai-shek's orders to attack the Soviet areas and the Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek's agent within the Northeastern Army is that fascist Political Training Office. In front of all officers and soldiers of the Northeastern Army, we should use every fact of Chiang Kai-shek forfeiting sovereignty and humiliating the nation to expose every deception of Chiang Kai-shek and his Political Training Office. To every slogan opposing us put forth by the Political Training Office, we must provide a timely, forceful rebuttal. Our rebuttals should make use of ironclad facts that no one can deny. We must concentrate our fire and fiercely attack Chiang Kai-shek and his Political Training Office, pitting the Northeastern Army against the fascist Political Training Office at every turn, so that the Political Training Office is completely isolated and surrounded by hostile circumstances. Only through this kind of struggle can the few individuals within the Northeastern Army most loyal to Chiang Kai-shek be placed in the position of running dogs for traitors and collaborators, in the position of internal traitors within the Northeastern Army, and face the scorn of all officers and soldiers of the Northeastern Army. Only through this kind of struggle can vacillating and neutral elements be transformed onto the anti-Japanese front. Only through this kind of struggle can the internal political unity of the Northeastern Army be further consolidated.
When portions of the Northeastern Army transition from partial struggles against Chiang Kai-shek and the Political Training Office to the entire Northeastern Army openly rising up to oppose Chiang Kai-shek and the fascist 288
Political Training Office, that will also be the time when the entire Northeastern Army openly calls for and implements resistance against Japan.
IV. The United Front Within the Northeastern Army
Our aim is to win over the entire Northeastern Army, so our united front within the Northeastern Army should proceed simultaneously at both the upper and lower levels, and both are for achieving the same purpose, namely, making the Northeastern Army an anti-Japanese army.

The upper-level united front has especially important significance in the Northeastern Army, because many officers of the Northeastern Army are natives of the Northeast, and thus many among them harbor anti-Japanese sentiment and will, facilitating our forming an anti-Japanese united front with them against the traitors. This united front can take various forms, whether written or unwritten (such as mutual non-aggression, mutual notification, mutual consultation, etc.). What is particularly important is that within the united front, we should strive to get close to them and sincerely present our anti-Japanese and national salvation proposals and methods; to every question they raise, we should provide the clearest, most detailed, and most sincere answer; regarding the difficult problems they encounter, we should adopt the standpoint of a friendly force and jointly consult with them to seek appropriate solutions, absolutely never allowing partial conflicts or misunderstandings to harm the overall situation. In this process of cooperation, we should gradually concretize the policy of resisting Japan and saving the nation, so as to guide preparatory actions for resisting Japan and punishing the traitors.

In order to step up preparations and secure a favorable moment for launching, it is permissible for the leaders of the Northeastern Army to adopt diplomatic coping measures in their dealings with the Nanjing government, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Political Training Office at present, and this is also necessary before the launching. But such measures should not cause the Northeastern Army to lose its political stance of resisting Japan and saving the nation in front of the entire Chinese people; at the same time, matters related to the Soviets and the Red Army must be decided through consultation.
The lower-level united front within the Northeastern Army is aimed at uniting the lower officers and soldiers of the Northeastern Army under the political goal of resisting Japan and saving the nation, creating a strong lower-level foundation and driving force for the Northeastern Army. In this way, the defection of individual upper-level officers cannot affect the lower-level officers and soldiers; the lower-level officers and soldiers can use their anti-Japanese demands and sentiments to push their commanders toward resisting Japan, firming up their commanders' anti-Japanese resolve, and anti-Japanese commanders can also gain a reliable force to depend on.
The lower-level united front can also take various forms, from mutual non-firing or firing shots into the air, all the way to mutual liaison. The lower-level united front should express passive resistance, go-slows, and perfunctory responses to orders for the Northeastern Army to attack the Soviet areas and the Red Army (for example, if superior orders demand building blockhouses, they might not build them, or build them but not sturdily, etc.).
The simultaneous advance and mutual coordination of the upper-level and lower-level united fronts can surely strengthen the Northeastern Army politically, accelerating the process of transforming the Northeastern Army into an anti-Japanese army.
V. Creating a Strong Leadership Core Within the Northeastern Army
At present, the work of our Party organizations at all levels concerning the Northeastern Army primarily involves exerting influence on the Northeastern Army from the outside. We use our propaganda materials, letters, talks, fraternization gatherings, comfort missions, theatrical performances, and other methods to influence the Northeastern Army. This method is necessary at the beginning, and we must also go through this method to establish their own leadership core inside the Northeastern Army, to carry out work within it.
A great weakness in the Northeastern Army currently is that there are only individual leading officers, but no leadership core. In the process of carrying out work on the Northeastern Army from the outside, we Central Committee's Guiding Principles on the Work Concerning the Northeastern Army 289
should help the Northeastern Army discover, identify, and educate a batch of its own brave and active elements, organizing them into a strong core. Through this core, we can drive the work of resisting Japan and saving the nation throughout the entire Northeastern Army, and can also conduct organized struggles against the fascist Political Training Office and all internal traitors. This organization should first spread universally among the various armies, divisions, and regiments. This organization could use names such as
"Northeastern Anti-Japanese Soldiers' Society," "Northeastern Anti-Japanese Association," "Recover the Northeast Society," or "Looking East Society," etc. Without this organization and leadership from within the Northeastern Army itself, the work concerning the Northeastern Army cannot proceed with unified step and smoothly.
In our work on the Northeastern Army from the outside, we must not only find individual anti-Japanese sympathizers and supporters, but also ensure that each element we find becomes, within the Northeastern Army itself, a propagandist and organizer for resisting Japan and saving the nation. We must not only tell these comrades the principles of resisting Japan and saving the nation but also teach them methods and ways of carrying out activities. We must understand that our work in the Northeastern Army places us in the role of helper and guide, not in the role of substituting for the Northeastern Army and taking over everything. The work of the Northeastern Army must be handled by the active elements and cadres from within the Northeastern Army itself; without countless such active elements and cadres, our work will lack strength and foundation.

VI. The Northeast Army Should Have Communist Party Cells and Branches
Within the Northeast Army, the most outstanding elements should be absorbed into the Communist Party. Any organization within the Northeast Army willing to join the Communist Party must remain entirely secret, and for the time being, Party cells should not establish horizontal relationships. However, apart from internal Party life, the activities of Communist Party members should be completely open. This is because the primary task of Communist Party members in the Northeast Army is to organize and unite all anti-Japanese and patriotic activists within the Northeast Army, so as to make the Northeast Army a staunch anti-Japanese force. Within the Northeast Army, they should present themselves entirely as anti-Japanese activists. In the leadership core of the Northeast Army, there should be a capable and efficient Communist Party cell to implement all of the Party’s strategies and decisions within the Northeast Army. The stronger the Communist Party organization, the more resolute the Northeast Army will become. The notion that the development of the Communist Party would disintegrate the Northeast Army must be resolutely opposed.

Under every possible condition, we should send our best comrades into the Northeast Army to carry out work and develop Party organizations there. In anticipation of future developments, we should now begin cultivating and training a group of cadres specifically designated for work in the Northeast Army.

VII. Party Work Should Be Conducted in All Areas Where the Northeast Army Is Stationed
In all areas where the Northeast Army is stationed, the task of winning over the Northeast Army must be the central work of the local Party there. The Party branch executive committee is the leader of this work. However, in addition to the overall responsibility borne by the branch executive committee, one comrade within the committee should be specially assigned to take charge of this work, responsible for its planning, organization, and leadership. Through the Party branch, all local masses, women and children, guerrilla units, and Red Guard and Junior Vanguard units should be mobilized to carry out this work. District committees, county committees, and provincial committees should all designate specific personnel or committees (such as at the provincial or county level) to take responsibility for conducting this work.

The methods used by local Party organizations in carrying out work within the Northeast Army should not be rigid or uniform everywhere. They must first examine the local conduct of the Northeast Army, the activities of its political training offices, and its relations with local militia, and then adopt approaches suited to these specific conditions. If the Northeast Army engages in harassing, looting, or abducting the people, we should adopt measures such as strengthening defenses and clearing the countryside, as well as launching guerrilla warfare, to strike at them and create various difficulties, thereby prompting their awakening. At the same time, during such actions, we must still carry out our propaganda and agitation work (such as distributing leaflets, writing slogans, and shouting slogans everywhere). Soldiers captured by our guerrilla forces should, after being disarmed, be well treated and then released (given propaganda materials if available, and helped to write letters if possible), and we should establish regular relations with them. As for those utterly evil fascist ringleaders or militia chieftains, if captured, they should be executed by shooting, and their crimes publicly announced. If the Northeast Army units stationed locally behave well, methods such as expressions of appreciation and joint celebrations can be used to win them over to the anti-Japanese front.

The Communist Party is the leader of the entire Chinese revolution. It stands above the enemy, and its vision is far-reaching. Whatever the conduct of the Northeast Army may be, it will never abandon the work of winning over the Northeast Army. However, it is not foolish; it will not always apply a single approach toward the Northeast Army regardless of its conduct, thereby causing itself losses. It must employ a variety of methods to deal with the varied behavior of the Northeast Army.

VIII. The Unification and Distinction Between Liaison Offices and Work Committees
Only in key locations where the Northeast Army is stationed and where we already have agreements with the Northeast Army should we establish liaison offices. A liaison office is a specialized organ for carrying out work aimed at the Northeast Army. Around the liaison office, many activists from within the Northeast Army should be rallied. It must have the clearest understanding of all the actions and situations of the local Northeast Army. The organization of a liaison office should be simple and flexible, and its staff should be politically very strong. A liaison office is a local organization, subject to the direct leadership of the local Party. Problems it cannot resolve, as well as all reports on the situation of work within the Northeast Army, should be reported to the provincial or central Northeast Army Work Committee to receive regular guidance.

