Speech at the Central Political Bureau Conference[1]

(March 23–27, 1936)

The Central Committee’s December Resolution[2] conforms to the resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and the work of the Central Committee is consistent with the Comintern resolution. The world is now in a period of revolution and war, characterized by revolution advancing day by day and counterrevolution declining day by day. The Chinese Communist Party is in the midst of war and must link the revolution with the nation. The Chinese Communist Party stands at the forefront of national liberation. Our task is to use every minute to win over the broadest masses. The slogans put forward by the Central Committee—“link the domestic revolutionary war with the national war,” “stop the civil war and unite to resist Japan,” “concentrate the Red Army in Hebei,” and “strive for rapid and direct combat against Japan”—are Bolshevik, not adventurist. To go beyond them would be adventurism; to fall short would be rightism. Our present slogans are exactly appropriate.

In Chinese affairs, we must act on our own and believe in ourselves. In the past, we had confidence and thus created the Soviets. Why should we lose confidence now? But it is even better to enlist a friend. Therefore, first, we should believe in ourselves; second, it is wrong to reject friends.

The contradictions among the six forces—Japan, the United States, Britain, the Kuomintang, the Soviets,[1] and the Soviet Union—are concentrated in North China. Japan has already erupted like a volcanic vent. Our going to North China to fight Japan is not moving too far, but too slowly. North China has vast masses with extremely high revolutionary fervor, and there we can also conduct large-scale mobile warfare without fixed battle lines. To act without certainty of victory is wrong. Not believing in winning with superior numbers in campaigns and with inferior numbers in strategy, not believing in developing toward North China, and thinking that developing toward North China would destabilize northern Shaanxi—these are completely wrong. Advancing into Hebei is a campaign issue; the Red Army will mainly operate in Shanxi in the future.

North China is the battlefield for all-out war against Japan; Central China is the rear area. In the Yellow River valley, the five provinces of North China will serve as the battlefield, and the rest as the rear area. Operating in Shanxi is an important step in the war against Japan. Our policy is “to seek consolidation through development”; only through development can consolidation be achieved. At present, we must focus on operating in Shanxi, while also preparing to conduct mobile warfare in the three provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan. Strategically, we must adopt a bold policy because the objective environment is favorable. In campaigns, we must adopt a cautious policy, using superior numbers to defeat inferior numbers on favorable terrain, and strive to minimize errors. In Shanxi, we temporarily adopt the principle of dividing our forces,

with the three army groups conducting widespread guerrilla warfare in a net-casting manner, so as to generally weaken the enemy while we ourselves win over the masses and expand the Red Army—and expanding the Red Army is the most important of all.

The Kuomintang has split into a national counterrevolutionary faction and a national revolutionary faction. The national counterrevolutionary faction, represented by Chiang Kai-shek, persists in the reactionary line it has followed since the defeat of the Great Revolution. They may feign resistance to Japan under mass pressure, but their role is to disintegrate the anti-Japanese front. The right wing of the national revolutionary faction (which is further divided into a left wing and a right wing) consists of national reformists who do not believe there is strength to resist Japan, disagree with the Soviets and the agrarian revolution, but oppose Japanese imperialism’s colonial policy and favor alliance with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. The left wing of the national revolutionary faction includes people like Song Qingling, middle- and lower-ranking military officers, small and medium-sized industrialists and merchants, and the petty bourgeoisie. They firmly support alliance with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, possess the courage to resolutely wage a national war, approve of the agrarian revolution, and can resolutely embark on resisting Japan under our leadership. This faction is very influential and is the center of our struggle with the counterrevolutionary faction. The Central Committee’s foreign affairs (united front) policy is: (1) We must not only distinguish the national reformists from the national counterrevolutionary faction but also distinguish the left wing of the national reformists from their right wing. Under the slogan “stop the civil war and unite to resist Japan,” we must cause the right wing of the national reformists to further separate from Chiang Kai-shek and cause their left wing to break with Chiang. (2) Establish a firm alliance with the left wing of the national revolutionary faction. (3) The five conditions put forward to Chiang Kai-shek[1] are the basis for negotiations with everyone. (4) The Central Committee’s diplomatic instructions to Li Kenong remain applicable today. The strategy toward Zhang Xueliang is: (i) Separate Chiang and Zhang; (ii) Mutual non-aggression; (iii) Persist in the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Congress and oppose in principle any congress convened by Chiang; (iv) Do not rupture relations, and seek practical

Speech at the Central Political Bureau Conference

benefits; (v) If “abolish the Soviets” is raised, counter with “abolish the National Government”; (vi) If “abolish insurrection” is raised, counter with “abolish Kuomintang oppression”; (vii) Do not oppose the concentration of the Red Army in Hebei. (5) When the issue of the Soviets arises, let the people vote. (6) Conduct diplomatic negotiations with any faction or group. (7) Make no concessions or compromises on basic principles. (8) Deal with the national counterrevolutionary faction by destroying them one by one, and deal with the national revolutionary faction by winning them over one by one. (9) Be prepared at any time for diplomatic negotiations to break down, and when they do, announce the course and content of the negotiations to expand our influence. (10) Issue general or individual letters of appeal.

--- Notes

[1] From March 20 to 27, 1936, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a conference in the Jinxi region of Shanxi Province, at which Mao Zedong delivered several speeches. Part 1 is an excerpt from Mao’s speech at the Political Bureau conference in Shikou, Xi County, on March 23. Part 2 is an excerpt from his speech at the conference in Sijiang Village, southwest of Shilou City, on March 24. Part 3 is an excerpt from his report on strategic policy at the conference in Sijiang Village on March 25. Part 4 is an excerpt from his report on foreign affairs (the united front) at the conference near Shilou County seat on March 27.


[1] “Soviets” here refers to the people’s revolutionary forces under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.


[1] Refers to the five-point opinion for negotiations submitted by the CPC Central Committee to the Nanjing authorities through Zhou Jiwu on March 4, 1936.


[2] Refers to the “Resolution on the Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks,” adopted at the Political Bureau conference of the CPC Central Committee in Wayaobao on December 25, 1935.