It Would Be Appropriate That the Second and
Fourth Front Armies Move Northward
into Southern Gansu
(June 19, 1936)
To Comrades Zhu [De] and Zhang [Guotao], and also to be transmitted to Comrade [Ren] Bishi:


1. The current political situation has already undergone enormous changes,
which have brought the Chinese revolution to a new stage. The Party's task is to
cause the united front against Japan and Chiang [Kaishek] to progress and take a
more concrete form, which means to establish a national defense government
and organize a unified anti-Japanese army.


2. There is already the possibility and the necessity to organize rapidly a
national defense government in the Northwest. We should coordinate the initiative in the Northwest with the initiative in Guangdong and Guangxi.


3. The timing and strategic deployment of the initiative in the Northwest
must proceed from the principle of striving for victory, and on the basis of this
principle, take into consideration the conditions with regard to the various aspects of the situation. As regards the deployment of the Second Front Army and
the Fourth Front Army, we think it best for them to move to the southern part of
Gansu, and not go toward the area of the Xia and Yao rivers. The reasons for this
are as follows:


First, it would avoid triggering conflict between the Muslim and Han peoples
and would be advantageous in winning over the three Mas¹ in Qinghai. Hatred
between the Muslim and Han peoples has run extremely deep in the past, so that
if we wish to establish ourselves in the Northwest we must unite with the
Muslims. Otherwise there will be major negative consequences. With movement
toward the Xia and Yao rivers, the likelihood of stirring up conflict is great.


Second, the enemy is relatively weak in southern Gansu. Since Hu Zongnan's
transfer away, all that remain are the troops of Wang Jun, Mao Bingwen, and Lu
Dachang.² Ma Bufang will not go to southern Gansu. To go toward the Xia and
Yao rivers would mean confronting the forces of Wang, Mao, Lu, and Ma all
together in a very small area, which would make it rather difficult for the Red
Army to maneuver.


Third, deployment of the Red Army to southern Gansu will facilitate a subsequent eastward move to southern Shaanxi to provide coordinated support according to the political situation.


Fourth, southern Gansu is advantageous as regards replenishment [of troops].


Please consider the above guidelines and reply by telegram.


[Lin] Yuying Luo Fu [Zhou] Enlai
Bo Gu [Mao] Zedong [Peng] Dehuai


We have translated this telegram from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 549-50,
where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.



--- Notes



1. Refers to three Guomindang officials in Qinghai who were related to each other as
uncle and nephews: Ma Lin, chairman of the Guomindang Qinghai Provincial
Government; Ma Bufang, who held various posts such as army commander and division
commander under the Guomindang army's Northwest "Bandit Suppression" General
Headquarters; and Ma Buqing, a cavalry division commander under the same
headquarters. See also the note to Mao's poem of October 21, 1935, addressed to Peng
Dehuai.



2. Regarding Wang Jun, see above, the note to the text of September 8, 1935. For a
biography of Mao Bingwen, see above, the relevant note to the text of October 17,
1935. Lu Dachang (1889), a native of Gansu, was at this time commander of the
Fourteenth Division of the Guomindang Northwest "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters.