Remarks on the Southwestern Incident June 8, 1936, via the Shaanxi–Shantung telegraph line: A reporter from the Red China News Agency, in connection with the outbreak of the Southwestern Incident, specially interviewed Comrade Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Government, on June 1st.
The following statement was made:

On the radio we have heard news from Guangdong stating that the military and political leaders of Guangdong and Guangxi are demanding that the Nanjing government declare war against Japan and establish in Guangdong an Anti-Japanese National Salvation Government along with an Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army.
As the Nanjing government has not acceded to these demands, the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army of Guangdong and Guangxi has already advanced northward to overthrow the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek and move north to defend North China.
It thus appears that war is now inevitable.
According to our observations, because Chiang Kai-shek has consistently pursued a policy of capitulation to Japan, abandoning Manchuria and other territories, the position of the Nanjing government has been steadily declining.
Under such circumstances, it is entirely possible and indeed necessary for certain leaders within the Kuomintang who are genuinely committed to national salvation through resistance to Japan, together with opposition factions opposed to Nanjing, to break away from the central leadership.
Those patriots who refuse to follow Chiang Kai-shek down the path of national betrayal and enslavement should courageously take independent action to resist Japan and overthrow Nanjing’s servile foreign policy—this would be a commendable and heroic undertaking.

Some argue that partial resistance to the enemy is bound to fail.
However, we have yet to see any factual evidence to support this claim.
The battles of January 28th and the Great Wall were not defeats of partial resistance; rather, they were failures resulting from a lack of resolve among the commanding officers to fight to the bitter end and from their failure to employ all available means to mobilize every possible force for the national struggle.
If the leaders of the Southwestern provinces demonstrate unwavering determination and confidence in achieving total victory, while skillfully uniting and rallying the nation’s anti-Japanese forces to rise up in concerted resistance, there will be no sign of inevitable defeat.
On the contrary, we firmly believe that they can achieve a great and glorious victory.
At present, Chiang Kai-shek is also opposing the Southwestern movement before the people by brandishing the slogan “End the Civil War—Unite the Nation Against Foreign Aggression.”
Yet this is nothing more than another deceptive ploy on his part.
Since the January 28th Incident, Chiang has repeatedly rejected the Red Army’s proposals for a Sino–Communist truce; and now he dares to use precisely this very slogan to mask his treacherous face.
However, the entire nation must understand that only if Chiang himself immediately declares war against Japan and actively supports the people’s armed resistance can civil war be ended and national unity achieved.
Should Chiang remain unwilling to resist Japan, while at the same time demanding that the Southwestern provinces rescind their declaration of war against Japan and their establishment of an anti-Japanese national salvation government, and further calling upon the Red Army to abandon its own program of national salvation through resistance, then the leaders of the Southwestern region—and we as well—should unequivocally declare: “We have no desire to negotiate unity with a traitor.”
We hold that waging “civil war” to punish the traitors is imperative.
Our sole reason for engaging in this conflict is our refusal to become a subjugated people or sell out our country.

As long as Chiang Kai-shek persists in his course of surrender and treason, both national unification and the cessation of civil war remain utterly impossible.
Following the lead of the Southwestern provinces, anti-Chiang banners will surely be raised throughout the country.
Except for those who stand firmly with the invaders, all others will ultimately be overthrown.
We regard the Southwestern provinces’ anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang military campaign as, objectively speaking, a revolutionary and progressive endeavor, even though it may still contain certain impure elements—motives related to personal power, territorial interests, and the like.
Therefore, we are prepared to provide the Southwestern provinces with every possible form of assistance, both militarily and on other fronts.
Moreover, we earnestly hope that the leaders of the Southwestern region will fully implement a program of national salvation by transforming Guangdong and Guangxi into a base for the anti-Japanese struggle, launching a full-scale war of resistance, mobilizing the masses, instituting broad democratic freedoms, rigorously punishing collaborators, confiscating the property of Japanese aggressors and domestic traitors, and improving the living standards of workers, peasants, and employees.
Only by carrying out such thoroughgoing revolutionary measures can the leaders of the Southwestern region dispel lingering doubts among segments of the population and win the sympathy of the entire nation; in that case, victory will be assured.
We hereby call upon all the people of China, as well as every patriotic party, organization, and military unit, to unite in response to the Southwestern provinces’ anti-Japanese, national-salvation movement and to overthrow the traitorous ringleader, Chiang Kai-shek.
A nationwide armed national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism lies directly before us.
Let us march forward together to secure victory, crush Japanese militarism, purge all collaborators, recover our lost territories, and reunify China. 1  O Teaching Reference Materials on the History of the Communist Party of China (Volume VI) Document Room, Department of CPC History, Renmin University of China June 8, 1936 Remarks on the Southwestern Incident II Eight-three