Central Committee Resolution on the Question of Military Strategy[1]

(December 23, 1935)

A. Strategic Policy

Under the present circumstances, in which Japanese imperialism is turning China into a colony, and given the current state of the Chinese Red Army and other revolutionary armed forces, the Party’s military strategy, that is, its strategic policy, shall consist of the following points:

(1) Under the general task of waging a resolute national war to resist Japanese imperialism’s attacks on China, it is necessary first of all, in all political and military calls and in practical actions, to establish the policy of “integrating the civil war with the national war.” This means putting into practice such slogans and actions as: “Anti-Japanese Allied Forces”; “The Red Army is the vanguard of the Chinese people in resisting Japan”; “All soldiers and troops unwilling to be slaves of a conquered nation, unite with the Red Army to fight the Japanese”; “Fellow countrymen throughout the nation, arm yourselves to oppose Japanese imperialism’s attacks on China”; “Workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers, unite and arm to defend China”; “Down with the Chinese traitors and collaborators who help Japanese imperialism fight the Chinese people”; “Down with the arch-traitor who helps Japan destroy China—Chiang Kai-shek”; “Down with the traitors and collaborators who invade the anti-Japanese base areas”; “Oppose the traitors and collaborators who disrupt the anti-Japanese rear”; “Consolidate the anti-Japanese rear”; “Expand the anti-Japanese base areas”; “Red Army and White Army unite to fight

[1] In December 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting at Wayaobao, Zichang County, northern Shaanxi, to discuss questions of military strategy, the national political situation, and the Party’s tactical line. On the military strategy side, the meeting determined that the central task was to open up routes for resisting Japan, with Shanxi and Suiyuan as the main directions for Red Army operations and the development of Soviet areas. This resolution was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee and adopted on December 23.

Central Committee Resolution on the Question of Military Strategy

Japanese imperialism”; “Confiscate the property of traitors and collaborators to fund the anti-Japanese forces”; “Confiscate the property of Japanese imperialism in China to fund the anti-Japanese forces”; “Those with money contribute money, those with strength contribute strength, those with guns contribute guns, those with knowledge contribute knowledge, to overthrow Japanese imperialism”; “Fight to the last drop of blood to overthrow Japanese imperialism”; “Long live the national revolutionary war”; and so forth.

(2) Correctly assessing the strength of the enemy and our own forces, the Party’s general policy for military dispositions in 1936 should be to “prepare forces for direct combat against Japan.” Therefore, in 1936, the main target of combat for the main force of the Red Army should still be the armies of the traitors and collaborators. However, in the areas occupied by Japan and in the autonomous regions,[1] every effort should be made to organize, expand, and unite all anti-Japanese armed forces—anti-Japanese volunteer units, anti-Japanese guerrilla units, etc.—to wage direct and vigorous guerrilla warfare against the Japanese forces. At the same time, it should also be estimated that in the latter half of 1936, the First Front Army may have the possibility and necessity of engaging in partial battles with the Japanese forces (on the Shanxi-Suiyuan-Chahar front).

(3) Vigorously expand the Red Army. In 1936, the total main force of the Red Army nationwide should reach 200,000, and the First Front Army should have 50,000.

(4) In order to resolutely and effectively carry out the policies stated in points (1), (2), and (3) (integrating the civil war with the national war, preparing forces for direct combat against Japan, and expanding the Red Army), the foundation for the First Front Army’s operational dispositions should be firmly placed on the two tasks of “linking up with the Soviet Union” and “consolidating and expanding the existing Soviet areas,” with “linking up with the Soviet Union” as the central task, closely linked to “consolidating and expanding the existing Soviet areas.” The concrete steps are to place the main direction for Red Army operations and the development of Soviet areas in the eastern province of Shanxi and the northern province of Suiyuan, etc.

[1] This refers to the area controlled by the puppet East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government. In November 1935, at the instigation of Japanese imperialism, Yin Rugeng, the Administrative Inspector of the Luan-Yu and Ji-Mi districts of the Kuomintang Hebei Provincial Government, established the East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Committee (soon renamed the East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government) in Tong County, Hebei Province, controlling 22 counties in eastern Hebei, detached from the jurisdiction of the Chinese government.