Apart from liaison offices, under the central or provincial Northeast Army Work Committees, there should be many mobile small work committees (or special envoys). These committees target specific units and move along with them, ensuring that various existing relationships can be continuously maintained and developed. Where liaison offices exist, these work committees should merge with them to work jointly, and the liaison office should be under their leadership.

Work committees should be more portable and simpler in organization than liaison offices. To facilitate work and prevent raids by local bullies and fascists, methods such as disguise may be adopted. The cadres of work committees must be even stronger politically.

IX. Explaining Our Policy on the Northeast Army to the Masses in the Soviet Areas: Striving to Protect the Interests of the Soviet Areas and the Masses
It is not surprising that many masses in the Soviet areas do not understand the strategy we have adopted toward the Northeast Army, because this method of winning them over is the most complex and an entirely new approach, and particularly because the poor conduct of some elements in the Northeast Army further confuses the masses.

We must constantly explain this issue to the masses in the Soviet areas. At the same time, we must point out that the level of political awareness within the Northeast Army is highly uneven and that the Northeast Army is not the same as the Red Army. Therefore, our methods for winning over the Northeast Army are also diverse. Winning over the Northeast Army and safeguarding the interests of the masses in the Soviet areas are not in conflict; rather, they complement each other. Sacrificing the interests of the Soviet area masses to win over the Northeast Army is not only fundamentally wrong but also makes it impossible to mobilize the Soviet area masses to carry out the work of winning over the Northeast Army. Winning over the Northeast Army is itself an important part of safeguarding the interests of the Soviet area masses. If a particular Soviet area, having suffered harassment from the Northeast Army, were to abandon the work of winning over the Northeast Army and harbor thoughts of retaliation, this would be tantamount to sacrificing the overall interests of the revolution for the sake of partial interests—which is naturally also a mistake.

X. Under All Circumstances, the Party Must Be the Leader of the Masses' Actions, and It Must Keep the Local Masses in Its Own Hands
Under all circumstances, the Party must be the leader of the masses' actions; it must keep the local masses firmly in its own hands. The organization of the masses, the arming of the masses, and the creation and expansion of guerrilla units are necessary under all circumstances. In times of peace, these organizations and armed units carry out peaceful work; in a combat environment, we mobilize them for battle. All mass organizations and armed forces must at all times be prepared to respond to any new emergencies. The greatest danger is to be caught off guard by a sudden incident, leading to panic and the disintegration of organizations. This is the gravest risk.

Now is a time of war. The Party in the Soviet areas and all the masses in the Soviet areas must be prepared for war. We must fight to defend our own interests and the interests of the entire revolution.

XI. Combating Erroneous Tendencies Within the Party Regarding the Northeast Army Issue
Within our Party, there are currently two opposing yet complementary erroneous tendencies regarding the Northeast Army issue.

One tendency is to think that since the Northeast Army has already united with us and is our friendly force, there is no difference between the Northeast Army and the Red Army. This tendency is naturally wrong, because there are fundamental and essential differences between the Northeast Army and the Red Army. The Red Army is a revolutionary army born and grown from the Chinese revolution and the Soviet revolution. The Northeast Army, on the other hand, is a former army of the ruling class that has the potential to transform into an anti-Japanese army (other differences need not be elaborated here).

The result of this tendency would inevitably lead us to abandon the combat task of winning over the Northeast Army and to forgo the mission of elevating the current Northeast Army onto the anti-Japanese front, treating the Northeast Army with the same attitude we have toward the Red Army. However, when the Northeast Army behaves poorly (and such poor conduct is encountered everywhere), these comrades become pessimistic and disappointed, and they express doubts or even opposition to the Party's strategy of winning over the Northeast Army.

Another tendency, because of seeing some poor conduct everywhere within the Northeast Army, is to doubt or even oppose the Party's strategy of winning them over from the very beginning. These comrades believe that all joint actions between the Northeast Army and us are fraudulent, intended solely to attack the Soviet areas and achieve their goal of eliminating them. This tendency is bolstered by the propaganda of certain bad elements within the Northeast Army. This tendency is also clearly erroneous because it fundamentally denies the great possibility of the Northeast Army transforming into an anti-Japanese force and ignores all the facts of cooperation between the Northeast Army and the Red Army. The result would likewise be the abandonment of the work of winning over the Northeast Army.

The main source of the errors in these two tendencies is that the comrades making these errors focus only on momentary phenomena rather than seeing the essence of the matter. Today, when they see one part of the Northeast Army behaving well, they say the Northeast Army is just like the Red Army; tomorrow, when they see another part behaving poorly, they say the Northeast Army is fundamentally useless. This fickle and inconsistent assessment prevents us from establishing a definite policy toward the Northeast Army and keeps us perpetually wavering. In the struggle against these two tendencies, we will carry out the Party's consistently firm policy toward the Northeast Army.

Guiding Principles of the Central Committee on Work in the Northeast Army

--- Notes

Selections from Materials on the Xi’an Incident, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1980.