(5) The Red Army forces other than the First Front Army (the Second and Sixth Army Groups, the Fourth Front Army) have a tremendous strategic role in weakening and pinning down the armies of the Nanking traitorous clique, and their actions should be appropriately directed.

(6) Guerrilla warfare has a great strategic role in the task of defeating Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors and collaborators. The guiding principles for it should be as follows:

1. All guerrilla units shall appear under the banner of the national war (in Japanese-occupied areas, autonomous regions, and neighboring provinces, they shall be called the Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Forces. In other areas—Central China, South China—they shall be called the Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Forces; when these guerrilla forces in Central and South China grow strong, they shall be called the Chinese Anti-Japanese People’s Revolutionary Army). The agrarian revolution shall be carried out under the slogans and tactics of the national war.

2. Develop guerrilla warfare in all provinces, with emphasis on the key provinces (Hebei, Shanxi, Rehe-Chahar-Suiyuan, the three northeastern provinces, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shaanxi-Gansu). In areas north and south of the Yangtze River where former Soviet areas have become guerrilla zones, rapidly elevate them from a state of recovery to a state of development.

3. The local Party shall be the sole director of guerrilla warfare in White areas, and the primary director in Soviet areas.

4. Attract large numbers of White Army soldiers and young students swept up in the anti-Japanese tide into the guerrilla war.

5. Guerrilla units must have base areas, but oppose conservatism (which easily harms the guerrillas).

6. Guerrilla units must closely integrate with the local revolutionary populace.

7. Improve guerrilla tactics.

8. Transform guerrilla units into regular revolutionary armies.

9. Guerrilla units are the creators of Soviet areas.

[1] Rehe refers to Rehe Province, abolished in 1955, with its former territory incorporated into Hebei Province, Liaoning Province, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

10. Increase the degree of planning in guerrilla warfare.

(7) Cause the revolutionary movement among White Army soldiers, under the banner of the national war, to integrate with the anti-Japanese Red Army and anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, paying attention to the following guiding principles:

1. Without the aid of soldiers (Chinese, and also Japanese), the complete victory of the national war is impossible.

2. The aid of soldiers is possible (due to the plight of being slaves of a conquered nation, suffering from hunger and cold, and having no rest).

3. Place the movement on a broad mass foundation, liberate it from closed-doorism, and combine open movement with secret work.

(8) Elevate the struggle of the Mongol and Hui nationalities (first of all the Mongols) against Japan and against the Chinese rulers to the level of armed struggle, and directly integrate their struggle with ours.

(9) Implement the tactic of the “Anti-Japanese Allied Forces,” organizing the contradictions and rifts within the enemy camp onto the national front, and combining our camp with the “third camp” to form a unified national camp.

(10) Combine the Soviet Red Army and the Chinese Red Army on the basis of opposing the common enemy, Japanese imperialism, beginning with the combination of technical conditions.

B. Basic Principles of Operational Command

(1) During strategic defense:

1. Oppose purely passive defense; carry out active defense.

2. Oppose preemptive strikes; carry out postemptive strikes (generally). Postemptive strikes, i.e., luring the enemy deep, are not the so-called “opportunist line of purely passive defense” (the Ningdu Conference and thereafter), but the correct principle for interior-line operations.

(2) During strategic offensive:

1. Oppose opportunist underestimation; strive to expand the fruits of victory (when shifting from counteroffensive within strategic defense to strategic offensive, and throughout the entire process of strategic offensive, one should strive to expand the strategic fruits of victory), and strive to seize the initiative.

2. Oppose adventurism:

(1) Stop when appropriate, ensuring the victory already gained (victory already gained can possibly be lost).

(2) Shift the position to a new direction, allowing the Red Army between two major battles to obtain temporary rest, allowing the Soviet area to expand, and linking the task of expanding the Soviet area with the task of creating battlefields to meet new battles. Linking two or more Soviet areas into one contiguous whole and eliminating White strongholds (attacking earthen forts) within and near the Soviet areas is not the so-called “opportunist vacillation” (the Party newspaper of 1932[1]), but the implementation of a correct policy.

(3) A policy of advancing amidst the developing situation, wave-like development, development with secure rear areas and positions (i.e., the so-called “consolidated development of Soviet areas,” the so-called “simultaneous expansion and deepening”), opposing the policy of reckless advance (except when the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves permits it).

(4) Attacking cities and consolidated enemy positions is conditional. The past opposition to “mountain-ism” and the “Northeast line”[2] was wrong (1932).

(3) General principles (whether in defense or offense):

1. Oppose the desperate-battle-ism of only “fighting” and not “moving”; both fighting and moving are necessary, naturally moving is for the sake of fighting. The guerrilla character of the mode of warfare, i.e., the absence of fixed battle lines, is a characteristic of Chinese Red Army operations determined by the backwardness of technical conditions, and was precisely the strong point of past military guidance.

[1] Party newspaper, here refers to the Central Committee organ, *Red Flag Weekly*. Its combined issue No. 37/38, published on April 25, 1932, carried the article "The Opportunist Vacillation Within the Communist Party of China in the Struggle for the First Victory of the Chinese Revolution in One or Several Provinces."

[2] In mid-March 1932, at the meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of the CPC held at Jiangkou, Gan County, to sum up the lessons of the attack on Ganzhou, Mao Zedong pointed out that attacking Ganzhou was a mistake and proposed that the main force of the Red Army should develop base areas in northeastern Jiangxi, where the enemy forces were relatively weak, the Party and mass base was better, and the terrain was favorable. This proposal was rejected by the majority at the meeting. This proposal was labeled "mountain-ism" and the "Northeast line" by the "Left" adventurists who sought the so-called first victory in one or several provinces.

Central Committee Resolution on the Question of Military Strategy

Here, opposing “guerrilla-ism” was wrong. The attempt to establish fixed battle lines during the fifth counter-“encirclement” campaign failed. Trading the temporary loss on one battle line (loss of territory) for victory on another battle line can also resolve the problems on that first battle line (the territory can be recovered).

2. Strive for the possibility of rapidly changing the technical conditions of the Red Army, transforming the state of having no fixed battle lines into a state of generally having fixed battle lines. Mobile warfare will still be mobile warfare, but its guerrilla character will be greatly reduced. Without this modern condition, the thorough defeat of Japanese imperialism and its lackeys is impossible. Passivity towards changing technical conditions is incorrect.

3. Mobile warfare is the basic principle. Oppose the conservative positional warfare of “not yielding an inch of ground.” Large-scale advances and retreats by the main force of the Red Army are unavoidable and necessary.

4. Concentrate forces on the main direction; strategically, strike with one fist; exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; war of annihilation. Oppose the doctrine of dividing forces, oppose the doctrine of striking with two fists, oppose strategic “offensive on all fronts,” oppose battles of routing (strategic and general campaign-level).

5. Strategically protracted war, operationally quick-decision war. Oppose operationally protracted war, oppose “fighting a war of attrition.”

6. Ensure sufficient rest and training. Oppose useless haste; learn necessary slowness.

7. Ensure sufficient combat preparations.

8. Determine command methods according to circumstances. Decentralized command under unified resolve is permissible and necessary.

9. Use strategic policy to guide campaign and tactical policies. Link today to tomorrow, link the small to the large, link the part to the whole. Oppose taking one step and looking only at the next.

10. The Military Commission has full authority within the military sphere.

C. Using the Following Three Main Steps to Achieve the Tasks of Linking Up with the Soviet Union and Consolidating and Developing the Existing Soviet Areas

Step One In Shaanxi:

Complete the following tasks before February 5:

1. Expand by 5,000 new recruits.

2. Deal a blow to the enemy attacking from the north.

3. Capture the two cities of Ganquan and Yichuan.

4. Bolshevize the two counties of Yichuan and Luochuan.

5. Organize the Twenty-eighth Army (north) and the Twenty-ninth Army (south).

6. Begin organizing a cavalry brigade.

7. Expand the guerrilla forces to one and a half times their original number.

8. Complete preparations for crossing the [Yellow] River.

9. Complete political preparations (within the troops, towards the Shanxi side, towards Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, towards the Soviet areas).

10. Expand and reorganize the Red Guards and Young Pioneers.

11. Prepare 300 local cadres to go to Shanxi.

12. Begin dispositions for the Suiyuan direction.

13. The first class of the Red Academy[1] graduates, the second class enters.

14. To prepare 300 platoon leaders for use after March, the Front Army shall open a training battalion.

15. Launch a medical treatment shock campaign (procure medicine), strive for one-half of the sick and wounded to be discharged from hospital by the end of January.

16. Begin organizing a Mongol guerrilla unit.

17. Other organizational preparations (Party, government, military).

Step Two In Shanxi:

Prepare to complete the following tasks within six months (February–July), extending or shortening the period according to circumstances:

[1] Red Academy, i.e., the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Academy. In November 1935, it was formed by merging the Central Revolutionary Military Commission Cadre Battalion (reduced from the former Cadre Regiment) with the Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army Cadre School, etc., at Wayaobao, Zichang County, northern Shaanxi. In January 1936, it was renamed the Northwest Anti-Japanese Red Army University. In June, it was expanded into the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Red Army University.

1. Smash the main force of Yan Xishan[1] and destroy a part of it.

2. Open up an area of five or more counties in western Shanxi (along the Yellow River) and turn it into an initial Soviet area.

3. Expand the Red Army by 20,000 men: 13,000 in Shanxi and 7,000 in Shaanxi.

4. Create guerrilla forces in the occupied areas, up to 1,000 men.

5. Maneuver enemy troops, recover all or part of the enemy-occupied areas in Shenmu, Fugu, Jia County, Wubu, Qingjian, Mizhi, Suide, and other counties; move the majority or a part of the northern Shaanxi guerrilla forces across to Shanxi.

6. Begin propaganda work among the Inner Mongolian nationality, achieving partial, tangible results.

7. Expand the Mongol guerrilla unit to a minimum of 200 men.

8. Intensify dispositions for Suiyuan.

9. Complete the formation of the cavalry brigade.

10. Strengthen guerrilla warfare in Hebei organizationally and in terms of guidance.

11. Initiate guerrilla warfare in the border region of Shanxi-Zhili[2]-Chahar-Suiyuan and the border region of Shanxi-Henan.

12. Strengthen guidance of the Shaanxi-Gansu guerrilla war.

13. The Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth Armies each complete expansion to 2,000 men.

14. The guerrilla forces in the two Soviet areas of northern Shaanxi and Shaanxi-Gansu expand to double their size as of January.

15. Complete communication links with the Soviet Union.

16. The Red Academy produces 500 company commanders, 300 political instructors, 50 battalion commanders, and 350 guerrilla warfare cadres, calculated over two terms (600 per term, total 1,200).

17. Complete communication links with the Second and Sixth Army Groups.

[1] Yan Xishan, then serving as Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang Government and Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Office.

[2] Zhi, refers to Zhili, an old province name, encompassing the present-day municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin, most of Hebei Province, and small parts of Henan and Shandong Provinces. It was renamed Hebei Province in 1928.

18. Begin organizing the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces.

19. Complete political, military, and organizational preparations for advancing into Suiyuan.

20. Guarantee boat crossings on the Yellow River, and if necessary, return to Shaanxi for a time.

Step Three In Suiyuan:

1. The timing of the transfer from Shanxi to Suiyuan shall be determined by how Japanese imperialism acts towards Suiyuan.

2. The estimate for the transfer to Suiyuan is that there are difficulties (possible Japanese obstruction, Yan Xishan’s cavalry, the weakness of political ties between the Inner Mongolian nationality and us), but it is possible (the three difficulties are all relative).

3. Even if temporarily it is not permissible to lean on Outer Mongolia, or if leaning close to it temporarily cannot solve the problem, the issues below, because the region is vast, the population large, and the anti-Japanese tide surging, there are many articles to be written.